

The Rise of National Socialism 1919-1933

A REVIEW OF SOME RECENT LITERATURE

At a time when there is popular speculation that economic and social problems in some western countries could lead to the rise of a movement akin to National Socialism, it is hoped that a short review of some recent publications on the German experience 1919-33 will be of interest and value to secondary school teachers. In the last ten years there has been a considerable growth in the literature on the rise of Nazism which has supplemented and in some ways modified the picture which could be obtained from the widely-read works of William Shirer and Alan Bullock.¹ This review will be confined to those works which are easily available in New Zealand and which were either originally published in English or of which there is an English translation.

The German Dictatorship by Karl Bracher is a work which is not particularly original nor controversial but which combines such intellectual scope, objectivity and command of other published sources that it must replace Shirer's book for anyone who is seeking a scholarly, comprehensive treatment of the Nazi phenomenon.² As might be expected from an historian, most of whose own research has been on the collapse of the Weimar Republic, nearly half of the book is devoted to the period before 1933. A section on the nineteenth and early twentieth-century intellectual background is followed by an analysis of what Bracher regards as the significant political and social developments in Germany in the same period. In pleasing contrast to those who explain National Socialism simply as the natural outcome of a uniquely German mentality, philosophy and history and to those who explain it equally simply as a phenomenon of the twentieth century brought about by the pressures of growing technology, mass democracy, loss of individuality and the recurrent crises of capitalism, Professor Bracher strives to provide a more balanced interpretation.³ With a few well chosen examples, Bracher demonstrates that nationalist, anti-semitic tendencies were present throughout Europe and were not exclusively German in origin but he also acknowledges that,

developing from the ideas of Johann Fichte at the beginning of the nineteenth century, there had grown in Germany a special sense of destiny which had an anti-western element.⁴ In the political sphere he contends that the events of 1870, 1914 and 1918 were 'decisive crossroads' which militated against the success of democracy and which help to explain why 'Germany chose the road to the Third Reich while others did not'.⁵ This does not mean, however, that Bracher regards the downfall of the Weimar Republic as inevitable. He reserves some of his harshest criticism for the politicians of the Weimar period; for the Social Democrats (S.P.D.) who for so long formed the largest party in the Reichstag but refused to participate in government; for the conservative politicians of the early 1930s who encouraged the President in the use of his powers under the Constitution to undermine the democratic order instead of to protect it; and for those who were misguided and short-sighted enough to invite the Nazis to share in the government when they had apparently passed the peak of their popularity at the polls and were still short of a majority.⁶ These miscalculations, he argues, as well as the more fundamental problems of the German lack of experience in representative government, the responsibility for signing the Treaty of Versailles and the recurrent economic crises, contributed to the collapse of the Weimar Republic. What was more, in the actual Nazi takeover of power in 1933, the political manoeuvrings of the Right, the compliance of the Army, the civil service and the courts, and the lack of vigorous opposition from the Left wing political parties and Trade Unions enabled the Nazis to promote the myth of a legal, national revolution.

Acknowledging that the history of National Socialism cannot be divorced from that of Hitler, Bracher devotes a short section to his youth. He has used the material which has greatly modified the dramatic picture of those years which Hitler presented in *Mein Kampf* but he is clearly not convinced of the importance of sorting out the details of Hitler's antecedents nor does he believe that on available evidence it is possible to reach a 'rational explanation' for Hitler's 'fanatical hatred of the Jews'.⁷

