

Entering the Periphery

REASSESSING BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN NEW ZEALAND IN THE 1820S IN THE CONTEXT OF WALLERSTEIN'S THEORY OF A WORLD-SYSTEM



WHEN ASSESSING THE MODUS of British imperial expansion in 1819, Sir Stamford Raffles – who had established a British settlement in Singapore the same year – concluded that ‘[o]ur object is not territory but trade, a great commercial emporium ... whence we may extend our influence politically’.¹ It was an ambiguous summation. Commercial, territorial and political expansion might have been regarded nominally as separate pursuits, but as the latter part of the statement concedes, trade typically became the precursor to greater political and territorial aspirations. Throughout the 1820s, this ambiguity became apparent in the case of Britain’s relations with New Zealand. The eagerness of private British interests to expand their commercial activities in New Zealand was counterbalanced by dogged official British reluctance for political entanglement in territories where it had no existing presence or commitments. Most of the historiography on this era rightly reflects this dichotomy of private commercial enthusiasm for British imperial expansion set against a backdrop of general state hesitance and vacillation over any possible enlargement of the Empire in the South Pacific at this time.²

This article is both an extension of, and in part, a departure from, that conventional representation in that it surveys the evolving nature of both the commercial and the official relationship between Britain and New Zealand in the 1820s in the specific context of the core–periphery construct – a framework that lies at the heart of the historical social scientist Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory.³ Wallerstein’s theoretical work is a branch of dependency theory, which was formulated in the 1960s and came to its greatest prominence in the following decade, particularly through the works of Paul Baran and Andre Gunder Frank.⁴ Dependency theorists shared a Marxist or neo-Marxist approach to global capitalism, and were concerned with the exploitative economic, political and class relations that emerged from unequal exchange in the international economy.⁵

As a corollary to this theory, the article explores the role of the neighbouring British colony of New South Wales during this time in its capacity as what Wallerstein categorized in his world-system as a semi-

periphery state. The intention here is not to extend the analysis to an in-depth critique of Wallerstein's theory itself, but rather, to utilize aspects of it as a means of interpreting events in the period under review, and in the process to develop an alternative explanation for the dynamics of British colonial policy relating to New Zealand in the 1820s. In taking this approach, this article builds, to some extent, on Tony Ballantyne's recent revision of the 'old imperial history tradition' of British empire-building.⁶ And although, as Ballantyne notes, the metropole-periphery binary is less reflective of the British Empire than the metaphor of a web,⁷ the specific theoretical model of a world-system in the form devised by Wallerstein adds the intermediary stage of a semi-periphery, which, as is demonstrated in this article, is a crucial departure from that binary construct.⁸ However, unlike Ballantyne's approach of positioning New Zealand's movement in the imperial matrix in cultural, constitutional and legislative as well as economic terms,⁹ Wallerstein's analysis is overwhelmingly economic in focus, with the emphasis placed on the significance of global capitalism. The role of culture is weakly developed in world-systems theory. Partly as a consequence of this, indigenous agency seldom features, and when it does, is underestimated. The indigenous peoples in Wallerstein's periphery tend to be portrayed as hapless victims who are incapable of political, economic or social resistance, and are thus at the mercy of the imperial nations of the core.

Britain's official policy during the 1820s was ostensibly opposed to the extension of its political dominion to encompass New Zealand. Yet the expansion of private commercial and other activities in the territory fostered New Zealand's growing economic dependence on New South Wales in particular. This in turn began to orient aspects of British policy (as directed principally by the colonial government in New South Wales) by the end of the 1820s in a way that anticipated a greater level of official British intervention in New Zealand in the following decade.

One of the themes that emerges from this analysis is that while private and state objectives in this period superficially appeared at odds with each other – and have typically been represented as such¹⁰ – in the context of world-systems theory, they were part of a single and systematic process: 'two sides of the same coin'.¹¹ In Wallerstein's construction of a world-system (a system which he saw as encroaching rapidly into the non-European areas of the world by the nineteenth century),¹² nations were classified as being either core, semi-periphery or periphery states. In such a framework, the relationship between Britain, New South Wales and New Zealand in the 1820s can be described as one of core, semi-periphery and periphery respectively. Wallerstein presented

the systematic extension of European-based capitalism throughout the world at this time, and the ensuing dependency on the core that it produced among periphery territories, as being part of the culmination of three centuries of capitalist encroachment and exploitation.¹³ The more general portrayal by other historians has been of an ad hoc and ostensibly hesitant approach (in this case by the British) to imperial enlargement.

The utility of applying this world-systems theory to the history of New Zealand's relationship with Britain and its Empire in the 1820s rests with the potential it offers to revise, to some extent, the conventional view that it was private British commercial activity in New Zealand that eventually compelled the British government reluctantly to formulate policies on the territory in the following decade. These policies were initially a reaction to private capitalist expansion, and almost inadvertently became a prelude to greater official intervention, leading eventually to annexation.¹⁴ Wallerstein's theory also provides a conceptual basis when accounting for the significance of New South Wales in this period as a semi-periphery state, mediating between the core and the periphery in a manner that advances the expansion of the capitalist world-system and entrenches the exploitation of the newly established periphery territory.¹⁵

At a more general level, the application of world-systems theory to New Zealand in this era illustrates the interpretive potential afforded by the employment of particular theoretical perspectives. It also shows us how such perspectives can broaden the understanding of various events – specifically in this case relating to the relationships between imperial powers, colonies and unclaimed territories – in a way that offers a structuralist challenge¹⁶ to existing presumptions about the nature of British colonial policy development in this era.

It was during the nineteenth century, according to Wallerstein, that the European model of aggressive capitalism spread to its fullest extent, incorporating finally the entire world.¹⁷ The generation of unprecedented levels of capital by many European economies at this time resulted in a correspondingly unprecedented degree of commercial expansion into those territories on the periphery of this system – territories which were subsequently subject to exploitation by the capitalist core. He summarized this centuries-long process as 'a constant and patterned movement between groups of economic actors as to who ... occup[ied] various positions in the hierarchy of production, profit, and consumption'.¹⁸

In Wallerstein's construction of this world-system, the nineteenth century was the culmination of the preceding four centuries of accelerating

globalization by selected European economies (rather than a more immediate and spontaneous phenomenon).¹⁹ This process of globalization was driven by the desire for the ‘ceaseless’ accumulation of capital by the European core.²⁰ Among the consequences of this process of European capitalist enlargement was the emergence of a global capitalist system characterized by the *structural* exploitation of periphery nations. In the world-system, no allowance is given to colonial expansion occurring incidentally or without an overarching policy, as is sometimes presented in the case of Britain’s evolving policies on New Zealand in the two decades preceding the cession of sovereignty in 1840.²¹ On the contrary, every action and inaction, every policy or absence of policy, and every decision or failure to decide, is portrayed in the world-system model as leading inexorably to the increased and entrenched exploitation of periphery territories – the theory does not allow for an alternative outcome.

One of the key characteristics of the core-periphery relationship – that of its interconnectivity – was summarized by another world-systems theorist, Andre Gunder Frank, who emphasized the central role of an interconnected system of exploitation that was fundamental to the process of nations being drawn into the periphery of global capitalism: ‘it is this exploitative relation which in chain-like fashion extends the link between the capitalist world and national metropolises to the regional centers (part of whose surplus they appropriate), and from these to local centers, and so on to large landowners or merchants who expropriate surplus from small peasants’.²² Wallerstein’s theoretical framework of the world-system can be used as a way to recontextualize conventional historical analyses of nation-states – positioning them in a historical setting that is necessarily global, with a span of several centuries, being part of a single division of labour encompassing the entire world, and with a single system of the control of capital. It is the predominance of this systematic nature of global capitalism and exploitation which is at the heart of the theory. To paraphrase Shakespeare, ‘all the world’s a system and all the nation-states merely players’.²³

However, Wallerstein avoided an oversimplified binary conception of the international core–periphery relationship by introducing the notion of a semi-periphery – a model which this article suggests has the potential to be applied to, and to explain aspects of, the evolving relationship between New Zealand, New South Wales and Britain in the 1820s. While core nations, Wallerstein argued, typically possessed high-profit, high-wage and high-technology economies with diversified production, and while periphery territories were represented as the opposite (low-wage, low-profit and low-technology economies with little diversification of production), he admitted into his construct of the world-system the role of the semi-periphery state,

which shared some traits of both core and periphery zones.²⁴ The semi-periphery was partly a descriptive category in itself, and partly a device employed to analyze and describe change within the predominately two-tiered world-system.²⁵ Additional distinctions were subsequently made by other world-systems theorists to account for the appearance of structural inequalities *within* nation-states, with the role of ethnicity, class, gender and other divisions being given more prominence in analyses of the workings of the world-system in order to explain the existence of these internal structural inequalities.

