The representation of Germans as ‘Huns’ is indicative of the unprecedented mobilization of belligerent societies through 1914–1918 and, more specifically, the intense layering of meanings onto the designation of ‘enemy’. In the case of the Hun, these meanings revolved around the sense of a barbaric, bestial adversary who threatened the physical and moral foundations of civilization and the necessity or righteousness of opposing such a foe. By the end of the war such representations of Germany and Germans had become common currency across various countries. The spread of the representation reflects the active transmission of such presentations in propaganda as well as common reactions to German conduct which reached for visions of a civilized self against a barbaric ‘other’. However, whilst the Hun was something of a global figure, the use of such representations in New Zealand provides a case study of how transnational content was often tailored to suit the conditions and concerns of local cultural and political realities. Indeed, as well as fitting within wider dynamics, New Zealand’s First World War anti-Germanism might be meaningfully located within deeper anti-alien and racialist philosophies, with the wartime vintage reflecting a high degree of continuity with established anti-alien material.

This interpretation is a little different to the two broad philosophies that might be detected within existing studies of New Zealand’s First World War anti-Germanism. These philosophies are not necessarily mutually exclusive – several interpretations feature both – though they are largely orientated in opposing directions and possess distinctly different focuses. The first concentrates on actions taken after August 1914 and identifies the power of the wartime state and propaganda as driving forces for anti-Germanism. Jean King’s study of New Zealand anti-German activity notes that once the war began ‘the anti-German propaganda machine’ had ‘full reign’. The second considers the importance of events in the decades before the war’s outbreak and spotlights New Zealand’s engagement with, and within, frequently choppy Anglo–German relations. Wartime anti-Germanism thus appears as an intensified continuation of pre-war antagonisms. Andrew Francis’s recent work on the subject claims that from 1902 various elements of New Zealand
society, and ‘newspaper editors in particular’, ‘were busying themselves in creating a culture of suspicion of Germany’. This culture is seen as ‘laying the groundwork for a virulent anti-German campaign which was activated immediately after war was announced’.5

This article argues that a firm grasp of the roots and workings of wartime anti-Germanism requires a wider scope, and considers pre-war anti-alienism alongside shifts in New Zealand’s conception of Germans and Germany towards and into the war. It is argued that a German foe was often perceived through a conceptual lens which had been ground and polished before the war in reference to other perceived threats and that whilst the vision of a barbaric threat to civilization was not original, the perception of Germany through such a lens, more or less, was.

The German connection
Both of the established approaches provide important vantage points for wartime depictions of a Germanic foe during 1914–1918, and the roles of state measures and pre-war animosities provide a good entry point into the history and historiography of the subject. For instance, the case for an anti-German machine taking reign after New Zealand entered the war seems promising. During 1914–1918 legal strictures around aliens were tightened.6 An Aliens’ Board was established to inquire into the status, conduct and character of alien enemies in New Zealand.7 The 1917 Registration of Aliens Act represents a still more vigorous enquiry and led to the creation of a database of the number, location and background of New Zealand’s unnaturalized enemy alien population, allowing for better state control.8 Official powers were actively exercised in regard to German aliens. There were approximately 450 interned aliens on Somes Island in 1919.9 At an individual level, the von Zedlitz affair is often taken as a prime example of the wielding of state power and anti-Germanism.10 A professor at Victoria University who lacked formal British citizenship, George von Zedlitz was removed from his position through the 1915 Alien Enemy Teachers Act, which was enacted to ‘prohibit the Employment of Alien Enemies as Teachers in Public Educational Institutions’.11 That von Zedlitz was the only enemy alien who met the Act’s regulations and that the Act had been drafted specifically with him in mind would seem to magnify the charge of state persecution.

Furthermore, the sense of anti-Germanism as the result of a manipulative war effort might well cite the substantial media activity that circulated conceptions of the Hun. In this labour, local efforts were supplemented by overseas works that include some of the most graphic imaginings of international artists such as Louis Raemaeker and Norman Lindsey.12
Additionally, New Zealand’s links to the imperial cable network imported some of the most (in)famous propaganda stories of the war, including claims of the *Kadaververwertungsanstalten* – the corpse utilization factories that Germany was alleged to have established to render human corpses into butter and grease. While much of this production and dissemination was spontaneous, aspects of it were more systematically managed. A few weeks after the outbreak of war, Charles Masterman’s War Propaganda Bureau, at Wellington House in London, was distributing a wide array of articles, interviews, cartoons and photographs for overseas consumption.

Those considering the links between wartime behaviour and pre-war tensions within Anglo–German relations can also make a good case. To a large extent New Zealand inherited a German enemy, as any challenge to British economic and military power was taken as a de facto challenge to New Zealand’s interests. This threat perception was imported through various political and cultural channels and is indicative of the active cultural network between Britain and the Dominions. Imports of British news and invasion literature, which grew as a popular genre from 1900, touched on the idea of a German enemy. By 1913 the New Zealand Defence Department received reviews of the strategic situation which noted Germany as ‘our probable opponent in the next great war’. Developments in Anglo–German relations – the naval race, industrial competition, diplomatic sparring, invasion literature and the content of *Boys Own* – underpin much of the increase in New Zealand perceptions of Germany as a threat. Additionally, there was a significant Pacific dimension to New Zealand–German antagonism. For instance, German interests in Samoa, formalized by the 1899 Tripartite Convention, had frustrated New Zealand imperialists coveting that Pacific territory. Robert Stout noted that from 1885 onwards New Zealand had anticipated Samoa becoming a British territory and claimed ‘Samoa is their [New Zealand’s] Alsace’. This gives some context to the enthusiasm of some to capture German Samoa at the war’s outbreak.

