

explore in rich detail the lives of his immigrant subjects. The writing is well-paced and engaging. As a result, this book achieves a new level of maturity in scholarship on the Irish in New Zealand.

However, there are issues raised here that will give specialist readers cause for reflection. Fraser brings to his subject an unusual richness of disciplinary background and experience, and is aware how his work has been affected by this. *Castles of Gold*, he writes, is 'far more "ethnographically informed" than any of my previous writing' (p.22). Signs of this are evident, and welcome, though perhaps readers will, like me, wish for an even more self-conscious and sustained engagement with disciplinary difference and the possibilities for innovation in content and style that it raises. More importantly, the trans-Tasman connections so effectively identified in this book continue to raise questions about how we should best deal with those immigrants who moved throughout the New World in fits and starts, mobile people whose identities were made and remade in colonial or other national settings. The revival of interest over the last two decades in the diversity of New Zealand's nineteenth-century European population has been a major achievement. However, the significant challenge remains to fully factor into our histories the ways in which New World experiences transformed what it was, and what contemporaries thought it meant, to be Irish.

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*Dominion of New Zealand: Statesmen and Status 1907–1945*. By W. David McIntyre. New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 2007. 211pp. NZ price: \$47.00. ISBN 0-978-0-908772-27-8.

WHEN DID NEW ZEALAND BECOME INDEPENDENT? The *CIA World Factbook* appears to leave no doubt: '26 September 1907 (from UK)'.<sup>1</sup> That was the day on which New Zealand became a 'dominion', by an Order-in-Council in London following a request from the New Zealand Parliament. Yet, as this work demonstrates, the change did little more than recognize the status New Zealand effectively already enjoyed as equivalent to certain white settler-ruled countries of the British Empire and greater than its numerous largely 'non-white' colonies. Certainly the Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, emphasized that the change would 'lift us out of . . . amongst a great number of colonies concerning which no distinction is made' (p.16) and stressed the need to maintain racial purity.

The slightly misdated *Dominion of New Zealand: Statesmen and Status 1907–1945* traces the development of New Zealand's constitutional relationship with Britain from that first Dominion Day to the adoption of the Statute of Westminster in 1947 and the formulation of a membership rubric to accommodate an Indian republic in 1949. An epilogue brings us up to the present. Unlike the *CIA World Factbook*, it recognizes that 'gaining independence' was a process rather than an event and was achieved in a manner befitting two countries with 'unwritten constitutions'. *Dominion of New Zealand* examines in greater depth than any previous work the steps by which the 'reluctant dominion' (as Angus Ross characterized it)<sup>2</sup> was drawn protesting down a road largely constructed by the 'restless dominions' of South Africa and the Irish Free State. From William Massey's disappointment that the Imperial War Cabinet had not survived into peacetime, through Gordon Coates's condemnation of the Balfour Declaration as 'a rotten formula' and George Forbes's exemption of New Zealand from the Statute of Westminster, to Peter Fraser's doubts about republics in the Commonwealth and the way it lacked any formal commitments, especially in defence, New Zealand opposed the 'watering down' of imperial ties. The largely implicit explanation here is that its governments considered

they had more to gain than to lose from the connection, that being a dominion was ‘independence with something added’, in Fraser’s words. From the withdrawal of British troops from New Zealand in 1870 to the removal of British forces east of Suez and entry to the EEC a century later, it was London rather than Wellington that saw its interests lying in less dependence.

David McIntyre devotes little space to discussing the concept of ‘independence’, which is a pity, given the extent to which it has featured, usually poorly defined, in analysis of New Zealand’s international relations. The major emphasis recently has been on ‘independence’ from the US, which has never actually exercised any formal authority over New Zealand. Given that all countries are exposed to the reactions of other states to their foreign policies (and increasingly their domestic policies), can any state be considered independent in the sense of feeling free to ignore outside pressure without some consequences? The ‘independence’ of a government must surely lie in the acceptance by itself and by those who enforce the law that it has the right to make its own decisions. Thus the Lange government’s decision that visiting warships be officially ‘non-nuclear’ was no more independent than the decision of the Muldoon government to press for visits without any such assurance. The calculus of cost and benefit was just different. In his 2002 Jim Gardner Lecture, McIntyre distinguished between internal political, international political, constitutional, strategic, economic and cultural independence.<sup>3</sup>

As far as most New Zealanders were concerned, the greatest of these was surely the first, which was experienced ‘by the early 20th century’ and which inevitably drove the others. If a date for that form of independence is sought, that of the direction from the British Colonial Secretary to the Governor on 24 September 1892, that he must take the advice of his New Zealand ministers, seems as good as any,<sup>4</sup> though it is not touched on here. Yet there was still the Colonial Stock Act, unfortunately mentioned only briefly. This British statute, valued by the New Zealand government as a means of raising cheaper loans in London, continued to give the British Parliament the right to disallow any dominion legislation repudiating loan agreements made under it.<sup>5</sup> Would New Zealand courts have accepted such a striking down of a local Act as late as the 1930s or 1940s? I suspect they would have, though a contemporary Canadian observer discounted the possibility in that rather different dominion.<sup>6</sup> This reinforces the significance given here to the ratification of the Statute of Westminster in 1947, which made the application of any British legislation dependent on acceptance by the New Zealand Parliament. Concerning international political independence, in the sense of conducting its own foreign policy, McIntyre agrees with Alister McIntosh’s judgment that Massey’s signature on the Treaty of Versailles ‘for New Zealand’ marked recognition of this, even if Sir John Salmond, our Chief Justice and delegate at the Washington Conference two years later, denied it.