In Wallerstein's analysis, one of the factors that propelled the expansion of European capitalism across the world in the nineteenth century was the requirement for the ascendant economies of the core to secure access to natural resources in peripheral zones, variously through formal or de facto annexation, wars of conquest, diplomatic activity, the introduction of new technologies or by other means.²⁶ It is argued here that the economic benefit Britain derived throughout the 1820s from extracting raw materials from New Zealand drew the latter into the world-system through the agency of New South Wales acting as a semi-periphery zone.²⁷ However, one important factor militating against Wallerstein's longer-term prognosis of periphery nations usually existing permanently in an exploited and dependent state was the gradual overturning of New Zealand's status as a periphery nation following its annexation in 1840. In the decades following annexation, substantial British immigration led to the country becoming one of the Empire's so-called 'white colonies'.²⁸ This transition highlights the nexus of race and capitalist exploitation as part of the equation of dependency, and demonstrates how shifts in the racial balance of a state can lead, in certain circumstances, to transitions in some core-periphery relationships.²⁹

In the context of this conception of the expansion of the world-system, one of the prominent aspects of New Zealand's entry into the orbit of British imperial capitalism in the 1820s is the role that the neighbouring British colony of New South Wales played – in the language of Frank – as a 'regional centre' that simultaneously is exploited by the core and seeks periphery territories to exploit in turn, as part of this 'chain-like' sequence of exploitation.³⁰ More specifically, what is evident in this analysis is the extent to which a semi-periphery state or regional centre can orient the policies of the core nation in favour of economic (and later political) expansion into the periphery territory at a rate that otherwise might not be anywhere near as rapid. A corollary to this, which is also examined in this article, is how official British reluctance in the 1820s to annex New Zealand can be interpreted not as some sort

of resistance by the core to further encroachment into the periphery, but principally as a case of the *official* apparatus of a core state allowing itself to be led to expand its capitalist exploitation by the *unofficial* agents of the core state – in this case, principally traders. What emerges at this point is the role of the semi-periphery state as the juncture where official and unofficial motives variously collide and collude, but that inevitably led, in this instance, to New Zealand (particularly the indigenous Māori population) becoming increasingly dependent on trade with the British Empire, with that trade serving as the precursor to encroaching political involvement, culminating in annexation.

One of the significant aspects of this particular example of the expansion of the world-system of European capitalism in the early nineteenth century is that throughout the 1820s, Britain did not *need* any of New Zealand's resources. Repeatedly, British officials rejected requests from traders and others to annex the country or offer protection for their commercial ventures, emphasizing that there were no resources that New Zealand offered that could not more easily (and usually just as cheaply) be obtained through existing periphery nations that were already a part of the Empire. Yet such was the regional significance of the commodity chain – particularly between New Zealand and New South Wales, which were linked by 'a network of labor and production processes'³¹ – that as a consequence of ongoing extraction activity in New Zealand, the territory grew into the role of a periphery state without there ever being a deliberate policy on behalf of the British government in this period for such a development to occur. This highlights the systematic element of world-systems theory, in which capitalist exploitation – however apparently slight – has the capacity to structure subsequent policy development by core nations, even if there was never previously an expressed intent in the policies of the core to expand its hegemonic control over new peripheral zones. It also illustrates how, from one perspective, delineation between official policy and private commercial activity has limited application in a world-systems setting, even though this distinction is central to most analyses of Britain's involvement in New Zealand in this period.

This article concludes with an assessment of the extent to which New Zealand was drawn into the capitalist system of the British Empire in the 1820s, and offers up the New Zealand example as a model for interpreting British colonial policy in this period. More specifically, it provides a framework for reconciling the stated policies of the core in the 1820s, which on the surface seem to conflict with the notion of a ceaseless accumulation of capital and expansion into new periphery zones that is at the heart of world-systems theory, yet which nonetheless enabled precisely such expansion to occur.

The beginning of official British consideration of New Zealand

Although Captain James Cook planted the Union flag in New Zealand soil in 1770, claiming the territory as a British colony,³² this act amounted to little more than a spontaneous gesture of patriotism, and when Cook returned to London in 1771, he found no enthusiasm among officials for adding New Zealand to the inventory of British colonial possessions. At this time, there was ‘a revulsion against colonization and a clear preference for trade over dominion’,³³ as David Mackay has described it – a ‘revulsion’ that persisted well into the early decades of the nineteenth century.

However, to describe the official British view, specifically of New Zealand from the time of Cook’s arrival until the start of the 1820s, as being based on a particular policy that had been carefully formulated would be to misread Britain’s stance on the territory as a potential colonial possession. Indeed, New Zealand hardly featured at all in the deliberations of colonial officials in Britain – a point emphasized in one of the very few official references made to the country prior to the nineteenth century. In April 1787, instructions were issued by the British government to Arthur Phillip on the eve of his departure to take up the position of inaugural governor of New South Wales. In these instructions, the closest to anything resembling a policy on New Zealand was an oblique reference to the territory in one sentence: ‘it has been humbly represented unto us that advantages may be derived from the Flax Plant which is found in the Islands not far distant from the intended Settlement’.³⁴ New Zealand was those ‘Islands’, and although its name was known, it did not even merit direct reference in this instance, so slight was its significance to Britain. At the start of the nineteenth century, New Zealand was still regarded in British official circles as a territory beyond the Empire, and there remained no formal policy on the country.³⁵ Between 1800 and 1819, New Zealand barely received a mention in the House of Commons. One of the few exceptions was when William Wilberforce, speaking on the transportation of convicts to New South Wales, praised the Reverend Samuel Marsden for his missionary work among the ‘savage natives’ of New Zealand.³⁶

As British commercial involvement in New Zealand increased from the second decade of the nineteenth century, however, so too did the degree of occasional official deliberation over the territory, primarily in Sydney, the capital of the semi-periphery zone of New South Wales (and the nearest British colony to New Zealand).

In response to the constitutional conventions that prevented British laws applying to British subjects in New Zealand, on 9 November 1814 the governor of New South Wales issued a proclamation stating that New Zealand was a dependency of the colony, and that thereafter, Justices of the

Peace could be appointed to act there.³⁷ The first to take up this post was the missionary Thomas Kendall, who was appointed as Justice of the Peace just before leaving Sydney for the Bay of Islands in November 1814.³⁸ Kendall's interest in obtaining this authority was associated in his mind more with his missionary vocation than the wider ambit of British legal jurisdiction, as he revealed in a letter to a colleague in 1816, when he explained that 'it is my undoubted province to check gross immoralities and prevent the profanation of the Lord's day, etc., yet my authority being (whilst I am without proper force to support me) merely nominal, it cannot be expected that my just commands will be always obeyed'.³⁹ Kendall clearly anticipated the impotence of his appointment with great prescience.

Such attempts at extending a type of quasi-official British jurisdiction in New Zealand were prompted mainly by concerns held by some New South Wales officials over lawlessness among British subjects living or working in the territory.⁴⁰ However, the authority of these positions was not only severely limited in terms of intended application, but could not be enforced either by the holders of the posts themselves or by the colonial administration in New South Wales. Such positions, in the assessment of Judith Binney, were 'powerless', while even the appointments themselves were 'probably illegal',⁴¹ in so far as they were an attempt to exert British authority in a territory where Britain had no basis to claim any legitimate jurisdiction. (The attempt by the New South Wales administration to invest 'with Power and Authority' three Ngāpuhi chiefs to support Kendall's authority may have been an implicit concession to such jurisdictional limitations).⁴²

The issue of New Zealand's status in relation to the Empire became slightly more ambiguous in 1817. While there had manifestly been an attempt at jurisprudential penetration by the British (albeit slight and unsuccessful) in the preceding four years, New Zealand was only alluded to once in British legislation – in 1817 – to confirm that the country was among 'those islands and territories not within His Majesty's Dominions'.⁴³ The notion of British legal authority of any form or capacity being exercised in the territory was therefore rejected in the statute – something that undermined from a legal standpoint the nominally judicial appointments, such as Kendall's, made by the New South Wales administration.

This relatively clear legislative delineation of jurisdiction was blurred within two years as the consequence of the governor of New South Wales, Lachlan Macquarie, appointing a magistrate to New Zealand in 1819, with the authority to apprehend European offenders in the territory and send them to trial in Sydney.⁴⁴ And although the lack of an effective means of enforcing this authority (just as with Kendall's appointment) undermined the

role, the initiative hinted at a desire among Sydney officials to exercise some British jurisdiction in New Zealand, at least over errant British subjects there, regardless of whether officials and politicians in London were averse to such moves.

