

Nation and Migration

POSTCOLONIAL PERSPECTIVES



IN THE APTLY-TITLED *NATIONALISM* (1997), a book completed just two years before his death, the philosopher and critic Ernest Gellner argued that nationalism should be understood as ‘a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond’.¹ He went on to suggest that ‘[w]hatever principles of authority may exist between people depend for their legitimacy on the fact that the members of the group concerned are of the same culture (or, in nationalist idiom, of the same “nation”)’.² This article attempts to disentangle — and to some extent, prise apart — the idea of ‘the nation’ and historical narratives of migration in the context of Aotearoa/New Zealand. It takes Gellner’s definition of the nation and addresses the following questions: What is the relationship between migration and the nation? More particularly, do histories and historical narratives of migration *reinforce* or *undermine* the nation? The article takes a generally discursive and historiographical approach, taking into account how, in New Zealand, the connections between migration and nation are further complicated by the rhetoric of biculturalism, the intervention of postcolonial perspectives and the existence of transnational practicalities.

The frame of reference adopted in this article is informed by an explicit postcolonial historical methodology, by which I mean an approach which engages in a critical re-reading of the past from the perspective of the twenty-first century.³ Perhaps not surprisingly, a postcolonial approach towards history prioritizes the project of colonization. This priority should not be read as endorsing or condoning the policies, practices and institutions enmeshed in the colonial project which have given (and continue to give) colonization local meaning and relevance. Rather, postcolonial interventions aim to destabilize, deconstruct and even undermine this project. It is worth pointing out here, too, that the term ‘postcolonial’ is not intended to mystify the past or to signal an end-point to colonization. On the contrary, the use of this term indicates awareness of the excesses of colonization and an acknowledgment of its enduring legacies. The value of a postcolonial approach to historical scholarship is that it offers a conscious political perspective, an attitude which assumes that colonization is not a relic of the past or a phenomenon of history, but an ongoing and continuing process. With its scepticism of claims to conformity and its suspicion of master narratives — fundamental assumptions which reify and endorse the idea of the nation — a postcolonial method offers a useful way of unpicking the relationship between nation and processes of migration.

But who — or what — is the nation? In the broadest sense, the term refers to a group of individuals usually (but not always) living in a defined and recognized geographical place. The term ‘nation’ is also used, as Gellner has noted, either by extension or metaphor, to describe any group promoting some common

interest or identity. The nation is, as many scholars have argued, largely a modernist nineteenth-century Western ideal; a vestige of global expansion and empire-building as well as a product of modernity and capitalism at a particular stage of historical development.⁴ The nation may also be seen as a discursive construct; a rhetorical artifact translated into actuality *usually* by rites/rights of citizenship, *frequently* by geography (land/whenua/place) and *increasingly* by legal and constitutional jurisdictions. But perhaps the most ubiquitous use of the phrase ‘the nation’ is its employment as an alibi for the nation-state. The nation-state can preserve and guarantee the existence of the nation, police its distinct identity and provide a territory where those practices recognized as typical of the national culture and ethos remain dominant. In addition, most nation-states appeal to cultural and historical myths to justify their past, present and future existence.⁵ Nations have, therefore, adopted various signs, symbols and motifs to assert their distinctiveness from other nations. Such assertions may be found through the forms of language, music, literature, folklore, mythology and even religion. Individuals, as members of a nation, are thought to exhibit national values and share in the nation when, for example, they participate in a collectively acknowledged ‘national pastime’. This aligns with Benedict Anderson’s frequently cited reading of the nation as an ‘imagined community’: a definition that in large part relies on individuals believing themselves to be constituent parts of the whole national ‘body’.⁶ Finally, the simplest working definition of the nation comes from historian Eric Hobsbawm, who described it as ‘any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a “nation”’.⁷ While this last reading of the nation prioritizes the ways in which people define *themselves*, it is worth remembering that nations are, of course, also defined by other, external factors and imperatives.

