

The editors' claims, as expressed in the foreword, are a reflection of their military interests. Despite their best efforts to include Pratt's sapping in Marjouram's diary, the diarist had left Taranaki a month before the action began. And the Armstrong gun, which the editors introduce but Marjouram does not, was not seen in New Zealand until after Marjouram had been invalided home to England.

Their reliance on out-dated sources for their historical background has misled them: they subscribe to a long-discredited Taranaki Land League; and they claim that in January 1860 Teira received the balance owing on his land sale. He did not; a war had been fought over the Waitara 'purchase' years before Teira was paid his money.

There are other areas of confusion too. First we are told that Pratt's sapping was ultimately successful, that the Maori had no answer to it, and were forced to sign articles of peace. Then we are told (after Belich) that Pratt's saps did not win the war; that both the British and the Maori resisters grew disillusioned with the possibility of victory.

The editors claim too much for this diary. It is interesting, rather than illuminating, but it adds little to other military or settler accounts. The story of the Ormata settlers and the battle of Waireka, in which Marjouram took part, is described more graphically by Thomas Gilbert, the Christian pacifist, than it is by Marjouram, the militant Christian; and Frances Porter's *Born to New Zealand* is a more vivid account of New Plymouth under seige.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect is the illustration of the state of literacy achieved by one who entered the service at a very early age and who subsequently received his education at the hands of the military and religious authorities. And it is a sobering reminder of nineteenth-century racial and environmental attitudes, expressed in terms of impudent natives, murderous savages and the depressing bush.

HAZEL RISEBOROUGH

The Path to Gallipoli. Defending New Zealand 1840-1915. By Ian McGibbon. G.P. Books, Wellington, 1991. xiv + 274 pp. NZ price: \$49.95 and \$39.95 (paperback).

THE PATH TO GALLIPOLI is a successor and companion to Ian McGibbon's earlier book, *Blue-Water Rationale*, about the naval defence of New Zealand, 1914-1942, except that it deals with military defence as well as naval, and defence policy in general.

New Zealand is so far from any land mass, or even islands, that it might be expected that its population would have felt secure from attack; but in fact they have, in European times, almost always felt very vulnerable. Remoteness bred nervousness, not usually fear of invasion, but of hit-and-run attacks by hostile warships. This fear accounts for the anxiety that consecutive governments felt about French, German or Russian imperial expansion in the Pacific or in East Asia. Foreign annexations in the region brought potentially hostile bases nearer. By the late nineteenth century there were naval units of those countries, as well as the American and British navies in the Pacific.

In the 1870s and 1880s there were several Russian war scares which led, after much procrastination, to the construction of batteries to guard the main harbours and some others. The delays were due to the fact that the Colony could scarcely afford to pay for the guns. The main fortifications were constructed after the war scare of 1885.

In addition to coastal artillery, it seemed obvious that a local navy was needed. But

what sort of navy? Part of the Royal navy or an Australasian navy? New Zealand certainly could not pay for its own navy. Increasingly the Australians wanted to have their own navy. Increasingly the British were reluctant to support localised navies and wanted a concentration of naval power which would not permit an enemy to pick off sections of the navy one by one. In the end New Zealand paid subsidies to the cost of the Royal Navy, and donated the battle-cruiser, *New Zealand*; in exchange the British generally stationed two warships in New Zealand.

These, and many other issues, Ian McGibbon discusses with good sense.

Some of the issues have more modern applications than those in the period he discusses. The naval planning, for instance, was more relevant to World War II than to World War I. Although the British hated to admit it, their power was in decline in comparison with their rivals. As the German navy grew, the U.K. could not maintain major naval forces in European and Pacific waters at the same time. This problem was solved by the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, which provided joint protection against the Russian navy in Asia. It was removed altogether in 1905 when the Japanese destroyed that Russian fleet. In New Zealand fear of Russia was now replaced by distrust of Japan. In 1908 the Americans showed that they were not to be ignored: President Theodore Roosevelt sent the 'Great White Fleet' to visit Australia and New Zealand, thus forecasting a future alliance.

Increasingly the British came to concentrate their naval forces and plans on Europe. The question now arose, how long would it take a British fleet to reach New Zealand or Asia, in the event of need. That question dominated New Zealand naval thinking right up to the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* by the Japanese in 1942. After that the question became academic.

Military planning was undergoing big changes at the same time. The men who fought in the contingents sent to the South African, or Boer war, were volunteers. McGibbon tells us that the men had to be five feet six inches in height and twelve and a half stone. This I do not believe — they would have been very fat or stocky men at that height! The first contingent, big men, averaged five feet nine in height and eleven stone six pounds.

In 1909 the old Volunteer system was replaced by compulsory military training for all males aged between twelve and thirty. Thus the people were preparing for Gallipoli and Flanders. There were even plans, as early as 1912, to send troops to Egypt as protection against the Turks.

One wonders which audience this book is aimed at. Scarcely the average reader, who would not be attracted by sentences like 'Bridge urged the devotion of [funds] . . . to the creation of a naval force of four gun-vessels or short range cruisers, four first-class gunboats of about 250 tons (each carrying a six-inch gun and two fifty-pounders), four second-class gunboats . . . ' and so on. Presumably this book is intended for historians to read, rather than the public or defence experts. It is worthy rather than gripping.

KEITH SINCLAIR

University of Auckland