

Visualizing Violence and Performing Law

POSTCARDS OF THE *KERSAINT* IN THE NEW HEBRIDES



IN THEIR RECENT RESEARCH on Pacific postcards, Max Quanchi and Max Shekleton observe that the ‘oppressive nature of colonial rule was either not shown, or only exposed inadvertently.’¹ The postcard series from the voyage of the French warship *Kersaint* in 1912–1914 (Figure 1) provides a rare exception: among the picturesque and ethnographic are direct depictions of the imposition of colonial law. While still evading the overtly violent elements of colonial rule, these images provide a window into the ways in which Islanders were coercively drawn into the orbit of colonial law as part of the so-called civilizing process. Indeed, as this series shows, the postcard craze of 1880–1914 coincides, and became closely entwined, with colonization in the Pacific. Such postcards deserve greater scholarly attention, given their widespread circulation. As Robert Aldrich has argued, they were among the most prominent and ubiquitous images of colonial life during this period.²

This article examines the postcards from this French naval voyage in the context of uncertain empire-building and the continued use of punitive justice in the colonial Pacific. The postcards in question were produced as a series by de Béchade of Nouméa in New Caledonia, using the photographs taken during the voyage of the French warship the *Kersaint* around 1913, and published the following year.³ In particular, I focus on two images that show the arrest and transportation of Islanders, in contrast to the picturesque landscape or exotic portrait photos that comprise the majority of the series. There is a double violence in the images of interest: both the purported violence of the arrested indigènes and that of the colonial state.

These postcards were initially published as a numbered and captioned series of over 40 images under the title ‘Campagne du “Kersaint”’. The concept of naval ‘campagne’ frames the set of otherwise diverse photographs taken across the region. A selection were also reissued unnumbered by Gabriel de Béchade’s widow Jeanne (née Leconte) after his death in 1917.⁴ This unnumbered reissue around 1919 under the imprint Vve [Veuve, widow] de Béchade complicates the attempt to identify the full series, and I am missing details or copies of some postcards. The photographer is believed to have been the *Kersaint*’s captain himself, Adrien Richard, though this information is not mentioned on the postcards. Other images of the voyages were

published in *L'Illustration*.⁵ Today the series is held in the Centre Tjibaou and in Max Shekleton's extensive private postcard collection in Nouméa. Some of the postcards can also be found for sale on stamp and postcard collection websites, with asking prices ranging from €6 to €60.⁶ The copies I have were never posted, as many cards of the era were kept as personal souvenirs or collectables.⁷

These commercial postcards are of unusual provenance, given their origins from an official source. More generally, however, the use of photography on colonial military campaigns was well developed by the turn of the twentieth century. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, both British and French campaigns often blurred the boundaries between the military and scientific, and the camera was a key tool for both purposes.⁸ As Serge Kakou notes, the simplification of photographic technology enabled officials and servicemen of all levels to capture their colonial and military experiences.⁹ In this context, James R. Ryan highlights that photographs 'reveal as much about the imaginative landscapes of imperial culture as they do about the physical spaces or people pictured within their frame.'¹⁰ In this article, I extend Ryan's argument from photographs to postcards, examining how postcards of punitive expeditions and colonial progress in the New Hebrides spoke to settler and government anxieties in the early years of Anglo–French colonial rule.

The 'Campagne du "Kersaint"' Postcards

Covering the New Hebrides, Wallis, the Loyalty Islands and Fiji, the de Béchade series included photographs of the crew and life aboard ship, ethnographic shots, as well as illustrations depicting the civilizing progress of the imperial state. In the latter category, a range of postcards focused on the success of imperial endeavours, documenting the smooth extension of authority over indigenous peoples and landscapes. They are thus analogous to the 'views trade' genre that Jane Lydon identifies in colonial Western Australia. Depicting the onward march of Western civilization, such images collectively 'reflect common white settler attitudes, including unease at the blurring of race, gender or class boundaries, and a "desire to visually remove Aboriginal people" from their active social world in order to emphasise their "primitive" status.'¹¹



Figure 1: The *Kersaint*. Campagne du 'Kersaint' postcard No. 6. En Rade de NOUMÉA.

The company that produced the series was itself entwined in the promotion and expansion of French interests in the region. Between the late 1880s and the 1920s, Maison de Béchade was one of the largest French trading companies in New Caledonia, alongside Maison Ballande. The formation of the Société des établissements de Béchade des Nouvelles-Hébrides extended its interests to the New Hebrides. Bordelaise founder Gabriel de Béchade was also heavily involved in the promotion of French interests in the region more generally, serving as a judge, as a member and President of New Caledonian Chamber of Commerce and as a member of the Council Privé.¹² The postcards, presumably available in de Béchade's stores, thus highlight the frequent alignment between commercial and colonial influence.

The narrative of French imperial progress in the series is underscored in a variety of ways. These included the annexation of Wallis (Uvea), inauguration of a colonial monument in New Caledonia, the parade of the indigenous militia or police in uniform in British Fiji, the island landscape tamed into orderly plantations in the New Hebrides, and newly built hospitals, post offices and government houses across the island colonies. In addition, the ethnographic photographs of Pacific Islanders amongst the collection serve to highlight the contrast between exotic primitivism and colonial modernity. Table 1 demonstrates that many of the photographs published served as visual evidence of the successful advance of the French empire in the Pacific Islands.

Theme	Number of Postcards	
	De Béchade	Vve de Béchade
Ethnography	15	5
Scenery and landscape	3	3
Ship and crew	2	7
Missions	1 or 2	
Economy and labour	3	
Government and government buildings	14	3
Ports and town	1	
Other and unknown	5 or 6	

Table 1: Subjects and Themes in the ‘Campagne du “Kersaint”’ Postcards.

Overall, the images reflect, on a smaller scale, the division that Frédéric Angleviel and Max Shekleton identify between postcards showing the indigenous/natural world and the European/civilized one:

On the one hand, the camera lens registers indigenous events and freezes the presumed authenticity of the location. This is a permanent and fixed world inhabited by men and women and characterized by their dwellings and activities.... On the other hand, the expatriate world takes shape through the symbols of its involvement (monuments, buildings accommodating institutions) and through technical, economic, or educational achievements.¹³

Yet, within the series there are a few images that show these worlds colliding, as the colonial world extends into the otherwise seemingly untouched lives of indigenous peoples.

