


Prohibition and the Myth of 1919



IN THE LATE NINETEENTH and early twentieth centuries New Zealand had an active and influential temperance and prohibition movement. For a time many considered it possible that the country would one day ban the manufacture, importation and sale of alcohol. In 1896 a *New Zealand Herald* columnist wrote that it is 'idle to close our eyes to the fact that Prohibition is coming'.¹ The New Zealand correspondent for the *Sydney Bulletin* confidently asserted in 1902: 'I hereby pronounce prohibition as inevitable as death in Maoriland'.² These predictions were of course never realized, although the prohibition movement came tantalizingly close to achieving its central goal in 1919. According to several historians, the movement faded away shortly afterwards. Perhaps the best-known version of this view came from Keith Sinclair, who wrote that the 'crusade' to outlaw the sale of liquor in New Zealand 'fizzled out' after World War I: 'The teetotallers almost succeeded, in 1919, in winning their campaign. Only the votes of the Servicemen overseas, ninety percent of whom voted "wet", saved the New Zealanders from that unlawful thirst which tantalized the Americans in the twenties. Thereafter the enthusiasm and numbers of the prohibitionists declined.'³

Sinclair was writing about a special one-off referendum on prohibition held in April 1919. To avoid disenfranchising members of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force serving abroad, the Licensing Amendment Act 1918 ensured that they would be entitled to cast special votes. When the initial results came in, 'National Prohibition' had a narrow lead over 'National Continuance' (that is, maintaining the status quo). But there were 40,000 votes yet to be counted, those of the troops still overseas. Eighty percent of the troops (slightly less than the 90% in Sinclair's account) voted for continuance, reducing the prohibition share of the vote to 49%, just short of the 50% required.⁴ Thus, after a close-run poll, the prohibitionist threat was supposedly vanquished once and for all.

The story of the troops 'rescuing' the country from prohibition in 1919 is well known, and has been repeated in a number of accounts.⁵ The fact that Sinclair's general history has been in continuous publication since 1959 must also take some credit for the story's familiarity, along with its appealing dramatic elements — the apparent prohibition victory after polling day, the long wait for the special votes to be tallied, and the thwarting of the prohibitionist dream once the final results came in. When Sinclair was first published, many readers would still have recalled first-hand the month or so when it seemed possible that prohibition would be introduced. A.H. Reed, writing a few years earlier, would have been able to recount the story from personal memory.⁶ In recent years the story of the 1919 referendum has been repeated in two general histories, James Belich's *Paradise Reforged* and Gordon McLauchlan's *Short History of New Zealand*. These books were aimed at different audiences, but both acknowledged the influence of the prohibition movement.⁷ Few historians have seriously questioned

that prohibition was dealt a fatal blow by troops rebelling against the prospect of returning to a country where they could not legally buy a drink. According to Richard Newman, the climax of the prohibition movement came as early as 1911, and ‘public interest in prohibition waned’ after 1919.⁸ For Belich, ‘moral evangelism’s long term assault on the “demon drink”’ lasted from 1880 to 1920.⁹ The prohibitionists largely disappeared from the historiography after that point in these narratives. Yet the version of events recounted by Sinclair, and his followers, is somewhat misleading. It is not just that he overstated the importance of the April 1919 poll and of the role the troop’s votes played in the result. More importantly, he was mistaken in linking this poll to the death of prohibition. The prohibition movement did not fade away after 1919, but remained a vibrant political force throughout the 1920s. The evidence indicates that the Depression of the early 1930s was the main factor that ended the prohibitionists’ dream. The votes of soldiers in 1919 had little to do with it. The strength of the prohibition movement during the 1920s helped ensure that the numerous restrictions placed on access to alcohol in earlier periods remained largely untouched for several decades. Thanks to the Depression and World War II, the country had more important issues to deal with in the interim.¹⁰

This article begins with a brief description of the development of liquor polls in New Zealand. The polls provide a useful gauge of public support for prohibition, although they are not the only measure. I then outline the progress of the prohibition movement during the 1920s and early 1930s, showing the ongoing strength and eventual rapid decline of the movement. A short section discusses a claim made by Conrad Bollinger — perhaps the sole historian to acknowledge the continued strength of the prohibition movement after 1919 — that only the addition of a ‘State Purchase and Control’ option to the ballot paper prevented prohibition from being carried in the 1920s. The strength of the prohibition movement throughout that decade ensured the survival of the triennial prohibition poll, which in turn helped perpetuate the influence of the prohibition movement long after prohibition ceased to be a practical proposition. The recurring polls on liquor issues provided politicians with a regular reminder of the strength of temperance support, making them wary of lessening restrictions on access to alcohol or abolishing the triennial poll. In addition, the repeated polls led to a kind of vicious circle. As John Prince has written, regular polls ‘cemented into New Zealand’s political consciousness the notion that alcohol was so sensitive a subject that issues concerning it ought to be regularly put to the people in referendums’.¹¹ The scope of liquor polling widened throughout the century to include such things as local polls on new liquor licences and whether or not they should be controlled by community trusts. Regular polling also helped instil in the public mind the idea that there was something sinister, or at least exceptional, about alcohol that required it to be controlled by intrusive regulations, of which the prohibition on liquor sales after 6pm (‘six o’clock closing’) was only the most obvious.

By the late nineteenth century it had become central to the ideology of New Zealand’s prohibition movement that liquor sales should be banned by way of referendum. The idea that ‘the people’ should control the liquor traffic originated in the US and rapidly spread to other parts of the English-

speaking world. Thirteen American states and territories banned liquor sales in the 1850s, some through referendums.¹² In Canada, the Canadian Temperance Act 1878 introduced 'local veto', which allowed communities to ban the sale of liquor through popular vote.¹³ The United Kingdom Alliance, a prohibition lobby group, also adopted local veto as one of its central planks.¹⁴ New Zealand eventually took up the notion of democratic control of liquor with an enthusiasm that was impressive by international standards.¹⁵ Initially the measures were low key. From the 1860s to the 1880s, forms of public control over liquor licensing at a provincial and then national level included petitions, local polls and elected licensing committees.¹⁶ Such measures fell well short of what was demanded by the prohibitionists, whose initial aim was to implement local veto laws, also known as the 'local option'. When William Fox unsuccessfully introduced a local option Bill into Parliament in 1873, he stated that it was to put the power of issuing licenses 'in the hands of the people'. The Bill would, he said, 'give them the power to say, by way of veto, "there shall not be alcoholic liquors sold in this district"'.¹⁷ In 1886 a national body, the New Zealand Alliance for the Abolition of the Liquor Traffic (generally known as 'the Alliance') was formed specifically to lobby for prohibition. Its primary aim, as stated in its constitution, was the 'abolition and prohibition of the liquor traffic in New Zealand by the direct vote of the people'.¹⁸