Bracher is more concerned with Hitler as the party leader. He argues that the Nazi party did not owe its success to the intrinsic appeal of its philosophy which he dismisses as a hotchpotch of ideas, many of which were shared with other *volkisch* groups, and vague on certain crucial issues. What he thinks was much more important was Hitler's appreciation of the value of organization and propaganda in the struggle for power.⁸ This is a point of view which is shared by Martin Broszat in his stimulating work *German National Socialism 1919-1945*.⁹ Broszat's short book is not designed for the general reader but for someone who has a working knowledge of the period. He makes no pretence at providing a comprehensive treatment similar to that of Bracher, but only to try to answer the central question of 'what was the character and essence of National Socialism'. He builds up a powerful argument to show that there was no systematic Nazi philosophy (and indeed that Hitler saw no need to produce one) but that in essence it was only the few basic concepts of the survival

of the strong, the mission of German settlement in the East and anti-Semitism. On other matters there was no consistency in the views of the Nazi leaders, and Hitler himself used or dropped parts of the 1920 Nazi party programme as expediency dictated. While Broszat therefore concludes that in ideology National Socialism was not original but derived the core of its ideas from pre-war pan-German nationalists and anti-semitic *volkisch* groups he sees the movement as 'avant-garde in style, organization and propagandistic dynamism'.¹⁰

Three major monographs which have been published recently provide a wealth of detail about this aspect of the Nazi party.¹¹ Dietrich Orlow's emphasis is on the close relationship between the party's propaganda activity and its organization. The skill of the Nazis in both these areas has long been recognized but what Orlow particularly wishes to demonstrate is the interdependence and complementary relationship between the two. His thesis is that by their propaganda the Nazis attracted those who were already discontented or alienated in some way from the society of Weimar Germany and then by the unusual combination of charismatic leadership and strong bureaucratic organization the new recruits were made members of 'an artificial substitute society' — the Nazi party. Then, as members and officials, they in turn played their part in propaganda activity and the cycle was repeated yet again.¹² The key factor in this whole process was the nature of Hitler's leadership. He was at one and the same time a personal leader, the embodiment of the party's programme, and the head of a very centralized bureaucratic organization. There were to be no divided loyalties between the leader and the programme. From the party member Hitler uncompromisingly demanded total commitment and blind obedience; submission to bureaucratic control was a necessary part of this service to the leader. Orlow introduces the major part of this book with an outline of his argument which, unfortunately, is couched in such terms that it could well confuse rather than enlighten and deter rather than encourage the potential reader.¹³ For this reader, at any rate, such statements as 'a society in disequilibrium or psychosociological disengagement is a potential seedbed for the most radical form of political myth, a type which might be termed a "totalizing and reflexive myth"' and 'It (i.e. the myth) totally politicized the party militant and then submitted the politicized entity to the absolute approval or disapproval of Hitler's personal impersonal will' are not immediately illuminating.

The main body of the book, however, provides well-documented material and an analysis which contributes a great deal to our understanding of the functioning of the Nazi party. Orlow illustrates the steps by which Hitler gained acceptance for his claim to unconditional leadership and the sole right to interpret the party programme. He sees the essential technique in this success as the way in which Hitler exploited the emotional response of members to a personal confrontation with him to gain a step by step increase in the centralization of the bureaucratic machine. Orlow also provides a clear analysis of the diverse groups within the Nazi party. For

instance, amongst the remnants of the party after the 1923 *Putsch*, he distinguishes two main groups, 'the pioneers' and 'the front generation'. Their conflict over the aims and organization of the party, he argues, stemmed from age and social background. The 'pioneers' were largely men of middle age and lower middleclass origins whose main fear was loss of social status. They had sought reassurance and security in *volkisch* organizations and looked to the Nazi party for the creation of an exclusive club which, at most, would seek to attract and mobilize the middle classes. The 'front generation', on the other hand, were largely younger men, who had reached manhood during the war years and who envisaged the party as having a more active revolutionary role. Much more prepared to countenance the use of violence, they wished to appeal not just to the middle classes but also to the large body of workers in order to use, as Goebbels expressed it 'the fermenting power that resides in the people'. In two important ways, however, the groups were in agreement. Both blamed the Jews for what they saw as the evils of the existing society and both denied the suitability of parliamentary democracy for Germany. Hitler played upon these beliefs to win acceptance for his leadership from the majority of men in both groups.¹⁴

