ON 9 JULY 1951, THE UNIONS INVOLVED in the waterfront lockout and the lockout’s supporting strikes met and passed a return-to-work motion: ‘Supremely confident of the conscious discipline of our ranks we call upon every individual member to return to work and hold up the banner of his union on the job.’1 The wording of the motion implied a top-down decision, and suggested that the rank and file were waiting for the call to return to work, an assumption that historians have not challenged. This article presents a different view of the end of the dispute, and explores the assessments that workers made about continuing the dispute, to demonstrate that they did not blindly follow those in leadership positions. Strike-breakers were central to the decisions workers made to continue the dispute: outside strike-breakers presented a risk to existing workers’ jobs – and the threat of never working on the wharf again made the costs of the dispute untenable for many. Despite their importance, strike-breakers have been underresearched, and this article suggests new ways of understanding the decisions made both by strike-breakers and by those who remained on strike or locked out until 9 July. To understand the end of the 1951 waterfront dispute, it is not enough, I argue, to examine the actions of union and political leaders like Jock Barnes, President of the New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union, and Prime Minister Sidney Holland.

Most historical accounts of the 1951 waterfront lockout and supporting strikes have focused on the leaders rather than the rank and file, and the origins of the dispute rather than its conclusion. In Confrontation ’51, Michael Bassett argued that the dispute was driven by political power and the leaders’ personalities.2 Although Bassett’s view has been challenged, his ideas have been treated as the orthodox view of the dispute, particularly in general histories of New Zealand.3 Bassett’s focus on leadership has been replicated in projects that disagree with other aspects of his interpretation. The Big Blue had its origins in a Trade Union History Project seminar and its 22 contributions deepened the discussion of the lockout; however, many of the pieces collected in the volume are narratives told from the perspective of individuals in leadership positions, either during the dispute itself or
subsequently.\textsuperscript{4} Anna Green’s \textit{British Capital, Antipodean Labour} provided the most sustained alternative understanding of the dispute to Bassett’s; she argued that the dispute, and conflict on the wharf, grew out of the nature of waterfront work, rather than the individuals involved.\textsuperscript{5} Green, along with several other historians, has examined the decades leading up to 1951 to put the dispute in context, but few discuss the aftermath, which contributes to the skewed picture of the finale as inevitable but uninteresting.\textsuperscript{6} The key question historians have asked about the end of the lockout has been about strategy: could different union leadership have avoided the defeat through less militant tactics?\textsuperscript{7} Even Green focused on leadership, rather than rank and file, in her brief discussion of the end of the dispute.\textsuperscript{8} The focus on strategy suggests a chessboard, a controlled environment where leaders were able to dictate decisions to the pawns they controlled. Concentrating historical attention on workers’ decisions in the last month of the dispute, however, demonstrates that the dispute was not a game that anyone controlled, and the actions of pawns were as important as the actions of any other piece.

The origins of the 1951 waterfront lockout have been covered elsewhere, and so a brief summary will suffice here. The immediate post-war period was a time of repeated and intense conflict on the waterfront; in the lead-up to 1951, industrial conflict on the waterfront was triggered by disagreements over the payment of dirt money, the union’s safety concerns, wages and, as Green points out, the struggle for control.\textsuperscript{9} The waterfront dispute began in February 1951 as a disagreement over wages, but quickly escalated into a major conflict: the waterside workers refused to work overtime and the shipping companies responded by locking the workers out. The Holland National government took control of the lockout and committed itself to dismantling the New Zealand Waterside Workers’ Union; cabinet granted itself extraordinary powers through emergency regulations that limited freedom of speech and criminalized the provision of money or food to waterside workers. The draconian nature of these regulations brought coal miners, freezing workers and seamen out on strike in support of the locked-out waterside workers. The government had to find labour to replace 8000 watersiders if Holland was going to claim victory and the economy was going to continue to function. From 27 February 1951, the armed forces worked the waterfront, which alleviated the government’s immediate problem of loading and unloading ships (although there were still delays) and bought them time to persuade watersiders to return to work on their terms, or to recruit a new workforce.\textsuperscript{10}

