

Fleurieu. The final chapter summarises a number of later visits to the Solomons. The book terminates with an impressive bibliography and an adequate index.

There is in this book a great deal that is admirable and little that is not. Readers who are familiar with the main sources are likely to receive added enlightenment from the peripheral material. Particularly valuable are the sections dealing with the mapping of the western Pacific during the period of exploration. The book as a whole approaches as nearly to a definitive work in English on the exploration of the Solomons as is possible in one volume, although those who wish to read full translations of the main sources will still have to resort to the relevant Hakluyt Society volumes, and the detailed tracing of coastal explorations, no doubt in deference to publishing realities, requires independent reference to large-scale charts.

The issues involved in the exploration of the Pacific transcend any academic distinction between history and geography. It may even be said of the discovery and rediscovery of the Solomons that the most significant themes are geographical. The early explorers who crossed the Pacific to the Solomons had rather vague ideas of the circumference of the world and the distances they had travelled, and navigation techniques for two centuries thereafter still gave no adequate answer to this problem of longitude. The Solomons had to be found all over again. Their political and economic value, contrary to the hopes of Mendana and Quiros, proved to be slight. Apart from the cosmographical issues and rivalry between the maritime powers, the main historical interest in the discovery and exploration of the Solomons lies in the fascinating dramas of the voyages themselves.

Jack-Hinton very properly does not hesitate to give his own opinions and suggestions on controversial issues. There is not much to dispute over with him, but I have a couple of personal reservations. I find it difficult to accept the possibility that 'Iave la Grande' in the sixteenth-century 'Dieppe' maps embodies knowledge of Australia. In preferring Roncador Reef to Ontong Java for Mendana's Baxos de la Candelaria, and Ontong Java to Nukumanu for the first island seen by Le Maire after the Horne Islands, Jack-Hinton argues that the persistent (although not invariable) southerly error in early latitudes noted by Guppy, Helen Wallis and myself (and also, I may add, the Dutch hydrographer Meyjes) has little or no significance for identifications in the absence of some demonstrated reason for this error. This predominant southerly error, however, is a fact, whatever the reason. But it seems unlikely that there will ever be a final consensus on the identification of either of these two discoveries.

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*The Shadow of the Land: A Study of British Policy and Racial Conflict in New Zealand 1832-1852.* By Ian Wards. Government Printer, Wellington, 1968. By Ian Wards xvix, 422 pp. N.Z. price: \$6.00

THIS ANALYSIS of British colonial policy began as a military history, and Mr Wards writes with the conviction that these origins bequeath him a realism previously unknown among historians of early New Zealand. He believes himself freed from the 'quixotic' visions of those who found in the decisions of the Colonial Office an attempt to create 'some other Eden'.

But Wards's error is to set up A. H. McLintock's interpretation as the precondition to his own conclusions. He centres his thesis around the mistaken premise that if there was an initial policy underlying the Colonial Office actions from 1840 then it must be a policy of government through 'moral suasion', an integral aspect of which was the absence of an adequate armed force. Being able to demonstrate that this lack of substantial military backing was a consequence of New Zealand's being part of an Empire which had over-reached itself, he concludes that thereby it is established that there was no 'long-term' policy. Wards insists there was no experiment in 'practical idealism', no attempt to create a harmonious bi-racial society.

Wards's initial error — upon which much rests — is to disregard the fundamental reason for intervention. It was not, as he would have, a 'missionary policy', which then was abandoned: it was the consequence of the reluctant recognition that European settlement had begun and would continue. The decision to intervene to bring law was not the reflection of 'unbalanced idealism', as McLintock has argued: it was a decision to act as arbiter, to establish the conditions for 'humane colonisation', and to impose control over land sales, as the most likely source of war. It was not simply a policy aimed at protecting the Maoris.

The term 'moral suasion', used to describe the goals of the Colonial Office and its first governors, is quite misleading. When FitzRoy said that the English position in the land 'depends on moral influence, and not in physical force', he may simply have meant that the English had not come as *conquistadores*, or more probably he meant that the lack of effective armed force left him with no other instrument of government, but he certainly did not mean that his objective was to govern without resort to force. Rather, as he commented in 1846, his lack of power had driven him to a position where he was utterly unable to carry out the law efficiently, and that such 'extreme of forbearance', which he had had to adopt towards the Maoris, 'bordered on inhumanity towards the settlers'. Wards is quite correct when he asserts that 'moral suasion had never been selected by the Colonial Office as a principal plank of practical politics', but 'a situation had arisen which made it appear that it had' (p.179).

But it is not a corollary to argue that it must follow that there was no policy at all. To sustain his argument, Wards presents a radical reinterpretation of the intentions embodied in the treaty of Waitangi. For Wards, the treaty was nothing more than a legal device to acquire sovereignty, its guarantees simply an 'accident' of drafting, left over from an earlier plan to exclude large areas of the country from British sovereignty. The guarantees, originally intended for those residing outside the scope of British rule, were, he argues, incorporated as a last-minute solution to the legal problem of arranging the cession: it was cheaper than distributing gifts (pp. 27, 29, 57). But he ignores the fact that Hobson had left with instructions to annex either the whole or parts of New Zealand *and* that he was to make integral with the transfer of sovereignty the Crown guarantee of land and its preemptive right of purchase. Hobson's subsequent decision to reject the notion of partial cession, in December 1839, did not affect these considerations. To treat Normanby's instructions of 14 August as mere 'idealistic residue' (p. 387) is to overlook the obvious: that, as instructions to the consul, they were intended primarily to be read by that consul; they were not simply a sop for missionaries (p. 29). Wards insists that, once the decision to annex had been taken, the Colonial Office's interest 'narrowed

to' and were 'to a large extent cancelled by' (pp. 57, 67) the practical issue of obtaining sovereignty. But the dual aspects involved in annexation — cession of sovereignty and the intention of protection of certain Maori rights — were not alternative or incompatible objectives; they were both components of the problem the Crown had finally faced when it decided to intervene: that extensive and uncontrolled settlement of the land by the British would probably lead to the extermination of the Maoris, whose title to the soil was 'indisputable'.