Orlow's researches have also provided new insights into the detailed working of the Nazi propaganda machine. An illustration of this is the party's reaction to the results of the 1928 Reichstag elections, which revealed that there was a potentially fruitful field for Nazi activity in the rural areas. A correspondence course in public speaking was established, the School of Orators of the Nazi party. The instruction was very basic, being the rudiments of public speaking techniques, a collection of set speeches which it was recommended should be practised in front of a mirror, and model answers to likely questions. The 'graduates' of this course were intended to operate only in the villages and small towns and to arouse sufficient interest to attract a sizeable audience for a meeting at the nearest large town. There, the next in order in the hierarchy of speakers, the *Gau* speaker, would use his more impressive skills and greater experience to win converts to the party. At the highest level in the hierarchy there were the Reich speakers who were reserved for the very large towns and cities or to go into an area which was already showing an encouraging amount of interest in the Nazi party.¹⁵

One of the main features of Orlow's work is his emphasis upon the fundamental reorientation of the priorities for propaganda by the Nazis at the beginning of 1928. During the previous two years, the organization of the Nazi party was concentrated in the larger towns and its propaganda was mainly directed at the workers, designed to win converts from 'Marxist' socialism to 'national' socialism. By the end of 1927, with the stagnation in party membership, Hitler was beginning to question the success of this concentration upon the urban areas. The 1928 election results confirmed him in his belief that a new orientation was necessary. While not entirely abandoning its work in the large towns and cities, the

structure of the Nazi party was now altered and its propaganda adapted to appeal to the farming community and the inhabitants of the small towns. A significant step was Hitler's new interpretation of Article 17 of the party's programme which had promised 'the expropriation of land for communal purposes without compensation'. Hitler now limited the application of this article to 'mainly Jewish speculative companies'. If the party was going to appeal to landowning farmers, small shop-keepers and craftsmen as well as to the business community as a whole, from whom it needed finance, then it had to play down its previous radical and socialist image.¹⁶

The argument that there was a reorientation of the party's efforts in 1928 is also put forward in the detailed, well-documented work of Jeremy Noakes, *The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony 1921-1933*. Noakes' book provides a valuable supplement to that of Orlow. It also provides a very pleasing contrast in the lucid and concise nature of its style. Noakes pays more attention to the question of 'why various sections of the population . . . were vulnerable to the appeal made by National Socialism'. In fact Noakes' evidence would not seem to support Orlow's general blanket explanation that National Socialism appealed to 'atomised individuals' because this work shows that the main nucleus of the party in Lower Saxony up to 1930 came from other *volkisch* organizations. There they had obtained fellowship and a sense of security. The appeal of the Nazi party was not so much different ideas or greater fellowship, but the demand for more total commitment and the prospect of more dynamic action. He stresses the importance of taking into account conditions outside the party to help explain its success. There was growing discontent amongst the younger generation of the peasantry who neither had land of their own nor sufficient money to seek their fortunes elsewhere. There was a gnawing fear amongst the small shopkeepers and craftsmen about the increasing competition from departmental and chain stores. Both groups, in the area which Noakes studied, proved to be very susceptible to Nazi propaganda in the years between 1928 and 1930.¹⁷ They were not alone. During the same period, the foundations for the dramatic success of the Nazi party in Saxony in the early 1930s were laid by Nazi gains amongst the whole range of the *Mittelstand* — a term which Noakes uses in preference to the middle class.

The work of Max Kele is an attempt to challenge the thesis that there was a major change of direction by the Nazis in 1928 and to modify the widely accepted belief in the 'middle class nature' of National Socialism.¹⁸ In minor ways the book provides new information and new insights but, to this reader, the major arguments remained unproven. Kele does show that after 1928 Goebbels continued a vigorous campaign to win the support of German labour, though one might question whether such themes as the 'thralldom of interest' and the 'excessive profits of the wholesale trade' were designed to appeal solely to the workers. In what might well be regarded as a subsidiary theme to the book, Kele considerably modifies the 'left-wing image' of the Strasser brothers which had largely been drawn

from Otto Strasser's book *Hitler and I*.¹⁹ He shows that it was Goebbels in *Der Angriff* rather than the Strassers in the publications of the Kampfverlag who continued to write mainly for the workers after 1928 and that it was Goebbels rather than Gregor Strasser who supported the development of Nazi trade unions.²⁰ Kele also emphasises that at the time of the final break between Hitler and Gregor Strasser in 1932 the issue was one of tactics, Strasser favouring a coalition with right-wing groups while Hitler did not, rather than philosophy.²¹