Effective local veto legislation finally came in 1893, in the form of an Act that enabled voters to close all bars and bottle stores in their electorates through a referendum held every three years.¹⁹ Premier Richard Seddon made this concession to the forces of prohibition primarily to placate the temperance faction within his own caucus. As David Hamer has written, '[b]y conceding local option Seddon had hoped to remove the question from the arena of parliamentary politics to the separate licensing poll'.²⁰ He thus hoped that liquor issues would no longer be a source of division within his government. In 1894 the Act was amended so that the polls would be held in conjunction with every general election, thereby, it was hoped, increasing the turnout in both. By 1908, 484 hotel bars had been closed through local option, and 12 out of 76 electorates had voted to abolish liquor sales.²¹

But progress was slow, primarily due to a 60% majority being required to close all liquor outlets in an electorate. Furthermore, although liquor sales were illegal in dry districts, alcohol could legally be imported from outside for personal use, and 'sly grogging' flourished. Prohibitionists therefore pushed for a referendum on national prohibition. They wanted to force a nationwide ban, not just on the sale of alcohol, but also on its manufacture and importation. In 1910 the Liberal government, led by Joseph Ward, legislated for triennial polls on national prohibition, with the same 60% majority being required as in the local option polls.²² National referendums on prohibition were held in 1911 and 1914, but the third was delayed, along with the general election, because of the war. In 1917 the National Efficiency Board, a committee of five businessmen, three of whom were staunch prohibitionists, recommended that an extra licensing poll be held, with compensation to be paid to the industry in the event of prohibition being carried.²³ The government put this

recommendation into effect in 1918, reducing the required majority to 50% for this and all subsequent national prohibition polls.²⁴

Figure 1 below shows the vote for prohibition in the first eight national licensing polls held under the Licensing Act as amended in 1910 and 1918. It is immediately obvious that there was nothing special about the size of the prohibition vote in April 1919 compared with previous polls. The prohibition vote, at 49%, was the same as in 1914 and considerably less than in 1911. What made the poll different was that it was the first in which a bare majority was required for prohibition to be implemented, rather than 60%. The next three prohibition polls produced an average prohibition vote of 48.5%, which hardly points to a significant decline in the popularity of prohibition. As will be seen later, there is a perfectly reasonable explanation for the big fall in prohibition voting in 1928. The Alliance deliberately refrained from campaigning for the floating vote through newspaper advertisements and billboards that year. The reasons for this decision are unclear, although several possible explanations will be discussed. The obvious result was a voter swing away from prohibition that did not necessarily reflect the level of support it would have achieved had a proper campaign been run in its favour.




Figure 1: Percentage voting national prohibition in licensing polls, 1911–1935.

Source: *New Zealand Official Year Book* (NZOYB), 1921–1938.

The surprising result of the special referendum of April 1919 was not that prohibition polled so well; it was that prohibition polled so poorly. There were good reasons to think that the poll result would be a considerable improvement (from a prohibitionist perspective) on the disappointing result of 1914. For one thing, the young men who made up the majority of war dead were likely to have been opponents rather than supporters of prohibition.²⁵ The prohibition cause benefited from the war in other ways too. Concerns about ‘national efficiency’ provoked an international hysteria about alcohol, with many countries imposing significant restrictions on its sale. Referendums on prohibition in several Canadian provinces and in Norway resulted in liquor sales being banned. Finland introduced prohibition by statute, while in the US it was

introduced through an amendment to the constitution. New Zealand banned the 'shouting' of drinks and implemented six o'clock closing supposedly as a temporary war measure. As already noted, Parliament also passed legislation for a special poll on prohibition. Moreover, the war encouraged many in the business community to support prohibition, establishing an Efficiency League to campaign in its favour in 1919. With all this wartime anti-alcohol sentiment, and the 1918 Licensing Amendment Act enabling prohibition to be introduced by a simple majority, prohibitionists must have felt confident. All they needed to do was improve on their 1914 result (49%). Victory was all but assured.

So why did prohibition fail to increase its share of the vote in the 1919 special poll? One possible explanation is that the public was satisfied with restrictions already imposed, most obviously the introduction of permanent six o'clock closing in 1918. While plausible, this explanation is incompatible with the evidence suggested by previous voting behaviour. Earlier restrictions, including cutbacks on hours of sale, a freeze on new liquor licences, the ability to vote electorates dry, and a ban on new barmaids, appear to have done nothing to blunt enthusiasm for prohibition. As noted previously, in 1911 voters were for the first time able to vote for both national prohibition and local no-licence. While a clear majority voted for national prohibition, less than half of voters supported local no-licence.²⁶ The greater popularity of the seemingly more radical alternative indicates that prohibition supporters were not satisfied with half measures such as regional restrictions on sales. They wanted the manufacture and sale of alcohol to be banned throughout the country. There is likewise no reason to suppose they would be satisfied with six o'clock closing when prohibition remained a viable alternative.

Another possible explanation for the failure of prohibition to win in 1919 is that wartime anti-alcohol hysteria quickly dissipated in the face of post-war euphoria. However, the supposition that anti-liquor sentiment evaporated within a few months of war's end is inconsistent with the international evidence. In several countries, wartime restrictions on alcohol were confirmed or increased after the war. Six o'clock closing became permanent in New South Wales in 1919 and the government legislated for the state's first referendum on prohibition.²⁷ The eighteenth amendment to the US constitution, which introduced prohibition, was not finally ratified until January 1919.²⁸ Anti-liquor sentiment clearly outlived the war in other countries and there is no reason to suppose that New Zealand was any different.

A more promising line of argument was suggested by Laurie Guy in a paper presented at the 2005 New Zealand Historical Association conference.²⁹ Guy noted that prohibition was strongly identified with the evangelical Protestant churches, particularly the Methodist, Baptist, Salvation Army and Presbyterian churches. In contrast, for reasons of doctrine and tradition, the Roman Catholic church was often unsupportive or even antipathetic towards the banning of alcohol. The upsurge in sectarian feeling following the 1916 Easter uprising, and the formation of Howard Eliot's Protestant Political Association in 1917, exacerbated these differences in the lead-up to the 1919 poll. Guy speculated that an upsurge in anti-Catholic rhetoric from Protestant prohibition advocates led the Catholic hierarchy to urge adherents, even more strongly than in the

past, to vote against prohibition. This may in turn have led some among the minority of Catholic voters who supported prohibition to reconsider their position on the issue.

Whatever the reasons, prohibition was defeated, perhaps against expectations, in April 1919. But historians have tended to overlook that there was not one, but two, polls on prohibition held in 1919. Because polls were, by statute, held in conjunction with every general election, a second prohibition poll was held in December, when the delayed 1917 general election finally took place. Although prohibitionists were given their second opportunity within eight months to abolish the evil of drink, they cannot have been optimistic about their chances in the second poll given their failure in the first. Previous referendums had been head-to-head contests between continuance and prohibition. From December 1919 a third option, 'State Purchase and Control', was added to the ballot paper, thanks primarily to lobbying by the Labour Party and the liquor industry.³⁰ Both the prohibition and liquor lobbies expected state control to capture votes from more moderate prohibitionists, thereby splitting the vote and ensuring that prohibition support would fall well short of the required majority. Everyone concerned considered a heavy loss by the forces of prohibition to be a foregone conclusion. Yet despite the addition of a third option, the prohibition vote actually increased to 49.7% in December 1919. If a further 1632 of the 543,762 votes cast had been for prohibition, it would have become law. By then the role of special votes was minimal, as there were only 1744 of them, including 278 for prohibition.³¹ It is likely that this 'near miss' took the liquor industry by surprise, after having supposedly made its position safe by successfully lobbying for the extra option. As it turned out, the modest 6% vote attracted by state control was entirely at the expense of continuance. The 'moderate' prohibition voter that the liquor lobby had hoped would be attracted to state control did not appear to exist.