That intervention was not backed by adequate administrative, financial, or military resources, that effective control would depend initially on the maintenance of a close pattern of settlement, which the advent of the New Zealand Company prevented, and that the government's plans for the Maoris were hopelessly inadequate, few would deny. In an article in *Historical Studies*, November 1962 (which Wards seems to have overlooked), C. H. Wake deals precisely with these problems, which created the mistaken notion that there was a policy of 'moral influence' as the means of controlling the Maoris. But nevertheless there was a degree of consistency in the imperial government's concept of its governors as mediators. With the advent of Grey, although the methods changed and financial and military backing was provided, the objectives were not changed. Grey had to recover the loyalty of the settlers and he had to destroy the Maori belief that the royal governor was 'as soft as a pumpkin' if he were to act effectively. But Grey does not mark a fundamental change whereby the 'Colonial Office had at last come down on the side of the settler' (p. 162). Rather, one would concur with Wards when he reveals the irony that, by providing Grey with 'too much' armed force, the Colonial Office made him vulnerable to arguments for 'subjugation and confiscation' (p. 147).

Wards is on firm ground with his assessment of the impact of military considerations on government. Grey's use — and misuse — of force in the land disputes in the Wellington area is ably analysed. But Ward's application of the military thesis to the Wanganui dispute seems questionable. To him, it was the presence of the military which provoked a war which otherwise might not have eventuated; in his view, the attack on Wanganui was not directed against the settlers, but solely against the soldiers. Therefore, it follows that it was a war which had 'no local reason' and had 'little to do with European settlement in Wanganui itself, and perhaps even less with the local land purchases' (p. 324). It is hard to reconcile these assertions with his evidence that Ngapara identified himself with Heke, who 'had been driven from his land and had no place to live' (p. 320). As Wards later admits, the skirmish at Wanganui, with others, 'merely touched the fringes of vast areas of discontent' (p. 375): the stirring of Maori resistance to the assertion of European domination.

Many of the difficulties which Wards has created for himself stem from his failure to grasp the contradictions and complexities within humanitarian thought. He commences with a fairly simplistic notion of the so-called 'policy of moral suasion': finding this notion untenable, he has thrown out both baby and bath water. He has thereby also failed to see that Grey's policy of 'enforcement of the law' was quite consistent with the ultimate objective of the humanitarians in office: the assimilation of the Maori into a European world. The humanitarians had never intended 'to preserve intact the Maori race' (p. 357). And, as Alan Ward has shown in his discussion

of the Anglo-Maori wars (*The New Zealand Journal of History*, October 1967) it is therefore to be expected that in the end the humanitarians would endorse a policy of force. This was the harsh logic of annexation: that the government would defend the European settlements against Maori interests.

Ian Wards has written a provocative work which was intended to prove the thesis that New Zealand was no 'exception to the normal nineteenth century British pattern of territorial acquisition'. If his thesis cannot be sustained, much of the argument and material will be of value to students of this period. There may be a few inaccuracies of name (Robert for Richard Cruise) or place (Matavia for Matauwhi), but there are excellent maps and much information, previously unpublished. It is a study which will be constantly read.

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*The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1911. A Study in Imperial Organization.* By John E. Kendle. Longmans (for the Royal Commonwealth Society), London, 1967. 264 pp. U.K. price: 36s.

THE AUTHOR of this new volume in the Royal Commonwealth Society Imperial Studies series is a young Canadian scholar who has worked in England, Australia and New Zealand. It is very much a book for specialists — and specialists will find it very rewarding. Dr Kendle takes a somewhat unfashionable subject and shows that it is far from 'worked out'. He has been exceedingly thorough and has unearthed much new ore.

The debate about imperial organization, the preparation (or lack of preparation) for the colonial and imperial conferences and the conferences themselves are examined in detail. Dr Kendle has discovered much new information about the Pollock committee (in which W. P. Reeves played an important part) and about the Round Table movement. He gives the fullest account so far of their activities. On pp. 146 and 171 he goes a little too far in revising 'accepted opinion'. Neither W. K. Hancock nor the present reviewer appear to have supposed that Lionel Curtis had much, or any, direct contact with J. G. Ward before he proposed his 'imperial parliament' at the 1911 Conference. But this is a minor matter.

In addition to bringing previously-known schemes of imperial reform into clearer focus, Dr Kendle discusses several which have not, I believe, been previously noticed, such as Watson Griffin's and William Courthope's ideas. All of them, he shows, broke on the rock of responsible government: to whom would the members of any new imperial council or parliament be responsible?

Sometimes there was a more covert opposition to reform than colonial or British nationalism. He shows most of the Colonial Office staff strongly resisting all efforts, in the years 1904-07, to create an imperial secretariat and an imperial council. They saw these proposals as threats to their own imperial function. When it was decided, in 1907, to establish a secretariat within the Colonial Office, the intention of the Conference was frustrated by the officials' apathy, conservatism or hostility.

Colonial politicians and agents-general often resented what they took to be the 'superior' attitude of British politicians and officials. Dr Kendle