

and especially of the much-vaunted oral information. The interpretation is rigid and unsatisfying, and the handsome cover and layout frame a second-rate picture.

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The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922. By William Reynolds Braisted. University of Texas Press, Austin and London, 1971. x, 741 pp. U.S. price: \$15.

HERE is a massive example of the new model of naval history. It is not about warships, tactics, battles and sea-dogs, but about diplomacy and strategy; departmental wrangles and inter-service rivalries; estimates, votes and cuts; war plans, bases and dockyards. It could hardly be otherwise. In contrast to his 1958 volume on the McKinley-Roosevelt era, here Braisted has no great operational landmarks to tell of, like Dewey's victory in Manila Bay or the great White Fleet. The only operations in the Pacific in the Taft, Wilson and early Harding periods were gun-boat activity in China and the ill-starred Siberian intervention of 1918-22.

The book is really about the *failure* of the Navy to get into the Pacific in the way it wanted. The completion of the Panama Canal; the opening of a graving dock at Pearl Harbour; a plan for building a major base in the Philippines, and the acceptance of capital ship parity by Britain, were all stages in a momentous shift in the world balance of power. Yet Braisted's conclusion is that the Washington treaties and the policy of a 'navy second to none' (rather than supreme) marked a set-back for navalists.

The book is solidly based in the Navy Department archives and filled out from private papers, State Department records and Japanese material held on microfilm in the Library of Congress. But unlike Captain S. W. Roskill's *Naval Policy Between the Wars* (Vol. 1, London, 1968), with which it overlaps for the post-war and Washington period (half the book), Braisted's work does not have the added dimension provided by research on both sides of the Atlantic. His material from the British side comes from the printed diplomatic documents (notoriously thin on strategic material) and some Admiralty memoranda in the Borden papers in Canada. Stylistically Braisted is less easy to read than Roskill.

One of the disadvantages of the new-style economic-political-diplomatic-strategic naval history, as opposed to the old battles-and-bulldogs variety, is that, while the latter usually had the climax of the great engagement as its focus, the new mode has as a major subject years and years of abortive plans and half-fulfilled promises. As these changed so frequently with turns of the political and financial weathercocks, the detail is, necessarily, complex.

At another level, that of strategic doctrine, the subject is a little like scriptural exegesis. Certain basic texts are handed down, which each generation of staff officers interpret to the faithful — usually reducing it all to a simple numbers game with (highly symbolic) colour codes. How many battleships are needed by

'Blue' forces (the USA) to match 'Orange' (Japan), 'Black' (Germany) and 'Red' (not Russia, of course, but the British Empire).

One set of numbers came to have a momentous significance: sixteen in '16, doubled in '18. The programme for building ten new battleships and six battle cruisers, which was adopted in 1916, and the proposal in 1918 for doubling this programme, presaged U.S. naval supremacy by the 1920s, even though that was not the announced intention. The British had emerged from the war with more vessels than virtually all other navies put together, but many of these were obsolete. The important comparison was between nineteen authorized American post-Jutland capital ships (the 1916 and earlier programmes) and only four British post-Jutland types (of which three were suspended in 1917).