Reprints of Anglophobic remarks from the German press and Kaiser Wilhelm II’s sabre-rattling did little to mellow sections of the New Zealand public’s perceptions of Germany. In Oamaru an Anti-German League was formed in 1902 and members pledged to boycott German goods, encouraging others to follow their example – and at least one other body, the Auckland Tailors’ Union, pledged itself to the cause. This might be seen as a less intense, but identifiable, version of the behaviour which would emerge later. The notion that a German presence was hostile, even threatening, to British interests was now established, if only on the fringes of public discourse. One correspondent in the boycott debates, ‘Britanicus’, noted that anyone who
selected English, Canadian or Australian manufacturers over German ones was a ‘Patriot’, ‘because every penny so spent will aid in the preservation of the industrial and international supremacy of our race’.21

As a result of German naval ambitions many saw Germany as a military, as well as a diplomatic and economic, challenge. Into the twentieth century British admirals began identifying Germany as the rising threat to British security: Sir John Fisher’s 1911 prediction that the war with Germany would begin on 21 October 1914 is eerie in its accuracy.22 The concern that British naval preponderance was being eroded was well reported in New Zealand.23 Continuing a policy of defence planning that depended upon British ability and willingness to defend New Zealand, Prime Minister Sir Joseph Ward launched an initiative to purchase a Dreadnought, HMS New Zealand, for the Royal Navy.24 In depicting this act, a 1911 pulp publication, Joe Ward Abroad, presented the Prime Minister as reprimanding the leaders of the Triple Alliance, who pout like scorned schoolboys. Ward declares that New Zealand’s support is a lesson that the Triple Alliance cannot compete with Anglo unity and suggests they knock off this ‘Mailed fist and Divine-Right-War-Lord-God sort of tommy-rot’. The episode concludes with Ward commanding the Kaiser to sign the ‘Magna Charta of Peace’.25

However, whilst top-down machinations and pre-war antagonisms offer meaningful context for wartime anti-Germanism, wider considerations complicate their explanatory power and neither offers a complete explanation. As will be seen, there must be some doubts about how obvious the notion of a Germanic foe was in the lead-up to 1914. Likewise, the premise of top-down actions as driving anti-Germanism should not obscure the fact that anti-Germanism was often spontaneous, decentralized and capable of mobilizing mass popular support. Rather than being reigned over by a dehumanized ‘machine’, state measures and official propaganda were facets of anti-Germanism, not the sum, or necessarily the driver, of it.

The popularist quality of New Zealand’s anti-Germanism is evident in the various ways in which numerous aspects of civil society engaged in anti-Germanism. Peter Lineham, for instance, has argued that churches felt the need to assure their parishioners of the nature of the war, including its cause, cost and righteousness.26 A consequence of this was the mobilization of religious rhetoric to envision the enemy. Reverend J. Gibson-Smith observed that ‘Germany today is the Lucifer of nations … already she has sold her soul to the powers of darkness … the real God of Germany today is Mars or Odin or Boal [sic]’.27 The demonization of Germany in the popular imagination was such that commercial interests actively rebranded products to avoid controversy and criticism, most famously rebranding ‘German sausage’
to ‘Belgian sausage’. Others saw anti-German sentiment as presenting commercial opportunities, selling war kitsch, such as the ‘inflatable dying Kaiser toy’ – in hopes of riding patriotic sentiment. Some businesses took the opportunity to argue the necessity of tariff reform for imperial preference. One such call reprinted a depiction of the German soldier in Belgium as an apelike monster with bloodstained hands brutalizing a woman and a child (figure 1). The presentation of Germany as an unchivalrous and primitive brute was confirmed by the accompanying message: “Look at this true to life representation of the temporary triumph of a fiendish, blood-glutted, bestial and perfidious foe … those bulging brawny sinews, so eloquent of brute force … were produced largely by a diet of British gold … Insist upon no purchase of yours encouraging any firm which would make an unpatriotic penny in such a loathsome way.”

Indeed, wartime assertions of Germanic villainy functioned as a powerful tool for social reformers and political activists eager to mobilize public opinion behind particular agendas. Thus prohibitionists presented alcohol interests as shaking the Kaiser’s hand and noted ‘the three unspeakables’ as ‘Liquor, Germans, and Turks’. At the same time, ‘wets’ noted a war for British liberties as including the right to a drink and aligned prohibition with German tyranny. Radical workers were depicted as aiding the Hun and dissent on the waterfront was tagged as the work of ‘waterside Kaisers’. Conversely, the *Maoriland Worker* presented the capitalist caricature ‘Mr Fat’ as outshining the Kaiser in the process of starving the common man. The Protestant Political Association promoted an alternative understanding of the outbreak of the war in which the ‘political chicanery’ of the Catholic Church was ‘an equally guilty party’. Other commentators emphasized German involvement in the Irish Easter Rising or perceived a German connection in the dissent displayed by Māori leaders Rua Kenana and Princess Te Puea.

The populist streak in New Zealand anti-Germanism operated quite independently of state designs. The internment of aliens, as it was carried out, was a more modest execution of public calls for a ‘clean sweep’ or to ‘intern them all’. Likewise, the case of the aforementioned von Zedlitz had taken place under intense public pressure and is indicative of wider forces than a draconian administration. Von Zedlitz himself noted in his memoirs that ‘the Government have done their best to protect me, but they are mostly a knock-kneed crowd … the trouble is due to members of Parliament wanting to pose before their constituents as democrats and patriots’. Major incidences of unrest occurred in Gisborne over New Year’s Eve and in Wanganui in May 1915 against the immediate news of the sinking of the *Lusitania* and of significant casualties from Gallipoli. Thousands of ordinary citizens
participated in the vandalism of German-owned, and suspected German-owned, businesses. In both cases police struggled to control the crowds and authority figures, appealing for order and fair play, were shouted down and pelted with stones.\(^{39}\)

Behind the visible mob demonstrations were quieter cases that highlight

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**Figure 1:** ‘The Lovers’, War Pictures and their Obvious Lesson, Christchurch, 1916, p.44
Source: F-116352-1/2, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand
more personal but no less spiteful activities. For example, in 1917 in the small town of Kurow, Anna Hardy was charged with vandalizing an Austrian neighbour’s house. Breaking windows, smashing furniture and killing hens, she caused an estimated £130 of damage. The owner returned to find a note tacked to the front door: ‘Clear out, you – Germans; if not we will burn you out.’ Someone did burn down the Rongotea Lutheran parsonage in the early hours of 2 July 1917, allegedly for a £25 bet. The captain of the steamer Pakeha took his crew to court for ‘refusing duty’ when they refused to work alongside German members of the crew. The case was thrown out with the remark that ‘no law-court would convict the men’. Press commentary on the incident added that ‘No loyal British community and no loyal colonial government would tolerate such a conviction were it legally possible.’ Numerous New Zealanders wrote to the authorities with accusations that German members of the community were engaged in various disloyal and dangerous activities, and archival records hold accusations of local Germans signalling to submarines, running wireless stations, spying, sabotaging and keeping homing pigeons. On 5 November 1918, with the war entering its last days, New Zealanders burnt effigies of the Kaiser, in a twist on the folk tradition of incinerating Guy Fawkes as the enemy to British order, just as they had on 5 November 1914.