Location	Number of Postcards	
	De Béchade	Vve de Béchade
Aboard ship	1	7
New Hebrides	20	11
New Caledonia	5	
Loyalty Islands	3	
Wallis	8	
Fiji	4	
Other and unknown	6	1

Table 2: Locations of ‘Campagne du “Kersaint”’ Postcards.

The largest number of the photographs were taken in the New Hebrides (Table 2). In this article, I will focus on two of the most striking images in the series that show the interaction between indigenous peoples and colonial authorities in the archipelago. These contrast with the other *Kersaint* images, which maintain a clear distinction between settler and indigenous worlds. The first is number 26 in the original series, titled ‘NOUVELLES-HÉBRIDES – Arrestation d’une tribu’ (arresting of a tribe) (Figure 2). Aboard the *Kersaint*, white-helmeted naval officers, backed by other crew members, arrest a large group of ni-Vanuatu. The indigenous men are shadowed in comparison to the officials, their heads down and their faces unclear. The Islanders aboard are out of place, contrasting the bright uniforms and stateliness of the naval environment. The caption itself is also suggestive of the nature of colonial understandings of indigenous society, where the ‘tribu’ was constructed as a natural grouping. Reducing Islanders to a seemingly unified whole, the colonial state deployed collective punishment as the best means to punish crimes, from individual acts of violence to perceived political agitation.



Figure 2: ‘Arresting of a tribe’.

Campagne du ‘Kersaint’ postcard No. 26. – Arrestation d’une tribu.

The second, number 27, shows the 'Débarquement d'assassins à Port-Vila' (disembarkation of murderers at Port Vila) (Figure 3). A group of ni-Vanuatu men stand upon a dock on the waterfront, patrolled by indigenous police who frame the group. The latter's uniforms and berets, though signifying their lower, 'native' status within the French forces, contrast with the mixed attire of the arrested men. As in the previous image, the effect is a mass of undifferentiated people, made threatening by the image caption as 'murderers'. They are, however, pacified and contained by the uniformed representatives of the colonial state. The arrested men are nevertheless notably different from other indigenous peoples in the *Kersaint* series, in which Islanders are shown in customary dress. The assemblage of European garments highlights the complexity and ambiguity of the image's attempt to delineate between civilized and other: the men are clearly not the archetypal untouched 'primitive' presented by the more ethnographically orientated photos. Similarly, the role of indigenous men as colonial auxiliaries further blurs such boundaries, while the European officers — recognizable in their white helmets — are barely visible in the background.

Again, the caption and image group the arrested men as one, implying collective punishment for the 'tribe' and perhaps a politicized view of their perceived crimes. The details of who was arrested, their crimes and punishment, are currently unknown. However, the practice of collective responsibility and collective punishment for Islanders was common in areas of the Pacific where European naval officials had trouble identifying suitably powerful individuals with whom to negotiate over disputes. As Stuart Bedford notes, the 'concept of collective responsibility for perceived transgressions became the Royal Navy's default position in Melanesia, encouraging arbitrary determinations of collective guilt and retribution.'¹⁴ In justifying this approach, private violence was frequently framed as a political attack, a threat to the colonial power.¹⁵

These two photographs stand out for their distinctive subject matter. However, they were not unique at the time. Other photographs from the era also depicted the role of colonial military and legal might in the region. For example, a postcard of a 1923 trial for murder of the Clapcott family quickly immortalized the event, and showed the accused men seated within the courtroom.¹⁶ Similarly, colonial reports were often accompanied by trial and pre-trial images aboard the ship, as well as photographs of landing parties and arms destroyed.¹⁷

Nevertheless, I regard these photographs as the most striking of the *Kersaint* series because, to contemporary eyes, they contain some of the most unusual subject matter.¹⁸ While images of exotic peoples and places were

commonplace for Pacific postcards in the post-World War II era, references to arrests and murder were not. These photographs unavoidably reference the subjugation of indigenous peoples to colonial rule, a disquieting subject for contemporary viewers.



Figure 3: 'Disembarkment of murderers at Port Vila'.

Campagne du 'Kersaint' postcard No. 27. – Débarquement d'assassins à Port-Vila.

However, as Susan Sontag argues, while such photographs may shock us and 'haunt us', alone they do not help us understand.¹⁹ They must be considered as part of the broader historical narrative if they are to move beyond their current role as simple symbols of colonial injustice.²⁰ As I will argue, these postcards, along with other colonial performances on or by the naval vessel itself and in the courtroom, did important work in propping up the reputation of an otherwise insecure colonial state in the New Hebrides.

The *Kersaint* in Twentieth-century Naval Imperialism

Constructed from 1895 and launched in 1897, the *Kersaint* was a three-master *aviso* or dispatch boat initially posted in East Asia (Figure 1). From 1906, it was based in the Pacific (mainly Nouméa) before running aground in 1919.²¹ During this time, it made various tours of the islands, both administrative and punitive. As such, the vessel was implicated in French imperial endeavours on multiple fronts. During World War I, the *Kersaint* support French efforts

in the 1917 war against Kanak, and voyaged to Vladivostok in 1918.²² Its Pacific operations also coincided with the formal colonization of the New Hebrides by Britain and France in 1907, and a period of transition for the archipelago as colonial structures such as courts embedded themselves.

Yet, as the expeditions of the *Kersaint* and other naval vessels demonstrate, punitive expeditions against ni-Vanuatu remained a key strategy of imperial governance decades after the establishment of the rule of colonial law and courts in the New Hebrides.²³ Throughout much of the nineteenth century, men-of-war constituted the only British and French imperial presence around the New Hebrides and other uncolonized islands. Over the nineteenth century, many parts of Melanesia had been gradually and loosely drawn into the orbit of European traders and missionaries, particularly through the sandalwood and *beche-de-mer* booms from the 1820s and the infamous labour trade from the 1860s. Such intrusions into existing social life created both opportunities as well as disruptions for island communities. Consequent violence between Islanders and newcomers necessitated official action by the late nineteenth century, though with some reluctance to dedicate manpower and resources to distant and potentially expensive islands.