By 1819, the few modest and impracticable attempts directed from Sydney at enforcing an element of British law and order in New Zealand had proven to be largely unsuccessful. And it had not been as though Sydney had wanted to exercise widespread sovereignty in New Zealand merely as some sort of constitutional muscle-flexing exercise. Rather, these efforts had been motivated principally by anxiety over accounts of seriousness lawlessness among British subjects in the territory.⁴⁵ There was no immediate desire to regulate trade, govern commerce, levy taxes or determine the nature of land tenure in the territory.⁴⁶ The absence in London of any enthusiasm for the application of British law in New Zealand ensured that New South Wales officials were severely limited in their options even in such comparatively modest attempts at extending British jurisdiction in New Zealand. Moreover, it was not as though the issue of unruly British subjects in New Zealand was either a continuous or pressing concern for officials in New South Wales (let alone London), especially considering that such a large proportion of the colony's own population was comprised of current and former convicts, and that the permanent British population in New Zealand at the time may have numbered in the low hundreds at the most.

The magistrates and Justices of the Peace appointed to New Zealand by New South Wales officials lacked any authority in the territory, and were manifestly not considered effective by officials.⁴⁷ Yet, from a world-systems perspective, such seemingly innocuous initiatives were the diffident early steps in the structural expansion of the British Empire's capitalist core into what was emerging as a periphery territory. The method may have been clumsy, the execution tentative, and the results ineffective in the short term; but the underlying explanation of such initiatives – in the context of world-systems theory – must extend beyond their immediate and obvious purpose (a means of trying to regulate wayward behaviour by British subjects in New Zealand) and be seen as part of a broader and longer-term process by which New Zealand would be absorbed into the global system of capitalism – a system which in this part of the world was dominated by Britain.

While this may initially appear as a case of a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument, Wallerstein's theoretical approach to the world-system, as much as it focuses on historical experiences, is at least partially prescriptive, and has not previously been applied in any other analyses of developments in New Zealand in the 1820s. To that extent, it serves as a model which affords

an additional (or even alternative) perspective on the encounters between the British Empire as the core (and its colonial outposts as semi-periphery regions) and New Zealand as the periphery territory during this decade. The pattern of the expansion of the core and the subjugation of the periphery, which Wallerstein applied to other parts of the world in various periods, fits closely to New Zealand's situation, and to that extent validates at least the general formulations contained in the theory.

Of the types of relationships that determine the status of core and periphery nations and the extension of the world-system, commercial exchanges are deemed by world-systems theorists as the most significant.⁴⁸ It was principally increased private British commercial activity in New Zealand during the 1820s, for example (most of which was conducted through Port Jackson in New South Wales), that accelerated New Zealand's entry into the world-system. The conventional view of this growth in trade between New Zealand and New South Wales is that it resulted in added pressure being put on the long-standing policy emanating from London of the upmost political restraint when it came to any official involvement in territories in the region that were not part of the Empire.⁴⁹ What emerges, from a world-systems perspective, is at the very least a possibility that such a portrayal of New South Wales' increased trade with New Zealand gradually forcing the hand of the British government represents more of a snapshot view of events, rather than a longer-term strategic interpretation of the commercial interests of the Empire. A world-systems analysis can even help bring to light an alternative conclusion: that apparent official British hesitance and lethargy could be characterized (seemingly paradoxically) specifically as part of a method of expansion and exploitation, as opposed to an obstacle to it, and that this was the approach which best enabled the British Empire to extend and enlarge its commodity chain with peripheral territories, without incurring the possible costs associated with the formal annexation of a colony. This would lead to what Hopkins and Wallerstein defined as the purpose of intervention in such staggered and apparently piecemeal stages: 'a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity',⁵⁰ with every step in the process dominated by unequal exchange to the detriment of the periphery and to the profit of the core⁵¹ – a description which applies to British involvement in New Zealand more generally from the late 1810s to 1840.

British commercial involvement in New Zealand in the 1820s

British economic activity in New Zealand in the 1820s was characterized by a steadily increasing growth in volume and value over the decade, and the

transformation of some branches of the Māori economy from purely subsistence activity to partial production for export as well. Barter rather than cash was used as the main means of exchange.⁵² Growth in trade value and trade-based activity are elements identified by Wallerstein as one of the chief factors linking a territory into the world-system. And collectively, the strengthening of the trade relationship between Māori and traders (the latter operating principally from New South Wales) is evidence of Wallerstein's emphasis on the interdependent nature of exchange in the world-system that both precedes and accompanies the emergence of a periphery state, and on the crucial role of the semi-periphery state in fostering this growing interdependence.⁵³

The scale of trade between New Zealand and New South Wales in the 1820s was substantial in comparison with anything that preceded it in New Zealand. Figures collected by the New South Wales Customs (through which most of New Zealand's trade passed) show that, for example, in 1826 the value of goods sent to New Zealand from Sydney was £1735, while New Zealand exports to Sydney that year amounted to £30,000. The following year, goods sent from Sydney to New Zealand had risen in value to £4926, against goods valued at £63,000 that left New Zealand for Sydney. And by 1829, goods sent from Sydney to New Zealand were worth £12,691, while New Zealand was exporting a staggering £135,486 worth of commodities to Sydney annually.⁵⁴

Other branches of economic activity that occurred in New Zealand's immediate vicinity were excluded from the preceding amounts. One such example is whaling, which had been taking place in New Zealand waters at least since 1804, but which generally involved little contact with the inhabitants of the territory. For almost two decades, most of the whaling vessels hunting in the area used ports other than those in New Zealand as the bases for their operations.⁵⁵ However, there was a small industry in whaleboat construction from the late 1820s on New Zealand territory,⁵⁶ and the surgeons on whaling ships were sometimes called on to treat Māori wounded in intertribal conflicts.⁵⁷

Significantly, New Zealand was a place of resource extraction for the whaling trade, whereas processing and selling of the raw product were based in New South Wales. This exemplifies the sort of surplus extraction which Wallerstein identified as occurring between periphery and semi-periphery states, whereby the latter profited more in the short term than the core nation, and the profit accrued by the semi-periphery was predicated on the prevention of the development of any non-extraction industry in the periphery and the inability of the periphery to capitalize on the unequal exchange which was at the heart of such trade.⁵⁸

Trade was also beginning to arouse slight official British curiosity about New Zealand in the 1920s. The direct role whaling played in the New Zealand economy, for example, may have been comparatively slight in monetary terms, but it served another, non-commercial function: as a source of intelligence on New Zealand for British officials, with British whaling captains expected to feed information on the places in the territory they visited back to the Admiralty.⁵⁹ However, because there was so little contact with the shore, there was a resulting dearth of reports from whalers back to London. Yet there is no evidence that the Admiralty was at all concerned with this paucity of information, which on first consideration seems to confirm the general lack of official British interest in New Zealand.

That the British government had issued intelligence-gathering instructions in the first place bears on the issue of world-systems theory. From this perspective, the quality or quantity of the intelligence that was obtained is of secondary importance to the motives behind the request for such intelligence. If, as most historians agree, Britain had no stated intention of any official intervention in New Zealand in the foreseeable future,⁶⁰ the requirement for some captains to gather information on the territory indicates at least that British interest in New Zealand's potential commercial opportunities and its political make-up existed from the start of the decade. Such activities in no way constituted or should be construed as part of a covert plan for further British official or commercial expansion in New Zealand. However, by the same token, the decision to collect information on the territory suggests that formal intervention was not explicitly excluded as a possibility either. The intelligence-gathering expectations set by the Admiralty could be classed as a precursor to the possibility of New Zealand being fixed more firmly in a core-periphery relationship with the Empire at some point in the future. Trade, rather than policy, may have been drawing New Zealand closer to becoming a peripheral state in the British Empire, but the pattern of interventionist British colonial policy sometimes following in the wake of growing trade was already well established, as the Raffles quote at the commencement of this article acknowledged. In metaphorical terms, the appearance of the left hand (in the form of private commercial interests) operating independently of the right hand (in the form of official British policy on New Zealand) belied the shared end of both: the extension of the system of British capitalist hegemony.

During the 1820s, trade was undoubtedly the principal reason for increased European interaction with Māori. The New Zealand economy relied almost exclusively on barter rather than cash as the means of exchange – a feature

that precluded any prospect of Māori communities accumulating capital (which is a precursor of elevation to a semi-periphery state). This gave greater control to the British in what remained an asymmetrical commercial relationship throughout the decade.