The links between pre-war Anglo–German antagonism and wartime aggression are also complicated by wider perspectives. What was said about Germany through 1900–1914 should not be seen as inevitably leading to what was going to be said about Germany through 1914–1918. Arguably, the discontinuities, alternative historical conceptions of the Germanic and renegotiation of other discourses are equally revealing. Indeed, rather than representing the obvious precursor to wartime rhetoric, public discourse concerning Germany and Germans before 1914 was complex and contrasts vividly to some of the content and the single-minded certainty that appears after that year. Paul Kennedy’s landmark study of the rise of an Anglo–German antagonism during 1860–1914 begins by noting the unexpected nature of this development. Kennedy observes that at the start of the period, political co-operation and the absence of any history of military struggle stood beside ‘dynastic, cultural, religious and economic ties’. The New Zealand–German antagonism might be observed as following the same course, where co-operation and/or benign coexistence competed with rivalry and animosity.

Through the nineteenth century, and notably during the Vogel administration’s immigration and public works scheme of the 1870s, thousands of immigrants from German-speaking Europe travelled to New Zealand. Estimates of those settled between 1840–1914 range between 5000
The 1911 census records some 4015 as being born in Germany.\textsuperscript{46} Despite the wide range and the relatively low totals of these estimates, it appears that German-speaking Europe provided the largest migrant group from continental Europe and was, until 1945, the second-largest source of migrants after the British Isles.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, the difficulty of tracking the German presence in New Zealand is indicative of the description of German-speaking settlers as a ‘submerged group’ which tended to integrate readily into the dominant British culture.\textsuperscript{48}

Immigration aside, there were additional arenas for friendly and profitable contact and exchange. German ships and sailors in the Pacific in need of supplies and services brought funds into New Zealand ports. In 1890 the German Navy made its largest visit to New Zealand to resupply. Shore leave seemingly went well. The crew was noted for their ‘clean and smart appearance and exemplary conduct’.\textsuperscript{50} The Evening Post commented that ‘it can safely be said that the officers and men have … made themselves universally popular and formed friendships which both they and the citizens of Wellington genuinely hope to renew at some future time’.\textsuperscript{51} It should also be noted that the results of Boer War-era trade boycotts were underwhelming. New Zealand–German trade links, while never extensive, were growing in the 1900–1914 period. The value of New Zealand’s exports to Germany in 1914 (£456,163) was the highest then recorded and more than ten times higher than the 1908 figure (£40,191).\textsuperscript{52} Likewise, the value of seeds, superphosphates, dyes, toys, pianos, glassware and ironmongery imported from Germany increased steadily from a 1900 figure of £182,074 to peak in 1913 at £687,935 – but by 1918 this figure had plummeted to £684.\textsuperscript{53}

Lastly, and in a stunning contrast to some wartime commentary, notions of a natural amity between British and German civilization regularly appeared alongside reports of tensions or predictions of a coming war. This commentary often framed Britannic–Germanic rivalry as meaningless bickering that was destined to be overshadowed by harmony. It was a point that often drew upon the racial philosophies of the age and cited a Northern European / Aryan / Nordic connection to group British and German peoples together under a shared kinship. Such associations of the Britannic and the Germanic were aired by mainstream commentators right up to the outbreak of the war. Consider the position of the New Zealand Herald, whose editorial line would be so mobilized come wartime. In 1901 it was noted that ‘any differences we may have with Germany will be some day settled’.\textsuperscript{54} In 1905, while grievances were acknowledged, it was noted that ‘the perverse German is at his worst a caricature of what we are ourselves’ and that ill feeling would be overcome when the average German ‘refined his appetites and could enjoy
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A 6 by 8 by 1 inch cut of good red beef hot and underdone, with plenty of horseradish, instead of that barbaric sausage and sauerkraut’.\textsuperscript{55} As late as 1 August 1914, with Europe mobilizing for war, it was stressed that German immigrants were welcome, German cultural and intellectual achievements were admired and kinship should trump foreign policy: ‘British and German are one and the same.’\textsuperscript{56}

Pre-war precursors

Such commentary is worlds apart from the binary conceptualizations of Germany and Britain after the latter entered the war. This might return us to a sense of grand manipulation – that manipulators simply began the construction of a Hunnish enemy to mirror Germany’s new enemy status. However, the language and imagery that commentators reached for was not innovative. The notion of a barbaric enemy who stood outside the cultural/racial boundaries of western civilization possessed roots in New Zealand society and was exercised in reference to other targets before the outbreak of the war. Appreciating the established nature of this material may provide us a better context for wartime expressions and reactions.

These precursors are perhaps most evident in discourse around New Zealand’s relations with Asia, particularly in reference to migration and security. It has been suggested that the newness of British civilization in the Empire’s settler colonies lent intensity to ethnocentric conceptions of identity: ‘All the British Dominions (save Newfoundland) were far more aggressive and relentless [than Britain] with regard to any matter concerning race and ethnicity.’\textsuperscript{57} In its strange way, the prominence of philosophies of race in determining cohesion and identity, together with the often protean quality of said philosophies, could spur solidarity for some ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{58} European conceptions of the indigenous Māori as being worthy to bear the rights and obligations of British civilization often drew on assessments that Māori were culturally or racially similar to the British, that they were ‘Honorary Members of the White Tribe’.\textsuperscript{59} Māori were, the contemporary historian James Cowan noted, a people ‘whose love of the sea and pride in deeds of battle show strangely close affinity to some of the dominant traits of the Anglo-Saxon-Celtic race’.\textsuperscript{60} This thinking was even given a racial foundation in some considerations of Māori origins. The most famous example is Edward Tregear’s \textit{The Aryan Maori} (1885), which examined racial and linguistic evidence to make the case that Māori were a long-lost branch of the Aryan race, now reunited with the European strain.\textsuperscript{61} A case could also be made that such dynamics secured the Irish within the British/European camp. During a debate upon Chinese immigration, for example, Richard Seddon asserted
that ‘to compare the Irish with the Chinese was an insult to every Irishman in
the colony … there was about the same distinction between a European and a
Chinaman as that between a Chinaman and a monkey’.62