Three medium-sized branches of the New Zealand Waterside Workers’ Union, New Plymouth, Timaru and Port Chalmers, voted to return to work
before July 1951. These branches give a sense of the sort of decisions workers were making. The Timaru branch had a history of conflict with the national union, which appears to explain the workers’ decision to return to work. When the New Plymouth branch voted to return to work, Jock Barnes dismissed it as a bad port, but unlike Timaru there is no evidence of a history of conflict with the national office. Norman Quinlan, a New Plymouth watersider, described the secretary of the New Plymouth union, Jack Harris, travelling down to Wellington to explain to the national office that the New Plymouth branch was desperate and needed financial assistance. Harris returned with a message that the national office could not provide any assistance. In 151 Days, Dick Scott offered a different explanation. After describing strike-breakers beginning work Scott stated: ‘The strikebreakers slowly grew in numbers and the following week the branch cracked.’ Scott suggested that strike-breakers were the catalyst for the return to work as watersiders feared for their jobs. The Department of Labour figures support Scott’s argument: on 26 April, 126 strike-breakers had registered to work in New Plymouth. A third of these had previously been members of the NZWWU: two-thirds had not, the highest percentage of outside workers at any port. The 82 workers who were not members of the union were a threat to the jobs of NZWWU members. New Plymouth workers watching other men do their jobs faced the possibility of never returning to the wharf. Norman Quinlan did not misrepresent the decision when he described the role hardship played in the decision to return to work in New Plymouth, but faced with the possibility of losing their jobs permanently, workers found that hardship much more difficult to withstand. New Plymouth workers based their decisions not just on short-term difficulties, but on the long-term threat to their ability to work on the wharf. On 8 June, Port Chalmers watersiders voted to return to work as a branch. By the end of May, Port Chalmers was one of the few ports where no new union had been formed. In early June, there were moves to register a new union. Such an organization would threaten the jobs of NZWWU members in a one-industry town. Neil Crichton, the president of the Port Chalmers branch, stated publicly that it was hardship and the threat of strike-breakers that drove watersiders back. In Port Chalmers, the return to work in June was not only motivated by short-term economic issues, but also driven by the threat of strike-breakers, the same combination of factors that had led New Plymouth workers back to the wharf.

Very few union members ended up working as strike-breakers; even at the beginning of July only 610 men had registered to work on the wharf from branches that had remained out. A far more common way that individuals
withdraw from the dispute was to get work in another industry, thus avoiding
the label ‘scab’, but this was regarded as an illegitimate survival strategy
by the NZWWU, and by other unionists who were on supporting strikes.
As the chair of the Auckland branch told a union member who travelled to
Taupō to start a business: ‘he left the Union during a critical time and if
every man did this there would be no union’.19 Or, as a watersider’s child
understood it: ‘I got the impression that if you took other work, you were
a scab.’20 The press and the government also saw the taking of other work
as a sign of watersiders’ weakness.21 The cumulative effect of locked-out
workers taking work in other industries can be seen in Auckland. On 29
May 1951, the new strike-breaking union in Auckland had 1400 members,
and the executive decided to close its membership.22 Once this occurred,
substantial numbers of Auckland watersiders withdrew from the dispute and
sought work in other industries as they believed they would not be able to
return to work on the wharf. In the first three months of the lockout, just ten
men applied for clearance (permission from the branch to get other work); in
early June there were five applications for clearance a week; and in the last
week of June there were over 20.23 Some applications addressed this directly:
one watersider wrote ‘the way I figure things I’d never get a job back on
the wharf so I think I’d better get my clearance and try and get another job
to replenish my swag again’.24 Many more Auckland members found other
work without getting formal clearance. On 11 June, the police estimated –
apparently without exaggeration – that 250 members, more than 10%, had
left the union in Auckland, with or without clearances.25 On June 23, the
relief committee revealed that 200 members had stopped collecting relief
over the previous fortnight.26 After four months without pay, the only reason
a watersider would stop collecting relief was that he had found other work.
The dramatic increase in Auckland watersiders who applied for clearance or
took other work without clearance in June demonstrated that workers were
making their own assessment of the costs of continuing the dispute. Once
Auckland watersiders realized that they would not work on the wharf again,
many decided they could not remain part of the lockout.

In the first week of July, a cascade of local decisions at ports and mines
made the continuation of the dispute untenable. At a meeting in mid-June,
miners’ representatives had expressed how difficult their position was.27
Striking coal miners articulated the same questions as watersiders when
deciding how long they could remain out: what was the cost of remaining
out and was that cost worth the risk? The two main mining areas were Huntly
and the West Coast. On the West Coast there were no strike-breakers, either
on the waterfront or in the mines; over five months just eight men registered
an interest in working on the wharf with the Department of Labour, which was insufficient to start working the wharf with civilian labour. In Huntly, there were strike-breakers, but they were only working in open-cast mines. Armed forces men, however, were working in both areas, and their strike-breaking labour created more of a threat to the coal miners than it did to the watersiders. As the coal miners were on a supporting strike, rather than fighting their own battle, the defence forces only needed to provide enough coal for the duration of the lockout to nullify the coal miners’ support for the watersiders. The representatives of the Westport branch of the watersiders union made the relationship between cost and risk clear: ‘We felt that the Army could produce sufficient opencast coal to defeat the ends of the strike. Very little relief had been forthcoming and the going was tough.’ On 26 and 27 June, miners in eight mines in the Buller district returned to work. Thirteen days earlier their representatives had said that the Buller Central committee ‘would have difficulty in holding the position for more than a week’. Other mines followed: between Tuesday 3 July and Friday 6 July miners at all mines but one returned to work. Miners at Ohura returned to work the following week, on Monday 9 July. At a joint union meeting in Auckland on 5 July, Mr Baxter said: ‘they have found it very difficult to hold their members owing to the economic situation […] the miners could see no hope of a settlement. If there was any hope they would have held out.’

