

Such an assessment, made of a time when Tāufa'āhau was crusading for his own political power as well as for Christianity, comes close to special pleading as does the author's explanation of the massacre of three hundred men, women and children at the hands of Tāufa'āhau and his allies in 1837. He notes that 'the power struggle was approaching its peak', but then suggests that an alliance of King George's enemies 'must have awakened in him the old savagery and fighting spirit which had lain dormant for several years to such an extent that they momentarily overshadowed the Christian influence on his actions and life.' (p. 110.)

It is reasonable to assume that Tāufa'āhau had some degree of commitment to Christianity from an early stage; certainly he was prepared to defy his traditional gods. But might it not be suggested that although the King had accepted Christianity as his faith, he was not prepared to allow his new beliefs to jeopardize his political future? Christianity gave him a cause to pursue, and an excuse for intervention in power struggles throughout the group. There was also the threat to his position from the Tu'i Tonga, a political rival and, traditionally, the spiritual head of Tonga. It might be argued that, in adopting Christianity, Tāufa'āhau was seeking an alternative source of spiritual legitimacy for his campaigns and for the new political order; he could not unify the country in the name of the Tu'i Tonga if he wanted power for himself. And his power was not secure until after the crushing of the rebellion at Pea and hence, until this time, the evidence is consistent with the King acting as politics demanded, rather than on Christian principles, when there was any conflict between the two.

Church and State is, and will remain, an important work of Pacific history, not simply because it is a perceptive study of change and adaptation in a Polynesian society but also because its account of these processes is not that of an outsider looking in but, rather, an insider's view of his country's history and the origins of its present constitution.

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Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition, 1953-1969. By J. D. B. Miller. Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, 1974. 500 pp. N.Z. price: \$25.30.

PROFESSOR MILLER'S continuation of a well-known and highly regarded series is a work of extraordinary range, complexity and mastery of detail. He suggests that 'five broad themes emerge' but the title reduces these to two — expansion by the admission of new members, attrition of the ties holding the Commonwealth together. The main lines of development are familiar to those who have followed international affairs in the period Mr Miller covers, but by the skilful use of biographical, autobiographical and other material that has since become available he gives us many glimpses behind the scenes which alter the picture as it appeared at the time.

Suez was of course a turning-point: the British Government and people went into the affair believing that Britain was still a great power and found that she

was not. 'Only Canada,' says Mr Miller, 'seems to have been concerned about Suez as a specifically Commonwealth issue.' Fortunately Canada's concern took constructive shape in the brilliant diplomacy of Lester Pearson. Mr Miller also stresses Nehru's moderation. He believed, rightly, that 'Nasser was not the Hitler he was thought to be' and vainly urged that the issue should be settled by negotiation; but India did not withdraw from the Commonwealth. Nevertheless the Commonwealth was never quite the same again. With the revelation of Britain's declining power it never could be.

Two chapters follow on what Mr Miller calls the 'Asian dimension' of the Commonwealth. The long chapter on 'The Commonwealth and Southeast Asia' is particularly interesting in its analysis of the proposed Commonwealth peace mission to Vietnam in 1965. 'The reception of the plan for the mission by the House of Commons showed', says Mr Miller, 'that Wilson's initiative was widely regarded as a proper exercise of British policy and the Commonwealth as a proper vehicle of that policy; it was only afterwards that doubts crept in.' It was not long before Britain, which had rendered invaluable assistance to Malaysia in the emergency before independence and in the confrontation with Sukarno afterwards, decided to withdraw her forces from the region.