This barter economy had its own specific traits, in which the items supplied for exchange by traders were subject to the forces of supply and demand in a way that cash would not have been to anywhere near the same extent. For example, the single most valued item for Māori when trading with Europeans was muskets.⁶¹ However, these weapons were subject to substantial inflationary effects over the decade. In 1820, one musket could be exchanged by European traders for 15 pigs or 200 baskets of potatoes in New Zealand, but by 1827, as these firearms began to flood the market, a musket could be exchanged for just ten pigs or 120 baskets of potatoes.⁶²

In addition to the erratic changes in value for items being traded was the relatively small scale of the transactions that typified many trading encounters between Māori and European in this period, as the example of the Reverend Daniel Tyerman in 1824 typifies. 'We were presently visited by natives', he recalled: 'All appeared very friendly, without any war-weapons ... They brought, in no great quantity, potatoes, cabbages, fowls, and natural curiosities, for sale, but their demands for articles in exchange were so exorbitant, that few bargains were made.'⁶³

While the quantities involved in many exchanges may have been small, Māori were quick to respond to the dynamics of supply and demand. In the six months leading up to February 1820, at least six ships berthed in the Bay of Islands, with a further 11 arriving in the subsequent four months. One local missionary noted that the costs of provisions rose dramatically when there were ships in the harbour, as demand outstripped supply. The region, he observed, 'is become very thin of pork ... as every ship takes away all she can get'. He then predicted that '[t]his will eventually so drain the Society's resources ... as to reduce the settlement to great distress'.⁶⁴

The demand for muskets in many Māori settlements quickly resulted in an increase in the production of food beyond the immediate subsistence requirements of the communities. And as Māori agricultural ventures grew in scale over the decade, so too did the requirement to protect them,⁶⁵ thus necessitating the acquisition of even more muskets, resulting in the growing cycle of economic productivity and militarism persisting throughout the 1820s. Yet, while overall food production increased markedly in New Zealand, there was no corresponding rise in the availability of capital in the territory. And meanwhile, one of the consequences of New Zealand being awash with muskets was heightened death tolls in inter-hapū and inter-

iwi conflicts, as firearms displaced less fatal traditional weapons, which resulted in what collectively has become known as the Musket Wars.⁶⁶ Despite the reports of ‘atrocities’ among Māori regularly published in newspapers, it was not until the 1830s that the Colonial Office considered such events as a possible basis for formal intervention.⁶⁷ Neither strategic, economic nor humanitarian considerations seemed to budge Britain from its reluctance to become officially involved in New Zealand in the 1820s, especially as the emergence of New Zealand as a periphery state enriching the New South Wales economy was already under way. This is in line with Wallerstein’s hypothesis that the economic dependency of a periphery territory generally precedes its political acquiescence to the core nation. Certainly, at the very least, Britain’s policy and practices in relation to New Zealand at this time could not be said to be inconsistent with such a hypothesis.

Without the presence of any government regulation in New Zealand, it would seem that there was an unencumbered system of perfect competition existing between sellers and buyers in the territory, and to this extent, that any claims of encroaching exploitation would appear to be without substance. Such a conclusion is broadly correct, but only as far as it extends. In Wallerstein’s assessment of the period when a territory begins to be drawn into the world-system, outward appearances of perfect competition and free trade mask the fact that such exchanges occur ‘when the economic advantage of the upper strata is so clear-cut that the unconstrained operation of the market serves effectively to reinforce the existing system of stratification’.⁶⁸ The evidence of stratification between traders (representing the core – sometimes via the agency of the semi-periphery) and Māori (representing the periphery) seems scant in New Zealand’s case in the 1820s – that is, until the benefits of this trade beyond New Zealand are taken into account.

David Hainsworth’s study of the significance of Australian trade in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries details the extent to which trade with New Zealand aided the growth of the economy of New South Wales, including the expansion of its shipbuilding industry,⁶⁹ and the ‘thriving’ trade in food, flax, whale products and timber.⁷⁰ Undoubtedly, this trade contributed to some extent to the expansion of Sydney’s European population, which grew by almost 40% during the decade, to around 16,000 by 1829,⁷¹ and to the city becoming a regional commercial hub – precisely the sort of development prescribed by Wallerstein for a semi-periphery zone.⁷² Meanwhile, there was practically no comparative growth in infrastructure, population or capital accumulation in New Zealand, which in a world-systems context is strongly indicative of its emerging status as a periphery territory.

Another aspect of this trans-Tasman trade relates to the type of goods involved. According to Wallerstein, trade in itself does not necessarily have to constitute evidence of a world-system. What matters more is whether the principal type of goods that form the basis of the trade is 'luxury' goods or 'bulk' or 'necessity' goods. This distinction is important analytically from a world-systems perspective, because trade in luxuries can occur *between* what could otherwise be separate systems, whereas trade in necessities tends to occur *within* a system.⁷³ In the case of New Zealand's trade with New South Wales, the goods were almost exclusively in the category of bulk or necessity goods – mainly animal products (whale oil, seal skins and pork), timber and food crops – which supports the contention that the emerging New Zealand economy was being incorporated into part of a larger, existing economic system, with few opportunities for directing its own growth, or even harnessing some of the capital being generated from this unequal exchange.

British policy on New Zealand in the 1820s

So how did British government policy at this time respond to these economic developments? The standard portrayal of the British Empire in the early nineteenth century – from a policy perspective – depicts the major decisions being made in London, and filtering down to regional levels, while in return, intelligence and recommendations from local officials throughout the Empire informed the development of this policy.⁷⁴ This was the case in a very general sense, but in some instances, the role of regional officials in the formation of policy was far more influential.

Throughout the 1820s, New South Wales played a vital role in most business ventures that were being carried out in New Zealand. This in turn brought closer together the twin (and seemingly conflicting) imperatives of attempting in some way to manage increased commercial activity between a British colony and a neighbouring 'unclaimed' territory, and the static or even reduced desire for political commitment to that territory demanded by London. Even in the smallest of private British commercial undertakings in New Zealand, the hand of the New South Wales government could sometimes be seen at work. When the Sydney ropemaker Robert Williams sought to travel to New Zealand, for example, to explore the possibilities of flax as a source material for his business, it was the New South Wales governor who gave him permission to travel.⁷⁵ And when it appeared that there were indeed significant commercial benefits to be derived from harvesting New Zealand flax, Macquarie wrote to the Colonial Office, arguing that there would be no 'bad consequences' if there was a greater level of formal British involvement in the territory.⁷⁶ There was no enthusiasm from London in

response to the suggestion, however, so the matter was left to lie, temporarily anyway. Ironically, in picking up the slack left by officials in London, who were opposed to any intervention, the New South Wales administration was obliged to take a more active role in overseeing the developing commercial relationship with New Zealand.

Here, the influence of New South Wales, as a semi-periphery state, is especially pronounced. It possessed a reasonably strong state system of the sort which was entirely absent in New Zealand: a modern armed force which was a branch of the state; a single leadership structure for the entirety of the state; a legislative authority; a judiciary; and the capacity to direct the economies in its regional sphere of influence. New South Wales was thus well positioned to serve as the principal link in the chain of dependency extending from New Zealand to Britain.

Flax exports from New Zealand exemplify the importance of the semi-periphery in this capitalist world-system. Exports of the plant from New Zealand grew, exceeding 1100 tons per annum by the end of the 1820s. The extent of the British government's stubbornness in its determination to avoid any intervention in New Zealand seems to be borne out by the fact that up to 70% of the flax harvested in New Zealand in the 1820s was contracted for use by the British Navy Board.⁷⁷ If anything ought to have triggered some sort of official British involvement in New Zealand, surely the security of the supply of flax for its military purposes was sufficient reason. Yet still, Britain refrained from any official form of intervention.

The apparent official British resistance to involvement in New Zealand in the 1820s has been accounted for by historians as being a direct result of the Colonial Office's aversion to the political and financial costs of further formal colonization.⁷⁸ Although there were philosophical objections in the Office to territorial expansion,⁷⁹ frugality was a much more direct influence. The accumulation of debts from the Napoleonic Wars, coupled with major transitions taking place in the domestic British economy, directed the attention of British politicians and colonial officials inwards during much of the 1820s, at the expense of looking to acquire remote and potentially burdensome colonial possessions.⁸⁰ British imperial expansion was only occurring as a direct result of the 'force of circumstances',⁸¹ and not at all simply as part of an impulsive desire for enlargement, or the need to secure a small tributary of trade. However, a world-system perspective proffers an alternative (or at least an accompanying) explanation for such a stance: that this reticence was so pronounced a feature of British colonial policy in relation to New Zealand precisely because of the corresponding eagerness by the semi-periphery to intervene. In this case, the combination of proximity and commercial gain

compelled the New South Wales administration to be the main source of, and therefore influence on, British policy formation on New Zealand. London could thus afford to procrastinate when it came to assuming any firm position on New Zealand, leaving the way open for New South Wales to take the lead role in shaping both the detail and direction of British policy on the territory that was still unclaimed by any other European power at this time.