Miners explained their decision to return to work by emphasizing the difficult position they were in, but – just as importantly – they had come to believe that the NZWWU could not win.

By the beginning of July, in Auckland, the number of watersiders who were seeking other work made the dispute unsustainable for the branch as a whole. When the executive met on Tuesday 3 July, the day after the miners returned to work, the executive granted 14 requests for clearance, and declined six. They were concerned about the effect this number of releases would have on the morale of other members and decided not to tell the applicants straight away, but to wait until after the members’ meeting the next day. At the same meeting, the executive passed a motion that demonstrated they did not believe the dispute could continue: ‘That national office be advised of the true situation of the Auckland branch’. At a members’ meeting the following day, Wednesday 4 July, Alex Drennan spoke about clearances: ‘Mr Drennan drew the members’ attention to the fact that at every meeting resolutions were moved to stand firm with the National organisation and these resolutions were carried unanimously but immediately after these meetings some of the members were applying for releases. Although he considered it was better for them to apply for release than to walk away from the union he
was of the opinion that if they were unable to carry on the struggle any longer they should intimate that to members. The members’ meeting then passed an even more urgent motion: ‘that this branch considers the National Strike Committee should be called together immediately to reconsider policy in the light of the deterioration in the situation’. The number of members who had taken other work gave the Auckland branch no choice but to seek an end to the dispute.

Lyttelton workers voted to return to work on Wednesday 4 July. The number of strike-breakers in Lyttelton had increased throughout June, and a substantial number of Lyttelton workers had wanted to return to work for some time. On Thursday 5 July, the branch met again, and reversed the decision of the previous day, but it was too late. The number of locked-out watersiders who had registered that they wished to work on the wharf increased from 37 on 4 July to 190 and then 286 over the next two days. The waterside workers who had taken work on the Lyttelton waterfront in the first week of July increased the number of workers registered with the new strike-breaking union to 700. There had been 800 waterside workers in Lyttelton before the dispute; the 500 workers who remained out in Lyttelton knew that not everyone would be able to return to work when there were only 100 jobs remaining.

Most discussions of the end of the 1951 waterfront dispute have focused on the actions of Jock Barnes and assumed that workers relied on the decision of the leadership. An Auckland branch leader told Green: ‘some of us made an attempt to pull back on this thing, but there were individuals in the leadership that were able to convince the workers that they were winning when they were losing’. Analysis of what happened in New Plymouth, Port Chalmers, Auckland, Lyttelton and in coal mining areas, however, demonstrates that workers were making their own decisions – and evaluating the likelihood of winning – and that the presence of outside strike-breakers was critical to their decisions. Throughout the dispute, strike-breakers begat strike-breakers; the more strike-breakers working on the wharf, the more likely former workers were to go back. The number of former watersiders registered with the Department of Labour in Dunedin leapt from just seven on 8 June to 61 on 11 June after the nearby Port Chalmers branch went back to work as a branch. The ports where significant numbers of watersiders went back to work as individuals, such as Bluff and Nelson, had a high level of strike-breakers registered from early on in the dispute. Fewer strike-breakers also meant a stronger branch. At the beginning of the lockout there were 2200 workers on the Wellington wharf and the Department of Labour struggled to get strike-breakers in the area. Although the number of members of the new union
steadily increased from 66 at the end of May to 409 by 12 July, this was less than a fifth of the size of the previous workforce, and therefore those who were locked out could believe that they were going to be able to return to their jobs. After the dispute ended, almost everyone who wished to return to work on the wharf in Wellington was able to do so, including union militants. In Wellington, because there were proportionally fewer strike-breakers, there was neither an exodus to other work, nor a last-minute rush to get back to limited places.

One of the enduring assumptions of most analyses of the 1951 waterfront dispute has been that the workers’ defeat was inevitable; watersiders could not win when they were fighting the full power of the state. The availability of strike-breakers has been taken for granted in the historical discussion. For example, Dick Scott believed government had too many advantages for the watersiders to overcome, listing economic and industrial factors, but he does not mention strike-breakers. Holland’s government could not win alone, or even with the help of the Federation of Labour. It needed replacement labour to move sugar off ships and lamb carcasses on. The availability of this labour could not be taken for granted, as on the West Coast there were no strike-breakers, and in Wellington there were not enough to pose a threat to the existing union. To suggest Holland’s victory was inevitable is to ignore the importance of strike-breaking labour.

