

## ‘Texts and Translations’

### RUTH ROSS AND THE TREATY OF WAITANGI



IN 1972 Ruth Ross presented an analysis of the Treaty of Waitangi that was to underpin debates over its meaning for the next 30 years. Her purpose was threefold: to untangle the various instructions and translations that shaped the drafting of the Treaty in 1840; to determine the intentions and understandings of the Treaty partners, Maori and Pakeha; and to historicize the signing of the Treaty, thus returning an element of objectivity and distance to an event whose symbolism, she believed, had come to outstrip both scholarly understanding and documentary evidence. Interpretations of the Treaty were coloured by attitudes running the gamut from ‘Pakeha self-righteousness’ to ‘Maori disillusionment’. The Treaty of Waitangi, she concluded, had come to say ‘whatever we want it to say’.<sup>1</sup>

Her paper made a considerable impact. First presented in February 1972 at Victoria University in Wellington as part of a Department for University Extension seminar, it attracted significant interest, including radio discussion.<sup>2</sup> Later that year the *New Zealand Journal of History* published an expanded version, ‘Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and Translations’.<sup>3</sup> Professor Keith Sinclair told Ross it was one of the ‘most important’ articles submitted to the journal. Its fine-grained analysis won the respect of the scholarly community, and it soon became required reading in university courses.<sup>4</sup> Politicians, constitutional lawyers, Maori leaders and the general public also read it, and Ross’s arguments have gone on to inform a number of subsequent influential works, including those of Ranginui Walker and Claudia Orange.<sup>5</sup> More than three decades after its first publication Ross’s contribution was still regarded by Walker as the ‘most penetrating critique in recent times of the events surrounding the drafting and signing of the Treaty’.<sup>6</sup>

Ross’s article was both a turning point in Treaty scholarship and a reflection of ideological and methodological developments in New Zealand historiography during the post-war period. By insisting that the text in Maori was the Treaty of Waitangi, it moved scholarly focus from the Colonial Office, which had dominated earlier studies, and asked instead what the Treaty had meant here, in New Zealand. In its criticism of the documentary sources, emphasis on a New Zealand perspective and scepticism about previous interpretations of the Treaty, the article was also a fine example of the scholarship of those ‘second generation’ New Zealand empiricists, students of J.C. Beaglehole, Frederick Wood, James Rutherford, James Hight and others, who, in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, used their academic training and methodological awareness to challenge the orthodoxies of New Zealand history. This article traces Ross’s methodology and examines the ways in which her historicization of the Treaty challenged established views about its role as a linchpin of New Zealand

society. It depicts the post-war decades, from the late 1940s through to the early 1970s, as a period of 'high empiricism' in New Zealand historiography. In this period scholars like Ross challenged the amateur/journalistic histories of the preceding years but were not yet engaged with the more complex interpretations of post-colonialism and post-modernism that appeared in the latter decades of the twentieth century. In an era that retained a certain confidence in the attainability of historical 'truth', historical empiricism was perceived to be a social science at the service of the community. At its best it included engagement with, and if necessary correction of, the patterns of historical understanding which wove themselves, subconsciously or otherwise, into the fabric of national life.<sup>7</sup> Ross's scholarship provides a micro-study of some of the tensions in the relationship between empiricism, tradition and national identity, tensions that still exist today, although the modes of historical examination may differ.

Ross studied at Victoria University from 1939 to 1941 under F.L.W. Wood and J.C. Beaglehole. Leaving to join Beaglehole's 'kindergarten' at the Department of Internal Affairs Centennial Branch, she honed her research skills on Old Land Claims for the Historical Atlas before leaving paid work for marriage and childrearing. Although she remained outside the academy for most of her career and balanced her research interests with the demands of parenthood, in many ways she fitted Beaglehole's model of the 'New Zealand Scholar'. She was passionate in her commitment to New Zealand, its identity, traditions and unique historical landscape. Methodical, analytical, relentless in her pursuit of detail and accuracy, Sinclair called Ross the 'sternest perfectionist in New Zealand'.<sup>8</sup> While researching from home had its disadvantages, placing her at times 'five hundred odd miles and twenty four damned uncomfortable hours' from her primary sources, for example, it also freed her from many academic pressures and enabled her to pursue her interests at will and over an extended period of time.<sup>9</sup> Ross began serious research into the Treaty in 1954 when, at Beaglehole's suggestion, she worked on an introduction to a publication of facsimiles planned by the Government Printer. During the 1950s Ross was living at Motukioere, a predominantly Maori community on the Hokianga Harbour; there she was well placed to discuss her perspectives and test her ideas.<sup>10</sup> Although frustration at the lack of sources and what she perceived as the stonewalling of her ideas by established academics caused her to abandon the project in 1957, the research from this period formed almost the entirety of her argument in 1972.<sup>11</sup> By this time contention surrounding the Treaty and protests by activists such as Nga Tamatoa had begun to challenge its place within the broader Pakeha consciousness.

'Texts and Translations' was, first and foremost, an exercise in empiricism, based on close analysis of the Treaty text and the documentary record surrounding its signings. Although she had not completed her BA degree, Ross sat in on Beaglehole's honours paper on empirical method and thesis preparation. There research method and technique were taught, inspired first by the work of Beatrice and Sidney Webb, second by books Beaglehole judged relevant at the time, and third by textbooks and manuals of empiricism such as those listed in the University calendar for 1944, the point at which the course

was formalized: *Introduction to the Study of History*, by Charles Langlois and Charles Seignobos; *The Nature of History* by Sir Henry Lambert; and *The Modern Historians* by C.H. Williams.<sup>12</sup> In her early research, and especially in 1972 when other historians had begun experimenting with techniques such as oral or community history to link history to social issues of the day, Ross deliberately used the standards and methods of the mid-twentieth century empiricism of her university years. She believed that in their haste to interpret the Treaty, many New Zealanders, including many academics, had failed to engage with the history of the Treaty critically or rigorously. In doing so she provided an excellent example of the healthy pedantry advocated by Beaglehole as a prerequisite to good history, a pedantry which, as Keith Sinclair noted, had by the early 1970s left many cherished myths of New Zealand's history 'sadly battered by fact'.<sup>13</sup>