As an example of this, at the start of the decade, Macquarie expressed his nervousness that the trade with New Zealand could suffer from ‘the hostility of the natives’ and other threats,⁸² and remained committed to strengthening economic and security links with New Zealand. It was a position that was fortified by the frequent reports in the New South Wales press of lucrative trading opportunities in New Zealand⁸³ – opportunities that had the potential to enrich further the New South Wales economy. Clearly, New South Wales had much more at stake, especially economically, in fostering these commercial opportunities than did Britain, so it follows that the more specific and more forceful arguments for intervention in New Zealand came from Sydney rather than London.

Noticeably absent from both the deliberations of British officials and politicians and those of their counterparts in New South Wales was any significant consideration given to the role of Māori in these formative stages of official British consideration of New Zealand. There was an irregular flow of intelligence from European visitors to New Zealand about Māori, but these often tended simply to confirm long-standing prejudices about the country’s indigenous population. A description of New Zealand published in the *Sydney Gazette* in 1827 portrayed the territory as an ‘emporium of cannibalism’,⁸⁴ mired in endless cycles of intertribal warfare. This was a common view of Māori among Europeans, but was evidently not enough to dampen Sydney’s eagerness to assert its authority in some limited way.

At this point, the relative weightings of commercial imperatives and political expediency come into play. The commercial advantages of the growing extraction-based trade with New Zealand were the chief factor that was likely to draw some form of official British intervention. However, this was militated against by the stated official reluctance to intervene, and the fact that the trade between New Zealand and the Empire was advancing without the need for official expenditure, which was in many ways the ideal situation for the core.

This is not to say that the British government was completely indifferent to New Zealand, despite general outward appearances and even occasional protestations to the contrary. Flax, as noted, was one item of value to the Royal Navy, but increasingly, timber from New Zealand also began to attract Naval

interest.⁸⁵ In 1820, James Downie, captain of the naval storeship *Coromandel*, received approval from the Navy Board (which administered the logistical requirements of the Navy) to produce a general assessment of the potential value of New Zealand timber to Britain's fleet. His survey culminated in a report sent to the Board in August of that year. The fact that the Navy had commissioned the report is significant because it meant that, all other things being equal, its findings would be given greater attention by British officials than those reports of varying reliability that arrived unsolicited from traders, missionaries and others.

Downie addressed first the character of New Zealand's indigenous inhabitants. He reported how he had 'found the natives in general much pleased with our visit', and that although they were 'a warlike people, they are the last to give offence to strangers'. He concluded that Māori 'wish for nothing so much as for some of these [Europeans] to reside among them, in order to learn agriculture and obtain a knowledge of mechanics'.⁸⁶ In itself, such a report would not have gone far in dismantling any concerns officials had about the threat Māori posed to formal British involvement in the territory, but it was a step towards mitigating any of the more exaggerated fears that may have been harboured by some in British government circles.

The Navy Board's interest in New Zealand extended only as far as the relative ease with which it could obtain timber and flax from the territory. Downie's report confirmed that these resources were both available in good quantities, and could be obtained without much difficulty. More formal intervention at the present time, as far as the Navy Board was concerned, was therefore unnecessary to secure this source of supplies.

Such reports on New Zealand, officially commissioned by branches of the British government, were rare in the decade, but they were complemented by a greater volume of unsolicited proposals intermittently arriving at the Colonial Office from entrepreneurs looking for official sanction for planned ventures in New Zealand. Some of these, such as William Savage's 1820 scheme to form an agricultural settlement, were vague, poorly conceived⁸⁷ and unlikely to have generated much interest among officials in London.

Others, however, made a more compelling case for intervention. The year after Savage's plan was submitted to officials, a more detailed proposal to establish a specifically English settlement in New Zealand reached the Colonial Office. This one was the work of Robert Sugden, who went to great lengths to argue the political, strategic and economic benefits of such a scheme.⁸⁸ At the direction of Lord Bathurst, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Henry Goulburn responded from the Colonial Office, observing

that Bathurst ‘did not feel he had any power of approving any particular encouragement to the establishment of a colony in New Zealand’.⁸⁹

Yet despite turning down these requests for official sanction for such schemes, British officials were not oblivious to New Zealand’s growing trading relationship with New South Wales, and some of the problems that were arising from this interaction. Its response at this time was to appoint an English judge – John Bigge – to ‘enquire into the best means of preventing the commission of outrage and violence on the persons of the inhabitants of the islands of New Zealand by the crews of vessels navigating the Pacific’, and to ‘obtain information respecting the state of the inhabitants and the progress that has been made in their civilization’.⁹⁰ The emphasis appears to have shifted from commercial expansion, which is at the centre of notions of a world-system, to ostensibly humanitarian concerns. Wallerstein addresses this very point, however, when investigating other cases of territories being incorporated into the world-system as periphery states. The interventionist nature of core nations, which attempt to ‘improve’ periphery societies (with the definition and parameters of such improvement defined by the core), tends to result in a tension between the core nation and the society where the intervention is occurring – a tension which can only eventually be resolved by harmonization, violence or a sort of transcendence.⁹¹ So while officials’ expressions of concern over the treatment of Māori on British vessels might seem innocuous or even humanitarian, in the context of the world-system it can be interpreted as the first small step in the creation of a nation–society antinomy, which could later lead to further intervention to resolve the tension: a case of intervention which simultaneously produces new tensions as it overcomes existing ones, resulting in a process that eventually entrenches the core–periphery polarity.

Among the many findings of Bigge’s commission of enquiry was a recommendation that ‘It would be advisable to give an express authority to the Governor of New South Wales, to appoint Magistrates as well as constables in the islands of New Zealand, and with a view to give efficiency to the Magisterial authority’.⁹² Bigge’s recommendations were used by the Colonial Office more as points for further reference rather than proposals to be acted on immediately. However, the fact that it was the Colonial Office that commissioned this enquiry reveals that interest in the territory of New Zealand and its connection with the Empire was starting to take on a more certain form.

Bigge’s report reached London around the same time that an anonymously authored work entitled *To the People of England: An Address on the Colonization of New Zealand*⁹³ was published. This book made reference to

the ‘known intention of several friends of humanity to colonize the Island [sic] of New Zealand; for which purpose it is confidently stated that active preparations are [being made]’. In addition to the usually cited benefits of extending civilization and Christianity, this embryonic plan promised ‘great wealth to many adventurers’.⁹⁴ The book consciously appealed to an especially wide range of interest groups, portraying the proposed colonizing company variously as a source of profit for entrepreneurs, a remedy for poverty and overcrowding, a propagator of Christianity, and the source of a more prosperous future for all those would-be settlers who signed up to the scheme. Not for the last time, a plan for the systematic colonization of New Zealand involved its advocates dressing up commercialism as humanitarianism. Admittedly, the motives were sometimes mixed, but the script for settlement was heavily layered with utopian assurances which conveniently concealed its commercial core.

This was no purely theoretical scheme. In 1825, a group of 16 directors formed the basis of the New Zealand Company, and in March of that year, two of these directors – Edward Littleton and John Lambton – met with Bathurst, seeking official British support for their venture. Among the other directors were members of the House of Commons, which enabled the Company as a whole to obtain easier access to Bathurst.⁹⁵ This intersection of private colonizing motives and political support⁹⁶ typifies a new development in the creation of New Zealand as a periphery to the British imperial core, relying on what world-systems theorists refer to as a ‘hierarchical alternative’ to the existing market relations that existed between New Zealand and New South Wales.⁹⁷ The semi-periphery zone was still the principal influence on New Zealand’s relations with the British Empire, but the New Zealand Company’s direct negotiations with the Colonial Office represented a development in which the semi-periphery played no role whatsoever.

Bathurst had initially shown some passing interest in the proposal from the New Zealand Company, but this was far from the same as offering the government’s endorsement of its scheme. The President of the Board of Trade also apparently gave the Company his ‘blessing’ before abandoning it.⁹⁸ So official encouragement was there, lurking somewhere in the background, but it was far too hesitant to materialize into anything more certain. The British government was only likely to intervene formally in New Zealand for either of two reasons. First, if their commercial interests in the territory were jeopardized to the extent that the cost of intervention would be justified by the protection of this commercial exchange. Second, if there were partial or fully non-commercial interests in the territory (such as the administration

or protection of British subjects residing there) that warranted intervention. Neither threshold even got close to being reached in the 1820s.⁹⁹

That the British government was receiving and evaluating proposals to make more formal New Zealand's commercial contribution to the Empire is indicative of the extent to which New Zealand could be regarded as a territory that conforms closely to the initial stages of Wallerstein's definition of an emerging periphery state. In a sense, its fate as a periphery state was implicitly decided, from a world-systems perspective, even while the British government continued to profess its disinterest in the territory.