A month after voters rejected prohibition by a paper-thin margin, constitutional prohibition came into effect in the US, thereby providing a huge fillip to prohibitionists worldwide. Soon they would be able to point to actual examples of the hitherto largely theoretical benefits of prohibition. Perhaps because of the American example, opposition to alcohol appeared to lose some of its extremist image. In 1921, the Chief Inspector of Primary Schools reported that temperance instruction had become a standard part of the school curriculum: 'Our chief aim should be to point out the great dangers coming from the use of alcoholic drinks, and to emphasise the evil effects of intemperance from the physical, mental and moral standpoints.'³² Also in 1921, the Department of Health issued a pamphlet that outlined the detrimental effects of alcohol on the mind, body and society. Its principal conclusion was that 'the evils, individual and social, physical and moral, inseparably associated with the taking of alcoholic beverages far outweigh any considerations of its comparative harmlessness in restricted quantities'.³³ It is hard to interpret this as anything other than an endorsement of prohibition.

After its close shave in December 1919, the liquor industry went on the offensive for the next poll, scheduled for November 1922. The industry had traditionally been divided into various factions, primarily consisting of

brewers, publicans and wholesalers, whose aims were often in conflict. It was only during World War I that an organization, the National Council for the Licensed Trade of New Zealand (generally called ‘the National Council’), was successfully established to provide a united lobby against prohibition, which posed a threat to all in the industry. In the months leading up to the 1922 poll, the National Council distributed seven issues of a free monthly newspaper titled *Cheerio*, which also came out in a limited form in 1925 and 1928.³⁴ The early issues of *Cheerio* were a mixture of serious criticism and light-hearted satire, aimed at combating ‘the dismal band of self-appointed reformers who would eliminate all joy from the world’.³⁵ It highlighted the alleged failures of prohibition in the US, especially enforcement difficulties and rising crime, and claimed that civil liberties there were being progressively curtailed. Other highbrow content included a syndicated column by the American essayist H.L. Mencken and an article by Canadian economist Stephen Leacock.³⁶ Less seriously, the newspaper drew attention to supposed attempts in various parts of America to ban smoking and beauty contests and to enforce modest skirt length, church attendance and codes of seaside dress.³⁷ It claimed that dancing, horse racing and the theatre would be the next targets.³⁸ It also quoted Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s quip that in the US ‘a man kissing his wife in the street is in danger of violating some amendment or other’.³⁹ *Cheerio* was not alone in mocking prohibition. Visiting American prohibitionist Mary Harris Armor wrote in 1922 that ‘[n]ot a cartoon or jest flung at prohibition was ever printed in America, that was not duplicated in New Zealand’.⁴⁰

The National Council’s 1922 propaganda also focused on the domestic arena. Many of *Cheerio*’s advertisements aimed to wean women voters away from their perceived preference for prohibition, trying to arouse fears that homes would be invaded by government agents looking for liquor, that the price of household essentials would increase because of lost tax revenue, and that husbands would become less manly.⁴¹ ‘No sane woman wants a finicky milksop for a husband’, declared one advertisement, while another claimed that ‘Every woman who votes prohibition casts a slur upon the manhood of this country’.⁴²





Figure 2: Percent voting in the general election who did not vote in the general licensing poll, 1911–1928. Source: NZOYB, 1913–1931, 1990.

On the opposing side of the debate, the Alliance ran a reasonably robust campaign, despite its resources being depleted by the two referendums in 1919. One result of this tightly fought tussle was increased public interest in the prohibition issue. Figure 2 shows the proportion of people who voted in the general election who failed to vote in the general licensing poll. As can be seen, voter participation in the poll in 1922 was almost universal; just two in every thousand general election voters failed to vote in the licensing poll. Participation was almost as high in 1925.

Prohibition received just under 49% of the vote in 1922, roughly the same level of support as in the three previous polls. The liquor industry's propaganda offensive had barely made a dent in the prohibition vote. The threat that prohibition would be imposed, with no compensation paid to the industry, remained a very real one. In 1923, several 'prominent representatives of the trade', as they were later described, approached the government in support of a proposal from Anglican clergymen for a scheme dubbed 'corporate control'. Under this proposal all liquor outlets and breweries would be united in a single corporation, in which the government would have a 20% stake.⁴³ The obvious intention was to foist some of the risk of prohibition onto the public. Although the proposal never came to anything, the fact that some in the industry



Concerned at the close results of the two prohibition polls held in 1919, the liquor industry ran a large-scale campaign against prohibition in 1922. But despite distributing seven issues of the free monthly newspaper *Cheerio*, the industry made little inroad into the prohibition vote. Source: New Zealand and Pacific Collection, S-L 803-1, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand.


were prepared to support it shows a degree of desperation in the face of the prohibitionist threat. Later that year a new company, New Zealand Breweries, was formed. Although this may appear to have been an expression of confidence in the industry, in reality the company came out of a defensive merger of the country's ten largest breweries, presumably to reduce competition and bring down costs. The new company offered £1 million worth of debentures to the public, paying a tax-free interest rate of 10% per annum, twice the contemporary going rate. The offer included an option for debenture holders to take up shares in the company. As with the corporate control proposal, this was a clear attempt to offload some of the risk of prohibition onto the public. The public showed little interest in taking on this risk. The New Zealand Breweries debenture issue was greatly under-subscribed, and few subscribers took up the share option.⁴⁴

In contrast to the malaise affecting the liquor industry, those in the prohibition movement were buoyed by their success in the face of the significant onslaught in 1922. The Alliance began to transform itself from a largely voluntary organization into a professional lobby group. From 1923 it employed increasing numbers of full-time staff in 11 (later 12) regional offices, and established a permanent head office in Wellington that included a publicity department. By 1925, the Alliance's staff had increased to 58.⁴⁵ Throughout the 1920s it continued to publish the movement's monthly newspaper, *Vanguard*, and in 1925 produced *The Alliance Handbook*, full of facts and figures to assist prohibition campaigners.⁴⁶ The non-conformist churches became increasingly united in support of prohibition, making their congregations available to fund-raising speakers and allowing church notice boards to feature prohibitionist posters.⁴⁷ Visiting overseas speakers continued to tour the country every three years extolling the virtues of prohibition. One of the 1922 speakers was legendary American campaigner 'Pussyfoot' Johnston.⁴⁸ All this activity indicates that the movement remained well funded. While it is a rather crude measure, a survey of advertisements in the *Dominion* in the weeks before the various polls provides an indication of the financial strength of the Alliance. Between 1922 and 1925, the number of advertisements placed for prohibition increased by over 25%, and exceeded the total placed for continuance and state control combined.⁴⁹ In addition, the Alliance sent three issues of a campaign newspaper, *Good Luck*, to every household in the country and issued other supplementary literature, including the aforementioned handbook.