However, the obvious consequences of racially based boundaries of
inclusion, as evident in the above example, were assertions of who was
outside those boundaries. This is readily apparent in attitudes to Asia in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1896, during a debate in
Parliament, William Montgomery declared: ‘If this is going to be a colony
that we may be proud of, and which we hope our children will be proud
of, we should fearlessly say we do not want Chinamen to be here at all.’63
Montgomery was by no means alone in deeming the Asian migrants as a threat
to the vision of an ideal British civilization in New Zealand.64 Major themes
in such commentary presented Asian immigrants as threatening domestic
and economic prospects and invoked a non-adherence to Christianity, poor
hygiene, addiction to opium, sexual deviancy and miscegenation.65

The chauvinism captured in such discourse flared near the turn of the
century. Some of this was channelled into politicized societies, and between
1894 and 1907 four major anti-Chinese societies were formed: The Anti-
Chinese Association, the Anti-Chinese League, the Anti-Asiatic League and
the White Race League. Some individuals took more direct and extreme
action. The white supremacist Lionel Terry shot a Chinese stranger, Joe Kum
Yung, on a Wellington street in 1905. Terry claimed this act of violence was
a proclamation that he would not allow ‘my rights and those of my fellow
Britons to be jeopardised by alien invaders’.66 Comparable notions that
an Asian presence would threaten economic security and workers’ living
standards were aired by the trade unions.67 Thus Mark Fagan claimed, at the
1913 Labour Unity Conference, that ‘this country must be defended from the
industrial and moral degradation of the yellow races’.68 Mr Melling added that
alongside a military yellow peril was the peril of cheap non-white labour.69

As this suggests, others spoke of the need to arm against rising Asian
power and potential belligerence. Among the most prominent subjects was
Japan’s demonstration that it had weathered European imperial expansion
and that it aspired to become an imperial power in its own right. Between
1895 and 1910 Japan took Taiwan and Korea as colonies and achieved a
string of dramatic military victories against China and Russia that attracted
world attention. Ideas of an ‘Asian awakening’ mixed with concern around
the reduction of the Royal Navy’s presence in the Pacific and scepticism that
the 1902 Anglo-Japanese treaty offered a viable guarantee of New Zealand’s
security.70 Campaigning for defence reforms and the introduction of universal/
compulsory military training, the National Defence League made a regular
feature of potential threats from Asia: ‘And when the myriads of Asia, with their utterly alien civilisation, troop down upon us – as they will, certainly, should we remain defenceless – what will happen to our civilisation?’

The mainstream press voiced similar sentiments, and editorials noted the importance of Australia and New Zealand taking measures to defend themselves stressing the peril of facing a ‘flood of Asiatic barbarism’ without local preparations and the backing of the empire. The Canterbury Times visualized the same message, portraying Australia and New Zealand as babes in the Pacific surrounded by leering Asiatic ogres (figure 2). When the US ‘Great White Fleet’ visited Auckland in 1908 the welcoming Fleet Week celebrations saw perceptions of Anglo-Saxon contact and kinship juxtaposed with potential Asian belligerency. The pinnacle of such thinking seems to have been reached by the Hon. Mr Hornsby: “I am thankful that Uncle Sam has come into the Pacific to keep the yellow and brown men busy if there is to be any trouble … give me the Stars and Stripes before the Dragon or the Risen Sun. I would rather live in the most abject manner under Uncle Sam’s flag than I would tolerate the monkey-brand any time.”

As well as illustrating Ward’s single-handed defusing of Anglo–German tensions, Joe Ward Abroad depicted the Prime Minister as ‘the hope of the white race’ and as knocking out ‘the yellow peril’ in a bout. Another cartoon sketched General Sir Ian Hamilton’s 1914 inspection of New Zealand’s army, and depicts the General praising New Zealand’s troops as a bulwark against ‘the Japs’. The image, published 2 May 1914, gives some hint of the direction some threat perceptions were cast in the months before the Great War.

Clearly not all social embodiments of this xenophobia were as politicized and organized as the Leagues’, as extreme and violent as Terry’s, or as bellicose as Fleet Week rhetoric. ‘Yellow peril’ conceptions were never a standardized philosophy or policy, appearing more as a background vibration within the wider public sphere and transcending any simple class, political agenda or regional categorization. James Belich has noted that Sinophobia ‘did not stem from a class-specific fear of competition: workers were Sinophobic but so were bourgeois and intellectuals’. Belich’s interpretation also notes the non-systematic and relatively unradical forms this prejudice took: ‘New Zealand Sinophobia was no pogrom, and it was not constant. It rose in the 1880s, killed only one or two Chinese, though it marred the lives of thousands.’ Other historians note examples of racism towards Chinese immigrants as standing beside examples of empathy, support and communal solidarity.

The existence of these boundaries and the cultural meanings layered upon them provide some context for wartime expressions and sentiments. One study of anti-Germanism observes the pre-war fear that Chinese workers
were precursors of an invasion of Asiatic hordes as ‘ironic’ because ‘the belief that settlers were the vanguard of a pre-invasion force was the very criticism levelled at long-standing German settlers when the war broke out in 1914’.

Arguably, however, what is in play here is not so much irony as

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**Figure 2:** ‘The Babes in the Pacific’  
**Source:** Canterbury Times, 18 June 1913, p.1
the redirection of a cultural paradigm. Before August 1914 Germans were typically placed on one side of a cultural/racial boundary; the war saw a withdrawal of a sense of connection between the British and German peoples and a renegotiation of positions within the schema.

The Hun during 1914–1918
The climax of the July Crisis tipped the European balance of power and in its own peculiar way, the underlying concept of an enemy provided a measure of continuity and stability. Though some of the players were radically recast, the available roles remained largely unchanged. The Russian bogey, which had been among New Zealand’s key antagonists through the nineteenth century, was cast in a more familial light. Character sketches depicted ‘Tommy’s Russian brother’, ‘Johnny’ or ‘Ivan’ as simple, stoical people, and a typical example noted, ‘When pure and unmixed with Tartar blood, he is not unlike many of the men I have seen in the north and east of England.’ Likewise, the mud slung at a neutral, avaricious, possibly pro-German, United States was renegotiated after that country entered the conflict. Thereafter the unity of the English-speaking peoples was emphasized with the revisionist touch that the American War of Independence had not been a rebellion against British rule but an assertion of British liberty against the tyranny of George III, a German. Germany was recast in a role that emphasized established pre-war grievances as well as borrowing material applied to perceived pre-war threats.