As far as the major theme of the book is concerned, while Kele has shown that Nazi efforts to win labour support after 1928 continued, he has not shown that these efforts remained the major activity of the party and that therefore there was no 'turn to the right' in 1928. If he is to justify his questioning of the view that the Nazi party was essentially a middleclass phenomenon then he has to substantiate his claim that, as a result of all the propaganda which he has described, the Nazis had 'substantial success' in winning proletarian support. On Kele's own evidence this conclusion would seem questionable. Between 1930 and 1933 there was an increase in the percentage of party members classified as workers, a rise from 26.3 to 32.5. In the same period, the percentage of white collar workers declined from 24.4 to 20.6 and there was a one percentage drop overall in other middleclass categories. But when Kele wishes to prove his point of the 'working class' character of the Nazi party, he chooses to merge the figures for workers of 'hand and head' (i.e. to include the white collar workers) to arrive at the impressive percentage of 53.²² Furthermore, he conveniently ignores the fact that blue collar workers were still under-represented relative to their strength in the overall population, that the great majority of Nazi party officials were drawn from middleclass groups and that there was a significant increase in the membership of the other categories in the years 1930 to 1932, especially civil servants and teachers.²³

Kele's analysis of the July 1932 election results would also seem of doubtful value as support for his major thesis. Admittedly the Nazis made substantial gains and replaced the SPD as the largest party in the country but, of the two parties traditionally supported by the workers, while the SPD lost 600,000 votes compared with the 1930 elections, the Communist Party (KPD) gained 700,000 votes. The most telling evidence which Kele produces is that in seven selected districts, including Berlin, 'it would appear that the Nazis gained at least 189,000 votes from the former voters for the SPD and KPD'. In the final analysis, however, he admits that the bulk of Nazi gains came from the middleclass and nationalist parties which considerably declined in strength.²⁴ Such evidence would not seem to require much modification of the more traditional picture.

The combined researches of Orlow, Noakes and even of Kele himself show that the Nazi party made its breakthrough in the years between 1928 and 1930 mainly by its successful appeal to various sections of the middleclass who felt threatened by growing pressure, the possibility of declining status and the lack of confidence in the existing political system. By the

nature of its organization, the skill of its propaganda and the very vagueness of its ideology, the Nazi party was then able to exploit the situation caused by the grave economic crisis of the early 1930s and appeal to all social groups as the party which could best overcome the divisions within German society.

Nothing to date has seriously challenged the view that Hitler's role in the Nazi party was crucial. Orlow and Noakes have illustrated the more technical aspects of the establishment of his leadership, but one must ask what new light has been shed on the nature of his personal magnetism by the two recently published major biographies.²⁵ Werner Maser's book, the result of twenty years study according to his English publishers, is clearly based on detailed research into all possible kinds of documentary evidence and personal interviews with those who had known Hitler at any stage of his life and were prepared to talk about it. The result is extremely disappointing. There is a great deal of factual information, much of it of the kind that in writing postcards to his friend Kubizek before 1908 Hitler regularly spelled *Theater* without the 'h', but there is comparatively little interpretation which helps to explain the nature of his appeal to others and the basis of his political success. The details of Hitler's childhood and youth are carefully sorted out and there is a particularly long and intricate discussion, with excursions into graphology, of the various theories regarding the identity of Hitler's grandfather, without any evidence to show that the uncertainty about his ancestry affected Hitler during his formative years.²⁶ A more balanced and lucid account of this part of Hitler's life has already appeared in Bradley Smith's work.