Empirical method aspired to raise history from a literary art to an objective science. It was based on the study of documents, which it privileged above other forms of historical evidence. By providing a series of analytical operations it intended to separate historians from their own preconceptions and prejudices, and those of the documents' authors. The aim was to reduce historical evidence contained in the documents to a series of well-made observations ready for analysis in the manner of other more direct sciences.<sup>14</sup> The first, heuristic (from the Greek word 'to find') step entailed the location, restoration, dating, collation and verification of historical records. This procedure was intended to dispose of forgeries, corrupted copies, selectively edited versions and so on. The second, hermeneutic, step analysed the verified documents to determine what facts about past events could be derived from them, including those of intention and motive. As none could be taken directly off the document, these facts had to be inferred from close and critical reading. Such inferences had to conform to rigorous rules of logic and were the product of trained thought.<sup>15</sup> This critical analysis of documents was a defining characteristic of the post-war generation of academically trained New Zealand historians. While enthusiastic amateur historians had continued to collect and write up historical material, their unquestioning acceptance of historical 'fact' and belief that history could, and would, speak for itself had tended towards a lack of analysis and the perpetuation of myths and stereotypes. Empiricists, such as Ross, operated from a position of perpetual mistrust and methodical scepticism, systematically criticizing each document and eliminating points of error or opinion to deduce historical truth or fact.

Ross's textual approach to the Treaty was, however, a difficult one; 'the hardest possible road', she thought, to its understanding. Her work emphasized the Maori text — which, as the document signed by those who ceded under the agreement, she believed to be the actual Treaty of Waitangi — and amounted to a radical reworking of both the documentary evidence regarding the Treaty and the assumptions that had been drawn from it.<sup>16</sup> Owing to its popular attribution as New Zealand's founding document, a considerable number of histories on the Treaty had been written prior to the 1950s. The published works of interest to Ross were those of H.H. Turton (1877), T. Lindsay Buick (1914, with subsequent editions in 1932 and 1936), Sir Apirana Ngata (1922), and James

Rutherford (1948). Ross thought Turton, as the editor of the original facsimile edition, had done a ‘useful and competent job’.<sup>17</sup> Along with the Treaty documents and their drafts, he had provided typescripts of the English version of the Treaty, the Maori text, copies of the reports and letters of Lieutenant-Governor Hobson and of those Hobson sent out to gather Treaty signatures. All extracts were retained in their primary form. No translation of the Maori text was provided, nor any major attempt made at analysis (apart from the act of selection itself) of the supporting documents. Other than his guarded comment that ‘without some such agreement between the two races as was determined by “the Treaty of Waitangi”, the Queen’s authority and government would never have been so peaceably admitted and established in this country’, Turton was prepared to ‘leave these sheets to the scrutiny of all interested inquirers’.<sup>18</sup>

By contrast, T. Lindsay Buick’s *The Treaty of Waitangi, or How New Zealand Became a British Colony* was intended as a popular historical narrative.<sup>19</sup> It was an authoritative yet accessible account, relating the story of the Treaty with what Chris Hilliard has described as an air of ‘literary statesmanship’.<sup>20</sup> Through its selection, or omission, of material it confirmed the notion of the Treaty as a symbol of ‘Maori acceptance of British ways’ and the ‘wholesome mythology of “he iwi tahi tatou”’.<sup>21</sup> Although it was uncritical in its use of sources, several of which Ross was later to refute, it was the most comprehensive synthesis of historical evidence regarding the Treaty of its time, and continued to be used as a reference text well into the 1970s.<sup>22</sup> Buick’s work both reflected and sustained the popular conceptions of the Treaty. It was of interest to Ross as a starting point and as the source of some possible leads. Buick’s theme was the successful and peaceable acquisition of sovereignty. He was largely uncritical of the Maori text. In his original 1914 edition he had praised Williams’s translation into Maori as ‘a perfect native reflex of the European mind, conveying in all probability a clearer view to the Maori of what the treaty meant than the English version has done to the average Pakeha’.<sup>23</sup> By the 1933 edition, which had been substantially reworked, he had moderated his view: ‘... although its phrase *taonga katoa* fails clearly to specify the reservation of “forests and fisheries” which it includes under the general term of “other properties”, it has stood the crucial test of time fairly well, and gives to the Maori as clear a view of what the treaty means as the English version has given to the average Pakeha’.<sup>24</sup> He continued to assert, however, as he had in 1914, that sovereignty had clearly been ceded through the Treaty, and that although the ‘forms by which our sovereignty was exercised were doubtless new and strange to them’, Maori ‘understood clearly enough that for the advantages they hoped to reap from the treaty they were yielding much of their existing power’.<sup>25</sup> To Ross, these were errors of judgement arising from poor scholarship. Despite his extensive use of primary material, often quoted in bulk, it was not until his third edition, following the assistance of Sir Apirana Ngata, that Ross thought Buick had really begun to look at the Treaty documents.<sup>26</sup> Ngata’s involvement had accounted for Buick’s more critical assessment of the Maori text. However, the alterations did not appear to be of particular significance to Buick himself; they were

not mentioned in the preface and his narrative account of the acquisition of sovereignty remained essentially unchanged.

Ngata’s own booklet on the Treaty was first published, in Maori, in 1922 specifically to explain the Treaty to the Maori people. In 1950 it was translated into English by M.R. Jones and republished as a dual text, *The Treaty of Waitangi, an Explanation/Te Tiriti o Waitangi, he Whakamarama*, by the Maori Purposes Fund Board.<sup>27</sup> Ross was interested in it for a number of reasons. Firstly, Ngata was the only historian to have dealt primarily with the Maori text. He aimed to clarify it for his Maori readership and in doing so was openly, if only mildly, critical of its translation: ‘The English expressions in the Treaty were not adequately rendered into Maori. There were minor parts left out.’ Aside from this, Ngata maintained that the Maori text ‘clearly explained the main provisions of the Treaty’.<sup>28</sup> Somewhat paradoxically, however, he continued to structure his argument around the English terms, and their intended meanings, as the conditions the Maori signatories had agreed to. Ngata explained the issue of *kawanantanga* and ‘governance’ in Article One of the Maori text in terms of British sovereignty: ‘What is a “Government?” The English word is “Sovereignty”. The English word for such a personage as a King or a Queen is “Sovereign”. This is the same as the Maori words “Ariki Tapairu” and is referred to as the absolute authority.’<sup>29</sup> Similarly, with regard to *rangatiratanga* in Article Two, although Ngata provided his own, and what he considered to be more accurate, translation, using *mana* in conjunction with *rangatiratanga*, he continued to confine it to the concept of independent ownership, as intended in the English text: ‘It is quite clear, the right of a Maori to his land, to his property, to his individual right to such possessions whereby he could declare, “This is my land...”’.<sup>30</sup> The inclusion of the term ‘sovereignty’ in the explanation in English following Ngata’s new translation appears to be an interpolation by Jones. Ngata further interpreted the pre-emption clause in Article Two as the ‘giving of the right to the Queen to acquire Maori land’.<sup>31</sup> While Ngata was critical of government land purchasing, he maintained that it was the policy of individual governments that was at fault and that ‘the blame cannot be placed on the Treaty of Waitangi which laid down this basis’.<sup>32</sup> His adherence to the English text was in line with thinking in his day and with his own general policy of ‘co-operation within the parameters defined by the state’.<sup>33</sup> He emphasized Maori agency and expected Maori to take responsibility for their part in signing the Treaty. He went so far as to instruct his Maori readers, ‘If you think these things are wrong and bad then blame our ancestors who gave away their rights in the days when they were powerful’.<sup>34</sup>

