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witness her remarks about the lack of anything exciting to write about (p. 76), about the simple amusements afforded by the colony (p. 209) — yet clearly this life appealed to her — to unpack was 'exciting' (p. 98), her health improved (p. 165), a dance was 'a thing of light and joy to look back upon' (p. 217), a picnic 'very delightful' (p. 207). The privileges consisted of money, servants, who although a constant source of annoyance made life a great deal easier than it would have been otherwise, position and a careless awareness of superiority without much responsibility.

Sarah Courage's memoirs are a genre in which New Zealand is fairly rich—the memoirs of the pioneering middle-class woman. They invite comparison with the earlier works of Charlotte Godley and Lady Barker. To my mind Lights and Shadows is less interesting and less lively. Sarah Courage did not have the same polish or style, despite the literary pretensions evident in the verses at the beginning of each chapter, nor the same perception of people and events. Yet in a way her book is equally as valuable. Sarah Courage unwittingly shows herself warts and all.

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New Zealand in World Affairs, Volume I. By Sir Alister McIntosh and others. Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1977. 204 pp. N.Z. price: \$12.15.

THIS collection of papers is the most informative recent publication on New Zealand foreign policy. Sir Alister McIntosh discusses the origins of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of an independent policy. Dr Stenson explores New Zealand attitudes to Asia. The core of the book is four articles by Professors Wood and McIntyre, Mr M.A. McKinnon and Mr I.C. MacGibbon on our foreign policy from 1930 to about 1960.

To a much greater extent than most readers would remember or expect, we find New Zealand agonizing between an attachment to the Commonwealth and the realities of American power and Asian problems. New Zealand governments hankered after a royalist and collective Commonwealth, which was dying on its feet, and for a universal collective security that was no more possible in the 1950s than in the 1930s. In both decades they sought unattainable absolutes.

When the question of admitting a republican India into the bosom of the Commonwealth in the years 1947-49 arose Peter Fraser said he did not want 'a flabby Commonwealth': he wanted an 'organic entity united by a common allegiance'. Fraser, it seems, was as royalist and imperialist as Forbes and Coates. On Peter Fraser's Commonwealth, David McIntyre presents new information from PM files in the New Zealand archives as well as from British sources.

Fraser's successor, Sidney Holland (and of course his ultra-imperialist Minister of External Affairs, F.W. Doidge) were even more empire-minded. They clung to the idea that New Zealand's defence role should be a Commonwealth one, and in the Middle East, In short, New Zealand was

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extremely reluctant to have an Asian connection, up until 1955. Yet this period was followed by the asiamania of the 1960s, when a minister proclaimed that New Zealand was part of Southeast Asia.

All of these articles contribute new detail or insights into our relations with the Commonwealth, our foreign policy in general, or our defence policy. But there is a disturbing aspect of this book. It was produced with the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and here and there strange footnotes are to be found: for instance, in David McIntyre's article, we read, 'Information Supplied by Ministry of Foreign Affairs'.

It appears that all of the four authors just listed had this assistance, and throughout their articles there are frequent statements for which no reference or evidence is cited. One constantly wonders what the precise evidence is, or the source of quotations - e.g. F.L.W. Wood's article, p. 96, citing a New Zealand delegation.

Almost invariably one must guess that the source is a document in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is not cited. The ministry is helping historians to write history by judicious leaks.

Should a historian bite the hand that feeds him? The answer is 'yes'. The Ministry is generous with its assistance but niggardly with permission to cite documents (though not as cautious as the S.I.S.). While writing Walter Nash I was permitted to see one document at the Ministry, but not to refer to it, even though I pointed out that it had already been cited in a seminar paper distributed in London. When one enquires why the Ministry is so coy, the answer is usually that the document is, in whole or part, British, American, Australian or whatever.

It is often very difficult to see what reason there could be for not citing a source. For instance, on p. 106, why not give a source for a remark made by Berendsen, in about 1950? Or, pp. 109-10, for Dulles's views in 1951? No matters of security — scarcely even of national interest — can be at stake. Without such evidence, the text shows a bland self-confident texture — voices above the battle — in this case of scholarship.

British records until after World War II are open to scholars. Large quantities of American National Security Council documents have been published and are referred to in this book. It seems that we have less freedom of access to such archives than do scholars in these and in many other countries.

I am coming to the view that historians should not accept access to documents on condition that they give no references. We do not know which Ministry files these authors saw, or whether they read, not the files, but the Ministry's own summary of them. (In that case, these ripe voices are those of the Ministry itself, speaking through historical puppets.) It will be difficult in future for historians to disprove statements in this book, because they will not know whether the authors had read evidence no longer available. In short, many statements in this book may not, in principle, be falsifiable, and are therefore (according to Popper) the voices of non-science, not of science.