Consider the way commentators conceptualized the Germanic as a monolithic force and Germany as an alien power whose deeds and intrigues showed it as outside the values, ideals and civilities of western civilization. Whilst the Kaiser and ‘Prussian militarism’ were often focal points of condemnation, and were sometimes cited as the root of the problem, more often than not denunciation or ridicule of these particulars were used as convenient proxies for the whole: ‘The attack of Germany upon civilisation has undoubtedly been made with an enthusiastic approval of the great mass of the German people.’ Indeed the punchline for one joke, wherein a ‘peacopathist’ provides the set-up that there are plenty of good points in Germans, was ‘The only good point I saw in the Hun was my bayonet.’ Furthermore, conceptions of monolithic foes tended to be coloured with established tropes. In 1908, whilst arguing the threat Asia posed, the National Defence League had called for goodwill between European civilizations. In regard to Germany it was noted, ‘we have no hostility to the German people … we admire their splendid qualities, their perseverance, their power of work, their love of truth, their immense contributions to science and industry, and,
above all, their patriotism and fine spirit of self-sacrifice'. These revered Victorian virtues – character, duty, order, rationality, progress and patriotism – presented Germany as familiar. Come wartime, Germany was shifted closer to the previous sentiments of the vices and threat posed by Asia.

Indeed, descriptions of Germany began to employ many of the qualities stereotypically ascribed to the Oriental mind – corruption, sly cunning, despotism, cruelty, debauchery, deception and irrationality. Given that the term ‘yellow peril’ is sometimes attributed to the Kaiser, the application of such descriptions to Germany could be considered as a case of being damned by your own rhetoric. One account explicitly noted that ‘Chinese and Prussians have certainly much in common’. These points of commonality are noted as including an instinct for industriousness, cultural chauvinism, a lack of diplomatic scruples and a willingness to break treaties, a latent capacity for cruelty, a lack of sense for democracy and an instinctive submission to autocracy.

In describing German atrocities, commentators reached for racialized language to express savagery in a manner that challenges James Belich’s claim that ‘with some exceptions, New Zealanders did not subject their twentieth century German and even Turkish enemies to racial denigration’. It was reported that ‘the veneer of civilisation covers the German officer and ranker no deeper than that of the Tartar, the Mongol or the Turk … The Germans are well named “the red Indians of Europe”’. Other editorials tagged Germany as possessing eastern or unchristian instincts. For example, the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of the Central Powers in October 1914 was interpreted by the Otago Daily Times as an unholy deal with a non-European, non-Christian power, something which was a ‘crime against the white races and against civilisation’. Racialized idioms also framed brave Allies against cowardly Germans. One supposed report of a soldier recalling his combat experiences noted that ‘Germans are yellow’, ‘that’s why you hear of one white soldier [emphasis added] taking a dozen German prisoners’. Two months after stressing blood-bound Anglo–German unity, the New Zealand Herald described Germans as ‘Mongolianised Europeans’.

Such abrupt recasting might tempt an invocation of Orwellian idioms: ‘we’ve always been at war with Eastasia’ comes to mind. However, the mechanisms which worked such shifts were not indicative of the systematic implementation of a coherent party line. Instead they represent an accumulation of instances where commentators acted in customary fashions: speakers and writers worked with familiar rhetoric and adjectives to articulate villainy, and cartoonists utilized the same practised techniques and tropes to depict adversaries and brutality. Likewise, audience reception of such presentations
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indicates a continued orientation towards ethnocentric notions of citizenship and the continued validity of ideas of racial character. However, the non-systematic nature of this process is also evident in how wartime damnations of Germany drew from wider sources than pre-war xenophobia. Alternative principles in arguing the case against Germany included liberal criticisms of Prussian autocracy and militarism as well as calls to defend international law, whilst visions of portly, bespectacled, craven Germans – more buffoonish than beastly – and animalized presentations of Germans as snakes, pigs or skunks provided alternative presentations of the enemy.95

Furthermore, making the manipulation of information and irrational bigotry the only subjects of explanation is parochial and ignores significant forces behind cultural presentations of Germany. Ultimately, demonizations of Germans as Huns made effective propaganda because they seemed to meaningfully encapsulate German conduct and address the genuine outrage that said conduct stirred.96

The deliberate targeting of cultural heritage – most notably the intentional burning of Louvain’s University Library (which held hundreds of thousands of books and irreplaceable collections of medieval, gothic and renaissance manuscripts and incunable) and the purposeful shelling of Rheims Cathedral – empowered visions of barbarians vandalizing the fruits of European civilization.97

The violation of Belgian neutrality, the sinking of civilian vessels (of which the Lusitania is only the best remembered) and the bombardment of British civilians in air and coastal raids added authenticity to images of a monstrous opponent who held contempt for civilized restraints. Atrocities in conquered territories – a record which includes the execution and massacre of some 6500 Belgian and French civilians (including women and children) and the creation of conditions responsible for the deaths of roughly 250,000 more – did much to affirm notions of an unchivalric enemy that targeted innocents.98

As Adrian Gregory puts it, ‘the press did not initiate the process of dehumanising the enemy; the German military and naval commanders did.’99

The persistent idea that racial lines formed the basis of Germany’s enemy status carried various consequences that might add to our comprehension of anti-Germanism in New Zealand. Indeed, sneers at German racial pedigree were, for some commentators, more than cultural munitions in the rhetorical arsenal and functioned as a fount of explanation as much as expression. The most studious sought to demonstrate this through racial science, and in the same way that Edward Tregear had negotiated the inclusion of Māori within the Aryan race, Germans were muscled out. Consider, for example, the findings of the British ‘ethnologist, philologist and author’ Lieutenant Colonel L.A. Waddell, that Germans were not racially Aryan or ‘even’ European. Instead Waddell concluded that Germans were ‘inexorably affiliated’ to
the ‘Alpine Race’ which is ‘essentially Turanian, from Central Asia, and of the same stock as the Huns and Turks’. This ‘discovery’ was circulated through New Zealand’s media network alongside the major components of Waddell’s thesis. According to Waddell, the racial distinction of Germans and Prussians was revealed though the shape of the head. Germans were ‘all round-heads or short-heads’ which contrasted to ‘the long heads of the British and Scandinavian peoples’. Next Waddell presented a linguistic analysis that concluded that the name ‘Ger-man’ or ‘Alle-man’ derived from its original meaning, ‘wolf-man’. It was noted that ‘Ger’, ‘Geri’ or ‘Garm’ was the chief wolf which attended upon Woden/Odin. Accordingly, this made Germans members of the ‘Wolf Tribe’, a distinction it was noted they shared with Attila the Hun. Finally, symbolic investigation was presented: it was noted that the double-headed German imperial eagle was not an eagle, but was instead ‘merely the conjoined pair of corpse-feeding ravens of Odin’. From this analysis Waddell concluded that Germans were a misplaced people who had taken on ‘a veneer of European civilisation’ which was now flaking away: ‘these interesting proofs of the non-European, non-Aryan ancestry of the German “Wolf Tribe”’ offered ‘explanations of the existence of a wild beast race in Europe’.