Professor James Rutherford also recognized discrepancies in understandings of the Treaty. His two published lectures, *Hone Heke’s Rebellion, 1844–1846: An Episode in the Establishment of British Rule in New Zealand*, and *The Treaty of Waitangi and the Acquisition of British Sovereignty in New Zealand, 1840*, were intended as part of a larger study of Maori political ideas that remained unpublished.<sup>35</sup> Of the two, *Hone Heke’s Rebellion* dealt more directly with Maori interpretation of the Treaty. Rutherford noted that there was ambiguity surrounding the notions of sovereignty in Articles One and Two in the Maori text. He believed the concept had been poorly explained to Maori at the Waitangi

signing, with insufficient emphasis given to the ‘restraints and restrictions and responsibilities’ it implied.<sup>36</sup> The term ‘*Kawana-tanga*’ had been a poor translation of British expectations of sovereignty. Furthermore, James Busby with his limited powers as British Resident since 1833 had provided but a ‘feeble and inadequate illustration of “sovereignty” indeed’.<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, ‘*Rangatira-tanga*’ seemed to Rutherford to be a ‘far stronger term used... to describe the authority they retained... which taken literally seemed to imply that, on their own lands, the Maori chiefs would retain all their power, authority and “mana” as rangatira over their own people’.<sup>38</sup> Despite these observations, however, Rutherford, like Ngata, continued to couch his discussion in terms of the ‘official English version’ of the Treaty. He recognized that there had been among the Maori signatories an ‘undercurrent of real apprehension’ and among the missionaries a ‘certain amount of soft-peddling on the subject of British sovereignty’. He stopped short, however, of suggesting ‘deliberate double dealing’.<sup>39</sup> Ross thought Rutherford’s lectures were well done and well documented. Her principal concern with Rutherford was the way in which his rough translation of the Maori text, created to the best of her knowledge by ‘looking up nouns and verbs in a dictionary’, had come to dominate, and mislead, academic interpretations of the Treaty.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, for want of any other, it was to continue as the accepted orthodoxy in university teaching in New Zealand until the 1970s.<sup>41</sup> While Ross thought it important to use these earlier historians as starting points, none appeared adequately to address the discrepancies she saw in the Treaty. Through a lack of critical groundwork, or in pursuit of their individual arguments, she thought all had missed a fundamental point. While each acknowledged to a greater or lesser extent that there were gaps between the English and the Maori texts, all unquestioningly gave primacy to the English text. The Treaty was a document drawn up by the British Crown. What the Crown had intended, they therefore assumed, was what the Treaty had meant. Early in the course of her research Ross became convinced that the reverse was true; that it was the Treaty document as signed and understood by Maori that constituted the Treaty of Waitangi, irrespective of Crown intentions. Any consideration of the Treaty, Ross was emphatic, had to begin with the Maori text.

The emphasis Ross gave to the Maori text marked a significant departure in Treaty historiography. It became a signature of her scholarship and was, eventually, to become a broadly accepted academic view. In 1954, however, it required considerable working through. She was aware of an alternative Maori view of the Treaty from her time at the Centennial Branch where her research into Old Land Claims had exposed her to a counter perspective on early settler land transactions. Once she began research for the introduction to the facsimiles, she also developed a network of Maori advisors. This gave her the confidence to pursue her alternative approach. ‘Of course I could not have taken this course unaided’, she wrote to Beaglehole of her decision to concentrate on the Maori text, ‘and have had wonderful help from Mat Te Hau [sic] and Pei Jones particularly, and can tap Bruce Biggs and Maha Winiata’.<sup>42</sup> These people helped Ross with translations, read drafts and discussed ideas. In the Hokianga also she recruited the help of local Maori whose life away

from the academy, in a 'historical vacuum' as she described it, encouraged an independent approach.<sup>43</sup> Increasingly for Ross studying the Treaty from the Maori text was not just one of a number of possible approaches, but the only ethical and logical one. If, as Mohi Tawhai had predicted, the Maori view of the Treaty was to sink 'like a stone', and from her search for documents it appeared to Ross that it had, her network of advisors made it at least possible to work toward re-establishing this perspective of the Treaty text within academic scholarship. She found historical precedent for asserting the Maori text also. While researching in early New Zealand parliamentary papers she was drawn to the 'pamphlet wars' of the 1860s as 'the first occasion when the actual treaty, i.e. the text and its meaning, was taken out and aired'.<sup>44</sup> The observations of Henry Martin, William Sewell and others, she thought significant, even if they were examples of settlers favouring the Treaty for their own purposes.

At the heart of Ross's analysis, then, were these two central points: her insistence on the primacy of the Treaty text and her assertion that the 'actual' Treaty of Waitangi was *te Tiriti o Waitangi*, the Treaty in Maori. In addition she differentiated between the Waitangi text and Robert Maunsell's sheet signed at Waikato and Manukau in March and April 1840, which she referred to as the 'Treaty of Waikato'. She felt that the Maori text was pivotal to any consideration of the Treaty, and believed that so long as people or institutions ignored this aspect, the allegations and speculations surrounding the Treaty, its obligations, its promise and its spirit, would continue. This was particularly so in the turmoil of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the civil unrest and racial strife evident in other Western countries made many New Zealanders concerned with the direction such developments could take.<sup>45</sup> When in 1972 the University Extension Programme at Victoria University organized a seminar in response to these concerns and asked Ross to speak, she took the opportunity to air her views of the Maori text and the meaning of the Treaty in translation.<sup>46</sup> Where once, in the 1950s, she had been disappointed to find her approach regarded as pedantic and 'historically worthless', it was now snapped up by an academy and general public anxious to understand an issue that seemed to strike at the core of New Zealand identity.<sup>47</sup> While her conclusions on the Treaty may not have been a source of comfort to New Zealanders, it was information she felt they needed, and information without which a degree of objectivity regarding the Treaty could not be achieved.