The Hitler who emerges from Maser's pages is much more cultured and widely-read, not to mention a gifted linguist with a working knowledge of French, English, Italian and Yiddish, than the Hitler of Alan Bullock's version who had 'imbibed the ideas of the gutter'. While there is sufficient material to modify Bullock's rather extreme picture, Maser's evidence is of unequal value, indiscriminating, ill-sorted and often conflicting. There is, for instance, an impressive list of the writers and thinkers who meant most to Hitler without proof as to how Maser arrived at it.²⁷ Hitler's knowledge of English is attested to by recollections of his landlord's son in Munich that some forty years earlier he used to fetch English books and periodicals from the library for his father's lodger.²⁸ At one stage we are told, and without reference to any particular period, that Hitler had a mastery of 'considerable areas of world history, comprising not only the history of Germany and Europe, both ancient and modern, but also of America in which he showed an unusual grasp of detail' but ten pages later we are also told 'his unfamiliarity with English history and its implications — which was to have ominous consequences, was more than matched by his ignorance of American history, an omission he only began to make good when forced to do so by the political contingency he had himself contrived'.²⁹ From all the detail with which the reader is confronted, the only significant points which seem to emerge in explanation of his personal

attraction is that he was more widely-read than he had previously been given credit for, that he could dazzle even experts by his powers of memory and that he had a peculiar fascination for women.³⁰

Fest's biography is a very different kind, based mainly on existing published material but making a much greater effort at interpretation. He is not obsessed with details about Hitler as a person but regards him as interesting only as 'part of the biography of the age', and therefore he tries to explain what influenced the young Hitler and promoted his successful political career.³¹ Fest argues that Hitler's own outlook developed from his failures at school and in Vienna where he learnt to despise the established order but, at the same time, desperately wanted to succeed within it. He was, therefore, filled with hatred and rancour and through his reading and observation of the political scene in Vienna he came to concentrate all his hatred on one object, the Jews. The problem for Fest, as for many others including Maser, is that while one can provide background information on all the possible anti-Semitic influences on Hitler, there is no conclusive evidence as to when Hitler became a 'fully fledged anti-semite'.³²

One minor problem in this English translation of Fest's work is that the footnoting is inadequate. There are many occasions when the reader feels the need of supporting evidence for a statement and can derive little comfort from the knowledge that there is twice as much footnote material in the original German version. We are told, for instance, that Kubizek and 'other companions from the dim twilight of underground Vienna have pointed out that Hitler had early on fallen out with everybody, that his hatred lashed out in all directions' but there is no reference to Kubizek's work, the reliability of which, in any case, Fest frequently questions, nor is there any evidence as to the identity of these other companions.³³ And this is on the subject of Hitler's hatred and rancour which Fest regards as two of the most important emotions in the development of his personality.

While Fest clearly has a special interest in the period of Hitler's rise to power, and in this way provides a good supplement to Bullock who devotes comparatively little space to it, he has not contributed a great deal which is new to our understanding of the power of Hitler's personality and the part which it played in the establishment of his undisputed leadership of the Nazi Party. Fest believes that Hitler's political success in the late 1920s and early 1930s was due to his ability to express the thoughts of the socially dislocated and fearful classes in German society. It is an analysis which complements the conclusions of Orlow and Noakes and is very similar to that of Albert Speer who has said that Hitler was able to sense the currents of opinion of the time, 'though many of them were still diffuse and intangible', and to 'articulate and exploit them for his own ends'.³⁴ This recognition of Hitler's skill as an orator is certainly not new. Bullock referred to him as 'the greatest demagogue in history'.³⁵ What has been obtained, not only from Fest but also from the published diaries and memoirs of Hitler's contemporaries, particularly Goebbels, Speer and François-Poncet, is more understanding of the nature of that oratorical