Thus, in 1925, the Alliance mounted its biggest campaign ever. The National Council responded with newspaper advertisements that made numerous claims about the American situation, particularly through 'open letter' advertising. These advertisements, which had been used to a limited extent in 1919 and 1922, featured a letter from a prominent American citizen, typically a Congressman, making allegations about the unenforceability and negative effects of prohibition.⁵⁰ The vote for prohibition again fell slightly, to 47%. Yet the arguments about the harms and benefits of prohibition in the US appear to have had little bearing on the result; the continuance vote fell by an equivalent amount. Instead, events in Canada, where some provinces had thrown out prohibition in favour of partial state control of the liquor trade, seem to have had the greater impact. The Moderate League, which campaigned for state

control, drew attention to the Canadian situation in its newspaper advertising.⁵¹ The state control vote rose by over three percentage points, gaining equally from continuance and prohibition. If prohibition had not lost votes to state control, its support would have remained at the same level as in 1922.

There was also another apparent setback for the prohibition movement in 1925. Ohinemuri, one of the country's dry districts, voted itself wet again in the local licensing polls. Since 1908 no more electorates had gone dry, and local veto was abolished in 1918. However, triennial polls continued in dry districts to give them an opportunity to reintroduce liquor licences, as happened in Ohinemuri. Despite appearances, this was a symbolic setback rather than a major blow for the prohibitionists. The Waihi miners, who made up a large proportion of voters in the district, had helped vote the area dry in 1908 to punish publicans for increasing the price of beer.⁵² The fact that the district went wet again was therefore no surprise, although it took five polls to muster the 60% majority required to restore licences. It was to be a further 18 years before another dry district voted itself wet.⁵³



In 1925 the Alliance ran its biggest prohibition campaign ever, and followed the liquor industry's lead by distributing three issues of the free newspaper *Good Luck!*. The idealization of the family illustrated here, while common, tended to be a minor part of Alliance propaganda at the time. The use of the swastika, a Hindu good luck symbol, was probably inspired by the admiration that many prohibitionists held for the alcohol restrictions imposed throughout much of India. Source: New Zealand and Pacific Collection, S-L 804-1, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand.

In 1928, the prohibition vote plummeted to 40%, a 15% fall in support in just three years. On the surface, this would seem to be the end of the prohibition movement in New Zealand. Yet there is a very simple explanation for the 1928 result. A scan of newspapers in the weeks leading up to the poll reveals that not a single advertisement was placed in support of prohibition. The Alliance had decided at its annual meeting not to incur the expense of newspaper advertising or commercial billboards.⁵⁴ This effectively delivered the undecided vote into the hands of prohibition's opponents. The decision seems very odd for an organization whose whole *raison d'être* was to win the prohibition poll. One plausible explanation for the low-key campaign is that the Alliance was in financial trouble. However, accounts produced less than two months after the 1928 referendum show the organization was in a reasonably sound financial state. The Alliance continued to maintain a regional branch office structure costing some £14,000 a year and had substantial financial assets on its books, including nearly £1000 worth of motor vehicles. Its income over a ten-month period had been £22,559, demonstrating continued substantial support from donors.⁵⁵ To put this latter figure in perspective, the Alliance later claimed to have spent £17,600 on its entire 1925 prohibition campaign.⁵⁶ The accounts did reveal considerable debt, amounting to nearly £17,000, which would have been worrying to an organization with an uncertain income. All the same, it is hard to understand why the Alliance chose to concede the 1928 poll without a fight rather than make other cutbacks, such as laying off staff or selling assets. Furthermore, in 1928 the Alliance was planning a book on the history of the New Zealand prohibition movement; it was published in 1930.⁵⁷ It would have been odd to fund such an undertaking if the organization was indeed worried about its financial state.

The Alliance's newspaper, *Vanguard*, gave no clues as to the Alliance's strategy in 1928; it merely expressed disappointment at the result.⁵⁸ The mainstream press paid little attention to the licensing poll, being preoccupied with a shock general election outcome that produced a hung Parliament. The liquor poll was barely mentioned while the country awaited the counting of special votes and talks between the major parties. One of the few comments came from the *Dominion*: 'The remarkable result of the national licensing poll has been overshadowed in the public mind by the surprise at the general election. But it is safe to say that the swing against prohibition was far more decisive than was generally expected.'⁵⁹ The surprise expressed by the *Dominion* is in itself perhaps surprising given that the newspaper would have been well aware of the lack of a prohibition print campaign. An upswing in demand for brewery company shares in the week after the poll was not expected in some quarters.⁶⁰

One possible explanation for the low-key Alliance campaign is that it was saving resources for a major campaign in 1931. As the campaign in 1925 had ultimately failed, it may have been thought that an even larger one was needed, something the organization could not afford in 1928. A more likely explanation, however, is that the Alliance was simply biding its time. The failure of partial prohibition in Canada, which had some impact in the polls of 1925 and 1928, would hopefully soon be forgotten.⁶¹ In the meantime near-complete

prohibition — a ban on the manufacture, importation and sale of alcohol — would remain embedded in the US constitution. Over time the prohibitionists hoped that the American example would bring home the value of prohibition to New Zealanders. This view may seem hopelessly naïve with the benefit of hindsight, but it needs to be put in the context of the time, when the impending world wide Depression was still unimaginable. The following quotation from an *Auckland Star* editorial, written as US prohibition approached its ninth anniversary, gives a good indication of mainstream views on the subject: ‘It is too early to definitely form any conclusion about the success or failure of Prohibition in the United States. At least a generation will have to pass before an unprejudiced observer will be able to pronounce with any degree of authority on the success or otherwise of this social experiment. Embodied as it is in the Constitution, only the very direst failure will end Prohibition in the U.S.’⁶²

Whatever the Alliance strategy in 1928, two things are clear. First, there is little doubt that prohibition would have received more votes if the Alliance had run a proper campaign. Secondly, it was unlikely the organization would repeat the mistake. Future campaigns included newspaper advertising. Indeed, there was much for prohibitionists to take heart from in the 1928 result. It appeared to show there were a significant number of floating voters ripe for the picking. If the Alliance could lose so many votes for the prohibition cause by running a minimal campaign in 1928, there seemed no reason to suppose that these votes could not be won back through a proper campaign in 1931.

The Alliance’s decision to forgo newspaper advertising in 1928 meant that liquor industry propaganda went unanswered, an advantage the National Council exploited to the full. Its advertisements in the *Dominion* highlighted the fact that Norway and most Canadian provinces had already overthrown their prohibition laws and claimed there was a rising tide of evidence from the US on the damage done by prohibition there.⁶³ An open letter from an American senator implored New Zealand voters to ‘keep out such lawlessness and corruption’, and other open letters expressed similar sentiments.⁶⁴ It did not help the Alliance cause that midway through the campaign the *Dominion* published an article by long-serving Hutt MP Thomas Wilford titled ‘Why Canada abandoned Prohibition’. Wilford had visited Canada on a field trip and wrote at length about the enforcement problems and alleged intemperance that had dogged Canadian authorities.⁶⁵ The only bright spot for the Alliance was the election of Herbert Hoover as US President a week before the 1928 licensing poll. Both the Alliance and the National Council treated the contest between Hoover and Al Smith as a ‘dry versus wet’ battle, and Hoover’s election was therefore interpreted by the Alliance as an endorsement of prohibition.⁶⁶ The minimal campaign run by the Alliance had another predictable effect on the general licensing poll: an increase in the incidence of non-voting. As Figure 2 shows, there was a jump in 1928 in the number of people who voted in the general election but who chose not to vote in the licensing poll.