Formal annexation was not initially pursued as the preferred option, despite the periodic patrols of British and French navies in the area since the 1840s.²⁴ A pact of mutual non-intervention in 1878 recognized the interests and influence of both British and French powers in the islands without colonization. During this period, the 1877 British Order in Council establishing the Western Pacific High Commission and the establishment of British and French Naval Divisions in the Pacific served to formalize the role of the British and French navies as the vanguard of imperial contact with Islanders.²⁵ Naval oversight thus served as an alternative to formal colonial expansion, and avoided awkward questions over divided Anglo–French interests in the New Hebrides. Non-intervention would nevertheless prove untenable, given the continued trading, proselytizing and violence in the area.

Consequently, the establishment of the Joint Naval Commission (JNC) formalized the role of the navies in the New Hebrides. By 1886, pressure from their respective nationals with interests in the New Hebrides — be they spiritual or economic — influenced Britain and France to begin negotiations over the status of the islands. Discussions focused on protecting European citizens' interests and finding a solution to land disputes. The resulting convention, signed on 16 November 1887, established the Joint Naval Commission (JNC). It was 'charged with the duty of maintaining order, and of protecting the lives and property of British and French subjects in the New Hebrides.'²⁶ The JNC empowered warships to patrol the local waters,

though unilateral action by either was discouraged except in urgent circumstances.

Given the infrequency of patrols through the islands and the difficulty of assembling warships from both nations, this requirement severely hindered the effectiveness of the commission. However, more problematic was the final point in the agreement: 'The Commission ... shall not interfere in disputes concerning the title to land, or dispossess of their lands any persons, natives or foreigners.'²⁷ Naval officers were not deemed equipped to mediate on land issues. The crux of the New Hebrides problem was thus left unaddressed by the 1887 convention, effectively undermining the commission before it even began.

France and Britain therefore re-entered negotiations for a 'sphere of joint influence' in 1904, which resulted in the establishment of the Anglo-French Condominium in 1907.²⁸ The condominium was a curious form of half-colonization: governed by a joint administration, with a British and a French administration each headed by a Resident Commissioner, accountable to the Governor of the Western Pacific High Commission in Suva and the Governor of New Caledonia in Nouméa respectively. However, it functioned more as two parallel administrations than one, with essentially separate police forces, mail services and courts. The Bislama term for the condominium, *tufala gavman*, encapsulates the divided nature of New Hebrides colonialism: 'the government of two fellows'.²⁹ While the condominium theoretically signalled a shift in the governance of the islands, in reality change occurred slowly, given the limits of resourcing and intra-imperial co-operation of the joint administration. The JNC remained the vanguard of contact and colonization for many Islanders. The condominium thus inherited recurring patterns of interaction between naval vessels, settlers and Islanders as well as narratives of race, respectability and rival political imperatives that justified continued repressive tactics.

The role of gunboat diplomacy has been the subject of historiographical debate. Discussing the pre-condominium period, Roger Thompson argued that murders or attacks on Europeans were avenged by naval bombardments, the preferred sanction when difficulties arose establishing the identity of offenders.³⁰ Jane Samson's work on the role of the British Navy in Pacific colonization pre-1874 shows how naval officers constructed their mission as one of 'imperial benevolence', and counters earlier work that argued for the authoritarian nature of the naval presence in the Pacific.³¹ The navy had a crucial role in drawing British authority into the region 'through the crafting of a humanitarian mission to protect islanders.'³² Samson illuminates the importance of naval protection in influencing and legitimizing greater intervention in the Pacific.

However, both British and French navies pursued punitive justice around the islands well after official colonization. With the continued centrality of punitive expeditions in the colonial era, racial bias triumphed over humanitarian ideals, and practical expediencies trounced ineffective and time-consuming legal procedures. The simultaneous condemnation of the violence between European traders, recruiters and planters (who were often subject to vitriolic assessments in official reports) and Islanders, and the continued condoning of imperial acts of violence in the colonial period, highlights the limits to imperial benevolence. This is particularly significant in the New Hebrides Condominium, because the JNC was technically stripped of its jurisdiction from 1906 yet continued to act as a court and as a war council. This perhaps reflects Samson's suggestion that the principled attitudes of naval officers shifted in the closing years of the nineteenth century, and reflected a hardening of racial attitudes during the same period.³³

For two decades after the condominium's arrival, therefore, 'life, and sometimes violent death, went on as before':³⁴ ni-Vanuatu experience of colonial rule was predominantly through warship visits or informal agents of imperialism, missionaries, traders and recruiters. As the French Resident Commissioner asserted in 1908, 'the presence of warships is still necessary in the archipelago. It helps maintain the indigènes' respect while ensuring, through the supervision exerted over recruiting vessels, the legality as well as the safety of their operations.'³⁵ The 1910 report noted that the JNC was instructed no longer 'to punish the tribes en masse but to search for the guilty and to seize them to remand them to justice.'³⁶ Naval expeditions in 1908, 1914, 1916 and 1918 sought to arrest the perpetrators of violent crimes, including Peter Greig and his two daughters in South Santo in 1908, participants in a 'revolt' at Malakula following the killing of British planter Robert James Bridges and his children on 18 August 1916, and the murderers of planter M. Meglia living at Aoré in 1918.³⁷

These attempts also involved the destruction of villages, crops and pigs, resulting in gunfire and conflict between Islanders, injuries and deaths on both sides.³⁸ The expeditions thus remained military in nature. While in principle the guilty individuals were sought, warships frequently returned without the accused, and in practice expeditions followed the concept of collective responsibility and collective punishment of the tribe.³⁹

The reality of naval expeditions, such as that of the *Kersaint*, was more complex than the orderly process of arrest and transport shown in the postcards. Gilchrist Alexander, serving on the bench of the New Hebrides Joint Court from 1912, recalled the typical condominium reaction to Islander violence against European settlers:

Information would be received that a white planter or trader had been murdered by natives on the island of Malekula [sic] or some equally wild place. After due inquiry a man-of-war would be dispatched to the place of the crime. A party of bluejackets [enlisted sailors, in this case British] would be landed. Heavily loaded with rifles, ball ammunition, and kit, they would be marched from the beach up to a native village through a bush so dense that they could not see more than a yard or two. When, pouring with perspiration and exhausted, they reached the village, they would discover only a few old men or women and children. The supposed malefactors had fled or, more probably, had been dogging the steps of the landing-force behind the thick bush. After burning down the village and killing the pigs, the bluejackets would retrace their steps and would be lucky to reach the beach without losing one or more of their number. Very often snipers waited, with rifles fixed to trees and trained across the path by which the landing party made its way in single file. Or, if it was not thought desirable to land ... to shell the village. This would be rough justice indeed, for, as like as not, the chief sufferers would be the old men, women, and children.⁴⁰

