

custom. That Gordon's legacy impeded development to some extent there is no doubt, but there were still ways of circumventing the structure.

The Charter of the Land is also intended to be a critique of applied anthropology, pointing up the dangers of using misconceptions about societies for administrative ends. But France is hitting here at a straw man. The anthropological knowledge of the nineteenth century on which Gordon relied would now be regarded as totally insufficient for a land programme. Such knowledge was quite speculative, gathered from traveller's gossip and only occasional forays into the countryside. What Gordon and his anthropological advisers lacked was what is now the hallmark of the anthropologist's professional method — intimacy with the local society. Gordon may have insisted that his staff drink *kava*, he may have tramped around the bush in bare feet, and even assumed the mantle of a chief, but he never really learnt the language nor communicated with the Fijians outside formal or official sessions. Again, Gordon only accepted anthropological knowledge because it dovetailed into the then current colonial policies and pleased patrons like Mr Gladstone.

In short, France's book is a very valuable addition to the Pacific literature not least because it is a refreshing counterweight to the determinism that is beginning to characterise anthropological writing.

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Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, 1914-1919. By William Roger Louis. Clarendon Press, 1967. 165 pp. U.K. price: 30s.

THIS MODEST but scholarly study of British policy towards the German colonies graphically illustrates that mandates were historically phenomena of 'the international frontier' formed by the zones where great power interests came together in conflict.¹

Before 1914 German colonial rule was held in some esteem, but after the southern dominions had captured neighbouring German colonies, 'as a great and urgent Imperial service', evidence of German 'colonial guilt' was deliberately accumulated to legitimise, as it were, the goal of permanent British occupation.

During the period of partition, the British had willingly yielded African and Pacific claims to Germany in return for help in Egypt, much to the resentment of leading statesmen of Cape Colony and the Australasian colonies. By 1916, however, it was generally accepted that the southern dominions would want to keep German South-West Africa, New Guinea and Samoa. As for the tropical African territory conquered with French and Italian assistance, Britain largely adhered to her traditional policy of giving way to France in the west and strengthening her strategic position in the east.

The Japanese seizure of German Pacific Islands north of the equator and rights in the Shantung peninsula posed new problems. While Australia, and to a lesser extent New Zealand, had misgivings about the 'Japanese peril', Britain needed Japanese naval support to win the war. The price of this support was the secret Anglo-Japanese understanding of February

¹ H. Duncan Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship*, London, 1948, p. 3.

1917, which recognised Japan's claims in the north Pacific and the Shantung peninsula and Britain's in the south Pacific. Although the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments were consulted and acquiesced, Hughes at first denied it, and Massey reiterated the need to keep Germany out of the south Pacific at the 1917 Imperial War Conference and at meetings of the Territorial Desiderata Committee. Smuts, similarly, expanded the arguments for retaining German South-West and East Africa.

Meanwhile Labour and left-wing agitation against British annexationist aims had been gathering strength. With the entry of the United States into the war and the Russian revolution, the cry became 'peace without annexations'. Lloyd George adopted Smut's idea of national determination, though he was careful to get evidence that New Guinea, Samoa and South-West Africa would self-determine in favour of the British.

At the Paris Peace Conference, Britain was caught on the horns of a dilemma between Wilsonian idealism and the annexationist aims of the southern dominions. Moreover, with Germany defeated, France victorious and Japan expanding, she needed American friendship to preserve her future power and world stability. The price she paid was the mandate system. When Wilson insisted that *all* Turkish territories and German colonies should come under the League of Nations, Smuts with Lord Robert Cecil suggested three classes. Lloyd George then cajoled and bullied Hughes and Massey into accepting C class mandates which could be administered as 'integral portions' of their own territory.

Despite this victory, Wilson could not prevent another 'scramble' when the mandates were apportioned. Nor could he prevent Japan eventually fortifying the north Pacific islands. In retrospect it seems that Hughes and Massey were well-justified in their lack of faith in League control, but not perhaps in their efforts to annex German New Guinea and Samoa at the cost of American friendship.

The international aspects of this inside story based on pioneering research into recently declassified public records and private papers are well-covered, but little is made of the way in which the southern dominions were growing into equal partnership with Britain. New Zealand attitudes and interests are treated very cursorily. Indeed Mr Louis is too ready to assume that New Zealanders thought like Australians and Massey partnered Hughes. Hopes and expectations that Samoa would be placed under the colonial office, criticism of Massey's atavistic imperialism, ambiguities in Massey's statements and rivalry with Australia over Nauru are ignored — and the 'Tonga islands' are erroneously said to 'form the larger part of the Solomon group'.

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The Oxford History of South Africa. Edited by Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson. I. *South Africa to 1870.* Clarendon Press, 1969. U.K. price: 75s.

THIS VOLUME and a second which is foreshadowed are an attempt to reinterpret a history which has previously been written from an essentially European point of view. Professor Eric Walker's well-known scholarly history, though its standpoint is liberal, does not devote a single chapter to the non-European peoples. The South African volume of the *Cambridge*