Despite the vital role they played in bringing about the end of the 1951 waterfront dispute, strike-breakers have received little attention from historians, a lack that is not unique to this industrial dispute, or newly discovered. As William Tuttle, a US labour historian, observed in 1966: 'Despite their obvious significance in labor history, little is known about strikebreakers: who they were; their motives in signing on for such employment. Strikebreakers are anonymities; yet in order to understand labor history, especially during its turbulent phases, much needs to be known about them.' While historians have gone some way to respond to Tuttle’s challenge, their focus has been on the ways that strike-breakers were different from the workers they replaced. Alun Burge’s study of scabbing in interwar Wales paints a picture of the strike-breaker as an individual whose actions place him beyond the pale. The most extended discussion on any aspect of strike-breaking is from the United States, where historians have explored the image and the reality of African-American strike-breakers. Historians have come at this idea from different angles: in the 1970s Mark Stern sympathetically examined the perspective of African-American strike-breakers, while Jerrell Shofner examined an African-American strike broken by white workers. More recent work has explored the portrayal of race and strike-breaking
in the movie *Matewan* and the role of convict labour.\(^5^7\) The discussion of African-American strike-breakers in the US is one example of a wider literature that discusses strike-breaking in terms of ethnicity and difference, particularly immigration.\(^5^8\) Most of this work in some way explores the idea that immigrants are more likely to work as strike-breakers, although John Chalcraft recently added to this debate by arguing that migration can increase political and industrial unrest.\(^5^9\) The predominant historical approach to strike-breakers has been to explore them as outsiders.\(^6^0\)

The role of ethnicity in strike-breaking seems a promising place to start an examination of strike-breakers during the 1951 waterfront dispute, as there is some evidence of a significant number of Māori strike-breakers.\(^6^1\) On the Auckland wharf, which had employed about 75 Māori workers before the lockout, there were 400 to 600 Māori strike-breakers.\(^6^2\) In Gisborne, although there is no record of the ethnicity of the pre-lockout workforce, the majority of strike-breakers were also Māori.\(^6^3\) On closer examination, however, the evidence about Māori strike-breakers demonstrates the limits of focusing on the differences between strike-breakers and the existing workforce. In Auckland and Gisborne, government, press and union sources independently described the number of Māori strike-breakers, and in doing so marked and drew attention to Māori.\(^6^4\) In other ports, the same sources remain silent about the ethnicity of strike-breakers, which strongly implies that the majority of strike-breakers were Pākehā.\(^6^5\) As sources emphasize the outsider status of strike-breakers, strike-breaking outsiders have received historical attention that was disproportionate to their presence.

To go beyond existing historiographical approaches to strike-breakers as outsiders, it is important to understand the limitation of the sources on well-documented strike-breakers. In 1951, the Department of Labour carefully assembled tables keeping track of how many people were working in each port and unions went to great lengths to create accurate ‘scab lists’.\(^6^6\) Despite this, any further information about strike-breakers is very difficult to access. The Department of Labour was interested in numbers, not in names, identities or any other information. Union scab lists just include the surname and the initial of strike-breaking workers; the names D. Ashley or F.H. Adams by themselves provide little information about who these men were or why they made the decisions they did.\(^6^7\) In contrast with the effort that others put into documenting strike-breakers, strike-breakers have not wanted to be remembered as such by those around them. The starkest evidence of this is the exceptionally well-documented United Kingdom 1985–1986 miners’ strike, by the end of which the majority of miners had gone back to work as strike-breakers. Academics, journalists and laypeople recorded the experiences of
those involved as a political act and therefore there is a literature, far larger than in any other industrial dispute, that documents the memories of strikers and their families. Even though hundreds of people have had extracts of their stories published, and strike-breaking was a majority experience, there is only one account of a strike-breaker. Moreover, that account begins with a long narration about why the strike-breaker does not want to be recorded. The same silence exists in oral history interviews about 1951, where a substantial body of oral histories have been recorded and many of those actively involved with the unions have been interviewed multiple times. Again, there is only one interview with a strike-breaker, and it only mentions working on the wharf in passing. Writing about strike-breakers is challenging for historians, because strike-breakers have tended to try and erase any record or memory of that work. As Alan Burge wrote: ‘Historians have paid little attention to scabs. Nor have scabs been anxious to promote their cause.’

Oral histories record a similar dynamic of those involved in the dispute actively remembering strike-breakers, set against the invisibility of strike-breaking experiences. Hester Barron’s discussion of memory and the 1926 miners’ lockout in Durham provides a useful starting point for an analysis of memories of 1951. Engaging with recent historiographical debates on individual and collective memory, Barron demonstrated the work that mining communities put into maintaining a collective memory of 1926 based on solidarity. Memories of solidarity involved both heroic narratives of those involved in the lockout and ‘remorseless demonization’ of those who had worked as strike-breakers. She pointed out that despite the similarities of narratives of solidarity, there were also significant variations in narratives about the 1926 miners’ lockout. She argued that individuals’ accounts relate to the collective memory of mining communities, but that narrators also have to make sense of their memories in terms of their own life story. Discussion of strike-breakers in oral histories often reflected the union-based collective narrative about strike-breakers, which is available from archival sources, both in vilifying strike-breakers, and in emphasizing the importance of remembering them. Oral history narratives about 1951 that discuss strike-breakers tend to emphasize conflict, but they also demonstrate that strike-breaking and locked-out workers lived on the same streets and used the same institutions. Johnny Mitchell described a fight with his strike-breaking neighbour in Freeman’s Bay; Gwendolene Pawson talked about physical fights with the children of strike-breakers at her Napier Catholic school; Kevin Ford recalled ‘getting a hiding’ from his father if he played with the neighbouring son of a strike-breaker. This is consistent with research into the 1912 Waihī strike, where mapping of
strikers and strike-breakers has shown that they lived side by side.\textsuperscript{78} In addition, some children remember how their fathers remained hostile to strike-breakers for decades. Maureen Fairey said: ‘I can also remember my father talking about scabs and bloody scabs and so forth all his life he spoke like that about people who did go back and work on the waterfront.’\textsuperscript{79} Kevin Ford remembered the way his father continued to fight the dispute with his strike-breaking neighbour: ‘when the scab got a TV aerial up, Dad went to Invercargill the next day to get a TV aerial up at our place. If the scab got something, Dad got something.’\textsuperscript{80} This material emphasized the depth of feeling towards strike-breakers, but there is a limit to how much it can help develop our analysis. In order to fully explore what oral history accounts can tell us about strike-breaking, we must look for material that goes beyond the narrative of solidarity, and includes the more personal memories that Barron uncovered in 1926.