His statement draws attention to the activities surrounding, but obscured by, the postcard images. In contrast to the confident, relaxed postcard shots of crew members, Alexander paints a picture of colonial agents ill-at-ease in the Pacific Islands, with limited knowledge of the Islanders and the geography, and fearful of 'natives' who were more adept in their environment and aware of their opponents' movements. His account references recurring elements in official reports of such expeditions. Considering the limits of colonial rule and law, these themes are unsurprising. The outer islands and the mountainous interiors of the New Hebrides remained troublesome zones for colonial administrations lacking the resources to effectively incorporate such regions into their jurisdiction.⁴¹

The warships' methods to maintain order ranged from investigations, arrests, imprisonment and deportation, to threats of reprisals and the burning and shelling of villages and crops if the guilty were not handed over to the JNC. The JNC reports made little differentiation between tactics, suggesting they were deemed equally acceptable. For example, in Case 17 (Murder of boy [servant] of M. Gano), the report of 4 September 1909 noted that:

As a result of the shelling of the village by the Kersaint, the Chief of the village of Lanebon came on board of his own free will and deposited £20 as a surety for good behaviour and stated that they were much impressed by the firing.... The French Officials of the Commission having declared themselves satisfied, the case is finished.⁴²

Despite acting as a courtroom, the JNC thus retained its underlying military character, both in the handling of trials and in the simultaneous use of other violent tactics.

These repressive measures were generally deployed by warships against individual acts of violent crime, rather than against political threats to the colonial state. The legality of such actions, technically identified as ‘acts of war’, was the subject of debate and critique within official circles, but they continued nonetheless at least until 1920.⁴³ Alongside the troublesome island geography, racialized constructions of indigenous society were deployed to counter such critiques. Some officials argued that swift and violent retribution was the only form of justice that ‘natives’ were capable of understanding. Like the colonial courts, such expeditions did performative work for the colonial state; they were essential in pacifying settler voices for greater government intervention as well as visibly demonstrating Anglo–French authority to Islanders. Adrian Muckle notes that officials justified military deployment in New Caledonia on similar grounds: ‘the need to calm settler fears or to guard against future threats rather than as the intimidatory or repressive measures which they almost certainly were.’⁴⁴ The postcards showing the advancement and success of European authority played an important role in circulating this idea, just as the postcards of plantations and expanding colonial townships demonstrated the advancement of the civilized over the natural landscape.

The voyage of the *Kersaint* in 1912–1914 was significant both for the postcards it produced and for the role of the French Navy at an historical high point of tensions between French officials and Protestant missionaries in the New Hebrides. The French were particularly concerned about Presbyterian missionary influence and its perceived overreach, especially on Tanna. Presbyterian missionaries were the main Anglophone influence on the island, and given their opposition to the labour trade they were a threat to the viability of French business in the New Hebrides. In addition, they were among the key agitators for British colonization of the group, stoking Australian public opinion in ways that troubled French settlers and government. In the early twentieth century, official French reports identified abuses by Presbyterian missionaries as a hindrance to French colonization and economic development, as their actions spread discontent among indigenous subjects while the mission hypocritically criticized French settlers. The well-resourced Presbyterians were accused of ‘abusing their spiritual power’ to become ‘true political chiefs’, with critics noting that ‘the majority of missionaries intervene directly into the repression of crimes and offences.’⁴⁵ French officials argued that the JNC was essential to maintaining French influence in the territory in view of the concerted efforts by missionaries to increase British power. That Presbyterian missionaries on Tanna made their own arrests, conducted trials and imposed punishments irked French officials and settlers, underpinning their support for the navy’s role in safeguarding

local French interests.⁴⁶ Adding to French frustration was their belief that missionaries were instrumental in influencing ni-Vanuatu to contribute money for lawyer Edward Jacomb to represent their land claims in the Joint Court.⁴⁷

These issues came to a head with the *Kersaint* voyage. The *Kersaint*'s officers made 'wholesale arrests', not only for serious crimes of rape and murder, but also for petty charges outside their mandate according to British critics. The arrested were primarily Presbyterian mission converts and teachers.⁴⁸ Commenting on the *Kersaint*'s recent actions in 1914, former official and Port Vila lawyer Jacomb, quoted in a *Daily Telegraph* article, argued that:

Nowhere and at no time can be found a shadow of legal justification for the Joint Naval Commission forming itself into a court of justice, trying people and awarding sentences ... the Joint Naval Commission has calmly stepped in and undertaken this most important judicial responsibility, without any legal power to do so, or, indeed, without any knowledge or capacity for the work.⁴⁹

Missionaries made similar protests.⁵⁰ Ni-Vanuatu accounts of their harsh treatment onboard the *Kersaint* added weight to these objections: they were 'kicked along' and 'capsized into the boat head first', where they were chained and fed minimal rations. Following the 1913 murder of planter Guitel on Epi, the *Kersaint* arrested Sam Miley and others. When Jimmy Tarames would not say who told him to kill the planter, the head Maré [Loyalty Islands] policeman 'cut him over the head' with a lash or whip until he answered as desired. Similar physical assaults were used on the other arrested men until they gave the same answers.⁵¹ As shown on the arrest postcard, policemen recruited from New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands played a critical role in punitive expeditions through their service in the colonial militia. Expressing concern about the high level of convictions and lack of judicial process, Commonwealth solicitor Wallace described the JNC as '[a]n instrument for the oppression of the natives by the French ... as a court it simply convicts at the request of the Administration'.⁵²

The images and related accounts highlight the continued importance of naval presence during the colonial period, often seen as a characteristic of nineteenth-century imperial strategies more than of the twentieth.⁵³ I argue, however, for greater continuity in strategies of rule between the pre-colonial and the colonial period. The shift from the purely naval oversight of the Joint Naval Commission-era to that of the condominium was predicated on establishing the firmer land-based rule of European law in the New Hebrides. However, in practice, for most Islanders outside Port Vila or Efate little change was discernible in their encounters with imperial agents, and this experience

was often characterized by violence. The postcards do visually demonstrate the continued role of the warship in twentieth-century colonization, responding to settler calls for greater naval presence and protection. Yet at the same time, the images largely obscure the navy's violent and punitive role by emphasizing its orderly, seemingly lawful, actions: the calm arrest of indigenous men, and their disciplined arrival at Port Vila for punishment.