Waddell’s ‘findings’ represent the scholarly approach to racial slurs, and such efforts stand beside more casual conceptions of Germany’s enemy status as underwritten by blood and racial character. One editorial explained, for example, ‘It was long believed in Europe that the Prussian was a half breed, the bi-product [sic] of that vast wave of Mongolian invasion which rolled westward from Asia centuries ago.’ Another analysis noted: ‘Rumour has it there is a strain of Tartar blood in the Prussians … Certainly, the photographs of his Imperial Majesty do betray a Tartare [sic] likeness.’ Other commentators took the premise of Germany’s racial difference into other considerations. For example, Ida Boeufve, a Vice-President of the Women’s Anti-German League argued, with an attitude to miscegenation more commonly applied to ‘Asiatics’, that the British ‘race’ could not be kept pure ‘with this amount of cursed Hun blood’ in the country. Boeufve predicted that, unless Germans and Austrians were excluded, New Zealand would become ‘a country of hybrids – an un-English, spineless set of men, neither flesh, fish nor good red herring’.

Such rhetoric might be observed as consistent with Nicoletta Gullace’s presentation of the dynamics of wartime Britain in regard to conceptions of belonging and loyalty: ‘notions of fictive kinship, based on an imagined community of blood ties and racial stock, began to undercut the living bonds of neighbours, familial affection, and – though far less successfully
– marriage itself. In this process, a liberal notion of inclusion, based on law and individual rights, came under pressure from more popular and emotive concepts of belonging.¹⁰⁴ As with representations of the Hun, this dynamic reflects both shared and regional idiosyncrasies. In particular, distinctions between racial origins, nationality and loyalty are generally held to be more evident in Britain than in the Dominions.¹⁰⁵ For instance, the United Kingdom continued to grant naturalization certificates, and even naturalize German residents, through the war.¹⁰⁶ New Zealand suspended all applications for naturalization and in November 1914 war regulations defined enemy aliens as including ‘any person who has been naturalised in New Zealand and who would have been an enemy alien had he not been so naturalised’.¹⁰⁷

A strict interpretation of irreconcilable racial lines as forming the basis of friend and foe statuses – as evident in such statements as ‘every typical German has the same mania … [whether he] … lives in Auckland or in Berlin, in the palace or in the slum, he is one and the same’ – eroded the power of individuals to be known by their works, communal links or time spent in New Zealand (which in some cases could be measured in generations).¹⁰⁸ Indeed, the logic that ‘blood will tell … The Hun was always a mix of pig and tiger’ meant that naturalization signified either an attempted deception or, in a rather no-win fashion, a despicable treachery to one’s own.¹⁰⁹ As the populist New Zealand Observer put it:

A naturalised Briton, what folly is this,
A fig for such humour and vapour.
Is Satan made fit for the regions of bliss
By signing ‘a mere scrap of paper?’
[...]
A man who turns dog on the land of his birth
Is not to be trusted for sure;
An official-made pedigree, what is it worth?
Will it hold if the blood isn’t pure? ...
Be kind to the stranger who enters your gate,
But this is the gist of my sermon,
It is no good to juggle and tinker with fate,
A German is always a German.¹¹⁰

Such sentiments are apparent within some official attitudes. In October 1916 John Cullen, the Commissioner of Police, forwarded a memorandum noting that he was ‘of the opinion that no naturalised enemy subject should be employed by the Harbour Board, as I am satisfied that a German who goes through the form of getting naturalised does so merely to enable him to pose as a British subject so as to get employment, whilst he remains a German at
heart just as much as he ever was’.\footnote{111}

However, as with pre-war ‘yellow peril’ philosophies, such rhetoric was never coherently translated into systematic solutions. The German presence was never tagged as so unbearable as to motivate deportations, wholesale internments or pogroms, and aspects of New Zealand society demonstrated qualified interpretations of presentations of a monolithic racial foe. Germans immigrants found friends, colleagues and communities willing to vouch for their characters, and collisions over how much weight should be placed on racial heritage can be witnessed in various episodes over Government policy.\footnote{112} For instance, Prime Minister William Massey noted his sense of the limits of racial lines in determining loyalty: ‘there are Germans and Germans. There are Germans in New Zealand who are old settlers, who are naturalised British subjects, and I have reason to believe that even in the present crisis their sympathies are with Britain.’\footnote{113}

A further, and more specific, example of how impassioned notions of loyalty competed with more reasoned assessments can be witnessed in the Grierson affair. A young Englishman who had migrated to New Zealand in 1913, Alexander Hugh Grierson had spent some time in Germany before the war and had put his knowledge of the language to use as a clerk in the German consul’s office.\footnote{114} This connection, together with general gossip and an apparent remark on the formidable nature of the German army, was cited by the Women’s Anti-German League as revealing his German sympathies, and the League began to note or assume that Grierson was of German blood. Refusing to accept a commission of inquiry’s verdict of Grierson’s innocence – and, for the record, an English background going back some three centuries – the League continued to petition that Grierson be removed from the army. Indeed, the MP John Payne, who worked closely with the League, touted the unwillingness of James Allen (the Minister of Defence) to recognize the necessity of ‘purging the NZ Army of all whose presence in the ranks … is a danger to the successful prosecution of the war’ as an indication of his unfitness for office.\footnote{115} Again challenges to such interpretations are evident. Allen responded that judgement of Grierson was ‘entirely wrong and savours of persecution … you are at liberty to impugn my own loyalty to the very full, but whilst I am satisfied as to the loyalty of my officers I shall do nothing to injure them or their reputations’\footnote{116}

**Conclusion**

When the war ended, public culture had been flooded with anti-German messages for over four years. It is unsurprising that ideas so extensively employed in wartime continued as the guns fell silent. Being German sat
uneasily with the popular attitude that a German presence in New Zealand was an affront to wartime sacrifices, and various instances of enduring social animosity have been recorded. In late 1918 the War Legislation and Statute Law Amendment Bill was passed into law, requiring that persons of ‘enemy origin’ apply for a permit to purchase land in New Zealand. A person of ‘enemy origin’ was defined as one who had ‘at any time been a subject of an enemy state’ and included ‘the wife of any such person’.