The history of strike-breakers has also been influenced by the ferocity with which union members ensured strike-breakers were remembered. Alan Burge, in his article about interwar strike-breaking in Wales, quoted an interview from 1978: ‘If you talk about Seary … the first thing that springs to mind is that he was a scab. It’s a name that’s with them forever. BRANDED. It will be with their children. BRANDED.’\textsuperscript{81} During industrial disputes in general, and in 1951 in particular, unions created an absolute distinction between strike-breakers and non-strike-breakers. Only those who actually started work on the wharf had their names put on scab lists or counted on the government’s careful tally. This absolute distinction suits the purposes of those producing sources, but historians do not have to accept it. Jim Gibson was a seaman who was on strike in 1951, and in his oral history he describes the role his father played in reducing the number of strike-breakers in Wellington. Gibson’s sister’s husband told his father-in-law, Gibson’s father, that he was considering getting work on the Wellington waterfront, and Gibson’s father replied that his son was on strike and if the son-in-law broke the strike he would no longer be welcome in his house; the son-in-law did not take the work.\textsuperscript{82} Maureen Martin, whose husband was a striking freezing worker, described the web of relationships and obligations that shaped decision-making in her community: ‘Well, we used to meet in Plunket rooms or out shopping and talk it over, say “who’s gone back in?”’ and some would say “my husband wants to go back in” and some would say “my husband would never go back in”. We used to discuss all that sort of thing and when they said they wanted to go back I would say “he is going to let down the rest of the men who have been out all this time and he’s going to let himself down and his family down too”.’\textsuperscript{83}
Due to the government’s emergency regulations, some unusual material is located in police files, and narratives of decisions not to work as strike-breakers survive outside of oral histories. William Price talked to his employer about going back to work on the cement works, but then refused to do so, citing threats from other workers. The police investigated and discovered quite another story. His wife had talked to a friend whose husband was also on strike and who said that anyone who returned to the cement works would be going back ‘as a scab’. After Price’s wife reported the conversation he changed his mind and refused to return to work. The absolute distinction between ‘strike-breaker’ and everyone else is not helpful for historians; many men thought about strike-breaking and never crossed a picket line.

The stories of Gibson, Martin and Price also demonstrate that when a man was thinking of working as strike-breaker, his relationships with striking workers and their families could persuade him otherwise. Examining the relationships that persuaded workers not to take work on the wharves suggests different way of understanding Māori strike-breakers. Rather than centering ethnicity as a deciding factor in strike-breaking, the contemporary discussion of Māori strike-breakers can help us explain strike-breaking more generally. Locked-out Māori watersiders formed a committee specifically aimed at persuading other Māori not to work as strike-breakers. Steve Watene and George Pitman travelled to marae around the upper North Island and spoke against strike-breaking. Aroha Harris has written about the importance of the connections that Māori who moved to cities maintained with their homes. Pitman and Watene used the relationships they had with their own homes and also with other iwi and marae to persuade Māori not to work as strike-breakers. As the Auckland minutes recorded: ‘First of all [Pitman] conveyed greetings from the Maoris [sic] at Ngaruawahia and from Princess Te Puea. At Maramarua there were only 3 Maoris [sic] employed at the open cast works and they will be knocking off.’ This account emphasized both ongoing relationships and undertakings not to work as strike-breakers. Māori workers in the deregistered union significantly reduced the number of Māori who were prepared to work on the wharves, by using relationships they had with individuals and marae to advocate against strike-breaking, just as Martin and Gibson had. Examining the decisions of Māori workers also suggests that just because those who decided not to work as strike-breakers did so because of their relationships, it does not follow that strike-breakers were acting as atomized individuals. Instead, Māori strike-breakers who talked about their decision to work on the wharves discussed that decision in terms of their community. Māori workers made up approximately a quarter of the
new union; strike-breaking on the Auckland wharf was a rare opportunity for Māori workers to join a large workplace en masse and participate in shaping that workplace. At a meeting between Māori members of the new and old unions, set up by the Waitematā tribal executive, those working on the wharf stated: ‘If they left the union now they thought they would only be replaced with others who might not be maoris [sic].’ While, as has already been mentioned, a feature of strike-breakers is that they rarely discuss their motivations, the limited evidence that exists suggests that strike-breakers could also see their decision in terms of their relationships.