But, in Mr Miller's view, 'the transformation of Africa was the greatest single source of change in the Commonwealth'. By the end of the 1950s the Colonial Office had begun 'to adopt the attitude that arguments were needed for delaying independence rather than for granting it.' Mr Miller draws attention to the significant role of Sir Andrew Cohen and of Kwame Nkrumah, 'the embodiment of that pressure by nationalist forces which Cohen recognized as decisive in the end.' At the same time it is fair to say that the Commonwealth found Nkrumah hard to take. While he lasted, he made nonsense of some of the principles for which the Commonwealth had been thought to stand. Fortunately he did not last long: he was at heart a revolutionary and *la révolution dévoré ses enfants*. 'The African transformation', Mr Miller rightly pointed out, 'was more than a matter of decolonization.' Post-independence instability was evident in many African states, which after all were often artificial creations of the period of the partition of Africa; and there was also 'the growing connection between African and world politics'. 'The sense of African unity was strong,' says Mr Miller, 'despite acute difference of opinion about what it entailed or could attain.' It became, in some degree at least, a rival focus of loyalties. There was also the problem of South Africa — too complex for discussion here. Dr Verwoerd took some of the heat out of Prime Ministers' Conferences by withdrawing from the Commonwealth in 1961, but as Mr Miller well says 'formal departure did not end the South African problem for the Commonwealth.' Two chapters on the Rhodesian problem follow. There is nothing startlingly new in them, but one point made at the beginning (by Mr Lardner Burke) is worth mentioning here because it is both illuminating and still relevant. 'Britain has never governed Rhodesia': the country passed immediately from Chartered Company rule to responsible self-government. It may be suggested that Mr Miller, like many African critics, hardly makes enough allowance for Britain's many difficulties, of which this is one. It is indeed a tragic dilemma, not to be resolved by any statement of principle but only by the hard pressure of facts. This section of the book ends with a penetrating chapter on the 'African Dimension', drawing attention to the 'change in Commonwealth tone and procedure' brought about by these African political advances and African pressures.

Mr Miller is right to connect this change with a decline in British belief in the Commonwealth, though this has other causes also. This is not the place to discuss Britain's 'turning away from Commonwealth markets and supplies towards its traditional areas of interest in Europe' except that we may ask whether 'traditional' is quite the right word when the greatest achievement of the last four hundred years of British history is that some three hundred million people outside the British Isles speak English. After discussing many of these changes — the break-up of the sterling area, the development of the E.E.C. and Britain's relations to it, Commonwealth immigration, changes in Commonwealth machinery (notably the creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat) and other 'networks of custom and convenience' Mr Miller closes this massive and thought provoking book with a brief review in which he notes one distinguishing characteristic of the Commonwealth which perhaps deserves more emphasis than he gives it, that it is an association of peoples as well as of governments. That, as a recent visit to Europe reminded the reviewer, the E.E.C. at present is certainly not.

Maybe this work of 550 closely-printed pages and over a quarter of a million words will not be read from cover to cover by many. The price certainly seems excessive in view of the present relation of the New Zealand dollar and the pound sterling. But it will be an indispensable work of reference and those who dip into it for that reason will, we hope, read on, for it will reward their effort.

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The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union. By John Kendle. University of Toronto Press, Toronto. 1975. xvi, 332 pp. Canadian price: \$17.50.

IN recent years there have been a number of articles, some by Professor Kendle, on various aspects of the Round Table movement, but its influence entitled it to the comprehensive and detailed study which he has given to it in the book before us. The subject is one for which private papers are more important than official sources, even Cabinet papers, and Dr Kendle has been able to draw on a variety of collections in many parts of the Commonwealth. As is well known, the movement originated with the group of able, dedicated young Oxford men whom Milner took out to assist him in the reconstruction of South Africa and who were collectively nicknamed 'the kindergarten'. They had an important part, though not perhaps so crucial as has sometimes been supposed, in bringing about the union of South Africa after Milner's departure; and this in its turn was the jumping-off point for the movement aimed at imperial union, which is the main subject of Dr Kendle's work.

The movement was one of propaganda, though on a higher intellectual level than one usually associates with that term. Much hard study was put into the work and the problems that were studied were real problems — imperial defence against the rising military power of Germany and the means of bringing the resources and manpower of the 'self-governing Dominions' to the aid of the United Kingdom and, at the same time, giving them a voice in the military strategy