ability.³⁶ It was not just a natural gift but one which he carefully practised and cultivated. He learnt to vary his whole style and approach as well as some of the content of his speeches according to the character of his audience. In mid-1926 Goebbels noted that while Hitler could be the 'born whipper up' he could equally adopt a style which was 'deep and mystical almost like the Gospels'.³⁷ Speer records that, before he heard Hitler speak for the first time, he had expected a ranting demagogue, but instead the professors and students of the University of Berlin were confronted by a man of modest demeanour, in a well-fitting blue suit who, for most of his speech, spoke almost shyly and in a low voice.³⁸ While a large part of Hitler's success as an orator lay in the emotional interaction with his audience, there was also, on his part, an element of shrewd calculation.

In much the same way the picture of Hitler as irrational, frequently hysterical and of fixed ideas has now been shown to be but one facet of a man who could also be rational and opportunist and coldly cunning. For instance, after the Bamberg meeting of February 1926 Bullock merely comments that Goebbels 'was now whole-heartedly Hitler's man'.³⁹ It was not such an easy conversion as this statement would seem to imply. Hitler deliberately set out to break the alliance between Goebbels and the Strassers. Shrewdly assessing Goebbels' character and playing upon his desire to be successful and important, Hitler carefully singled out Goebbels for particular attention. He chose him to share the platform at a series of public meetings, he loudly praised his speeches in front of other members of the party, and he paid him the compliment of inviting him to pay a private visit to Berchtesgaden. Hitler also ostentatiously displayed the powerful cars and comfortable living conditions which were available to those in his immediate circle but which had been beyond the reach of those in the Strasser group. In addition, by making Goebbels the *Gauleiter* of Berlin Hitler at one stroke gave him a formidable challenge and put him in a position which made him a rival to the Strasser brothers.⁴⁰ Such deliberate encouragement of rivalries, which became a marked feature of the National Socialist state, served to strengthen Hitler's own unique position as leader.

In any study of the rise of National Socialism, the fundamental question is 'how a dictatorial regime of such dimensions could come to power so quickly and with so little or no resistance in a country with Germany's traditions and cultural heritage'.⁴¹ The books which have been under review here have shown that there is no simple answer but that a multiplicity of causes and conditions must be taken into account. As Bracher has pointed out there were the strong authoritarian and nationalist traditions in German political and intellectual life; there were the problems inherent in the origins of the Weimar Republic; there were the mistakes and miscalculations of the Weimar politicians; and there was the social dislocation brought about by the world-wide economic changes and modernization of the twentieth century. Noakes has shown how these changes particularly affected the various groups in the wide range of the

Mittelstand of Lower Saxony — the farmers, the artisans, the small shopkeepers, the larger scale industrialists and the new growing group of white collar workers. One particularly notable result was that they became increasingly dissatisfied with the traditional old style parties who seemed unable to protect their interests. It was this kind of situation, as Noakes himself and Orlow have demonstrated, that the Nazi party's closely integrated propaganda and organization was designed to exploit. In this area their methods and skill were far superior to those of their rivals.

Vital to the whole National Socialist movement was Hitler. Despite rivalries and conflicts between individuals and sections of the party, and of these there were many, his undisputed authoritarian leadership gave it a coherence and discipline which were essential for its success. The steps by which Hitler established his control and the importance of this charismatic nature of his leadership in the rise of the party have been clearly analyzed.⁴² What is still much less clear is why so many Germans were prepared to accept his claims and to submit themselves to his will and to the control of the party. To what extent those who voted for the Nazis or even those who joined the party understood the full implications of National Socialism remains something of a mystery. More studies at the local level similar to that carried out by Noakes and greater research into the background, character and ideas of other Nazi leaders and officials rather than more concentration on Hitler could provide further light on this point.⁴³ Until this is done, one is tempted to conclude with François-Poncet that in any explanation of why the German people followed Hitler and allowed the triumph of National Socialism, there remains an element which escapes detection and which can best be understood by looking back to the story of the Pied Piper of Hamelin.⁴⁴

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NOTES

¹ William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (hereafter *Rise and Fall*), New York, 1960; Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, London, 1962.

² Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The German Dictatorship — The origins, structure and effects of National Socialism*, London, 1971.

³ An example of the first viewpoint is Shirer, *Rise and Fall* and the second Gerhard Ritter 'The Historical Foundations of the Rise of National Socialism' in *The Third Reich, A Study under the Auspices of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies with the Assistance of UNESCO*, New York, 1955.

⁴ Bracher, pp. 7ff, 22ff.

⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 16ff, p. 23.

⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 48-49, pp. 169-78.

⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 57ff. Two books which deal specifically with young Hitler are Franz Jetzinger, *Hitler's Youth*, London, 1958 and Bradley F. Smith, *Adolf Hitler: His Family, Childhood and Youth*, Stanford, 1967.

⁸ Bracher, pp. 142-52.

⁹ Martin Broszat, *German National Socialism 1919-1945*, Santa Barbara, 1966.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 59.

¹¹ Dietrich Orlow, *The History of the Nazi Party, Vol. I 1919–1933*, Newton Abbot, 1971; Jeremy Noakes, *The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony 1921–1933*, London, 1971; Max Kele, *Nazis and Workers*, Durham, North Carolina, 1972.

¹² Orlow, pp. 5ff.

¹³ *ibid.*, pp. 1–10.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 47ff.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 159ff.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 114ff.

¹⁷ Noakes, pp. 121ff.

¹⁸ Kele, pp. 6ff.

¹⁹ Otto Strasser, *Hitler and I*, Boston, 1940.

²⁰ Kele, pp. 130ff.

²¹ *ibid.*, p. 209.

²² *ibid.*, pp. 203ff.

²³ Bracher, p. 234.

²⁴ Kele, pp. 207ff.

²⁵ Werner Maser, *Hitler*, London, 1973; Joachim C. Fest, *Hitler*, London, 1973.

²⁶ Maser, pp. 9–20.

²⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 184, 379.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 186.

²⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 120, 130.

³⁰ Other authors have touched on these qualities. Josef Lipski *Diplomat in Berlin 1933–1939*, New York, 1968, p. 575. Lipski, by no means a favourable observer, has remarked on Hitler's phenomenal memory and his use of it to impress and to win arguments. *Chips—Diaries of Sir Henry Channon*, 1967, London, p. 158. This inveterate gossip and snob records that the French-born Begum Aga Khan regarded Hitler as the most attractive man she had ever met.

³¹ Fest, pp. 1–57, 87–107.

³² *ibid.*, pp. 41ff. Maser, p. 173 'Yet despite the wealth of information gained from an analysis of all the available data on Hitler's medical, intellectual and social background there is still no really satisfactory explanation for his anti-semitism'.

³³ Fest, p. 40. August Kubizck, *Young Hitler, the Story of our Friendship*, London, 1954.

³⁴ Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, New York, 1970, p. 15.

³⁵ Bullock, p. 68.

³⁶ *The Early Goebbels Diaries*, edit. H. Heiber, London, 1962; Andre François-Poncet, *Souvenirs d'une Ambassade à Berlin 1931–1938*, Paris, 1946. English translation *The Fateful Years*, London, 1949.

³⁷ Goebbels, pp. 91–6.

³⁸ Speer, p. 16.

³⁹ Bullock, p. 139.

⁴⁰ Goebbels, pp. 67ff; Fest pp. 241ff.

⁴¹ Bracher, p. 3.

⁴² This has been well covered by Orlow and Noakes. There is also an earlier work which has a similar emphasis, Joseph Nyomarkay, *Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party*, Minneapolis, 1967.

⁴³ Apart from Noakes, the other study at the local level which is well worth reading is W. S. Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power — The Experience of a Single German Town 1930–1935*, London, 1966.

Joachim Fest has made a pioneering study of a number of Nazi leaders in his *The Face of the Third Reich*, London, 1972.

⁴⁴ François-Poncet, pp. 350–55.