The number of former union members who worked as strike-breakers in different ports, strongly suggests that contrary to the union construction of strike-breaking as an identity, the decision to work as a strike-breaker was contingent for many workers. In total, 821 watersiders were members of the new, strike-breaking, unions by 6 July 1951, about 10% of the union membership. The vast majority of these were from branches such as Port Chalmers who had voted to return to work. At branches where there was no collective vote to return to work, less than 5% of workers returned to work. No one registered to work as a strike-breaker in Westport. Just seven men registered to work as strike-breakers in Greymouth; these men never started work as seven was considered insufficient to form a new union. The West Coast mining areas had a strong union history and culture. If anyone thought of returning to work then their friends, family members, or people they met at Plunket, out shopping or at the pub, would remind them not to ‘scab’. The difference between workers in Port Chalmers, where 80% returned to work, and workers in Dunedin, where 3% did, was not their opinion about the dispute, or their commitment to unionism, but that in Dunedin workers would be called ‘scabs’ by their fellow workers and in Port Chalmers they would not. Watersiders made decisions to become a strike-breaker, or not, in relationship to the workers around them.

The complex situation in Lyttelton further suggests that family and community relationships played an important role in determining who returned to work. In Lyttelton, there was considerable conflict among watersiders in the aftermath of the vote to return to work on 4 July. Those who had returned to work between 4 July and the official end of the dispute a week later were not quite ‘scabs’, but they did not receive a loyalty card. The list of workers who received loyalty cards from the Lyttelton branch and their addresses has survived. Although this list does not identify strike-breakers, and there is no comparable list of the pre-lockout membership, this list can be used to deduce information about strike-breakers. Approximately half of those who lived outside of Lyttelton received loyalty cards, while
about 90% of those who lived in Lyttelton received loyalty cards. Living in a port community made men much less willing to work as a strike-breaker.

Strike-breaking is usually explained as either an economic decision, or a result of ideological opposition to the strike or lockout. There is plenty of evidence of both ideology and economics affecting workers’ decisions to work as strike-breakers in 1951. Bassett argues that prior to the lockout it was already difficult for Wellington employers to find labour and that this contributed to the lack of strike-breakers in Wellington. In Auckland, where there was higher unemployment, strike-breakers were available. The union formed the Māori committee out of recognition of the economic reality that many Māori workers were available to act as strike-breakers. As ‘Lessons of the New Zealand Waterfront Dispute’, written in 1952, states: ‘While in the Auckland province four-fifths of Maoris [sic] still live in rural areas, the young people are drifting into the towns as a result of economic pressures.’ Ronald Belsham, the leader of the new Auckland Waterside Workers Union, had been in conflict with the leadership of the watersiders’ union, a characteristic he shared with at least one other worker on the Auckland waterfront. There was also intense economic hardship among workers who remained part of the dispute and plenty of conflict about how to fight it. At every port where a return-to-work vote was passed, workers returned in large numbers; there must have been workers throughout the country who wished to return to work, but would not do so ‘as a scab’. As Maureen Martin and Jim Gibson’s oral histories and William Price’s decision not to return to work demonstrate, the pressure not to work as a strike-breaker was maintained not just in union meetings, but in kitchens, living rooms, shops, pubs and Plunket rooms. In order to work as an individual strike-breaker in a port without a return-to-work vote, workers did not just need a reason to work on the wharf, but they also had to ignore any relationships they had with family members, neighbours and others who disapproved of ‘scabs’. The biggest predictor of whether or not watersiders worked as strike-breakers was not their economic situation or their beliefs, but the actions taken by workers around them.

Close study of the end of the 1951 waterfront lockout demonstrates the importance of expanding our ideas of historical actors past leaders such as Holland and Barnes. On 23 July 1951, Ray Stratton wrote to the Auckland branch of the waterside workers’ union, letting them know that he had taken other work a month earlier. His assessment that he must take other work was influenced by the costs he faced, but also by the realization that he would not work on the wharf again, because of the number of strike-breakers. Stratton and his comrades who took other work, or refused to do so, as well as those named on the carefully assembled scab lists, all played an important
role in the end of the 1951 waterfront dispute. Strike-breakers were the single biggest influence on the day-to-day decisions that rank-and-file workers made about the costs and risks of continuing the dispute. The events of 1951 were not a chess match between two teams that had control of their strategy: it was the decisions of the pawns on both sides that determined the result. Locked-out workers, potential strike-breakers and farmers with an interest in breaking the strike were connected by webs of relationships which influenced the decisions they took and the outcome of the dispute.

Victoria University of Wellington
NOTES

1 Dick Scott, *151 Days: History of the Great Waterfront Lockout and Supporting Strikes, February 15–July 15, 1951*, 50th Anniversary Facsimile Edition, Auckland, 2001, p.197. In this article, lockout and supporting strikes or dispute are used to refer to the entire industrial conflict, and lockout to describe the events on the waterfront.