What emerges from these examples is that in the 1820s the Colonial Office very seldom asserted any specific policy position on New Zealand, and on the rare occasions when it did, it deferred repeatedly to its default stance of preferring non-intervention.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, its commissioning of reports, its consideration (however faint) of proposed colonizing schemes, and above all, its failure to check most of the attempts by the New South Wales authorities to extend a small degree of British legal jurisdiction to New Zealand, indicate a degree of informal integration. The official non-intervention policy served to mask a structural process identified by Wallerstein as 'an increasingly interrelated system of strong "core" and weak "peripheral" states, in which interstate relations – and hence patterns of state-formation ... are continually shaped ... [by] the deepening and expanding world-scale division and integration of production'.¹⁰¹

Wallerstein's formulation of a world-system accounts for the contemplation by the New South Wales administration of greater and broader forms of commercial as well as officially sanctioned involvement in New Zealand, if for nothing else than to regulate the rapidly expanding trade between the two states – a trade which was fundamentally extractive and unequal, enriching New South Wales at the expense of any significant domestic economic growth or development in New Zealand. It is from the interaction of these various branches of Britain's colonial administration and private entrepreneurs that the roots of a distinctive policy on New Zealand were nourished, and from which New Zealand's position as a periphery state (dependent on the semi-periphery but unable to ascend to semi-periphery status itself) became more certain in the 1830s.

An assessment of the nexus of policy and theory

So weakly developed was the official British stance on New Zealand in the 1820s (and well into the 1830s) that it would be overly ambitious to assert that there were any distinct stages in the development of a British policy.

Some of the examples explored here, where British officials (both in London and Sydney) either sanctioned or were influenced by private commercial involvement in New Zealand in the 1820s, helped to form the basis of an embryonic official British view. The employment of Wallerstein's notion of a world-system provides a closely fitting context for this pattern of gradual and reluctant official intervention beyond the Empire's existing boundaries in New Zealand, with the character of this interaction shaped predominantly by the specific economic relationship between New Zealand and New South Wales. Increasingly, officials in New South Wales were inclined to see New Zealand as a territory which presented opportunities for commercial expansion, and recognized that if these opportunities were to be secured, then a more interventionist policy – however slight – covering the regulation of trade and the reach of British jurisprudence would be required at an official level.

While it would be overstating the case to speak of a distinct shift in official British policy towards New Zealand occurring in the 1820s, developments at this time were starting gradually to direct the orientation of official attitudes. By the end of the decade, this orientation had still not gone sufficiently far to suggest the inevitability of developments in the following decade (such as the decision in 1832 to appoint a Resident to New Zealand), let alone the decision seven years later to issue instructions for a treaty to secure a cession of sovereignty. To claim otherwise would be to make assumptions based on the benefit of hindsight, rather than from the perspective of officials and others who contributed to the initial evolution of this policy in the 1820s.

Yet when assessed through a world-systems lens, this view necessarily alters. The reticence London showed in committing itself to New Zealand was counterbalanced by the mounting enthusiasm in Sydney for greater economic ties with its nearest neighbour. Such a contrast resonates with Wallerstein's construction of a global capitalist system in the final stages of its territorial expansion: Britain fills the role of a core nation (often geographically remote from the periphery); New South Wales functions as a semi-periphery state (simultaneously possessing the trait of a localized lead agent of capitalist expansion); while New Zealand is the periphery state, being drawn into the global system as a fully dependent nation, deprived of the very capital it generates due to the unequal trading relationship with the core and the semi-periphery.

The advantage of applying a world-systems theory to New Zealand's pre-annexation history in the nineteenth century extends beyond the mere fact of its application as an academic exercise. This approach reveals that in the 1820s, what historians suggest as British reluctance even to consider

making any commitment to New Zealand can be interpreted not as a case of official hesitance or lethargy at all, but rather, as part of a longer-term process to achieve precisely the opposite: to draw New Zealand into the realm of the British Empire as an economically and politically dependent state. It almost certainly was never consciously planned this way, but the absence of deliberate ambition and intent does not in itself necessarily have any bearing on the almost autonomous structuralist extension of British capitalism to the most distant extremities of the world. In world-systems theory, this longer-term structuralist expansion tends to override any day-to-day signs that the core is acting in any way other than to extend the network of dependency which props up the dominance of the core state. The historiographical implications of utilizing this theory are evident even in this cursory survey of the 1820s, and can have application in subsequent decades in analyses of the dynamics of New Zealand's relations with Britain.

That New Zealand never emerged into a fully fledged periphery state, of the sort depicted in Wallerstein's construction of the world-system, might initially appear either as a deficiency in the theory, or confirmation that the process of a territory becoming a periphery state was one in which New Zealand was never involved. However, closer inspection of Wallerstein's world-system theory reveals that an explanation exists for states with histories such as New Zealand's in the 1820s – states which initially seem to be heading along the path of dependency, but then halt this process and even reverse it, emerging essentially as a branch of the core. The allowance for this is found in Wallerstein's observation of the racial division of the world-system,¹⁰² which in the case of substantial immigration into the periphery state of people from the core nation can result in the core–periphery division emerging *within* a formerly peripheral state – a division aligned along racial lines. While the state as a whole may shift from being a periphery to a semi-periphery entity, and later maybe even to a core country, the racial delineation of the state ensures that one group (in New Zealand's case, Māori) remains part of an internal periphery. This development, however, did not materialize until later in the century in New Zealand, and is an area which lends itself to a similar application of world-systems theory in order to expand the historiographical parameters that have traditionally framed analyses of New Zealand's colonization after 1840.

PAUL MOON

Auckland University of Technology

NOTES

1 Thomas Stamford Raffles to Colonel Addenbrooke, Singapore, 10 June 1819, in 'The Founding of Singapore', *Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 2 (1878), p.175.

2 Mark Hickford, 'Making "Territorial Rights of the Natives": Britain and New Zealand, 1830–47', DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1999, p.12ff; J.C. Beaglehole, 'The Colonial Office, 1782–1854', *Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand*, 1, 3 (1941), pp.170–89; E.T. Williams, 'The Colonial Office in the Thirties', *Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand*, 2, 7 (1943), pp.141–60; A.G.L. Shaw, 'British Attitudes to the Colonies, ca. 1820–1850', *Journal of British Studies* (JBS), 9, 1 (1969), pp.71–95; Elizabeth Elbourne, 'The Sin of the Settler: The 1835–36 Select Committee on Aborigines and Debates over Virtue and Conquest in the Early Nineteenth-Century British White Settler Empire', *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 4, 3 (2004); Bernard Semmel, 'The Philosophic Radicals and Colonialism', *Journal of Economic History*, 21, 4 (1961), p.514; Helen Taft Manning, 'Who Ran the British Empire 1830–1850?', *JBS*, 5, 1 (1965), pp.88–121; the role of Māori in this growing trade is detailed in Hazel Petrie, *Chiefs of Industry: Maori Tribal Enterprise in Early Colonial New Zealand*, Auckland, 2006, pp.38–39, 47–48.

3 Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 16, 4 (September 1974), pp.387–415.

4 Their seminal works, respectively, are Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth*, New York, 1957; Andre Gunder Frank, *The Development of Underdevelopment*, New York, 1966.

5 Stephen Bunker, *Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and the Failure of the Modern State*, Chicago, 1985.

6 Tony Ballantyne, *Webs of Empire: Locating New Zealand's Colonial Past*, Wellington, 2012, pp.13, 24–45.

7 Ballantyne, *Webs of Empire*, p.44.

8 In more oblique ways, this article also builds on a range of other works dealing with economic dimensions of New Zealand's colonization. Belich, for example, examined the role of industrialization in Britain's colonial expansion in the nineteenth century, although the tendency towards unequal exchange is occasionally played down: see James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939*, Oxford, 2009, pp.106–33. A more nuanced appraisal of the confluence of capital and trade in New Zealand is offered by McAloon, although the focus is on the post-1840 phase: see Jim McAloon, 'Mobilising Capital and Trade', in Tom Brooking and Eric Pawson, eds, *Seeds of Empire: The Environmental Transformation of New Zealand*, London, 2011, pp.94–116; and for a perspective on the emergence of New Zealand's economic dependence on Britain, see Jim McAloon, 'Resource Frontiers, Environment, and Settler Capitalism, 1769–1860', in Eric Pawson and Tom Brooking, eds, *Making a New Land: Environmental Histories of New Zealand*, Melbourne, 2002, pp.52–56. Armstrong sketched an overview of the application of dependency theory to the New Zealand economy post-1840: see Warwick Armstrong, 'New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and Uneven Development', *Journal of Sociology*, 14, 3 (1978), pp.297–303. Gibbons' exploration of how 'New Zealand' as a subject could be decentred through 'non-national explicatory frameworks' made direct reference to Frank and Wallerstein, and is a forerunner, in a general sense, to this article: see Peter Gibbons, 'The Far Side of the Search for Identity: Reconsidering New Zealand History', *New Zealand Journal of History* (NZJH), 37, 1 (2003), pp.38–49. A regional perspective is provided by Denoon, who makes passing reference to Wallerstein and examines the role of trade as a factor influencing British expansion in the Southern Hemisphere: see Donald Denoon,

Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere, Oxford, 1983. John Darwin addresses the economic dimensions of nineteenth-century British imperialism, but even though he refers to a 'world-system', curiously he provides no reference to Wallerstein: see John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970*, Cambridge, 2009.