Ross's conclusions were the result of a strict empirical methodology. The following section traces the steps she covered in coming to conclusions which were so at odds with the accepted view of the Treaty. Empiricism posited history as a process of inference and reasoning. Without the capacity for direct observation, a scientific understanding of historical events could be gained only by analysis of their documentary remains. As the documents themselves were regarded as nothing more than the material traces of a series of psychological operations on the part of their authors, their subjection to a process of critical scrutiny became the defining operation of an historian's scholarship.<sup>48</sup> The steps in this process of hermeneutic analysis were of two types. The first, 'external criticism', concerned examination of the documents themselves, for authenticity, authorship, sources and so forth. The second, 'internal criticism',

referred to assessment of the mental states through which a document's author passed: his or her meaning, belief in the accuracy of what he or she wrote, and his or her justification for that belief. Applied to the Treaty, this required Ross to not only assess and define the Treaty documents, but also to examine the motives and understandings of their participating authors. She took this process one step further in attempting to ascertain what Maori signatories to the Treaty documents may have understood them to mean. External criticism had three aims: to accurately define the document in question; to ensure that the historian was working as close to the original source as possible; to clear the mind of previous assumptions and suppositions surrounding the document. Step one, textual criticism, used close study and comparison to differentiate original documents from their copies. The examination of 'traditional variations', the errors or alterations that tended to accumulate between copies of texts, could be used to determine the order in which copies had been made and in particular to construct a 'genealogical tree' to map the sequence of events surrounding the creation of a document or group of documents.<sup>49</sup> This was very much the analysis that Ross applied to the Treaty documents and which served to uncover a number of discrepancies unnoticed by previous scholars.<sup>50</sup>

After defining her aims and making specific mention of the nature of missionary input into the Treaty, Ross began her analysis with a critical assessment of the Treaty texts. As she was working with documents involving translation, she had to closely compare all documents and copies in English with each other, and then compare these with the Maori text. Starting from her assumption that 'the Treaty of Waitangi' was the text in Maori, she worked backward to try to define the original or 'official' English version. From a detailed collation of the various English texts she uncovered five separate English versions, each slightly different, and each with some claim toward official status.<sup>51</sup> She related these copies to each other as to their origins, in a genealogical manner. As none were in exact accordance with the translated Maori text, Ross concluded that all were copies of an earlier draft. As the basis for the Maori translation, only that draft could, she felt, logically claim to be the official Treaty of Waitangi in English. To the best of her knowledge, however, it was lost. The English text most commonly referred to as 'the Treaty of Waitangi' was Maunsell's copy signed at Waikato and Manukau. She identified this as being at odds with the inferred original. The absence of 'Forests' and 'Fisheries' from the original translation into Maori and an early version in English returned by Hobson to the Colonial Office led Ross to conclude that the terms stated in the second article of the Waikato copy were interpolations, or later additions.<sup>52</sup> Although she was unsure of the status of the Waikato text, she was forced to conclude that forests and fisheries were not intended among the original guarantees of the Treaty articles.

In the light of subsequent Treaty scholarship it may be difficult to appreciate the extent to which this analysis was at odds with contemporary understandings of the Treaty. As noted above, prior to 1972 no other scholar had catalogued the variations of the English texts, nor had anyone come to the conclusion that the original version of the Treaty in English was missing. To assert this point, therefore, was to give primacy to the Maori text — with no comparable

English text available, it became the 'only' Treaty of Waitangi. Simultaneously, it undermined the validity of the Waikato text, which until then had been so broadly accepted as 'the Treaty' as to be incorporated in the schedule of the 1960 Waitangi Day Act. To invalidate the Waikato text was also to discredit the translation of one of the country's foremost Maori leaders, Sir Apirana Ngata, and to undercut the argument of contemporary Maori regarding access to traditional fishing grounds. This analysis also cast doubt on the solemnity attributed to the Treaty-making process. While the annual repetition of Lord Bledisloe's prayer at Waitangi celebrations promoted the notion of a 'sacred compact', the repeated and unacknowledged variations in Hobson's English texts suggested to Ross not only that he was still adjusting the terms of the Treaty after its initial signing, but that there had also been an unhealthy degree of chance, 'carelessness, or cynicism' attached to the whole proceedings.<sup>53</sup> Within the first step of analytical operations, therefore, Ross had opened the validity of the Treaty to doubt.

Textual criticism was followed by the investigation of authorship. Here again Ross dislodged some accepted theories, particularly with regard to the former British Resident James Busby's open claim to authorship.<sup>54</sup> Indeed, it was the widespread acceptance of Busby's exaggerated claims, she believed, that had 'in a large part been responsible for today's chaotic misunderstanding about the Treaty of Waitangi'.<sup>55</sup> To proceed with internal analysis, that is to determine the intended meanings of the Treaty, it was necessary to untangle its drafts and authors. To determine authorship, or the relative contributions of multiple authors, Ross compared the draft notes of Hobson, James Stuart Freeman (his secretary) and Busby, all of which were still available.<sup>56</sup> With the preamble and a significant proportion of the Treaty articles coming from Freeman and Hobson, Ross was able, with considerable satisfaction perhaps, to dispel Busby's claim of having been the principal author of the Treaty, although she did acknowledge that in the English version of the articles 'there appears to be more Busby than anyone else'.<sup>57</sup> Seeing 'the Treaty of Waitangi' as the Maori text, however, meant Busby's input had been minimal, merely the exchange of the term *whakaminenga* for *huihuinga*.<sup>58</sup> From Ross's perspective, whatever the intended meaning of Busby, Hobson or his officers, the onus of authorship lay with the Treaty translators, the missionary Henry Williams and his son Edward. Henry Williams was neither an experienced translator nor a scholar. Edward, 'a green young man of twenty one', seemed little better equipped. While his 'spoken Maori was very probably more fluent than his father's, his ignorance of English constitutional law and convention' was, she thought, 'almost certainly greater'.<sup>59</sup> Understanding their choice of terms in conveying the complex concepts of British sovereignty and governance was central to an analysis of the Treaty. This, therefore, became her next step.