7 Tom Bramble explores and responds to this historiography in his introduction to Jock Barnes’s autobiography: Bramble, pp.18–26.

8 Green, pp.146–9.

9 Green, pp.132–43.


12 Minutes of Meeting of Unions Directly Involved in Waterfront Dispute, 13 June 1951, Box 1, Vault 156, Barnes Papers, Auckland University Library (AUL).

13 Scott, *151 Days*, p.103.

14 Strike Returns, 26 April 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, Archives New Zealand (ANZ).
15 Hotere, p.78.
16 Hotere, p.81.
17 Hotere, p.79.
18 Strike Returns, 2 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
19 Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive & Chairmen of Committees, 6 April 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.
20 Maureen Fairey, Oral History Interview, 5 July 2010, Families and the 1951 Waterfront Dispute Oral History Project, author’s possession.
21 Minutes of Meeting of Unions Directly Involved in Waterfront Dispute, 13 June 1951, Box 1, Barnes Papers, AUL; Huntly Coalfields Oral History Project, Oral History Centre, ATL; ‘Many waterside strikers now in full-time jobs in various other industries’, 5 April 1951, Dominion, ADMO, 21007, 25/9/20/6 Part 1, ANZ; Report of Dave Patterson, Wellington, 1 April 1951, ADMO 21007, 25/9/20/12, ANZ; Report of E.G. Ward, Lyttelton, 1 April 1951 and Report of Duncan Wilson, Oamaru, 31 March 1951, ADMO, 21007, 25/9/20/2 Part 1, ANZ; Report Bluff, 2 May 1951, ADMO 21007, 25/9/20/3, ANZ.
22 Strike Returns, 29 May 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
23 NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Meetings of Executive & Chairmen of Committees, 27 February–10 July 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.
24 R.B. Jones to R. Jones, [1951], 94-106-11/04, Roth papers, ATL.
25 Telephone Message Detective Sergeant R. Jones, 11 May 1951, ADMO, 21007, 25/9/20/1, ANZ.
26 NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive & Chairmen of Committees, 23 June 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.
27 NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive & Chairmen of Committees, 23 June 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.
28 Strike Returns, 19 April 1951–12 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
29 Minutes of Meeting of Unions Directly Involved in Waterfront Dispute, 13 June 1951, Box 1, Barnes Papers, AUL.
30 ‘Department of Labour, ‘Final Return of Strike or Industrial Dispute’, Buller, 1951, AANK W 3285/7, ANZ.
31 Minutes of Meeting of Unions Directly Involved in Waterfront Dispute, 13 June 1951, Box 1, Vault 156, Barnes Papers, AUL.
32 Department of Labour, ‘Final Returns of Strike or Industrial Dispute’, Miners, 1951, AANK W 3285/7, ANZ.
33 Department of Labour, ‘Final Return of Strike or Industrial Dispute’, Ohura, 1951, AANK W 3285/7, ANZ.
34 Minutes of Joint Action Committee, 5 July 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.
35 NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive & Chairmen of Committees, 3 July 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.
36 NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive & Chairmen of Committees, 3 July 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.
37 NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive & Chairmen of Committees, 3 July 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.
38 NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Members Meeting, 4 July 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.
39 NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Members Meeting, 4 July 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.
40 Strike Returns, 1 June 1951–29 June 1951, AANK W 3285/7, ANZ; Report of E.G. Ward, Lyttelton, 5 June 1951, ADMO, 21007, 25/9/20/2 part 2, ANZ.
41 Strike Returns, 1 July 1951–12 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
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42 Strike Returns, 1 July 1951–12 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
43 Strike Returns, 1 July 1951–12 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
44 Green, p.146.
45 Strike Returns, 19 April 1951–12 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
46 Strike Returns, 19 April 1951–12 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
47 Bassett, p.100; Strike Returns, 19 April 1951–12 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
48 Strike Returns, 19 April 1951–12 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
49 G.E. Breeze to H.L. Bockett, 4 October 1951, AANK W3285 7, ANZ.
50 For example, Noel Woods, ‘Setting the Scene’, in Grant, pp.15–21.


62 The figures vary depending on who provides them. See ‘Lessons of the New Zealand Waterfront Dispute of 1951’, 1952, 94-106-10/3, Roth Papers, ATL; ‘Maori Wharf Workers Settle Differences’, *Sunday Star*, 18 June 1951, CAHV CH21, Box 73 1951/136/2 Part 1, ANZ.

63 Strike Returns, 8 May 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.

64 ‘Lessons of the New Zealand Waterfront Dispute of 1951’, 1952, 94-106-10/3; Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive & Chairmen of Committees, 19 April 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL; ‘Maori Wharf Workers Settle Differences’, *Sunday Star*, 18 June 1951, CAHV CH21, Box 73 1951/136/2 Part 1; Strike Returns, 8 May 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.