The prohibitionists’ apparent tactic of conserving resources for future campaigns hit a fatal snag. Thanks to the Depression, the poll scheduled for 1931 never took place; it was cancelled as an austerity measure. Despite the

lack of a referendum result to gauge public support, it was clear that prohibition in New Zealand was dead, and nothing short of a miracle would ever revive it. The Alliance's accounts for the year ending 31 March 1931 speak volumes. Income for the previous year was just £1270, and most of the Alliance's staff had been laid off.⁶⁷ The monthly publication *Vanguard* was shut down after 25 years, later to be re-launched as a quarterly.⁶⁸ The 1932 annual report lamented a year that was 'one of the most difficult, if not the most difficult and trying, of any in the history of the Movement'.⁶⁹ Morale was at rock-bottom. The annual report blamed the fall in income on the Depression, causing the movement's supporters to prune discretionary expenditure. Yet this explanation does not ring entirely true. Other organizations dependent on donations survived the Depression without such drastic cutbacks. The Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), for example, continued to publish its monthly newspapers the *White Ribbon* and the *Beacon* throughout the 1930s, and in 1934 published a fiftieth anniversary booklet.⁷⁰ While the WCTU advocated prohibition, it also focused on other social and religious issues, enabling it to maintain support through tough times. The Alliance, on the other hand, was a single-issue lobby group for a cause the practicalities of whose implementation even its core supporters were starting to doubt.

The cause of this sudden loss of faith was almost certainly the fact that the Depression had its origins in the US. Economic reasoning had long been important in the prohibition debate. In 1922, for example, the National Council's newspaper advertising repeated well-worn arguments that increased taxes would be needed to replace lost liquor revenue and fund the enforcement of prohibition, a sensitive issue at a time when taxes were already on the rise.⁷¹ The Alliance countered that prohibition would lead to a more efficient use of resources in the economy and thus no decline in tax revenue, and claimed that enforcement costs would be balanced by reduced costs in other areas, such as health and crime.⁷² During the 1920s the Alliance often went further than this, claiming that the American experience showed that prohibition benefitted the economy. For example, six weeks before the Wall Street crash, *Vanguard* stated that 'it is now a matter of record that during the prohibition regime the U.S. has continually prospered, and in the 10th year is going on establishing new records in industry and trade'.⁷³ The dramatic refutation of such claims in subsequent weeks, and years, helped to quickly put an end to prohibition in America, and it just as quickly ensured a loss of faith by many previously hard-core prohibition supporters in New Zealand. While they may have still believed in prohibition as an ideal, they no longer supported its practical implementation strongly enough to back it with their money.

When the next prohibition poll was finally held in 1935, the general election having been delayed for a year, it confirmed what was already obvious. Prohibition support plummeted to under 30%, a fall of over a third in ten years. It was clear to all but the most myopic of supporters that any chance of prohibition being adopted in New Zealand had disappeared. By 1935 almost every country and territory that had introduced prohibition had overturned it. Finnish voters threw out prohibition in a December 1931 referendum and Iceland followed suit two years later.⁷⁴ The US was, of course, the most prominent country to repeal

prohibition, officially lifting the ban on alcohol in January 1934, although the change had been approved much earlier. By 1935 tiny Prince Edward Island was one of the few remaining prohibition territories of any significance in the developed world.⁷⁵ ‘The Prohibition Experiment has been heavily paid for by other countries, all of which have repealed this impossible law’, declared a typical National Council advertisement in 1935.⁷⁶ Other slogans averred ‘you know what prohibition did to America’, ‘remember — all the world has rejected prohibition’, and called prohibition ‘an acknowledged universal failure’.⁷⁷ It was claimed that prohibition had ‘thoroughly demonstrated its calamitous results both economically and morally’.⁷⁸ Edith Thornton, writing in 1936, noted that the Alliance had held up American prohibition as an example to voters and ‘the most telling blow to prohibition in New Zealand was dealt when the U.S.A. went “wet”’.⁷⁹

However, prohibition was dead in New Zealand before constitutional prohibition ended in the US. The dismal financial state of the Alliance in 1931 was testimony to that. Its core backers had already withdrawn their support, and they did not return when the economy started to improve. The Alliance’s accounts for 1933–1934 were in no better shape than they had been two years earlier.⁸⁰ Once the Depression hit America, the Alliance’s supporters were not only less able to dip into their pockets to support the prohibition cause, they were also far less willing to do so.

While Sinclair and others gave prohibition a premature burial Conrad Bollinger allowed prohibition a much slower death. Because his 1959 book *Grog’s Own Country* was a highly polemical and uneven work (and the 1967 edition no less so), some of his views have been overlooked. But Bollinger argued, as does this article, that in the 1920s the prohibition movement remained a political force. In fact he took the argument a step further, claiming that the only thing that stopped prohibition from winning in several polls was the insertion of the state control option into the ballot paper from December 1919. According to Bollinger, state control took votes away from prohibition, thus ensuring the status quo would prevail. ‘There is little doubt’, he wrote, ‘that the existence of the third alternative saved the trade during the 1920s’.⁸¹ Thus, it was not the troops in 1919 who saved the country from prohibition; it was those who voted for state control in the 1920s. Bollinger was not alone in this view. John Daniels claimed that ‘the insertion of the state purchase and control issue worked, as had obviously been intended, to draw away votes from prohibition’.⁸² Even before the results of the first three-way poll were out, the *Evening Post* claimed that the poll was unfair in requiring a majority vote for prohibition.⁸³ The paper advocated that, with three options on the ballot paper, whichever achieved the most votes should win, as would have happened in an electorate contest in a general election.

It has already been noted that when the state control option was introduced in December 1919, it had no effect on the prohibition vote, which increased in that poll rather than falling as expected. Table 1 shows the estimated effect of the state control vote on prohibition and continuance before 1950. The figures were calculated on the basis of the shifts in voter support between polls. When support for two options moved in opposite directions, it was assumed there

was a net migration of voters from one option to the other. When support rose or fell in unison, it was assumed that there had been no net migration of voters between these options. In 1928, for example, the vote for state control increased by 0.47 percentage points compared with 1925, the continuance vote also increased, and the prohibition vote fell. It was therefore assumed that the increase for state control was entirely at the expense of prohibition.