'Punishment they will remember':⁵⁴ Justifying Violence

In the colonial period, many settlers and local officials continued to advocate punitive justice for Islanders on the basis of racial theories of criminality. Petitions, reports and correspondence repeatedly asserted that swift and forceful eye-for-an-eye action was the only form of justice that 'natives' understood. In 1897 the President of the Société Française des Nouvelles-Hébrides (SFNH) drew attention to recent violence by ni-Vanuatu around Port Sandwich, Malakula. He argued that more numerous and lengthy patrols of warships were essential to prevent such incidents:

These acts of violence are unfortunately neither a new nor exceptional thing. Each year, from January to April, the European settlers are exposed to them and the list is already long of those who have been victims in recent years. They coincide too exactly with the absence of French and British warships in these environs/waters for it to be possible to doubt that they should be attributed to it and that the indigènes believing their impunity, take advantage of this absence to satisfy their vengeance against Europeans and their natural instincts for cruelty.⁵⁵

The salutary effects of naval visits on the European settler and trader community were also acknowledged, as 'everybody, traders and natives, is on highest behaviour when the man-of-war is in the neighbourhood.'⁵⁶

Enabled by narratives of race, motivated by inter-imperial rivalry and necessitated by the lack of effective law, naval vessels in the condominium could take unilateral action, as the *Kersaint* did in 1913, if the situation was construed as 'urgent'. And it almost always could be. In other situations, an enquiry would be held to determine the course of action before the JNC was instructed to pursue the offenders.⁵⁷ As Keith Woodward notes, scarcely a year passed without similar violence.⁵⁸ While technically replaced by the Joint Court after its opening in 1910, naval justice therefore continued to be the main means by which ni-Vanuatu outside colonial settlements such as Port Vila encountered the colonial state.

As in the pre-condominium era, a punitive response was continually promoted as most suitable to local conditions. Such action was deemed more effective for its speed: the cogs of European justice turned slowly, lessening

the exemplary effect for ‘uncivilized’ Islanders. Echoing reports from the 1880s concerned with the JNC’s loss of power and the 1897 statement quoted above, the first French trimestrial report on the colony for 1916 argued that:

Its swift justice is equally the only one that is accessible to the simplistic spirit of the Canaques [Kanak]. They find it natural that a wrongdoer suffers, as soon as he can be apprehended, the punishment he has incurred. If this punishment is delayed several months as a result of the difficulties of the investigation or the complications of the procedure, they would not consider the motives anymore, and on the contrary, would be inclined to consider it as an act of revenge.⁵⁹

The report argued the injustices of trying indigenous cases under French or British law would be greater and the Islanders — ‘much inferior than the natives of our African colonies’ — were incapable of fulfilling the role of assessors if cases were tried by District Agents.⁶⁰ Continued naval tours by the JNC were presented as the only viable option for dealing justly with the indigenous population.

In 1915, protesting attempts to reduce the role of the JNC, the officer of the *Etat Civil* (Registrar of births, deaths and marriages) based on Epi, Ancelin, asserted that:

[T]he only French authority that may still have an influence on the indigènes in our islands is the warship. It represents a power, a material force that they can see, appreciate and evaluate. It is because of the fear they have of it that we can obtain respect of our people and properties. It has not always been effective, it is true, but as it is, our indigènes fear [the warship]. It exists; it can come. When? No matter, they simply know that it will come, that it will take action more or less severely.... It’s the doubt, the threat that hovers above the guilty indigènes, the obsession sometimes more effective for these simple folk than the fact of the action. They fear the warship because it has the force and the power, and they respect it because for them it also represents justice. Justice in the true sense of the word, sometimes lively, a bit brutal, but more in line with the mores/morals and habits of the indigènes.⁶¹

Ancelin linked the visible strength of the navy to its impact on the local population, suggesting the importance of performative forms of justice in maintaining European authority over the Islanders. He went on to argue that continued tours of French naval ships were crucial to mitigate Presbyterian influence, as the *Kersaint* voyage aimed to do.⁶² Naval justice was thus acknowledged for its role in local Anglo–French imperial rivalries, helping to maintain prestige and authority over European counterparts as well as

the indigenous other. The postcards helped spread this image of successful colonial development to settler audiences across the Pacific (with many postcards never sent) as well as further afield.

Conclusion: Postcards Performing Authority

The rhetoric and justifications of naval officers and colonial officials contrasted with the reality of punitive justice, as Gilchirst Alexander's account highlights. Post-voyage reports similarly acknowledged the limited success of expeditions to pacify and punish in the New Hebrides. As one French commandant noted, such punitive attempts 'cost dearly', as the navy and accompanying indigenous auxiliaries lost lives while failing to capture any culprits.⁶³ The costs were also high for the ni-Vanuatu affected, as the rare instances that their voices were recorded demonstrate. In the same vein Jacomb wrote in 1919 that:

The white man is satisfied if in lieu of catching a murderer he sacks the tribal village from which he comes, and destroys a number of the villagers who probably had no connexion whatever with the crime. Again, it is in the New Hebrides, that unfortunate group [of islands] where all the evils of the South Seas seem to find their happiest hunting-ground, that we find this miserable practice in full vigour.⁶⁴

Ultimately, then, the Joint Naval Commission and the voyages of the *Kersaint* form part of a longer history of punitive expeditions that did not pacify. This was widely acknowledged, yet the practice continued.