*Dominion of New Zealand* is no dry recital of conference resolutions and constitutional niceties. It focuses on the interchange of interests and ideas between statesmen at imperial and Commonwealth conferences, demonstrating that they not infrequently picked up on suggestions from academics. The characters of the statesmen involved in the meetings and the flavour of the exchanges are well captured, as we renew our acquaintance with the prolix Ward, the bluff Massey and the impatient Fraser. Certainly there are more nuanced glimpses of the views of the latter two on the Empire/Commonwealth than have been published hitherto. Written in a very accessible style, frequently marked by humour, based on very extensive research in several countries, and equipped with an excellent index, this is a substantial contribution to New Zealand’s constitutional historiography.

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## NOTES

1 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nz.html>, accessed 24 January 2008. To be fair, a note elsewhere warns that some unspecified 'other countries' did not 'achieve sovereignty' on the date specified, so it 'may not represent "independence" in the strict sense, but rather some significant nationhood event such as the traditional founding date or the date of unification, federation, confederation, establishment, fundamental change in the form of government, or state succession'.

2 Angus Ross, 'Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful Daughter?: New Zealand and the Commonwealth in the Inter-War Years', *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, 10 (1972), pp.28–44.

3 W. David McIntyre, *When, If Ever, Did New Zealand Become Independent?*, Christchurch, 2002, pp.29–31.

4 Gavin McLean, *The Governors: New Zealand's Governors and Governors-General*, Dunedin, 2006, pp.139–44, describes how the ruling came about.

5 Simon Boyce, "'In Spite of Tooley Street, Montagu Norman, and The Reserve Bank's Governor": Recolonization or the Eclipse of Colonial Financial Ties with Britain in the 1930s?', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 39, 1 (2005), pp.77–78.

6 'W.P.M.K.', 'Colonial Stock Act, 1934', *University of Toronto Law Journal*, 1, 2 (1936), pp.348–50.

*Te Kerikeri 1770–1850: The Meeting Pool*. Edited and introduced by Judith Binney. Bridget Williams Books, Wellington and Craig Potton Publishing, Nelson, 2007. 134 pp. NZ price: \$34.99. ISBN 978-1-877242-38-0.

KERIKERI BECAME A 'MEETING POOL' OF Māori and Pakeha because it was first a 'meeting pool' for Māori, socially, politically and economically. As part of the government-funded Kororipo Kerikeri Basin Sustainable Development Plan, run by the Department of Conservation and New Zealand Historic Places Trust, *Te Kerikeri* was written to stimulate wide awareness of the site's significance. Information gathered in the planning process has been used to promote the Kerikeri Basin Historic Precinct as a World Heritage site for UNESCO's list.

*Te Kerikeri* features 13 short essays covering the site's heritage significance; its strategic importance for Māori, its archaeology and the history of human encounters from the time Europeans first ventured as far as New Zealand. From Joan Maingay's and Jeremy Salmond's analyses of static archaeological and architectural features, to Patu Hohepa's reflective consideration of the meaning of tapu and wāhi tapu in Kerikeri two centuries ago, the contributors weave a rich tapestry.

Judith Binney's introductory chapter avoids the usual formula for a multi-authored book, of a synopsis of following chapters and an explanation of the book's structure; these are left as self-evident or self-explanatory. Instead, it is used to open up the subject matter widely and comprehensively. *Te Kerikeri* closes cleanly and simply, with a narrative about efforts and struggles to protect and preserve the often- and long-overlooked significance that the book seeks to highlight.

Central in the book, and to its theme, Grant Phillipson's chapter, 'Religion and Land', draws primarily on Richard White's *Middle Ground* theories to describe the complex people-to-people and people-to-land relationships. White argued that 'contact was not a battle of primal forces in which only one could survive. Something new could appear.' New customs of relating that evolved from mingling, mixing and immiscibility explain land transactions as well as Māori and missionary parties' subsequent land use, uses that arose from, and gave rise to, complementary and contradictory understandings of the nature of the transactions.

Phillipson refers to Nola Easdale's *Missionary & Maori* and Gavin McLean's history of the Kerikeri Stone Store, both earlier descriptions of Kerikeri. A comparison of *Te*