	Change in SC Vote	Effect on Prohibition	Effect on Continuance
1919	+5.93	None	-5.93
1922	-0.16	None	+0.16
1925	+2.53	-1.26	-1.27
1928	+0.47	-0.47	None
1935	-1.78	None	+1.78
1938	+3.61	-0.54	-3.07
1943	+2.80	None	-2.80
1946	+6.77	-3.43	-3.34
1949	-7.41	None	+7.41

Table 1: Estimated effect of state control (SC) on other options by year (percentage points). Source: NZOYB, 1921–1951.

Continuance took votes away from, or lost votes to, state control in every year except 1928. However, state control had a material effect on the prohibition vote in only two years: 1925 and 1946. The 1925 result has already been discussed; support for state control rose because of events in Canada, taking support equally from prohibition and continuance. The resulting reduction of a little over one percentage point in the prohibition vote was insufficient to have robbed prohibition supporters of victory. The other year in which state control had a significant effect was 1946. That year the Royal Commission on Licensing recommended a government takeover of the breweries, resulting in the state control vote leaping to over 20%, taking votes almost equally from prohibition and continuance.⁸⁴ In the next poll (1949) state control lost all its new-found support to continuance. Interestingly, it was not until the 1970s that there was any evidence of prohibition winning votes at the expense of state control.

The reason for these patterns is fairly obvious; the three options were not logical alternatives. State control was a subset of continuance (the continued manufacture, importation and sale of alcohol), and both were incompatible with prohibition. Prohibition supporters were therefore understandably unwilling to opt for an alternative that involved the government manufacturing and selling alcohol. Prohibition activists tended to see this as the worst of alternatives, as it would essentially mean government endorsement of the liquor trade.⁸⁵ But the fact that state control generally took few or no votes from prohibition does not mean it was irrelevant to the outcome of the poll. In 1919 and 1922, in particular, the Alliance used valuable campaign resources attacking state control. If the prohibitionists had been able to concentrate on fighting one

enemy instead of two, they may have been able to mount a stronger campaign. The state control option may well have materially affected the outcome of some of the closer licensing referendums, although not in the direct way that Bollinger seemed to suppose.

One important result of the ongoing influence of the prohibition movement throughout the 1920s was the embedding of the general licensing poll as a national institution. During that decade Parliament rejected five legislative attempts to have the triennial polls conducted less frequently or to raise the threshold for prohibition in order to provide greater security to the liquor industry.⁸⁶ Once the Depression arrived, followed soon after by war, parliamentarians had more important issues to deal with. Thus, after the 1918 amendments there were no changes to the poll provisions for another 70 years. MPs, it seems, were wary of the possible prohibitionist backlash if they sought to reduce the importance of the general licensing poll. By the end of World War II, the referendum had been held too many times in its existing form for anyone to contemplate meddling with it, despite it being clear by then that prohibition was unlikely to gain a majority. The liquor industry regularly proposed that the triennial poll should be abolished, or at least held less frequently, but without success.⁸⁷ On this issue independent bodies appeared cowed by the temperance lobby. In 1946, a Royal Commission on Licensing recommended that the referendum be retained because 'about 30 percent' of people still voted for prohibition.⁸⁸ Prohibition support fell to 26% that year. In 1960, a parliamentary select committee was divided on the issue, but thought abolition of the triennial poll might be able to be considered 'at a suitable future time'.⁸⁹ Another royal commission in 1974 recommended the abolition of the poll, but suggested that there should first be a referendum on its abolition.⁹⁰ Without an unambiguous recommendation by an independent body, politicians were unwilling to act against the poll. As the Justice Department wrote in a memo to its minister in 1983, 'the referendum is retained only because governments prefer to let sleeping dogs lie and avoid the violent protest that the anti-liquor force would certainly mount in the short term'.⁹¹

Thanks to the survival of an unmodified triennial licensing poll, it came to be seen as the norm that liquor issues would be subject to public referendum. The National Party's 1943 election platform included a proposal for a royal commission on licensing, with the commission's recommendations to be specified in such a way that they could be easily put to the public vote in a series of referendums. The referendum results would then guide the government in any legislative change.⁹² In 1947 National had not given up on this idea; it advocated that the five main recommendations of the 1946 royal commission should be put to the people to decide upon.⁹³ In 1948 the Labour government introduced a provision allowing local objection polls on new liquor licences.⁹⁴ From 1949 local communities were asked if they wanted a community trust to operate any new licences that were issued, particularly when a previously dry area went wet.⁹⁵ Referendums on hotel closing times were held in 1949 and 1967. The National Party's 1957 election manifesto included a proposed referendum on allowing licensed restaurants.⁹⁶ The 1974 Royal Commission suggested national referendums on whether to allow Sunday

liquor sales and on whether the general licensing poll should be abolished.⁹⁷ In 1967, Cabinet Minister Tom Shand observed that liquor referendums were 'the price New Zealand political parties paid for the prohibition vote'.⁹⁸ As recently as 1983 a standard text on the liquor laws stated that 'even today it is often considered axiomatic that on liquor matters, the people should have the right of referendum'.⁹⁹

The regular repetition of liquor polls affected the attitudes of both politicians and the public towards liquor. For the public, regular polls reinforced the idea that liquor was 'something uniquely wicked, or at least something remarkable and special'.¹⁰⁰ The retention of the poll because of fear of a temperance backlash created a vicious circle for politicians. The poll itself provided a regular reminder of the strength of prohibition support, which in turn made politicians wary of upsetting the temperance faction. The average number of votes cast for prohibition in the 16 polls held between 1938 and 1987 was 273,000, and generally exceeded a quarter of a million.¹⁰¹ Prohibitionists were a minority, but a significant minority who relished the three-yearly show of strength that the triennial poll provided. Thus, the prohibition movement was able to survive the disastrous poll result of 1935, albeit in a severely diminished form. But once prohibition became an impossibility, the prohibition campaign ceased to be a reforming movement intent on bringing social change by removing access to a harmful drug. Instead, the movement became an insular and reactionary force, intent on preventing change. In this it was highly successful. Six o'clock closing, introduced as a temporary wartime measure, remained in place for 50 years. A freeze on new liquor outlets, increasingly imposed between 1881 and 1910, did not thaw to any significant extent until the 1960s. In contrast, the Australian states implemented a number of reforms to liquor licensing during the 1920s and 1930s.¹⁰²

The poll was finally abolished in 1989 following a recommendation of a government working party. The survival of the general licensing poll was, in itself, a striking demonstration of the ongoing influence of the prohibition movement. By 1989 there had been 24 national referendums on whether or not to prohibit the manufacture, importation and sale of alcohol in New Zealand. The working party was at a loss to explain the 'lack of political fortitude' that kept the poll going.¹⁰³ Its 1986 report questioned 'why this one issue should be made the subject of endlessly recurring referendums when other issues capable of having a major impact on New Zealand society are not submitted even once to the same process'.¹⁰⁴ Despite the death of the prohibition cause in the early 1930s, the prohibition movement cast a long shadow.

