

upon d'Urville's seamanship.¹

Rosenman has refused to embellish or refine Dumont d'Urville's sometimes laborious prose and in her translation she maintains a modern, colloquial style, avoiding anachronisms and remaining faithful to the original. The resulting text flows smoothly and the Australian sections, where there are long passages of direct translation, are very absorbing. Maintaining a style markedly heavier than her own must have required considerable restraint on Rosenman's part, and her attempt to combine the two is less successful. In the New Zealand sections, for example, the juxtaposition of Dumont d'Urville's stately, prosaic style with Rosenman's racy and highly readable summaries is disconcerting. The end result is disjointed and it is difficult to maintain a coherent point of view. For a reader seeking no more than a general knowledge of the main events of the voyage, this presentation may be satisfactory and it is certainly amusing. But, for scholars wishing to sort out the confused threads of foreknowledge, observation, personal opinion, and hearsay, already woven into Dumont d'Urville's own text, the addition of the editor's own interpretation and notes from various sources is a further complication. However, New Zealanders wishing to reconstitute the summaries concerning this country can always refer to Olive Wright's translations of the New Zealand sections of the voyage², and the fullness of the Australian sections avoids the problem entirely.

The reorganization of the original work has allowed comments drawn from the journals of other officers to be inserted in their chronological place, thus considerably enriching the text.

The two volumes are abundantly illustrated, mainly from the work of Louis de Sainson for the first voyage and Louis Lebreton and Ernest Goupil for the second. Many of the plates are in colour and the reproduction is good. Clear sketch maps help to situate the voyages.

Rosenman has added a number of useful and amusing appendices: rapid biographical sketches of all the participants in the voyages, extracts from relevant correspondence, official instructions, details about Baron de Thierry and Peter Dillon, even a phrenologist's very flattering assessment of Dumont d'Urville's character deduced from the study of his skull. A brief bibliography and an index round off this welcome contribution to our knowledge of nineteenth-century voyages around Australia and the South Pacific.

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1 Pierre Adolphe Lesson, 'Voyages de découverte de l'*Astrolabe*', MS 8124 Res 1-B, Municipal Library, Rochefort-sur-Mer, France.

2 Olive Wright, *New Zealand 1826-1827*, Wellington, 1950; *The Voyage of the Astrolabe — 1840*, Wellington, 1955.

New Zealand Prepares for War. By W.D. McIntyre. University of Canterbury Press, with assistance from the Historical Publications Branch and the Ministry of Defence, Christchurch, 1988. 287pp. illus. NZ price: \$44.00.

New Zealand's Moral Foreign Policy 1935-39. The Promotion of Collective Security through the League of Nations. By B.S. Bennett. NZ Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1988. 134pp. NZ price: \$34.95.

PROFESSOR EDWARD INGRAM is notable for the tart prefaces with which he begins his

very good books. In one such preface he notes that 'fashion has turned away from political, diplomatic, and military history in all forms. The discipline [of history] has, supposedly, progressed beyond them into the studies of drainage, the psyche, and bentwood boxes, beloved of my colleagues. . . . The only people who seem to matter in history today are the nameless, the hordes thronging the computer printouts of social and economic historians.'

Political, diplomatic, and military history is attacked by its critics for being narrative; for being élitist and simplistic; for glorifying events that had little significance in the lives of 'ordinary' people; and for lacking intellectual or analytical content. Instead, these critics favour studies of class, gender, or race, implying that such are the concerns of people. And so they may be but, again to quote Ingram, 'historians, unlike political scientists or sociologists, should tell stories'.

David McIntyre's book, *New Zealand Prepares for War*, represents many of the strengths and some of the weaknesses of 'diplomatic' history as it is currently practised. (Throughout this review the word 'diplomatic history' is used generically to include military and political history.) In a book that is pleasantly and expertly written, well-researched, and thorough, he succeeds in his intention to 'define the role of defence policy and analyse how New Zealand viewed security, and made preparations for war, between the two world wars'. However, he also uncovers many important issues that he leaves unresolved. Ingram is correct: historians should seek to tell a story. But he should have added that they also have a responsibility to explain what the story means. That many diplomatic historians have failed to go that extra mile gives succour to their critics.