The interpretive analysis of the Treaty documents was one of the strengths of Ross's seminar and article. Her observations regarding the use of the words *kawanatanga* and *rangatiratanga* have sustained a wealth of subsequent scholarship. Having defined the Treaty documents and their authors, investigation of the language of the Maori text was one of the first tasks Ross had set for herself in 1954. She had worked on it systematically, adding to her

understanding as opportunities arose, for nearly two decades. She began by identifying the language of the Treaty text. It was, she noted, non-indigenous Maori: 'missionary-Maori, specifically Protestant missionary-Maori'.<sup>60</sup> Thus it was likely to differ from both the contemporary Maori of native speakers and from Maori as spoken in her own day. Protestant missionary (Mihinare) Maori constituted, for the purpose of analysis, a 'dialect' of its own. Making this delineation helped Ross to better determine the terms of the Treaty in Maori and the meanings they sought to convey. Close readings of early Church Missionary Society (CMS) translations, the 1837 New Testament in Maori and Williams's Maori dictionary familiarized her with Mihinare Maori as an idiom, and with the pattern of 'missionary translation of English thought into Maori'.<sup>61</sup>

Missionaries, Ross noted, had a near monopoly on translating and explaining the terms of the Treaty. In both the choice of language and its explanation, this had resulted in a blurring of religious and political terminology. Henry Williams had stated in defence of his translation that it had been necessary to 'avoid all expressions of the English for which there was no expressive term in the Maori, preserving entire the spirit and tenor of the treaty'.<sup>62</sup> On close comparison of the Treaty with mission texts, however, Ross found significant discrepancies of meaning, particularly regarding the choice of the words *kawanatanga* and *tino rangatiratanga* in the preamble and articles as expressions of sovereignty. While the cession of sovereignty was clearly the 'chief purpose' of the Crown's treating with Maori, Ross felt that the choice of the term *kawanatanga* without the accompanying term *mana* in the Treaty translation had failed to convey the extent to which sovereignty, as an imported concept, would affect the traditional authority of Maori chiefs. There were scriptural precedents, she noted, for the use of *kawanatanga* to denote the act of ruling, or oversight, and *mana* to denote ultimate authority. This usage also had a political precedent in Busby's 'Declaration of Independence', *He W[h]akaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni*, in which *Kingitanga* and *mana* had been used to denote sovereign power and authority respectively. Failure to continue this association in the Treaty had weakened the explanation, clouding the finer distinctions and underplaying the balance of power. This misrepresentation appeared to have been exacerbated by the use of the term *tino rangatiratanga* in Article Two. Here Ross found precedents in Mihinare Maori that indicated that, until its use in the Treaty, the term *tino rangatiratanga* had been more closely aligned to the concept of sovereignty than had *kawanatanga* chosen in Article One. In CMS scriptures *rangatiratanga* had been used as a translation for 'kingdom', and in Busby's Declaration of Independence for a state of political independence.<sup>63</sup> These interpretations had been borne out by Henry Williams who, when subsequently asked to translate the Treaty back into English, equated the term with 'full rights as chiefs, (and) their right to possession of their lands and all their property of every kind and degree'.<sup>64</sup> *Rangatiratanga* had also been used by Hobson himself shortly after the initial signing of the Treaty to convey the concept of sovereignty. In a proclamation from April 1840 'te rangatiratanga o te Kuini' was used to denote the sovereignty of Queen Victoria.<sup>65</sup>

The textual basis of Ross's argument problematized the Treaty to an unprecedented degree. As long as Crown policy had remained the principal focus of historical analysis, issues surrounding its representation to Maori had been eclipsed. Where discrepancies in translation had been touched on in previous scholarship, they were either not pursued, as by Rutherford for example, or dismissed, as by Ngata, who contended that the real meaning lay in the English text.<sup>66</sup> Although the concept of a 'free and intelligent consent' by Maori chiefs was central to both general and academic understandings of the Treaty, Ross was the first historian to consider carefully the language through which this intelligent consent had been obtained. The outcome was, in her opinion, an artless pastiche which relied on a handful of neologisms to convey complex and incommensurate political practices. Even the manner in which assent was demonstrated defied clear cultural definition. What, in the circumstances of the Treaty, she wondered, constituted a signature? Could an individual sign on behalf of his tipuna? Could the consent of one signatory be overridden by a higher chiefly authority?<sup>67</sup> The margin for error within all aspects of the Treaty seemed to Ross to be immense, yet its consequences were profound. For interpretation Maori had trusted in missionary guidance.

The final stage of hermeneutic analysis is to assess a document's validity in terms of its author's intentions and motivations, a test which Ross applied to the Treaty's principal author, Henry Williams. Ross, characteristically perhaps, was sceptical of the universal beneficence of early missionaries. In a lecture to the Auckland Historical Society in 1971 she had stated, 'No one would question that most of the early missionaries, Protestant and Catholic, were sincere men, doing their best for the New Zealanders, often under very trying conditions. But what we must recognise is that their best was not always very good; their actions were not always wise; their teaching was not always in the best interests of those they taught.'<sup>68</sup> In her consideration of the Treaty's language, Ross had suggested that terms vital to the full meaning of the English text had been held back from Maori. The conditions of Williams's life had placed him at the service of the northern Maori community. They had turned to him for interpretation and advice on the Treaty, and it was, Ross noted, a role in which he appeared both confident and comfortable. It was also a responsibility, she thought, that he assumed too lightly. Both he and Busby were by her estimation given to self-importance and were assured of their position 'on the side of the angels'.<sup>69</sup> In establishing motive, it needed to be noted that any well-integrated member of a community must be at one and the same time a member of many, and sometimes conflicting, groups.<sup>70</sup> Ross identified Williams as being at once British, Protestant, an ex-naval officer, a New Zealand landholder, a missionary, and a friend and advisor to Maori. The terms in which he chose to present the Treaty would depend on the extent to which he perceived these roles as being in conflict with one another, and which he let come to the fore. In contrast to those historians who had praised Williams, such as Buick, Ross found his attitude toward Maori to have been at best paternalistic and at worst condescending.<sup>71</sup> It was well known that Williams had supported formal British intervention in New Zealand. In his determination to see this goal achieved she believed he had consciously restricted the terms in which sovereignty had

been presented to Maori. This Ross perceived to be a breach of trust.<sup>72</sup> In her seminar she stated:

If Henry Williams and young Edward had translated sovereignty as *te kawanatanga katoa te mana katoa me te kaha*, no Maori would have been in any doubt about what was being given to the Queen. But if *mana* had been seen as a part of the European concept of sovereignty, would any New Zealander have signed the treaty?... So was the Williams translation of sovereignty political rather than meaningful? Did they, knowing the chiefs would never sign away their *mana* to the Queen deliberately eschew the use of this word and this concept in their translation? Well, your guess is as good as mine.<sup>73</sup>

In ‘Texts and Translations’ she was more outspoken and assured:

In the Maori text of Busby’s declaration of independence ‘all sovereign power and authority within the territories of the United Tribes’ was translated as *ko te Kingitanga ko te mana o te w[h]enua o te w[h]akaminega*. Yet when this same sovereign power and authority was to be ceded to the Queen by, among others, the very chiefs who had supposedly declared themselves possessed of it in 1835, only *te kawanatanga katoa* of their lands was specified. It is difficult not to conclude that the omission of *mana* from the text of the Treaty of Waitangi was no accidental oversight.<sup>74</sup>

The Williamses could, Ross concluded, ‘fairly be held responsible’ for this omission.<sup>75</sup> The paternalistic assumption behind the act, that Pakeha knew what was best for Maori, and should if necessary humour them into compliance, had thus been incorporated by Williams in the country’s inaugural agreement between Maori and the Crown, and had continued to permeate, she felt, historical interpretations and policy toward Maori in her own time. Similarly, Ross did not believe Henry Williams’s to be beyond reproach on the issue of pre-emption in Article Two of the Treaty. Land was a particularly contentious issue at Waitangi during the Treaty signing. Many of the speeches in the debate concerned land sales, some of which specified Williams’s own land holdings as a point of contention. There was also precedence to show that Maori would not have agreed to a Treaty that prevented them from dispensing of their lands on their own terms.<sup>76</sup> However, Ross did not feel Williams to be directly responsible for his mistranslation of pre-emption in the Maori text. She felt it was unlikely that Hobson had indicated the extent to which he intended the embargo on private sales to go. She was, nonetheless, suspicious of the lightness of Williams’s explanation during the Treaty meeting which, as William Colenso had noted, had left Maori clearly misinformed.<sup>77</sup> Subsequently he had also perpetuated the misunderstanding when he would have been in a position to support the Maori perspective. Because of his own land interests, she believed, Williams had remained studiously aloof from the subsequent debates over the Treaty and land sales. It was not until 1861, when he was ‘stung into declaring himself’, that he admitted the explanation he had given to Maori was at variance to the use of pre-emption in the English text.<sup>78</sup> Ross saw Henry Williams, then, as being culpable for two of the more serious misunderstandings in regard to the interpretation of the Treaty. By considering his intentions and motivations as

the principal author of the Maori text she demonstrated the extent to which, in as much as it may be interpreted as 'sacred pact', it was also the product of human error and ambition. She maintained that as a document it was based on an element of deceit and omission and should therefore be judged less on what it intended to achieve and more on what it resulted in conveying.

This analysis of the Treaty, however, placed Ross in an unenviable position, not only at odds with the accepted scholarly view of how British sovereignty was acquired, but openly critical of a central figure in that iconic event. Exposing the Treaty would be both distressing to Pakeha, who had come to accept the sanctity of a pact which legitimized the European presence in New Zealand, and possibly counterproductive to Maori causes with which she sympathized.<sup>79</sup> 'Much of it is dynamite, I know', she had written to Beaglehole at the start of her research in 1954.<sup>80</sup> While her resolve had strengthened in the face of the increased controversy surrounding the Treaty in the early 1970s, it left her no more comfortable with this aspect of her work. 'Why I can't leave well alone I'm damned if I know', Ross wrote to her friend Ormond Wilson while preparing 'Texts and Translations' in 1972. 'What harm have all the rose-tinted spectacles done me that I am driven to snatch them away from people and trample them under foot?'<sup>81</sup> But snatch them she did, feeling as each Waitangi Day celebration passed, with its protests and demonstrations, 'pious moralising' and 'patriotic guff', that New Zealanders were entrenching a myth, 'hoist with a monstrous misconception of our own making'.<sup>82</sup> Empiricists saw myth, in the sense of historical misunderstanding, as arising out of a natural human tendency toward intellectual ease, or even 'sloth'. Failing some obvious reason for examination, 'outrageous improbability' or contradiction, a historical document could become caught in a cycle of uncritical acceptance: 'we swallow it whole, we pin our faith to it, we hawk it about and, if need be, embellish it in the process'.<sup>83</sup> Within the New Zealand context historians such as Beaglehole saw mythmaking arising out of the social need to create an accessible tradition: 'to shed off, as indeed tradition has a habit of doing without deliberately moulding, the inessential for the essential — even if', he noted, this process 'sometimes rather inadequately, or erroneously, picks on a symbol...to incorporate its feeling for the essential'.<sup>84</sup> Ross may have regarded the myths surrounding the Treaty as resulting from a combination of both laziness and social need. This article concludes with a consideration of Ross's view of the Treaty within common historical consciousness, or, in the terms of her day, the national tradition.

Ross believed Maori and Pakeha both searched for an identity within the Treaty. The document's lack of clear definition, however, meant that any sense of identity it provided would be illusory. 'To each one of us', she wrote in the conclusion to 'Texts and Translations', 'the politician in Parliament, the Kaumatua on the marae, Nga Tamatoa in the city, the teacher in the classroom, the preacher in the pulpit — the Treaty of Waitangi says whatever we want it to say. It is a symbol, of Pakeha self-righteousness, of Maori disillusionment.... The signatories of 1840 were uncertain and divided in their understanding of its meaning: who now can say what its intentions were?'<sup>85</sup> Ross's own intentions were to strip the Treaty of symbolism, to lay it out as objectively

as the evidence would allow and to view it again from a strictly documentary basis. Seen thus it may, she hoped, be brought back into perspective as only one of a number of processes that contributed to the acquisition of sovereignty and the colonization of New Zealand.