The prohibition movement did not die after World War I as the conventional historiography would have it. The notion put forward by Sinclair and others that soldiers rescued the country permanently from the prohibition threat in 1919 is a myth. The April 1919 vote was not the largest one for prohibition; that came in 1911. Nor was it the closest; that was in December 1919. Arguably the sectarian divide of the time had a greater bearing on the result than the troops. More significantly, the prohibition movement survived as an active and well-supported political force until 1930. Six referendums produced a prohibition vote of 47% or higher. The polls of 1922 and 1925 were particularly keenly contested, as shown

by the fact almost everyone who voted in the general election also voted in the general licensing poll. Even prohibition's poor showing in 1928 can be explained by the prohibitionists deliberately refraining from mounting a full campaign. If a date is to be chosen for the end of the prohibition cause in New Zealand, the onset of the Depression in 1929 would be the most appropriate marker. The poll of April 1919 was insignificant in comparison.

PAUL CHRISTOFFEL

Waitangi Tribunal

NOTES

- 1 *New Zealand Herald*, 25 April 1896, p.9.
- 2 cit. Gordon McLauchlan, *The Story of Beer: Beer and Brewing — A New Zealand History*, Auckland, 1994, p.99.
- 3 Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, revised ed., Auckland, 2000, p.246. All earlier editions of Sinclair's history contain identical wording for this passage.
- 4 Figures from the *New Zealand Gazette*, 1919, II, 23 June 1919, p.1949. Most of the troops were on ships returning home, although some were already back in New Zealand but were temporarily residing in army camps.
- 5 Perhaps the most thorough account of the story was provided by R.M. Burdon, *The New Dominion: A Social and Political History of New Zealand 1918–39*, Wellington, 1965, pp.20–21.
- 6 A.H. Reed, *The Story of New Zealand*, 7th ed. (revised), Wellington, 1955, pp.292–3. Reed was born in 1875 in England but his family moved to New Zealand when he was a child.
- 7 James Belich, *Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders From the 1880s to the Year 2000*, Auckland, 2001, p.170; Gordon McLauchlan, *A Short History of New Zealand*, Auckland, 2004, p.125. Alison Dench, *Essential Dates: A Timeline of New Zealand History*, Auckland, 2005, p.153, also recounts the 1919 referendum story. In contrast, two other recent general histories — Michael King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, Auckland, 2003 and Philippa Mein Smith, *A Concise History of New Zealand*, Cambridge, 2005 — do not mention the prohibition movement at all.
- 8 Richard Newman, 'New Zealand's Vote for Prohibition in 1911', *New Zealand Journal of History* (NZJH), 9, 1 (1975), pp.52–53. Stevan Eldred-Grigg put forward a similar view in *Pleasures of the Flesh: Sex & Drugs in Colonial New Zealand, 1840–1915*, Wellington, 1984, p.217.
- 9 Belich, p.170.
- 10 The first Act to remove some of the earlier restrictions, albeit in a very tentative way, was the Licensing Amendment Act 1948. This allowed for new liquor licences in some circumstances, something that had been prohibited, for all practical purposes, since 1910. However, significant licensing law reform did not come until the 1960s.
- 11 John Prince, 'Look Back in Amber: The General Licensing Poll in New Zealand, 1919–1987', *Political Science*, 48, 1 (1996), p.56.
- 12 Ian Tyrrell, *Sobering Up: From Temperance to Prohibition in Antebellum America, 1800–1860*, Westport, Connecticut, 1979, pp.3, 244–5, 254.
- 13 Craig Heron, *Booze: A Distilled History*, Toronto, 2003, pp.159–60. The Act was also known as the 'Scott Act', after its sponsor.
- 14 Brian Harrison, *Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England 1815–1872*, London, 1971, pp.199, 290.
- 15 Some of the democratic measures adopted or proposed are outlined elsewhere in this article. Paul Christoffel, 'Removing Temptation: New Zealand's Alcohol Restrictions, 1881–2005', PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2006, provides a number of international comparisons on the subject of liquor polling. See especially pp.61–66 and 93–96.
- 16 Eldred-Grigg, p.65.
- 17 *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates* (NZPD), 1873, 14, pp.275, 277.
- 18 Alliance constitution quoted by John Daniels, 'Prohibition', in A.H. McLintock, ed., *An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand*, Wellington, 1966, III, p.874.
- 19 Alcoholic Liquors Sales Control Act, 1893.
- 20 David Hamer, *The New Zealand Liberals: The Years of Power, 1891–1912*, Auckland, 1988, p.118.
- 21 Rev. J. Cocker and J. Malton Murray, eds, *Temperance and Prohibition in New Zealand*, Wellington, 1930, pp.271–2. Over 70% of the bars that closed did so because of the 'reduction' option in the three-option ballot paper, which could force up to a quarter of bars and bottle stores in an electorate to close at the behest of local licensing committees. The remaining bars closed through the 'no-licence' option, the third option being 'continuance'.
- 22 Newman, pp.52, 57–58.
- 23 'Report of the National Efficiency Board 1917', *Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives* (AJHR), 1917, H-43, Appendix I, p.18. For a discussion of the prohibitionist makeup of the Board, see Christoffel, pp.56–57.
- 24 Licensing Amendment Act, 1918.

25 The evidence from the 1919 special poll indicates that the troops were overwhelmingly opposed to prohibition.

26 Figures calculated from Cocker and Murray, p.271. In 1914, too, more voters supported national prohibition than local no-licence. The local no-licence option was abolished in 1918.

27 Milton Lewis, *A Rum State: Alcohol and State Policy in Australia, 1788–1988*, Canberra, 1992, p.65. The referendum for prohibition with compensation was cancelled in 1920 by the incoming Labour government. Lewis speculates that the poll was cancelled because the government thought that prohibition might win and it could not afford the compensation payable. The referendum was finally held in 1928 and prohibition was soundly defeated.

28 Presumably the last states to ratify the US prohibition amendment included those in which prohibitionism was weakest, yet these states were still able to ratify the amendment after the war ended.

29 My thanks to Laurie Guy for supplying me with a copy of his unpublished paper. I have attempted to succinctly summarize his argument as best I can.

30 *Dominion*, 4 December 1918, p.6. Prime Minister William Massey summed up the background when introducing the Licensing Amendment Bill to Parliament.

31 Figures from *New Zealand Gazette*, 1920, vol.1, p.672. For prohibition to carry would have required 50% plus one or 271,882 of the votes cast. National prohibition received 270,250 votes. This was a binding referendum, as were all referendums on prohibition.

32 'Report of the Chief Inspector of Primary Schools', AJHR, 1921, E-2, Appendix A.

33 Department of Health, *Observations on Alcohol in Relation to the Human Body and Mind*, Wellington, 1921, p.4. The pamphlet was intended to provide a resource for school teachers.

34 Two issues of *Cheerio* with a cover price of 1d. were put out in 1925 and another two in 1928. They lacked the humour of the 1922 issues. The newspaper's publication was of course timed to coincide with the triennial polls.

35 *Cheerio*, June 1922, p.1.

36 *Cheerio*, August 1922, p.5.

37 *Cheerio*, September 1922, p.3.

38 *Cheerio*, November 1922, p.2.

39 *Cheerio*, October 1922, p.12.

40 cit. Ian Tyrrell, *Woman's World, Woman's Empire: The Woman's Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880–1930*, Chapel Hill, 1991, p.278.