The value of McIntyre's book lies in its detail. The sorry state of New Zealand's military preparedness is graphically portrayed, and it comes as a surprise to realize that by 1939 the Permanent Force (i.e. the standing army) comprised only 578 men. The 'Cinderella' role of the Air Force during these years is neatly (and often humorously) outlined. The proliferation of paper plans in the inter-war years, confusing restructuring with real development, reveals a fascinating insight into a lack of resources, and the difficulty the military had in communicating a sense of urgency to their political masters. Grandiose and impractical, the plans reflected the ever-present tension between the priorities of the military and the priorities of the politicians. As a result, the reader can only agree that 'the extent of New Zealand's war effort was amazing for so small a nation, especially as there was virtually no professional army available and ready in 1939'. Unfortunately, in places this dramatic account of unpreparedness is diluted by a superabundance of detail, with pages of organizational breakdowns, troop numbers, and equipment lists.

The work's weaknesses, the result of its narrow focus, are that it fails to look at relevant factors beyond those of immediate defence policy, and it does not acknowledge some of the important issues it raises.

Despite cataloguing the serious economic constraints faced by the military, McIntyre resists any temptation to analyse how well the New Zealand economy was prepared for war in 1939. He also avoids considering the attitude of the public to the steady decline in preparedness of the New Zealand military. Were people ambivalent? If so, what does that suggest about their awareness of international issues? Even the RSA is mentioned only cursorily. Similarly, the make-up of the territorial forces is not elaborated upon, despite a discussion of their role in the 1932 Queen Street riots. The chapter dealing with the armed services and the Depression is an unconvincing pot-pourri of detail in search of a theme.

When Professor McIntyre does go beyond immediate defence policy and discusses some of the relevant issues, as in the chapter on Labour and collective security, he does

so to very good effect.

After detailing the penny-pinching policies practised by politicians after the war, McIntyre discusses the Chanak crisis of 1922 during which New Zealand, almost immediately, was prepared to shoulder the cost of a 7000-strong Brigade group to be sent overseas. Although earlier in the book McIntyre notes that a crisis makes priorities clearer, he makes no comment as to what Chanak revealed about New Zealand's imperial priorities. Likewise, he discusses the fact that the Navy was used four times in the inter-war years to quell disturbances in various Pacific islands (Niue 1921, Ocean Island 1925, Western Samoa 1928 and 1930), but he is silent about what such acts revealed about New Zealand's regional and quasi-imperial identity. It is to McIntyre's credit that the book raises these sorts of questions, but sad that they remain languishing backstage. To be fair, however, McIntyre does remain true to the narrow limits he defines at the start of the book. It can only be hoped that he will traverse some of these wider issues in his forthcoming companion work, *Background to ANZUS*. It promises to be essential reading.

New Zealand Prepares for War has other small blemishes: the controversy over air routes in the Pacific in the 1930s seems out of place; the spelling of Mukden (Muckden) on p.121 is idiosyncratic; an explanatory list of the acronyms used would have helped.

New Zealand's Moral Foreign Policy is derived from the author's recently completed MA thesis and is well presented (with the exception of the loss of 17 footnotes on p.88) and impeccably researched. It is also frustrating, provocative, and challenging. If McIntyre encourages the reader to think because he says too little on some issues, Bennett does the same by saying too much on others.

Bennett's thesis is, as the title suggests, that the First Labour government, or at least some within that government, practised what he terms a 'moral foreign policy'. The most frustrating aspect of this book is that nowhere does he explain what is meant by a 'moral foreign policy'. He seems to take its meaning as self-evident, and the nearest he gets to it is in his last sentence (by which time it is too late), where he writes: 'It is where this tradition [of New Zealand speaking up on the world stage] coincides with high ideals of peace and justice — or perhaps "love and truth" — that New Zealand faces the world with a moral foreign policy.' He also admits that evidence of this 'moral foreign policy' is implicit rather than explicit, and cites only three examples where a leading policy-maker refers to the morality inherent in New Zealand's foreign policy (pp.29, 32, 64). He is in danger of constructing a straw man.