In the famous 'naval battle of Paris' in 1919 Lloyd-George tried to get the U.S. to cancel the 1916 programme in return for British support for the League Covenant. All he got was an agreement to suspend the second sixteen (the, as yet unauthorized, 1918 programme) and to 'consider' reductions in the 1916 programme once the League was in being. Braisted suggests (p. 440) that 'the opening of the British naval records will probably reveal that the engagement in 1919 was as significant a turning point in the history of world sea-power as the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, and the battles of Trafalgar, Tsushima, and Midway'. However, writers who have studied the British records give a different emphasis. Roskill (*Naval Policy*, p. 104) suggests that in late 1919 'everything still remained to be played for in the field of maritime supremacy'. J. Kenneth McDonald, in a contribution to *Lloyd George — Twelve Essays*, edited by A. J. P. Taylor (London, 1971) also shows that the picture was complex and still uncertain. While Lloyd George hoped for an agreement over naval parity with the U.S., he did not announce such a policy and the Admiralty wanted to maintain British naval supremacy even though drastic expenditure cuts had to be made. Thus for two more years Britain tried to follow contradictory policies.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Braisted's work, from the viewpoint of the land which donated one of the 'Red' battle-cruisers scrapped under the Washington treaty, is the comparison between the strategies for the Western Pacific of the United States Navy and the Royal Navy. In the days of the Anglo-German dreadnought race before 1914, Theodore Roosevelt had suggested a tacit division of labour: 'Red' would counter 'Black' and 'Blue' counter 'Orange' although 'Red' and 'Orange' association in the Anglo-Japanese alliance made for awkwardness. The Washington conference ended this particular awkwardness by creating a new one — that is by leaving 'Orange' supreme in the Western Pacific. The famous 5:5:3 ratio in capital ship tonnages and the *status quo* on Pacific fortifications meant that to fight Japan, Britain or the United States would have to concentrate virtually their entire battle fleets at great distances from home bases. This would also mean leaving themselves largely unprotected on their other flanks. Yet to conduct effective operations against Japan both would need Pacific Fleets superior to Japan with advance bases. Jellicoe proposed such a fleet for the British Empire in 1919 — an 8:8 fleet to match Japan's proposed eight battleships and eight battle cruisers. The British wanted a main base at Singapore and advance bases on the Chinese or Korean coasts. The U.S. Navy wanted bases in the Philippines and Guam and an advance base in the Ryukyus. Very little of this came about. The British started work at Singapore in 1923 but their base was barely ready in 1941. The U.S. was better established in

Hawaii but new bases in Guam and the Philippines were ruled out. Both powers kept their main fleets in the 'west'. To counter 'Orange' both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy would have to move their fleets thousands of miles, through vulnerable bottlenecks like Suez and Panama to 'impregnable' bases in the Pacific which were either unfinished or non-existent. It is hardly surprising that Japan won a quick supremacy in 1941. At one level, the defeated navalists of the 1920s, whom Braisted brings out, had been right.

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A Show of Justice: Racial 'Amalgamation' in Nineteenth Century New Zealand.

By Alan Ward. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, and Auckland University Press, 1974. xv, 382 pp. N.Z. price: \$11.90.

ALAN WARD has written what is undoubtedly the best book on nineteenth-century New Zealand's racial policies and what is also probably the angriest. It is the first attempt to assess the concept of racial 'amalgamation', liberal and progressive in intent, in its actual application in the colonial society which, by the end of the century, was boasting of its unique record in 'good' race relations. He demonstrates, with accuracy and lucidity, that these policies could become as oppressive in operation as any overt commitment to settler self-interest and racialist segregation. The policy of amalgamation ensured a legal equality for Maoris by the end of the century but in the establishment of this nominal equality the rights to separate political structures, to economic assistance, and to a respect for different social values were denied. Alan Ward reveals a substantial continuity of assumptions about the process of racial 'amalgamation' between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: primarily, the erroneous equation of equality with conformity to one set of cultural 'norms' — that of the white majority — which notion has perhaps been successfully challenged only in the last few years with the growth of wider community support for urban maraes. It was precisely this fear, that such a concept of equality would be used to destroy separate rights, that directed the articulate protest from Maori groups, including the Maori Council, against the 1971 Race Relations Act.

It is, therefore, hardly surprising to discover a substantial continuity also in Maori demands between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Alan Ward shows that the Maoris were always selective and pragmatic in their responses to the introduction of the Europeans' technology and the spread of their society. Most wished to participate in the material and economic benefits, but not at the price of submission, subservience, and acceptance of voiced contempt for their values and social forms. In 1840, Maori leaders who signed the Treaty of Waitangi expressed their objectives with a remarkable consistency: acceptance of British authority as the better way of preserving their lands, their mana as a people, and a substantial degree of independence under the protection of the law. Few of the chiefs who signed doubted that they would participate in the new order and be consulted in governance. But 'amalgamation' was initially paternalist and