However, the argument here has been that wartime anti-Germanism reflects deeper cultural dynamics. Indeed the renewal of German immigration in 1928 and the continuation of restrictions on Asian immigration might be read as a return to the pre-war order. Whilst a wartime Germanic ‘other’ did survive as a coherent interwar figure, it was also somewhat subsumed and superseded by other figures – Bolsheviks, radicals, revolutionaries, strikers and non-white foreigners – which inherited many of its features and functions. The political zeitgeist of the interwar years certainly reflects this trend. In 1919 the Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act was passed. This legislation empowered the Attorney-General to prohibit the landing of people deemed ‘disaffected or disloyal, or of such a character that his presence in New Zealand would be injurious to the peace, order and good government of the Dominion’. The text of the Bill specifically mentioned subjects of Germany and the (former) Austro-Hungarian Empire as belonging within this category, but debate suggests that Marxists, radicals and various ethnic groups were included within its margins. Xenophobic tendencies continued, intersecting with post-war concerns around economic slumps and notions that returned soldiers were losing work to coloured immigrants. In the 1930s civil servants were being issued with the fourth edition of Our Race and Empire. The text, originally published in 1926, covered the emergence and history of the British race and civilization. The section on New Zealand noted the Dominion’s ‘stern policy in regard to the admission of Asiatics’. This policy was noted as a response to ‘the fact’ that ‘European communities have found it impossible to assimilate successfully large bodies of Asiatics’ and the notion that a ‘big influx of Asiatics would lower the standard of living in the Dominions … to the detriment of the white workers’.

Furthermore, the ideas behind anti-Germanism adapted to the post-war environment. Studying the results of one collection of New Zealand newspaper articles on post-war Russia reveals the extent to which the ‘Bolshie’ antitype inherited many of the bestial, unchristian and ‘eastern’ qualities of wartime Germans (which had to some extent borrowed from pre-war Russophobia). Again the vision of a barbaric ‘other’, beyond standards of decency, chivalry and restraint, was used to make sense of the situation as Russia descended
into the chaos of revolution and civil war. An intermediary/association stage can even be identified in the final months of the war. Thus during the 1918 Wellington central election, voters were informed – via the independent Labour and Protestant candidate M.J. Mack – that a vote for the Labour Party candidate Peter Fraser was a vote for ‘the Bolsheviks, their programme and methods (made in Germany)’. Likewise, John Blomfield depicted a brutish Bolshevik barbarian with bloodstained hands, dragging a woman (drawn in the same style as poor abused Belgium), inheriting the German position as chief agent for German culture in the east and as competing with the devil (figure 3). Old and new enemies were blurring whilst underlying conceptions remained remarkably static.

Appreciating this assists us in recognizing that wartime anti-Germanism is symptomatic of more than just an escalation of pre-war tensions or the launch of a propaganda campaign. Rather, it signifies how cultural comprehension of a German enemy was augmented as notions of a barbaric and alien threat were appropriated against a new target. Even specific aspects of the discourse – a showdown between civilization and barbarism, an enemy who operated as a horde, the place of race in explanations of behaviour – were cut from existing
cloth. Recognizing the underlying, established nature of these conceptions might give some insight of their relationship with wider society and help us understand the power these conceptions possessed within New Zealand society circa 1914–1918.

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NOTES

1 The author would like to thank Professor Tony Ballantyne and the two anonymous reviewers for their comments and advice on earlier incarnations of this article.

2 In a sense this motif of Germanic barbarism contrasts rather neatly with the dominant themes of German Anglophobia which damned Britain as a degenerate civilization rotted by superficial materialism, the rule of Mammon, English liberalism, bourgeois values and ‘Jewish ideals’. See Peter Watson, The German Genius: Europe’s Third Renaissance, the Second Scientific Revolution, and the Twentieth Century, New York, 2010, pp.531–45 and Mathew Stibbe, German Anglophobia and the Great War, 1914–1918, Cambridge, 2001.


7 Hawera & Normanby Star, 9 June 1915, p.8.

8 New Zealand Statutes (NZS), 1917, 12, pp.64, 66.

9 Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1919, H-33, ‘Prisoners of War at Somes Island’, p.2. Lesser numbers were also interned on Motuihi Island and Ripapa Island (also known as Ripa Island).


15 The cultural dimensions of this network are investigated in Felicity Barnes, New Zealand’s London: a Colony and its Metropolis, Auckland, 2012 and form a major subject within James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders From the 1880s to the Year
For instance, classic examples of invasion literature were serialized in New Zealand newspapers. These include the *Battle of Dorking in the New Zealand Herald* through July 1871 and *The Invasion of 1910* in the *Canterbury Times* through May 1906. For the cultural influence of news in maintaining a British World, see Potter.

‘Defence scheme, expeditionary action by territorial force, August 1912–June 1913’, R3885320-AAYS-8647-AD10-7-16/6, Archives New Zealand.

For an argument of this case in regard to boy’s literature see Andrew Francis, *Willingly to War: British and Imperial Boys’ Story Papers, 1905–1914*, *Notes Books Authors*, 10 (2007).


* Nelson Evening Mail*, 22 January 1902, p.2; *Press*, 17 January 1902, p.5; *Hawera & Normanby Star*, 22 January 1902, p.3.

*Wanganui Herald*, 15 January 1902, p.3.


*Southland Times*, 6 November 1914, p.3.

*Dominion*, 1 September 1915, p.1.

Anti-German Trade Campaign, *War Pictures and Their Obvious Lesson*, Christchurch, 1915, p.44.


*New Zealand Free Lance (NZFL)*, 3 September 1919, p.3.


For examples of groups calling for more systematic interment see Graham Hucker, ‘Bundling out the Hun; the Women’s Anti-German League in New Zealand during the first world war’, MS-Papers-5163, Alexander Turnbull Library, pp.13–17.

von Zedlitz, p.17.