More provocative, however, is his failure to consider that the basis of all foreign policy is self-interest, as policy-makers seek to defend and advance the interests of their country. The support that Savage, Fraser, Nash, Jordan, and Berendsen had for the League of Nations may have been couched in moral terms — some of the time — but the true basis of that support was the realization that New Zealand's interests were best served by the strengthening of collective security. Any moral duty to support the League was secondary to the need to support the League, full-stop. Jordan may have been the conscience of the League, but less out of a sense of morality and more out of a desire to strengthen the League and protect New Zealand's interests.

Bennett concedes that 'the moral and the practical were inextricably interwoven, and both the aura of morality and the advantages of practicality were imputed to the whole entity', but asserts that 'it was morality which provided the main point of reference'. However, that self-interest and not morality was the root of New Zealand's foreign policy is best demonstrated by those occasions where, in the face of a policy conflict with Britain over the role of the League, New Zealand preferred to 'protest and abstain' rather than vote against Britain. Examples are when Britain attempted a rapprochement with Italy in early 1938; and when Britain desired to reinterpret article 16 of the League Covenant in September 1938 (pp.66, 69). In both cases New Zealand could have exercised a veto, but

instead promised to abstain should the need arise. Did it feel its isolation and limited responsibilities too much to exercise a veto, as Bennett suggests, or were New Zealand's best interests served by maintaining imperial solidarity, even at the expense of the League?

Bennett is at his best in his concluding pages, where he assesses the significance of this 'moral' foreign policy in New Zealand's history. He argues that the policy was based on a sense of internationalism rather than a sense of independence, and his comments are penetrating. Whether the policy was internationalist in outlook or not, it is certainly time that the myth of New Zealand's being unquestioningly faithful to the policies of Britain was laid to rest. New Zealand leaders undoubtedly saw the importance of maintaining imperial solidarity, but within the councils of empire they were more than prepared to make their interests known. Independence within dependence has, until 1984, been the expression of New Zealand's international identity. Bennett helps to lay to rest the old myths associated with New Zealand's foreign policy. However, in trying to establish a tradition that Labour governments pursued 'moral' foreign policies, he is in danger of constructing a whole new set.

The successful amalgamation of the story-teller with the political scientist and the sociologist is a rare achievement. The work of John Lewis Gaddis and Christopher Thorne, for example, has shown how richly rewarding this synthesis can be. Ingram is right when he exhorts historians to be story-tellers, warning that 'the difficult task of explaining what happened seems to have been given up by historians for the much simpler task of explaining why it happened'. Both McIntyre and Bennett tell a good story. More importantly they also prompt the reader to think about a range of issues. Not every historian could claim as much.

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The American Connection. Edited by Malcolm McKinnon. Allen and Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, Wellington, 1988. 153pp. NZ price: \$29.95.

THIS COLLECTION comprises papers first presented at the third annual Stout Centre conference in 1986. As suggested in the title, the conference examined various aspects of the influence that the United States has had on New Zealand life. It is testimony to the diversity of this influence that the 14 contributions to the collection range widely in their specific subject matter, approach, and chronological focus.

The individual papers in the collection will interest New Zealand historians according to their areas of specialization. Labour historians will find that Erik Olssen's article on 'American Influences on the New Zealand Labour Movement, 1885-1920' sheds new light on a neglected source of antipodean labour radicalism. Social and cultural historians will be more likely to turn to the four papers that explore the ambiguities of New Zealand reactions to US culture and raise questions concerning the issue of cultural imperialism. Diplomatic, military, and economic historians will be most interested in the five final essays which assess how the realities of US power since World War II have affected New Zealand's foreign policy, defence strategy, and foreign economic policy.

A striking feature of almost all these interpretations of the 'American connection' is the one-dimensional nature of their analysis of New Zealand-US relations. With the exception of David Hamer's essay on American visitors to New Zealand and Anne Philbin's personal observations as an expatriate American living in Wellington, these papers tell us little of US perceptions of New Zealand. Admittedly, such an outcome is