When Ross first began work on the Treaty in the 1950s and 1960s, concern over interpretation and implementation of the Treaty was still largely a Maori endeavour, impinging on Pakeha only within the bounds of governmental agencies. With the advent of a new generation of Maori activist groups such as Nga Tamatoa taking protests into more public areas, the need for Pakeha to define the Treaty's meaning acquired a degree of urgency. While she was still relatively tentative in her seminar presentations, as interest in the Treaty along the lines that Ross had been advocating increased, she was able to become more outspoken in presenting her findings. 'If I'm no longer just nuts on the subject of the Treaty', she wrote to Keith Sinclair as he edited 'Texts and Translations', 'I can change down out of this rather apologetic personal gear'.<sup>86</sup> 'Texts and Translations' was a more open and confident attack on the emotion and symbolism surrounding the Treaty than her earlier seminar. Rather than, in the manner of some academic writing, hoping to redirect an erroneous tradition subtly, she intended to dispel the error altogether. A basic tenet of empiricism was historicism, the necessity to understand a document on its own terms. Ross felt that after the Treaty had been studied and understood from a documentary basis New Zealanders, Maori and Pakeha, would be in a position to resume their debate and decide what place to accord it in the national consciousness.

'Texts and Translations' used its empiricist base to claim authority over and discredit contemporary perceptions of the Treaty. Its detailed analysis and stance of scholarly objectivity positioned it as the antithesis to the uncritical recycling of an emotive myth. Yet the individual and subjective elements of Ross's interpretation were also displayed. 'Texts and Translations' had its heroes, and antiheroes, and used emotive language to engage the reader in its argument and to carry that argument over into the concept of 'felt tradition'. Busby, particularly his account of the drafting, attracted a number of stinging adjectives from Ross: 'inflated', 'distorted', 'exaggerated' and 'shrill'. He was described as 'leaping into the fray' with 'wild' arguments, and his authorship of the Treaty was dismissed almost entirely from the perspective of the Maori text: 'So much', she stated, 'for Busby's claim to have drawn the treaty'.<sup>87</sup> Henry Williams, while treated less vehemently than Busby, also emerged with his reputation tarnished. In these respects Ross may be regarded as being hypercritical. Claudia Orange, for example, writing 15 years after 'Texts and Translations', and drawing on Ross and her same sources, was notably more supportive of Busby. Not being as emphatic in dismissing the English text, Orange suggested that he might 'be forgiven for the proprietary pride with which he discussed the treaty in later years'.<sup>88</sup> Assessing Williams's translation of the Treaty, she credited him with seeking to preserve, through his choice of rangatiratanga in Article Two, the authority of the chiefs and their 'right to exercise some control', at a time when by international understandings they may not have been regarded as having any at all.<sup>89</sup>

Lyndsay Head has also been critical of the naivety with which Williams's

translation of the Treaty has been approached.<sup>90</sup> Writing to release Maori terminology from the legacy of 'linguistic essentialism' initiated by Ross, she dismissed the 'implausible linguistic incompetence and an implausible conspiracy to deceive' attributed to Williams's choice of terms.<sup>91</sup> Pre-Treaty usages of the term *mana*, for example, suggested to Head not only the appropriateness of its omission from the Treaty text but also the accuracy of *tino rangatiratanga* because the term reflected the 'logic of the Treaty's concern with land' at that time. 'Henry Williams', she concludes, 'translated the treaty of Waitangi for his day, not for posterity', any lightness or amateurishness noted by Ross and subsequent historians need not require such a 'paranoic analysis'.<sup>92</sup> Such readiness by Ross to distrust and dismiss missionary contribution may be characteristic of her historical environment. In a recent assessment of religion in New Zealand history John Stenhouse noted a hypercritical tendency among post-war historians writing about Christianity. They were a generation who, 'with Sinclair leading the way', played down the role of religion in history in favour of nationalist 'myths of origin', and a 'secularized' past.<sup>93</sup> Ross, certainly, was sceptical of the work of early missionaries, but her main concern with mission records was that they had been used too exclusively and too uncritically in New Zealand history. As a result missionary views and prejudices, especially with regard to Maori, had continued to permeate historical interpretations to her present day.<sup>94</sup> This was particularly so in Williams's case because of his elevated historical reputation. She did, however, recognize a margin for personal interpretation, and conceded that hers was a more critical view than many. 'How extraordinary', she wrote to Ormond Wilson of his own work on *Nga Puhī*, 'that we should so often read H. W. differently'.<sup>95</sup> Ross more frequently gave credit to William Colenso, the mission printer, for his own scepticism regarding Williams's explanation of the Treaty and for his 'courageous stand' at the Waitangi signing.

The most outspoken section of 'Texts and Translations' was its conclusion, with its eminently quotable description of the Treaty as 'hastily and inexpertly drawn up, ambiguous and contradictory in content, chaotic in its execution'. 'To persist in postulating that this was a "sacred compact"', Ross maintained, 'is sheer hypocrisy'.<sup>96</sup> While engaging in dispassionate analysis, her conclusion provided a catchphrase that the general public could latch onto, quote at parties and argue about.<sup>97</sup> Between the seminar presentation and the publication of the article the phrase had already come into popular use, being quoted by Maori MP Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan and used on National Radio. It was so hackneyed by the end of the year, in fact, that Ross considered not including it in the article at all.<sup>98</sup> In 1981 J.M.R. Owens used her catchphrase to introduce the Treaty in his chapter of the *Oxford History of New Zealand* and in 1982 Bob Brockie incorporated it into a cartoon on the Treaty for the *National Business Review*.<sup>99</sup> 'Mrs Ross', Brockie wrote, acknowledging his source '[of] Auckland University history department and author of this universal put-down must be gratified to see her words passing into the vernacular'.<sup>100</sup> That perhaps was an accurate summary of the goal of a particular style of history in the post-war period: empiricism in the vernacular.

