

Another theme which is emerging is the contrast between the periods before and after 1870. There was a marked tendency in the late nineteenth century towards ossification in departmental procedures. The scope for recruitment from outside the regular civil service diminished, and there were fewer chances for 'statesmen in disguise' such as had been able to shape the development of governmental activity in the earlier nineteenth century when rules were much more elastic and unformed.

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British Strategy in the Far East 1919-1939. By William Roger Louis. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971. 284 pp. N.Z. price: \$5.40.

TWO FEATURES stand out about this book. First, it gives a fascinating, and appetizing indication of the richness of the British public records which were recently opened under the 30-year rule. Concentrating on the Foreign Office, Cabinet, and, to a certain extent, Committee of Imperial Defence records, Louis is the first author to have surveyed the entire inter-war period in this way. Secondly, it manages to discuss 'strategy' with a deliberate neglect of its military aspects. Thus Louis offers a work which, he admits, is 'impressionistic and thematically selective'. He attempts 'something rather more than a study of British policy', something considerably less than a study of military appreciations, capabilities, theories or preparedness. What he has done may be described as outlining the Foreign Office's assessments of events in China and Japan; its conception of British interest and objectives, and its broad diplomatic 'strategies' for achieving them.

To cover so broad a canvas from such a wealth of documents is no mean achievement and, in so far as a dominant theme comes through, it is the role of personalities in a set of situations where they knew they were powerless. Most frequently quoted are Sir Victor Wellesley (deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1925-36) and Sir John Pratt (who served in the consular service in China, 1898-1924, and was adviser on Far East affairs, 1925-38). In the long run, British diplomatists in the Far East, concludes Louis, 'felt themselves buffeted by Asian forces beyond their control'.

One might, indeed, be tempted to see the British policy-makers as 'latter-day Victorians' doing their best to retain their composure in a world rapidly passing them by. Thus over the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921, Lloyd George insisted: 'the British Empire must behave like a gentleman', and when, at the end of the Washington Conference the termination of the alliance was announced, Lord Balfour's head was seen to drop forward: 'It was an amazing revelation', wrote a journalist, 'of what the Japanese Treaty has meant to the men of a vanished age. It was the spinal cord that had been severed'. Again, in the uncertainties of

the Chinese revolution in the 1920s, Leopold Amery, that latter-day imperialist at the Colonial Office, suggested that Britain should assist the anti-Communist forces in southern China to ensure the security of Hong Kong. Meanwhile, British residents in the treaty ports found the need to pack up and move, in face of looting and riots, 'an unadulterated bother'. Britain stood for 'fair play', and 'straight dealing'. 'Personality, especially British personality', wrote an F.O. man, 'counts enormously in China'. But in Japan things were, by 1931, very different. 'Cricket is, I am sorry to say, in a somewhat less satisfactory condition than it was twenty-five years ago', wrote the ambassador, Sir Francis Lindley.

Yet, on they went, imperturbably. Chiang Kai-Shek asked Sir Alexander Cadogan in 1936: 'What's wrong with China?' and was treated with the reply: 'What's wrong with China was that there was something wrong with the Chinese. . . .' Cadogan's remedies were not unlike those recommended by Sir George Grey for the Maoris a century before: 'remove the youth early from the family influence and put them into schools and academies and colleges where they will be trained, not so much intellectually, . . . but where they might acquire a corporate spirit and wider loyalty and a sense of service'.

Occasionally, however, they did get ruffled. On 26 August 1937, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen was motoring from Nanking to Shanghai when Japanese aircraft machine-gunned the car. He realized 'something unpleasant had happened . . . I had been shot', and, from his hospital bed he told the Japanese ambassador 'in somewhat outspoken terms' exactly what he thought of the business. The British Government awarded him £5,000 to show the Japanese 'the value which we set upon an Ambassador'.

Yet, behind these stiff upper lips, the British were adjusting to new realities of power and Louis suggests they did so with care, if not understanding. As the Foreign Office approached the acute dilemmas posed by the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japan's activities in China, United States' relations with Japan, and the position of the Pacific Dominions in 1921, the officials studied the matter 'with a thoroughness probably unsurpassed by any group in the world at the time'. As they stood by, perplexed, awaiting the outcome of China's revolution, they sought to preserve a chance for trade and to protect Britain's investments in Shanghai, by beginning to revise the unequal treaties. But they knew it was beyond Britain's power to have a major influence. Japan's ambitions in China and the attitude of the United States were the determining factors. Although Britain was building the Singapore naval base to enable part of the Royal Navy's 'main fleet' to operate in the Pacific, it had been admitted as early as 1922 that a conflict with Japan, without the United States as an ally, was out of the question. If the Foreign Office had a general attitude in the late 1930s it was: 'Firmness towards Japan, generosity to China'. But all the time European events had to be kept in mind and the British responded to Chinese events 'more in regard to the role Japan might play in a world war'.

This fascinating book was Professor Louis's contribution to the International History Seminar at Yale. As such it has some of the disadvantages of this genre, namely too many slabs of verbatim quotations, and some odd

'End Notes' from G. F. Hudson of Oxford. As Louis admits, much fuller accounts are available on important aspects of the subject — by Nish on the Anglo-Japanese alliance, by Roskill and Braisted on naval matters — and a more conventional study of 'strategy' will have to be based on the Chiefs of Staff, and service department records. But as an appetizer for the new wave of inter-war studies his book is well worth reading.

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The Anglican Church in New Zealand. A History. By W. P. Morrell. Anglican Church of the Province of New Zealand, Dunedin, 1973. xi, 277 pp. N.Z. price: \$4.85.

THIS official history is broader in subject matter than the title suggests. The Church Missionary Society period, before the formal constitution of the Church in 1857, has ample treatment, while over a quarter of the book is concerned with that mission enterprise in Melanesia and Polynesia for which the province of the Church has assumed responsibility.

The dominating figure in the first part of Morrell's account is George Augustus Selwyn, the bishop appointed to give authority and discipline to Anglicanism in the new colony. Energetic, earnest and authoritarian, he soon fell out with those missionaries on the spot whose necks had never felt a halter. Morrell tells how Governor Grey, early showing a flair for mischief and insinuated misinformation, used Selwyn as a wedge to prize land away from missionary families. This episode was but one of the many disappointments of the bishop's first ten years in the colony. By 1853 Selwyn was depressed. As a pastoral bishop he seemed to have 'come close to failure'; he had 'pitched his hopes too high'. Yet, says Morrell, his greatest triumph was at hand: the 1857 constitution of the province of New Zealand, which established a system of synodical government that freed, as Selwyn planned it would, the colonial church from the private patronage, administrative confusion, Erastian compromises and all those abuses which encumbered the mother-church in England and Ireland. An enthralling account is given of how Selwyn realized his object. Believing that, in Morrell's words, 'voluntary compact was the only possible basis for the Church connection', Selwyn was prepared to concede much to the individual dioceses to win their support for the constitution. His monument is a system of Church government, in essentials still operating today, whose lay representative character is indeed more in keeping with twentieth century concepts of government than with those of the time in which it was formulated.

From a narrowly European and Anglican viewpoint, church work among Maoris, Morrell suggests, has been disappointing. He tells of a recession from Anglican orthodoxy often to heretical variants as early as the 1850s. And the process accelerated during the racial wars of the 1860s despite the championing of the Maoris' cause by Octavius Hadfield and less emphatically Selwyn himself whose wry consolation was the knowledge that