9 Tony Ballantyne, 'The State, Politics and Power, 1769–1893', in Giselle Byrnes, ed., *The New Oxford History of New Zealand*, Melbourne, 2009, pp.99–124. Also see Tony Ballantyne and Brian Moloughney, 'Asia in Murihiku: Towards a Transnational History of a Colonial Culture', in Tony Ballantyne and Brian Moloughney, eds, *Disputed Histories: Imagining New Zealand's Pasts*, Dunedin, 2006, pp.65–92.

10 This perception of harmful private interests in territories being at odds with more benign official British approaches to potential colonies is exemplified in *Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Aboriginal Tribes (British Settlements)*, London, 1837, pp.15–27.

11 Ikechukwu Eke Jeffrey Emeh, 'A Discourse on Andre Gunder Frank's Contribution to the Theory and Study of Development and Underdevelopment: its Implication on Nigeria's development situation', *Greener Journal of Biological Sciences*, 2, 3 (2012), p.55.

12 Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World-Economy*, Cambridge, 1979, pp.27, 30, 198–9, 232.

13 Anibal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Americanity as a Concept, or the Americas in the Modern World', *International Social Science Journal*, 1992, pp.549–57.

14 Alan Ward, *A Show of Justice: Racial 'Amalgamation' in Nineteenth Century New Zealand*, Toronto, 1974, pp.34–40.

15 One of the few places where this mediation (and the partial self-positioning of New Zealand and New South Wales in this period respectively as periphery and semi-periphery states) sometimes manifested itself at the time was in the press. See Alan Lester, 'British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire', *History Workshop Journal*, 54 (2002), pp.27–50.

16 This structuralism is assessed in Angus McDonald, 'Wallerstein's World-Economy: How Seriously Should We Take It?', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 38, 3 (1979), pp.535–40.

17 Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy', *African Studies Review*, 17, 1 (1974), pp.1–26.

18 Wallerstein, 'Dependence in an Interdependent World', p.1.

19 Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Globalization or the Age of Transition?: A Long-Term View of the Trajectory of the World-System', *International Sociology*, 15 (2000), p.249.

20 Immanuel Wallerstein, 'World System versus World-Systems: A Critique', *Critique of Anthropology*, 11 (1990), p.190.

21 Trevor Williams, 'James Stephen and British Intervention in New Zealand, 1838–40', *Journal of Modern History*, 13, 1 (1941), pp.21–22; Ward, pp.15, 25; Wayne Rumbles, 'Spectre of Jurisdiction: Supreme Court of New South Wales and the British Subject in Aotearoa/New Zealand 1823–1841', *Law Text Culture*, 15 (2011), pp.209–25.

22 Andre Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution: Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy*, New York, 1970, pp.7–8.

23 A paraphrase of William Shakespeare's *As You Like It* (c. 1599), Act II Scene VII.

24 Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis', *Theory and Society*, 3, 4 (1976), pp.461–83.

25 Adam Driscoll and Edward L. Kick, 'Naval Stores Extraction in Eastern North Carolina: The Historical Basis of Spatial Inequality within a Core Nation', *American Sociological Association*, 19, 1 (2012), pp.1–23; Stephen P. Hanna, 'Finding a Place in the World-Economy: Core-periphery Relations, the Nation-State and the Underdevelopment of Garrett County, Maryland', *Political Geography*, 14, 5 (1995), pp.451–72; Kees Terlouw, *The*

Regional Geography of the World-System: External Arena, Periphery, Semi-Periphery, Core, Utrecht, 1992, pp.36–45.

26 Stephen G. Bunker and Paul Ciccantell, 'Economic Ascent and the Global Environment: World-Systems Theory and the New Historical Materialism', in Walter Goldfrank, Daniel Goodman, Andrew Szasz, eds, *Ecology and the World-System*, Westport, 1999, pp.107–22.

27 An account of New South Wales ascending to this role is found in Grace Karskens, *The Colony: A History of Early Sydney*, Crows Nest, 2010, pp.63–67.

28 Robert Huttenback, *Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colored Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies, 1830–1910*, Ithaca, 1976, p.23.

29 Satyananda J. Gabriel and Evgenia O. Todorova, 'Racism and Capitalist Accumulation: An Overdetermined Nexus', *Critical Sociology*, 29, 1 (2003), pp.29–46; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789–1914*, Berkeley, 2011, p.xiii.

30 Frank, pp.7–8.

31 Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Patterns of Development of the Modern World-System', *Review*, 1, 2 (1977), pp.127–8.

32 J.C. Beaglehole, *The Discovery of New Zealand*, London, 1961, p.49.

33 D.L. Mackay, 'Direction and Purpose in British Imperial Policy, 1783–1801', *The Historical Journal*, 17, 3 (1974), p.487.

34 Viscount Sydney, 'Draught Instructions for Governor Phillip,' *Historical Records of New South Wales, I, Pt. 2, 1783–1792, Sydney, 1892*, p.89.

35 J.W. Davidson, 'New Zealand, 1820–1870: An essay in re-interpretation', *Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand*, 20 (1953), p.352.

36 William Wilberforce, 18 February 1819, *Hansard, XXXIX, London, 1819*, p.487.

37 Joseph Somes to Lord Palmerston, London, 7 November 1839, in *Correspondence with the Secretary of State Relative to New Zealand*, London, 1840, p.67.

38 Timothy Yates, *The Conversion of the Maori: Years of Religious and Social Change, 1814–1842*, Grand Rapids, MI, 2013, p.16.

39 Thomas Kendall to Josiah Pratt, 22 January 1816, in John Rawson Elder, ed., *Marsden's Lieutenants*, Dunedin, 1934, p.121.

40 Lydia Wevers, *Country of Writing: Travel Writing and New Zealand, 1809–1900*, Auckland, 2002, p.65; J. Stephen, Memorandum, Enclosure No. 38, London, 19 March 1840, in Great Britain Colonial Office, *Correspondence with the Secretary of State Relative to New Zealand*, London, 1840, p.67; *Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser (SGNSWA)*, 12 November 1814, p.1.

41 Judith Binney, *The Legacy of Guilt: A Life of Thomas Kendall*, Auckland, 2005, p.45.

42 SGNSWA, 12 November 1814, p.1.

43 57 George III, c. liiii, in Frederick Lloyd Whitfield Wood, *New Zealand in the World*, Wellington, 1940, p.10.

44 Somes to Palmerston, p.67.

45 John Liddiard Nicholas, *Narrative of a Voyage to New Zealand, Performed in the Years 1814 and 1815, in Company with the Reverend Samuel Marsden, Principal Chaplain of New South Wales*, London, 1817, I, p.213, II, pp.189–90.

46 Stuart Banner, 'Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand', *Law and Social Inquiry*, 24, 4 (1999), pp.807–19.