Despite many claims for the salutary impact of the warship on indigenous behaviour, the continued use of punitive naval justice was equally, if not more, a performance for the benefit of settlers. In the New Hebrides, such performative work showcased the progress of colonial law and order in the face of ongoing challenges to and uncertainty about its status, success and future in this archipelago. Indeed, it was particularly important in this context of tenuous colonialism. It provided a reassuring façade of control and protection in a colony where the fragility of colonial power was all too often in evidence. It was also a show of humanitarian intentions, focused on the benign and civilizing power of law, rather than emphasizing the violence that equally accompanied naval justice. As such, the *Kersaint* postcards were one element of performing imperial authority. They served as 'trophies' of the successful containment of otherwise 'savage', threatening peoples.⁶⁵

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NOTES

- 1 Max Quanchi and Max Shekleton, *Postcards of Oceania: Port towns, portraits and the picturesque during the colonial era*, USP Press, Suva, 2015, p.154.
- 2 Robert Aldrich, *Greater France: a history of French overseas expansion*, Macmillan, London, 1996, p.258.
- 3 Frédéric Angleviel and Max Shekleton, "'Olfala Pija Blong Niuhebridis Blong Bifo": Old Pictures of the Early New Hebrides (Vanuatu)', *Pacific Studies*, 20 (1997), p.169. The authors suggest the earliest de Béchade postcards appeared in 1914.
- 4 Max Shekleton private archive, Nouméa.
- 5 'LA CAMPAGNE DU KERSAINT DANS LE PACIFIQUE,' Médiathèque du Centre Culturel Tjibaou, <http://www.adck.nc/mediatheque/tresors-de-la-mediatheque/192-la-campagne-du-kersaint-dans-le-pacifique>, accessed 20 April 2017.
- 6 See, for example, the range of prices for the *Kersaint* postcards for sale at www.delcampe.fr.
- 7 Quanchi and Shekleton, *Postcards of Oceania*, p.19.
- 8 James R. Ryan, *Picturing Empire: photography and the visualisation of the British Empire*, Reaktion Books, London, 1997, pp.73–83.
- 9 Serge Kakou, *Découverte photographique de la Nouvelle-Calédonie 1848–1900*, Actes Sud, Arles, 1998, p.128.
- 10 Ryan, *Picturing Empire*, p.19.
- 11 Jane Lydon, "'Behold the Tears": Photography as Colonial Witness', *History of Photography*, 34, 3 (2010), pp.241–2.
- 12 R. Wagner, *Le Livre d'Or de la Gironde*, Dictionnaires Biographiques Illustrés Départementaux, R. Wagner, Paris, no date [1914], p.38. Note that a postcard of de Béchade's Port Vila store can be seen in Angleviel and Shekleton, "'Olfala Pija Blong Niuhebridis Blong Bifo'", p.171.
- 13 Angleviel and Shekleton, "'Olfala Pija Blong Niuhebridis Blong Bifo'", p.175.
- 14 Stuart Bedford, "'A Good Moral Effect?": Local opposition and colonial persistence in Malakula, New Hebrides, 1875–1918', *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 18, 1 (2017).
- 15 Adrian Muckle, 'Troublesome chiefs and disorderly subjects: the internment of Kanak under the indigénat—New Caledonia, 1887–1946', *Journal of French Colonial History*, 11 (2010), pp.131–60.
- 16 Angleviel and Shekleton, "'Olfala Pija Blong Niuhebridis Blong Bifo'", p.172; Margaret Critchlow Rodman, 'The Heart in the Archives: Colonial Contestation of Desire and Fear in the New Hebrides, 1933', *Journal of Pacific History*, 38, 3 (2003), p.299.
- 17 Bedford, figures 3a and 3b; Kate Stevens, 'Criminal Justice, Race and Gender in the Colonial Southwest Pacific, 1880–1920', PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 2014, p.319.
- 18 Notably, these postcards also fetch the highest prices online, but whether this is a function of their rarity or their popularity as unusual items is unclear.
- 19 Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, Farrar, Straus and Girou, New York, 2003, pp.79–80.
- 20 Lydon, "'Behold the Tears'", pp.247–9.
- 21 There is now a street in Magenta, Nouméa, named after the ship. Marie Thérèse Faure-Bourdocle and Georges Kling, *Les Rues de Nouméa*, Société d'Etudes Historiques de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, Nouméa, 1988, p.169.
- 22 Sylvette Boubin-Boyer, *De la Première Guerre mondiale en Océanie Les guerres de tous les Calédoniens 1914–1919*, Editions Septentrion Thèse à la carte, Lille, 2003, pp.196–210.

23 For a recent exploration of the concept of punitive expeditions in Pacific imperialism, see Chris Ballard and Bronwen Douglas, “‘Rough Justice’: Punitive expeditions in Oceania”, and Chris Ballard, ‘Swift Injustice: The expedition of imperial punishment’, *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 18, 1 (2017).

24 Bedford, “‘A Good Moral Effect?’”

25 See Deryck Scarr, *Fragments of Empire: A History of the Western Pacific High Commission 1877–1914*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1967, introduction and chapters six and seven. Margaret Rodman, *Houses Far from Home: British Colonial Space in the New Hebrides*, University of Hawai‘i Press, Honolulu 2001, pp.24–25.

26 ‘Convention between Great Britain and France for the protection of Life and Property in the New Hebrides, signed Paris, 16 November, 1887’, available at University of the South Pacific (USP) Vanuatu Legislation and Law Reports http://www.usp.ac.fj/fileadmin/random_images/home_middle_banners/emalus/Pacific_law_materials/Vanuatu/2.Convention_between_Britain_and_France_respecting_New_HEbrides_November_16__1887.pdf, accessed 2 July 2014; ‘Declaration between Great Britain and France, for the Constitution of a Joint Naval Commission for the Protection of Life and Property in the New Hebrides’ (Paris, 26 January 1888), accessed via PacLII (<http://www.pacii.org/>); D.P. O’Connell, ‘The Condominium of the New Hebrides,’ *British Year Book of International Law*, 49 (1968–1969), pp.74–75.

27 ‘Declaration between Great Britain and France, for the Constitution of a Joint Naval Commission for the Protection of Life and Property in the New Hebrides’ (Paris, 26 January 1888), accessed via PacLII (<http://www.pacii.org/>); ‘Convention between Great Britain and France for the protection of Life and Property in the New Hebrides, signed Paris, 16 November, 1887’, available at USP Vanuatu Legislation and Law Reports http://www.usp.ac.fj/fileadmin/random_images/home_middle_banners/emalus/Pacific_law_materials/Vanuatu/2.Convention_between_Britain_and_France_respecting_New_HEbrides_November_16__1887.pdf, accessed 2 July 2014.