41 *Cheerio*, September 1922, p.2; December 1922, p.2; September 1925, p.10.

42 *Cheerio*, September 1922, p.2.

43 A detailed account of the scheme was provided by the 1946 Royal Commission on Licensing: AJHR, 1946, H-38, pp.51–53. The Commission recommended its own, more radical, version of the scheme.

44 AJHR, 1946, H-38, pp.53–55. Only 40% of the debenture issue was taken up.

45 Cocker and Murray, p.136.

46 J. Malton Murray, *The New Zealand Alliance Handbook: A Handy Guide for Speakers and Writers*, Wellington, 1925.

47 Cocker and Murray, pp.129–30.

48 *Dominion*, 24 November 1922, p.9.

49 In 1922, the *Dominion* contained 19 advertisements in support of prohibition. This increased to 24 in 1925.

50 *Dominion*, 3 October 1925, p.16; 17 October 1925, p.22; 20 October 1925, p.13; 22 October 1925, p.14; 24 October 1925, p.22; 27 October 1925, p.7; 29 October 1925, p.7. The Moderate League also used this technique. See *Dominion*, 30 October 1922, p.3.

51 See, for example, *Dominion*, 22 October 1925, p.2.

52 Anthony Grigg, 'The Attack on the Citadels of Liquordom: A Study of the Prohibition Movement in New Zealand, 1894–1914', PhD thesis, University of Otago, 1977, pp. 265–6.

53 The citizens of Invercargill voted to restore licences in 1943.

54 Cocker and Murray, p.139.

55 New Zealand Alliance Annual Accounts for the 10 months ending 31 January 1929 in New Zealand Alliance: Records, 77-206-14/9, Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL), Wellington. Head office salaries alone amounted to some £2500 per annum.

56 AJHR, 1946, H-38, p.56, para. 230.

57 This history was already underway in 1928, as indicated in *Vanguard*, 18 August 1928, p.9.

58 *Vanguard*, 15 December 1928, p.3.

- 59 *Dominion*, 16 November 1928, p.13.
- 60 *Auckland Star* (AS), 17 November 1928, p.4.
- 61 Canadian prohibition was something of a farce because the provinces could only ban the sale of alcohol, not its manufacture, which continued as before.
- 62 AS, 12 November 1928, p.6.
- 63 See, for example, *Dominion*, 8 November 1928, p.9; 9 November 1928, p.27; 10 November 1928, p.31.
- 64 *Dominion*, 3 November 1928, p.31; 5 November 1928, p.17; 6 November 1928, p.18.
- 65 Thomas Wilford, 'Why Canada abandoned Prohibition', *Dominion*, 9 November 1928, p.13.
- 66 *Dominion*, 13 November 1928, p.20 and *Vanguard*, 15 December 1928, p.1. The National Council described Al Smith as a 'wet' in *Cheerio*, August 1928, p.4.
- 67 New Zealand Alliance, Annual Accounts for the year ending 31 March 1931, New Zealand Alliance Records, 77-206-14/09, ATL.
- 68 *Vanguard*, March 1932, New Series no.1.
- 69 New Zealand Alliance, Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 1932, New Zealand Alliance Annual Meeting Minutes 1932-1954, New Zealand Alliance Records, 77-206-14/07, ATL.
- 70 Women's Christian Temperance Union, *WCTU: Fifty Golden Years*, Wellington, 1934.
- 71 *Dominion*, 1 November 1922, p.5; 8 November 1922, p.5; 23 November 1922, p.12; 28 November 1922, p.4; 2 December 1922, p.3.
- 72 *Dominion*, 13 November 1922, p.4; 24 November 1922, p.11; 29 November 1922, p.5; 1 December 1922, p.11; 6 December 1922, p.4.
- 73 *Vanguard*, 14 September 1929, p.2.
- 74 David Butler and Austin Ranney, *Referendums Around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy*, Washington DC, 1994, pp.267-8.
- 75 Heron, pp.269-70.
- 76 *Dominion*, 18 November 1935, p.15.
- 77 *Dominion*, 22 November 1935, p.22; 23 November 1935, p.18; 25 November 1935, p.17.
- 78 *Dominion*, 23 November 1935, p.18.
- 79 Edith Thornton, 'A History of the Prohibition Movement in New Zealand,' MA thesis, Canterbury University College, 1936, p.59.
- 80 New Zealand Alliance, Annual Accounts for the year ending 31 March 1934, New Zealand Alliance Records, 77-206-14/09, ATL.
- 81 Conrad Bollinger, *Grog's Own Country: The Story of Liquor Licensing in New Zealand*, 2nd ed., Auckland, 1967, p.86. See also pp.79-80.
- 82 Daniels, p.877.
- 83 *Evening Post*, 18 December 1919, p.6. The *Dominion* made an identical argument.
- 84 AJHR, 1946, H-38, p.281. This particular recommendation understandably received considerable publicity.
- 85 A.R. Grigg, 'Viable Option or Vote Splitter?', *Comment*, new series, November 1981, pp.15-19, outlines the prohibitionists' main objections to state control.
- 86 AJHR, 1946, H-38, pp.50, 57; Cocker and Murray, pp.132-5.
- 87 See, for example, AJHR, 1946, H-38, p.204.
- 88 *ibid.*
- 89 'Report of the Committee on Licensing', AJHR 1960, I-17, pp.27-28.
- 90 *Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Sale of Liquor in New Zealand*, Wellington, 1974, pp.145-6.
- 91 *cit.* Michael Stace, *A History of the Liquor Legislation in New Zealand*, Wellington, 1988, p.193.
- 92 AS, 28 August 1943, p.7.
- 93 NZPD, 1947, 278, p.603.
- 94 Licensing Amendment Act, *New Zealand Statutes 1948*, II, pp.948-51.
- 95 L.H. Southwick, Alan Dormer and G.R. Halford, *The Liquor Laws of New Zealand*, Wellington, 1983, p.5; Bollinger, pp.114-16. Twenty-two polls had been held on trust ownership by 1955.
- 96 NZPD, 1960, 325, p.3259.
- 97 *Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Sale of Liquor in New Zealand*, pp.118, 146, 306.

98 AS, 19 September 1967, p.3.

99 Southwick, Dormer and Halford, p.2. In addition to the regular prohibition polls, local licensing polls in dry districts continued throughout the twentieth century. From 1949 these were supplemented by polls on whether to introduce trust ownership of liquor outlets, and local residents could force a poll on any proposed new liquor outlet (Southwick, Dormer and Halford, p.5). Two national referendums were held on the continuation of six o'clock closing, in 1949 and 1967.

100 Justice Department submission to the Royal Commission on the Sale of Liquor 1974, COM 21/8, submission 18, p.31, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.

101 Figures from *New Zealand Official Year Book*, 1940–1990.

102 Lewis, pp.64–76. One of the main reforms was to set up bodies that could redistribute liquor licences and enforce hotel standards, something that did not happen in New Zealand until the Licensing Control Commission was established in 1949.

103 Working Party on Liquor, *The Sale of Liquor in New Zealand*, Wellington, 1986, p.84.

104 *ibid.*, p.23.