

would have been useful. The preface refers to this, but more could have been made of it. The press neglected to analyze critically the government's decision. As the worst-case scenario — an Indonesian military challenge to the presence of UN forces — has not eventuated, this decision escaped critical review.

It is clear that New Zealand's deployment of forces to East Timor, like INTERFET itself, was not without risk. There were contacts between Australian and New Zealand SAS troops and militia groups, and the New Zealand Battalion Group lost lives. This book emphasizes the risk that was taken in deployment of INTERFET, reveals the dilemmas faced by its commanders in securing it within East Timor and leaves the reader with the impression that New Zealand Forces have had both luck and professionalism on their side.

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A Wise Adventure: New Zealand and Antarctica 1920–1960. By Malcolm Templeton. Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000. 328 pp. NZ price: \$39.95. ISBN 0-86473403-4.

THE YEARS 1920–1960 may be ancient history to the callow, but thinking readers will be aware how profoundly the past gives meaning to the present, and appreciate this book.

That the past shapes our era is exemplified by the continued vitality (but also the controversial nature in the eyes of non-parties) of the Antarctic Treaty. Given that expansionist powers had dispatched explorers to and staked out vast pie-shaped claims in the continent for decades, the conceiving, drafting and signing of that Treaty in the 1950s was one of the twentieth century's unsung triumphs. It not only suspended territorial claims, deflected rivalries, averted conflict and protected the environment but also created the world's first weapons-free zone.

New Zealand's long and intimate role in the Ross Dependency and in the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty is the focus of Templeton's work. Drawing from official documents, he traces and analyzes New Zealand's diplomatic dealings with an imperialist Britain, a sceptical United States' government, and a visionary (read pushy) Admiral Byrd in detail never previously attempted. In so doing he provides instances of official ignorance, prevarication and obfuscation as well as far-sighted idealism, artful compromise, and skilful word-smithing. Diplomats and political leaders, and scholars of their affairs, can learn much from Templeton's patient and lucid clause-by-clause analysis of the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty.

Templeton, a former Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs and author of numerous works on New Zealand's diplomatic history, is confident that history will speak for itself, and does not insult the reader's intelligence by drawing explicit lines to current issues. But he has embedded a sufficient wealth of illustrations and insights in his well-crafted analysis of diplomatic exchanges and political decisions to justify acquisition of his book not only by libraries but also serious students of international affairs, contemporary as well as historical.

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