28 Full text of the 1906 convention that created the condominium is available in ‘Convention between the United Kingdom and France Concerning the New Hebrides. Signed at London, October 20, 1906. (Ratifications exchanged at London, January 9, 1907.),’ *The American Journal of International Law*, 1, 2, Supplement: Official Documents (Apr., 1907), pp.179–200.

29 William F.S. Miles, *Bridging Mental Boundaries in a Postcolonial Microcosm: Identity and Development in Vanuatu*, University of Hawai‘i Press, Honolulu, 1998, p.41.

30 Roger Thompson, ‘Natives and Settlers on the New Hebrides Frontier, 1870–1900’, *Pacific Studies*, 5, 1 (1981), p.7.

31 Jane Samson, *Imperial Benevolence: Making British Authority in the Pacific Islands*, University of Hawai‘i Press, Honolulu 1998, p.4.

32 Samson, *Imperial Benevolence*, p.4.

33 Samson, *Imperial Benevolence*, pp.146–7. Compare with Deryck Scarr, who argues: ‘That act of war was a mode of punishment unsatisfactory in practice and improper in itself was a point of view more frequently advanced by naval officers than by the [Western Pacific] High Commissioner.’ Scarr, *Fragments of Empire*, p.73.

34 Keith Woodward, ‘Historical Note’, in Brian J. Bresnihan and Keith Woodward, eds, *Tufala Gavman: Reminiscences from the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides*, Institute of Pacific Studies, USP, Suva, 2002, p.27.

35 ‘Les Nouvelles-Hébrides en 1908 – Le Condominium et l’Effort National. Rapport d’Ensemble du Commissaire-Résident de France’, in Dossier Batiments du Condominium. Difficulties concernant le paiement des dépenses[?] effectives pour la construction des hôtels du juge français et de juge anglais, Dossiers nominatifs de magistrats 1912/1924, Tribunal Mixte, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Affaires Politiques 1AFFPOL/1916, Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer

(hereafter ANOM). 'La présence de navires de guerre est encore nécessaire dans l'Archipel. Elle contribue à maintenir les indigènes en respect tout en assurant, par la surveillance exercée sur les bâtiments recruteurs, la légalité, en même temps que la sécurité de leurs opérations.'

36 Rapport d'Ensemble sur la situation des Nouvelles-Hébrides en 1910. Port-Vila, 20 April 1911, Dossier 1909-1910 – Rapports d'ensemble sur la marche des divers services pendant les années 1909 et 1910, Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 11bis, ANOM. The role of the Joint Naval Commission 'n'est plus "de punir en masse les tribus, mais de rechercher les coupables et de s'en saisir pour les déférer à la Justice."'

37 Miramende, Commissaire Résident de France à le Haut Commissaire, 7 Novembre 1916, and J.M. Jackson Commander R.N., to Monsieur Boju, Commandant du 'Kersaint', 7 November 1916, Dossier A1 (57), Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 8, ANOM; Dossier 'Affaire/operations de Malekula', Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 4, ANOM; Gouverneur et Haut Commissaire à Ministre des Colonies, 9 Dec 1918, Dossier 'Affaire/operations de Malekula', Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 4, ANOM; Bedford, "'A Good Moral Effect?'"

38 Rodman, 'The Heart in the Archives', p.299.

39 See, for example, J. Repiquet, Haut-Commissaire à Ministre des Colonies, 23 Octobre 1918, Dossier A1 (38), Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 4, ANOM.

40 Gilchrist Alexander, *From Middle Temple to the South Seas*, John Murray, London, 1927, pp.219-20.

41 The Loyalty Islands were often an exception or contrast to this conceptualization of dangerous spaces, as inhabitants were considered more amenable to Christianity and 'civilization' than Kanak of the Grande Terre or ni-Vanuatu, tied into their characterization as Polynesian rather than Melanesian.

42 Minutes of Meeting of Joint Naval Commission held on board the 'Kersaint' at Vila on 4 September 1909, 71/1909 (Mixed Naval Commission Cases. 1909-1919), New Hebrides British Services (hereafter NHBS) I/1 General Correspondence, MP Series 1907-1942 Volume One (1907-1914), Western Pacific Archives, University of Auckland Library Special Collections (WPA).

43 Just as the tribu was ascribed collective responsibility for crime and disorder from 1867 in New Caledonia, the Western Pacific High Commission was obliged to treat Islander violence against Europeans in the same manner, as an act of aggression by a foreign power, making the JNC a rather blunt diplomatic tool. Scarr, *Fragments of Empire*, pp.208, 241; 'Instructions to the British High Commission on the issue of native labour', in Dossier A2 (03), Nouvelles-Hébrides Séries Géographiques, Carton 11, ANOM.

44 Adrian Muckle, 'Killing the "Fantôme Canaque": Evoking and Invoking the Possibility of Revolt in New Caledonia (1853-1915)', *Journal of Pacific History*, 37, 1 (2002), p.37.

45 'Rapport d'Ensemble sur la situation des Nouvelles-Hébrides en 1910', Port-Vila, 20 April 1911, Gouverneur to Ministre des Colonies, Noumea, 10 February 1910, Dossier A3(1), Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 11bis, ANOM. On French concerns regarding the impact of Presbyterian funding (compared with the poorly resourced Catholic mission), see also: 'Situation politique et économique', M. Revel, Chef de la Mission d'Inspection de la Nouvelle-Calédonie et Dépendances to Ministres des Colonies, Noumea, 3 Juin 1912, Séries Géographiques Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 31, ANOM. 'Abusant de leurs pouvoirs spirituels, les missionnaires allèrent jusqu'à créer des tribunaux indigènes présidés par les chefs de village qui leur paraissaient les plus sûrs. Ils organisèrent des corps de police et établirent même des droits de sortie'. The report states that these missionaries were 'leurs véritables chefs politiques', and 'La plupart des missionnaires presbytériens interviennent directement dans la repression des crimes ou des délits.'