47 Binney, p.45.

48 Bunker and Ciccantell, pp.107–22.

49 Davidson, pp.349–50; Wood, *New Zealand in the World*, p. 17; Jim McAloon, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and Settler Capitalists: Imperialism, Dependent Development and Colonial Wealth in The South Island of New Zealand', *Australian Economic History Review*,

- 42, 2 (2002), pp.211–12; Roger P. Wigglesworth, 'The New Zealand Timber and Flax Trade, 1769–1840', PhD thesis, Massey University, 1981, pp.14, 259–61; The persistence of this official reluctance into the 1830s is detailed in Shaw, p.75.
- 50 Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology*, Beverly Hills, 1982, p.159.
- 51 Wallerstein, 'The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System', pp.387–415.
- 52 Vincent O'Malley, *The Meeting Place: Maori and Pakeha Encounters, 1642–1840*, Auckland, 2012, p.114.
- 53 Christopher Chase-Dunn and Richard Rubinson, 'Toward a Structural Perspective on the World-System', *Politics & Society*, 7, 4 (1977), pp.453–76.
- 54 SGNSWA, 22 December 1828, p.2; *Sydney Monitor*, 26 September 1829, p.4; Robert Carrick, ed., *Historical Records of New Zealand South prior to 1840*, Dunedin, 1903, p.73.
- 55 P.G. Canham, 'New England Whalers in New Zealand Waters, 1800–1850,' MA thesis, Massey University, 1959, pp.7, 11.
- 56 John Butler, in R.J. Barton, *Earliest New Zealand: The Journals and Correspondence of the Rev. John Butler*, Masterton, 1927, p.331; H. Morton, 'Whaling in New Zealand Waters in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century,' PhD thesis, University of Otago, 1977, p.286.
- 57 Peter Bays, *A Narrative of the Wreck of the Minerva, Whaler of Port Jackson*, Cambridge, 1831, p.147.
- 58 Wallerstein, 'Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis', p.464.
- 59 Morton, p.158.
- 60 Gordon Beckett, *British Colonial Investment in Colonial N.S.W. 1788–1850*, Singapore, 2013, p.365; James Belich, *Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century*, Auckland, 1996, p.182; Andrew Potter, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century*, Oxford, 1999, p.173.
- 61 Kathleen Shawcross, 'Maoris of the Bay of Islands, 1769–1840', MA thesis, University of Auckland, 1967, p.170
- 62 Malcolm McKinnon, *New Zealand Historical Atlas*, Auckland, 1998, p.28.
- 63 Daniel Tyerman, in James Montgomery, ed., *Journals of the Voyages and Travels by the Rev. Daniel Tyerman and George Bennet*, London, 1832, p.130.
- 64 Butler, in Barton, p.63.
- 65 John Fitzpatrick, 'Food, Warfare and the Impact of Atlantic capitalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand', Refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2004, p.9; Paul Moon, *A Savage Country: The Untold Story of New Zealand in the 1820s*, Auckland, 2012, p.19.
- 66 Ron D. Crosby, *The Musket Wars: A History of Inter-Iwi Conflict 1806–1845*, Auckland, 1999; Angela Ballara, *Taua: Musket Wars, Land Wars or Tikanga? Warfare in Maori Society in the Early Nineteenth Century*, Auckland, 2003, pp.147–52.
- 67 Alfred Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe*, Cambridge, 1986, p.250; Fitzpatrick, p.14.
- 68 Wallerstein, 'Dependence in an Interdependent World', p.1.
- 69 William Charles Wentworth, *A Statistical Account of the British Settlements in Australasia*, I, London, 1824, pp.4, 25.
- 70 David Hainsworth, *Builders and Adventurers: The Traders and the Emergence of the Colony 1788–1821*, Melbourne, 1968, p.74ff.
- 71 SGNSWA, 1 October 1829, p.2.
- 72 Wallerstein, 'The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System', p.401.
- 73 Wallerstein, 'World System versus World-Systems: A Critique', p.192.
- 74 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas: I. The Old Colonial System, 1688–1850', *Economic History Review* (EHR), 23 (1986), pp.501–

6; Shaw, p.78.

75 James Birnie to Lachlan Macquarie, 31 March 1813, in Robert McNab, *Historical Records of New Zealand*, I, Wellington, 1908, p.315.

76 Lachlan Macquarie to Henry Bathurst, 1 April 1817, in McNab, pp.409–10.

77 Donald Denoon, 'Land, Labour and Independent Development', in Donald Denoon, et al., eds, *Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders*, Cambridge, 1997, p.157; Harry Morton, *The Whale's Wake*, Dunedin, 1982, p.167; Petrie, p.39.

78 Ballantyne, *Webs of Empire*, p.135; David Lambert and Alan Lester, 'Imperial Spaces, Imperial Subjects', in David Lambert and Alan Lester, eds, *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge, 2006, p.3; John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *EHR*, 6, 1 (1953), pp.1–15; Miles Fairburn cites New Zealand's distance from Britain as a consideration: see Miles Fairburn, 'Is There a Good Case for New Zealand Exceptionalism?', *Thesis Eleven*, 92, February 2008, p.42; the free trade element of this policy is dealt with in Bernard Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism, 1750–1850*, Cambridge, 1970, p.30.

79 Richard Cobden, speech on free trade, Manchester, 15 January 1846, in John Bright and James Edward Thorold Rogers, eds, *Speeches and Questions of Public Policy by Richard Cobden*, I, London, 1870, pp.362–3.

80 Paul Moon, *Te Ara Ki Te Tiriti: The Path to the Treaty of Waitangi*, Auckland, 2002, p.20; Llewellyn Woodward, *The Age of Reform, 1815–1872*, Oxford, 1961, p.365.

81 Daniel Hall, *A History of South East Asia*, 4th ed., London, 1988, p.642.

82 Macquarie to Bathurst, 1 April 1817, in McNab, pp.409–10.

83 Hainsworth, pp.104, 136–40; SGNSWA, 5 May 1828, p.2; *Monitor*, 23 March 1827, p.8.

84 SGNSWA, 27 August 1827, p.2.

85 James Downie to John Butler, 4 April 1821, in Barton, p.121.

86 James Downie to Navy Board, 12 August 1820, in McNab, pp.569–70.

87 William Savage to Henry Bathurst, 20 March 1820, in McNab, p.483.

88 Robert Sugden to Henry Bathurst, 18 January 1821, in McNab, p.516.

89 Henry Goulburn to Robert Sugden, 25 April 1821, in McNab, p.532.

90 John Bigge to Henry Bathurst, 27 February 1823, in McNab, p.587.

91 Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Development of the Concept of Development', *Sociological Theory*, 2, 1 (1984), p.104.

92 Bigge to Bathurst, 27 February 1823, in McNab, p.587.

93 Anonymous, *To the People of England: An Address on the Colonization of New Zealand*, London, 1824.

94 Angus John Harrop, *England and New Zealand from Tasman to the Taranaki War*, London, 1926, p.7.

95 *London Gazette*, 2 July 1841, p.1722; Benjamin Disraeli, *An Inquiry into the Plans, Progress, and Policy of the American Mining Companies*, 3rd ed., London, 1825, pp.25, 72.

96 James Taylor, *Creating Capitalism: Joint-Stock Enterprise in British Politics and Culture, 1800–1870*, Suffolk, 2006, pp.21–54, 135–68; Anthony Webster, 'The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization: The East India Company Charter Act of 1813', *EHR*, 43, 3 (1990), pp.404–19; Thomas Tooke, *A History of Prices and of the State of the Circulation, From 1793 Until the Present Time*, II, London, 1837, p.150.

97 Terry Boswell, 'Colonial Empires and the Capitalist World-Economy: A Time Series Analysis of Colonization, 1640–1960', *American Sociological Review*, 54, 2 (1989), p.180.

98 Douglas Pike, *Paradise of Dissent: South Australia 1829–1857*, Melbourne, 1967, p.33.

99 One of the additional arguments used by the Company was that their planned colony in New Zealand would help in the relief of 'surplus' population in Britain. This was in line with a

recommendation made in the House of Commons that the British government consider measures such as 'emigration upon an extended scale' to 'prevent the injurious effects ... upon the condition of the labouring classes of this country' brought about by overcrowding and poverty. Sending hundreds or even thousands of the British poor to the colonies, it was suggested, was 'the only means by which the evils to be apprehended from the continued increase of the pauper population ... could be averted'. Such arguments in themselves did not alter directly British colonial policy in this period, but they were gaining currency in some quarters, and accordingly were utilized by those looking to further their private colonizing proposals for New Zealand. See Edward Gibbon Wakefield, *A Comparison of the Social and Political State of Both Nations*, New York, 1834, pp.198–8, 288; Anonymous, *To the People of England*; Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, 'Trajectories of Protection: Protectorates of Aborigines in early nineteenth-century Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand', *New Zealand Geographer*, 64, 3 (2008), pp.205–20; Edward Jerningham Wakefield, ed., *The Founders of Canterbury*, I, Christchurch, 1868, pp.126, 190; Eileen P. Sullivan, 'Liberalism and Imperialism: J.S. Mill's Defense of the British Empire', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 44 (1983), pp.599–617; Edward R. Kittrell, 'Wakefield and Classical Rent Theory', *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 25 (1966), pp.141–52; Helen Taft Manning, 'Lord Durham and the New Zealand Company', *NZJH*, 6, 1 (1972), p.2; R.W. Horton, 24 June 1828, *Hansard*, series 2, XIX, London, 1828, pp.1501–3.

100 Eris O'Brien, *The Foundation of Australia, 1786–1800: A Study in English Criminal Practice and Penal Colonization in the Eighteenth Century*, London, 1937, p.62; John Manning Ward, *Colonial Self-Government: The British Experience, 1759–1856*, London, 1976, p.108.

101 Hopkins and Wallerstein, 'Patterns of Development of the Modern World-System', p.113.

102 Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, London, 1991, p.198.