Ibid.
40 Truth, 19 May 1917, p.5.
42 NZH, 26 September 1914, p.6.
44 See New Zealand Farmer, December 1914, p.vii and March 1919, p.376.
45 Kennedy, p.xi.
47 New Zealand Census, 1911, p.179. The 1911 census was the last census taken before the war.
51 EP, 10 December 1890, p.2.
52 New Zealand Official Year Book (NZOYB), 1920, p.135; NZOYB, 1910, p.283.
54 NZH, 2 January 1901, p.4.
55 NZH, 9 September 1905, supplement, p.1.
56 NZH, 1 August 1914, p.6.
58 This is further considered in James Belich, ‘Myth, Race, and Identity in New Zealand’, NZJH, 31, 1 (1997), pp.8–22.
62 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), 1880, 36, p.97.
63 NZPD, 1896, 92, p.380.
64 Continuing the theme of Asian immigrants as a hazard that should be avoided, one cartoon grouped depictions of Chinese coolies alongside rabbits, stoats and weasels under the title ‘imported pests’; New Zealand Observer and Free Lance, 16 April 1887, p.8. For further examples see Ip Manying and Nigel Murphy, Aliens at My Table: Asians as New Zealanders See Them, Wellington, 2005.
67 Belich, Paradise Reforged, pp.143, 216–44.
68 James Milburn, ‘New Zealand’s First Experiment with Compulsory Military Training
A GERMAN IS ALWAYS A GERMAN? 75


69 EP, 11 July 1913, p.11.


71 Defence, 28 March 1908, p.6.

72 NZH, 14 May 1914, p.6.

73 Canterbury Times, 18 June 1913.

74 NZPD, 1908, 143, p.589.

75 Hiscocks, p.33.

76 NZFL, 2 May 1914, p.20. This image may be based on General Hamilton’s alleged remark that ‘the Pacific would be a possible battle ground between Asiatics and Europeans’. See Otago Daily Times (ODT), 21 May 1914, p.8.

77 Belich, Paradise Reforged, p.229.

78 Ibid.

79 See Moloughney and Stenhouse.

80 Francis, To Be Truly British, p.45.

81 Glynn Barratt, Russophobia in New Zealand 1838–1908, Palmerston North, 1981.

82 EP, 4 January 1915, p.3.

83 Grey River Argus, 4 July 1918, p.2. This presentation of US/British relations as representing the assertion of shared ‘civilisational principles’ can also be seen in a British context. See David Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda in First World War Britain: the National War Aims Committee and Civilian Morale, Liverpool, 2012, pp.142–7.

84 NZH, 7 November 1914, p.6.

85 NZO, 10 April 1920, p.18.

86 The text continues ‘we believe that the British and German peoples can and should exist in friendship and sympathy, founded upon a common race, philosophically speaking, a common language, to say nothing of their pursuit of the same great objects in the progress of humanity.’ Defence, 28 March 1908, p.12.

87 A further case of being damned by your own words might be seen in the designation of Germans as ‘Huns’. This label is sometimes noted as drawing from a recollection of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s own comments that the German expeditionary corps dispatched to put down the Boxer Rebellion should ‘behave like the Huns under Attila’.

88 NZH, 24 October 1914, supplement, p.1.


90 Feilding Star, 27 August 1914, p.2.

91 ODT, 12 October 1914, p.6. Accusations of ‘betraying the white race and western civilisation’ were reciprocated by German commentators who condemned British and French uses of non-white troops against Europeans. See Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14–18; Understanding the Great War, translated by Catherine Temerson, New York, 2000, pp.150–4; Stibbe, pp.38–44.


93 NZH, 24 October 1914, supplement, p.1.

94 The idiom references Orwell’s depiction of Oceanian society in 1984 where representations of the enemies are utterly manipulated to present them as absolute and eternal foes. This is despite the reality that alliances within the perpetual war regularly shift. The populace is thus required to regularly forget and reinvent history. ‘The enemy of the moment always represented absolute evil, and it followed that any past or future agreement with him was impossible.’ ‘Oceania was at war with Eastasia: Oceania had always been at war with Eastasia.’ See George Orwell, 1984, London, 2000, pp.36, 189.

95 Typical examples can be found in the Pepperell Album held in the Alexander Turnbull
There is still a persistent tendency amongst studies of British propaganda to add quotation marks or ‘alleged’ to references to German ‘atrocities’, presumably to indicate that the author is not uncritically imbibing depictions of ‘babies on bayonets’. Often such propaganda is held to tell us more about its producers than its subject and is discussed with the insinuation that it represents a pure exercise in duplicitous inventions to stoke public outcry. For an example see Keith Crawford, ‘When the English Began to Hate: The Manufacture of German Demonisation in British School History Textbooks 1900–1930’, History of Education Review, 38, 1 (2009), pp.54–62. Too often such approaches are not accompanied with any indication of awareness of actual German atrocities and the genuine outrage they stirred.

99 Gregory, p.69.
100 Thames Star, 18 July 1917, p.4.
101 NZH, 24 October 1914, supplement, p.1.
102 ODT, 25 November 1914, p.8.
103 New Zealand Times, 23 June 1916, p.4. For additional background on the League see Hucker, ‘Bundling out the Hun’.
105 Saunders, pp.28–29.
106 Francis, To Be Truly British, p.74.
110 NZO, 29 September 1917, p.9.
113 He went on to say: ‘A man is known by his work and if a man offers to go to the front as a member of the Expeditionary Force and at the same time contributes to the Patriotic Fund, I think, that is proof of where his sympathies lie.’ NZPD, 1914, 171, p.140.
114 For further background see Hall, p.7 and Johnson, p.88.
115 ‘Minister of Defence-Anti-German League, circulars etc’, R22319681- ADBQ-16145-ALLEN1-8-D4/70, Archives New Zealand. Further notions of conspiracy were advanced in The Truth about the Grierson Inquiry, Wellington, 1916 [?].
116 Ibid. A further and similar case can be witnessed around Private W.P. Nimot, a young man of naturalized German parents who enlisted and then deserted his post to join the enemy lines. The affair was cited as indicative of how blood and loyalty ran the same way and of the need to protect against potential spies and fifth columns in New Zealand. For additional details see Christopher Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell: New Zealanders and Military Discipline in the First World War, Auckland, 1991, pp.77–90.
118 NZS, 1918, 10, pp.77–93.
119 Belich, Paradise Reforged, p.224.
121 NZPD, 1919, 185, pp.825–31.
125 EP, 28 September 1918, p.3.