'Texts and Translations' was Ross's last publication on the Treaty. In the

10 years before her death in 1982 she continued voluntary work on church archives and then, for a time, was a Senior Research Fellow at The University of Auckland, but she did not continue publicly in the Treaty debate. With a handful of other scholars, she had contributed to a new body of Treaty scholarship, one that represented something of a watershed in New Zealand society. In her analysis of the drafting and signing of the Treaty, Ross had demonstrated the extent to which its hurried and somewhat ill-thought-through execution undermined its effectiveness as a document of cession. Her intention was to historicize the Treaty text, to locate it clearly in the context in which it was signed. In doing so she hoped to free the Treaty from its retrospective burden as a symbol of national identity, and to free New Zealanders from the Treaty myth. Compared with the celebratory view of the Treaty at the time, Ross's analysis left New Zealanders with lean pickings. If their wish was to use the Treaty to found a tradition, she believed they needed to accept it as being the document in Maori, with all the contradictions and limitations that entailed. For Maori it would mean accepting that forests and fisheries were not specifically guaranteed by the Treaty, and for Pakeha, relinquishing the myth of a warmly welcomed and benign colonization. An honest tradition required acceptance of both successes and failures. On uncovering a degree of truth about a historical document or situation one could not then use it as a corrupt means, no matter how worthy the end. If, when viewed objectively, the Treaty did not supply the answers New Zealanders were looking for, Ross suggested they would do better to look elsewhere rather than superimposing their frustrations and desires onto an inadequate symbol.

In the years following the publication of 'Texts and Translations', the institutionalizing of the Treaty through the Waitangi Tribunal greatly increased Treaty scholarship in New Zealand. While many of the empirical aspects of Ross's article were embraced, and indeed have become fundamental to understandings of the Treaty, her challenge to its primacy in the national discourse has gone unanswered. In an outspoken 2001 essay on Tribunal histories, Professor Bill Oliver drew attention to the ways in which he believes 'Tribunal hermeneutic and history' have become 'less concerned to recapture the past reality than to embody present aspiration'.<sup>101</sup> '[B]y an appeal to timelessness', Oliver maintained, 'which in effect enables it to apply the standards of its own time to the events of an earlier time — the Tribunal was able to establish a basis for ideal colonising policies which, it believes, should have informed government action affecting Maori from the very beginning'.<sup>102</sup> To have adhered to 'a more academic way of doing history', he suggests, would have resulted in its 'political effectiveness' being 'severely curtailed'.<sup>103</sup> Like Ross, Oliver argued that the historical reality of the Treaty had been put aside in favour of its symbolic potential, in this case through the Treaty principles which circumvent the specific conditions of 1840 and stretch a bridge between a 'retrospective utopia', present political objectives and future aspirations. Where Ross saw interpretation of the Treaty as being used to legitimize a Pakeha presence and the myth of benign colonization, Oliver perceived a similar 'intellectual suppleness' is now used to hold the government accountable, both for the 'settler-state aggression' of the colonial

period and in addressing Maori grievance. This dehistoricization, he asserted, has reduced the Treaty once more to what it 'patently is not — a simple guide to simple action'.<sup>104</sup> The dynamic of the Treaty has been reversed, perhaps, but the problem remains the same.

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## NOTES

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2 Ruth Ross, 'The Treaty on the Ground', in W. Parker, ed., *The Treaty of Waitangi, Its Origins and Significance, A Series of Papers Presented at a Seminar Held at Victoria University of Wellington, 19–20 February, 1972 under the auspices of the Department of University Extension of the University*, Wellington, 1972.

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4 Keith Sinclair to Ross, 7 April 1972, MS 1442, 83:4, Auckland War Memorial Museum Library (AWML).

5 Ranginui Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, Struggle Without End*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Auckland, 2004; Claudia Orange, *The Treaty of Waitangi*, Wellington, 1987.

6 Walker, p.90.

7 For a model of historical engagement with the community see the series of essays by J.C. Beaglehole, 'The New Zealand Mind', *The Australian Quarterly*, 12, 2 (1940), pp.40–50; 'History and the New Zealander', in Ernest Beaglehole, ed., *The University and the Community, Essays in Honour of Thomas Alexander Hunter*, Wellington, 1946, pp.98–124; 'The New Zealand Scholar', in Peter Munz, ed., *The Feel of Truth, Essays in New Zealand and Pacific History Presented to F.L.W. Wood and J.C. Beaglehole on the Occasion of Their Retirement*, Wellington, 1969, pp.237–52.

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12 Tim Beaglehole, *A Life of J.C. Beaglehole, New Zealand Scholar*, Wellington, 2006, p.250; Personal communication with Tim Beaglehole, 30 July 2008; Ch.V. Langlois and Ch. Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History*, trans G.G. Berry, London, 1898; Sir Henry Lambert, *The Nature of History*, London, 1933; C.H. Williams, *The Modern Historian*, London, 1938; see also *Victoria University College Calendar*, 1944, p.39.

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14 Langlois & Seignobos, p.67. This text has been used to provide the empirical methodological framework discussed in this article.

15 Beaglehole, 'History and the New Zealander', p.106.

16 Ross to Dora and Graham Bagnell, 16 November 1954, MS 1442, 90:2, AWML.

17 H.H. Turton, ed., *Facsimiles of the Declaration of Independence and the Treaty of Waitangi*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Wellington, 1960; Ross to Beaglehole, 2 July 1957, MS 1442, 91:1, AWML.

18 Turton, Preface.

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21 Hilliard, pp.71–73. Hilliard was working from Buick's 1936 edition.

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23 Buick, 1914, p.92. (Italics in the original.)

24 Buick, 1933, p.113.

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- 30 *ibid.*, p.8.
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- 32 *ibid.*, p.10.
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- 34 Ngata, p.16.
- 35 J. Rutherford, *Hone Heke's Rebellion, 1844–1846: An Episode in the Establishment of British Rule in New Zealand*, Bulletin No.34, Auckland University College, 1947; J. Rutherford, *The Treaty of Waitangi and the Acquisition of British Sovereignty in New Zealand, 1840*, Bulletin No.36, Historical Series No.3, Auckland University College, 1948.
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- 49 *ibid.*, pp.71–86.
- 50 Ross, 'The Treaty on the Ground', p.17.
- 51 *ibid.*, pp.17, 27; Ross, 'Texts and Translations' p.134.
- 52 Ross, 'The Treaty on the Ground', p.21; Ross, 'Texts and Translations', p.142.
- 53 Ross, 'Texts and Translations', p.135.
- 54 Ross to Beaglehole, 1 April 1954, MS 1442, 24:5, AWML; 'Our Queen to Visit Historic Waitangi', *Auckland Star*, 6 June 1953, p.2.
- 55 Ross, 'Texts and Translations', p.132.
- 56 Langlois and Seignobos, p.96; Ross, 'The Treaty on the Ground', p.18.
- 57 Ross, 'The Treaty on the Ground', p.18.
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- 59 *ibid.*, p.138.
- 60 Ross, 'The Treaty on the Ground', p.16; Ross, 'Texts and Translations', p.136.
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