46 Stevens, 'Criminal Justice, Race and Gender', pp.102–110.

47 'Nouvel Assassinat commis par des indigènes contre un blanc. Jacomb coupable d'excitation au meurtre', *Le Néo-Hébridais*, 16 Août 1913; 'Jacomb... Toujours Jacomb...', *Le Néo-Hébridais*, 13 Septembre 1913; 'Notre Enquête sur l'affaire Guitel', *Le Néo-Hébridais*, 6 Décembre 1913. See also 'Report of the Proceedings. Meeting of French Subjects held at the Douteleau Hall at Vila, Efate, on 2nd December 1913,' MS 894/23, Edward Jacomb Diary 1913, Senate House Library, London (SHL); and Rapports adressés par Monsieur Vigoureux, Directeur de la S.F.N.H. à Monsieur le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française dans le Pacifique à propos des agissements Jacomb dans l'Archipel (1915); Dossier A1 (52), Séries Géographiques Nouvelles-Hébrides Carton 7, ANOM.

48 Scarr, *Fragments of Empire*, p.240.

49 *The Daily Telegraph*, 13 February 1914, in Dossier A1 (14): Convention du 16 Novembre 1887 et Déclaration du 26 Janvier 1888; Commission navale mixte des Nouvelles-Hébrides; Note d'Higginson sur la Convention du 16-11-1887; Rapport de la Commission Naval Mixte avec le Gouverneur de la N. Caledonie; Fonctionnement de la Comm. Navale Mixte. 1887–1914, Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 2, ANOM.

50 'Meeting of Protest', in 'Rapport Trimestriel du Commissaire-Resident de France aux Nouvelles-Hébrides. Octobre-Novembre-Décembre – 1913.' encl. to Gouverneur/Haut Commissaire à Ministre des Colonies, Noumea, 25 Février 1914, Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 11bis, ANOM.

51 Jacomb, *France and England in the New Hebrides*, pp.123–4.

52 Wallace to Paton, 30 March 1914, External Affairs Records, quoted in Scarr, *Fragments of Empire*, p.242.

53 See, for example, Samson, *Imperial Benevolence*.

54 Rapports du Lt de vaisseau Legrand, Commandant la 'Dives' sur sa tournée aux Nouvelles-Hébrides (copies envoyés au Département en 1922), 11 April 1886, Dossier A1 (08), Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 1, ANOM. 'Notre but est de surprendre les coupables et de leur infliger un châtiment dont ils garderont le souvenir.'

55 Le Président du Conseil, Societe Française des Nouvelles-Hébrides [name illegible], to Ministre des Colonies, Paris, 21 June 1897, Dossier A1 (28), Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 4, ANOM. 'Ces violences ne sont maheureusement pas un fait nouveau, ni exceptionnel. Tous les ans, de Janvier à Avril les colons européens y sont exposés et la liste est longue déjà de ceux qui en ont été victimes depuis quelques années. // Elles coïncident trop exactement avec l'absence des navires de guerre français et anglais dans ces passages pour qu'il soit possible de douter qu'elles doivent lui être attribués et que les indigènes se croyant s__ [surs?] de l'impunité, profitent de cette absence pour satisfaire contre les Européens leurs vengeances et leurs instincts naturels de cruauté.'

56 Bridge to Des Voeux, 27 July 1882, Western Pacific High Commission (hereafter WPHC) Inwards Correspondence, 112/82, quoted in Thompson, 'Natives and Settlers on the New Hebrides Frontier', p.7. What does WPHC stand for?

57 Gouverneur to Ministre des Colonies, Noumea, 19 Jan 1909, and related correspondence, Dossier A1 (45), Séries Géographiques Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 6, ANOM.

58 Woodward, 'Historical Note', p.27.

59 Rapports Trimestriels sur la Situation des Nouvelles-Hebrides – January – March 1916, Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 12, ANOM. 'Sa justice expéditive est également la seule qui soit à la portée de l'esprit simpliste des Canaques. Ils trouvent naturel qu'un malfaiteur subisse, dès qu'il peut être arrêté, le châtiment qu'il a encouru. Si ce châtiment est différé de plusieurs mois, par suite des difficultés de l'instruction ou la complication de la procédure, ils ne s'en expliqueront plus, au contraire, les motifs et seront enclins à la considérer comme un acte de vengeance.'

60 Advisors to the judge or colonial agent hearing a case, used as an alternative to trial by jury. Assessors did not have a vote on the outcome of a case.

61 Ancelin to the Commissaire-Résident, Api, 2 October 1915, encl. in Gouverneur to Ministre des Colonies, Noumea, 7 February 1916, Dossiers nominatifs de magistrats 1912/1924, Tribunal Mixte, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Affaires Politiques, Carton 1AFFPOL/1916, ANOM. 'La seule autorité française qui puisse encore avoir de l'influence sur les indigènes dans nos Iles c'est le navire de guerre. Il représente une puissance, une force matérielle qu'ils peuvent voir, apprécier et évaluer. C'est en raison de la crainte qu'ils en ont que nous pouvons obtenir le respect de nos personnes et de nos propriétés. // Il n'a pas toujours été efficace, c'est vrai, mais tel il est, nos indigènes le craignent. Il existe, il peut venir. Quand? peu importe, ils savent simplement qu'il viendra, qu'il agira plus ou moins sévèrement; peu importe encore. C'est le doute, la menace qui plane sur les indigènes fautifs, l'obsession quelquefois efficace pour ces simples que le fait de l'action. // Ils craignent le navire de guerre parce qu'il a la force et la puissance, et ils le respectent parce que pour eux il représente aussi la justice. La justice dans le sens propre de mot, quelquefois vive, un peu brutale, mais plus en conformité avec les moeurs et les habitudes des indigènes....' (Emphasis added.)

62 Commissaire délégué aux Nouvelles-Hébrides to Commissaire Général de la République dans l'Océan Pacifique, Ile d'Api, 5 June 1905, Dossier A1 (36), Séries Géographiques Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 4, ANOM.

63 'Extrait du Rapport de M. le Capitaine de Frégate Roque, Commandant du Kersaint'; and 'Report on Expedition to Putermwomo village, Malekula Island', Senior British Naval Officer J.R. Le H. Ward, encl. in 'Rapport Trimestriel du Commissaire-Resident de France aux Nouvelles-Hébrides. Avril-Mai-Juin 1914' encl. to Gouverneur/Haut Commissaire to Ministre des Colonies, Noumea, 15 October 1914, Séries Géographiques, Nouvelles-Hébrides, Carton 11bis, ANOM. 'C'est payé bien cher.'

64 Edward Jacomb, *The Future of the Kanaka*, P.S. King & Son, London, 1919, pp.123-4.

65 This term is taken from Lydon, "'Behold the Tears'", p.245.