65 For example, ‘Freezing Workers Bulletin’, 26 June 1951, Roth Papers, 94-106-12/4, ATL.

66 Strike Returns, 19 April 1951–12 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ; Papers re strikebreakers, MS-Papers-8572-02, Scott Papers, ATL.

67 ‘Scab’, 9 July 1951, 90-295, Goddard Papers, ATL.


69 Parker.

70 The oral history projects held by the ATL Oral History Centre that discuss the dispute most fully include Shaun Ryan, Trade Union Oral History Project, 1998–9, OHColl-0478; Kerry Taylor, Trade Union 1951 Oral History Project, 1995, OHColl-0861; Cath Kelly, Trade Union Oral History Project, 1987–9, OHColl-0112; Robert Paton, Labour Movement Oral History Project, 1991 OHColl-0056; Jamie McKay, Huntly Coalfields Oral History Project, 1992. As well as over 50 interviews related to the dispute, the ATL Oral History Centre also holds materials from seminars and other public events that include participants’ memories of 1951, such as Confrontation ’51 Seminar, 2001 OHColl-0538. In addition to the interviews at the ATL Oral History Centre, this article uses interviews from the Families and the 1951 Waterfront Dispute Oral History Project, which comprises 15 interviews recorded by Grace Millar 2010–2011.

71 Vavuara Aukino, Oral History Interview, OHInt-0337-1, ATL Oral History Centre.

72 Burge, p.59.

Barron, p.229.


See for example, Ted Thompson Oral History Interview, OhInt-0112/3, ATL Oral History Centre; Tom and Pat Gregory Oral History Interview, 20 December 2010, Families and the 1951 Waterfront Dispute Oral History Project, author’s possession.


Barron, p.229.


See for example, Ted Thompson Oral History Interview, OhInt-0112/3, ATL Oral History Centre; Tom and Pat Gregory Oral History Interview, 20 December 2010, Families and the 1951 Waterfront Dispute Oral History Project, author’s possession.


Maureen Fairey Oral History Interview, 5 July 2010, Families and the 1951 Waterfront Dispute Oral History Project, author’s possession.


Burge, p.58.

Jim Gibson Oral History Interview, 14 March 2011, Families and the 1951 Waterfront Dispute Oral History Project, author’s possession.

Maureen Martin Oral History Transcript, OHColl-0458/1, ATL Oral History Centre.

The documents of this investigation have survived in the Nelson Districts Special Branch file about the dispute: ADMO, 21007, 25/9/20/5, ANZ. These examples also demonstrate a point Alessandro Portelli made about the oral origin of some written sources. Two are oral history accounts and the third comes from a police investigation. However, the account in the police file originated as oral accounts to police officers (told under a certain amount of duress). Alessandro Portelli, *The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History*, New York, 1991, p.51.


Steve Watene to the Chairman, [1951], 94-106-09/06, Roth Papers, ATL. Herbert Roth discusses this in some depth: Herbert Roth, *Wharfie: ‘From Hand Barrows to Straddles’: Unionism on the Auckland Waterfront*, Auckland, 1993. This article is, as the endnotes suggest, also deeply indebted to his work as an archivist.


NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Members Meeting, 13 April 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.

Melissa Williams’s work outlines both the importance and the success of this strategy for Māori in this period: Melissa Williams, ‘Factory-ing Workplaces into Māori History’, *Te Pouhere Kōrero*, 6 (2012), pp.5–26.

‘Maori Wharf Workers Settle Differences’, 18 June 1951, *Sunday Star*, CAHV CH21
Box 73 1951/136/2 Part 1, ANZ.
91 Strike Returns, 6 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
92 Strike Returns, 6 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ.
94 Johnny Mitchell, ‘Report of Acting Secretary, New Zealand Waterside Workers’ Union’,
February 1952, 94-106-10/02, Roth Papers, ATL.
95 [List of Watersiders], MB 550/38, Frank McNulty Papers, Macmillan Brown Library
(MBL), Christchurch.
96 Townsend, ‘From Bureau to Lockout’, p.14.; [List of Watersiders], MB 550/38, Frank
McNulty Papers, MBL; Strike Returns, 1 June 1951–1 July 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398,
ANZ.
97 See for example Norwood; Stern; Brown and Boswell.
98 Bassett, p.165.
99 ‘Lessons of the New Zealand Waterfront Dispute of 1951’, 1952, 94-106-10/3, Roth
Papers, ATL.
100 NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive & Chairmen of
Committees, 17 April 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL.
101 See for example Jenny Cameron [pseudonym], interview with Grace Millar, 17 April
2012, Families and the 1951 Waterfront Dispute Oral History Project; Maureen Fairey, interview
with Grace Millar, 5 July 2010, Families and the 1951 Waterfront Dispute Oral History Project;
Telephone message, From Detective Sergeant Jones to Police Headquarters, Wellington, 4 July
1951, Strikes: 1951 Strike General, ADMO, 21007, 25/9/20, ANZ.
102 Ray Stratton to R. Jones, 23 July 1951, Roth Papers, 94-106-11/04, ATL.