Given the above renditions of the nation — which might seem natural and even innate — why should we single out this idea for critique? What are the problems with the nation and why does the nation now demand scholarly attention? The reply to these questions is that appeals to ‘the nation’ and ‘national identity’ (and by extension ‘nationalism’) have in recent years been found seriously wanting. This concern has been most strongly articulated by scholars who see ‘the nation’ and its emphasis on a singular identity as politically untenable, practically unenforceable and increasingly out of date.⁸

From a postcolonial perspective, the idea of the nation with regard to history and history writing is deeply problematic. Postcolonial historians argue that the nation-state’s emphasis on homogeneity rather than difference, the assumptions around the indivisible nature of power relative to the nation, and its relationship with constitutional ‘bounded-ness’ further underwrites the dominance of the nation. Postcolonial scholars, from Edward Said through to Dipesh Chakrabarty, have argued that the nation is largely a product of colonial chauvinism and aspirations towards global expansion.⁹ In the new critical histories which have blossomed in the wake of the ‘imperial turn’, the nation has also been increasingly exposed as a falsely homogeneous entity; again this is largely due to the nation’s insistence on normative practices and intolerance of difference.¹⁰ The phrase ‘imperial turn’ — itself a product of postcolonial

impulses — has been coined to describe the relatively recent revisionist trend in imperial (and particularly British) history. As Antoinette Burton has suggested, this change of direction may be succinctly defined as ‘the accelerated attention to the impact of histories of imperialism on metropolitan societies in the wake of decolonization, pre- and post-1968 racial struggle and feminism in the last quarter century’.¹¹

In addition, a focus on the nation can make history rather insular and inward-looking. Ann Curthoys has written of national histories in Australia: ‘[they] generally tend to focus on what is distinctive about the history of the nation, what seems to hold it together... . There is an implicit assumption, that this — the discovery of what makes a nation, a people distinctive — is the task of national history, rather than a focus on what is shared with histories and societies elsewhere’.¹² Marilyn Lake has also noted that the writing of history is, and always has been, ‘complicit with, and constrained by, modern nation-building’.¹³ Certainly, history writing has tended to endorse and empower the nation and nation-state. Scholars in North America have also been grappling with these issues. Don Doyle and Marco Pamploma’s recent work locates the ideas of nation and nationalism in the Americas in much broader contexts,¹⁴ while Thomas Bender’s scholarship unpicks various longstanding assumptions around ideas of American exceptionalism and the idea of the American nation.¹⁵

The nation has not only been exposed as a remnant of nineteenth-century colonial ambition, testimony to narratives of progress and exploitations: it is also a colonizing tool.¹⁶ In New Zealand those who have been adversely affected by colonizing processes and those who see history through other interpretive and cultural frames may well see the nation as a particular Pākehā construct from which they feel excluded or within which they feel marginalized. At best, therefore, the nation may be defined as an historical category and a matrix through which to view and explain the past; at worst, it is understood as being implicit in continuing, rather than addressing, the colonial project.

In response to these challenges, postcolonial critiques have recently focussed on transnationalism (or the adoption of transnational perspectives) as a way of teasing out the inherent problems with the nation. Transnationalism signals an approach that has been successively described as blending elements of ‘comparative’, ‘international’, ‘world’ and ‘global history’ perspectives. While there are important distinctions (and disjunctions) between these particular approaches, they are characterized by a common desire: the impulse to eschew the nation-state as the principal category of analysis. In particular, these approaches seek to question and undermine the ethnocentrism that once dominated the writing of history in the West. A transnational approach to history therefore tends to focus on the shared ties and common features across, above and beyond national boundaries.

Transnationalism has, in other historiographies, been touted as a way to deconstruct the nation and so challenge its status as the central organizing device in explaining and making sense of the past. As Catherine Hall has argued, ‘A focus on national histories as constructed, rather than given, on the imagined community of the nation as created, rather than simply there, on

national identities as brought into being through particular discursive work, requires trans-national thinking'.¹⁷ Recently, scholars such as Sheldon Pollock and Dipesh Chakrabarty have considered how individuals can exist as part of the centre and periphery at the same time.¹⁸ On the other side of the coin, what might be called 'transnational realities' threaten to weaken the hegemonic claim of the nation. This is borne out by the movement of peoples, economic and political networks, cultural trafficking and of course, the internet. This does not mean that transnationalism is simply 'globalization in disguise', for it emphasizes the interconnections and links which act horizontally as well as vertically.

New Zealand historical research and scholarship is becoming more transnational, both in direction and emphasis. It is rapidly reconnecting with world history in terms of practice, methodology and content. As well as working collaboratively with historians elsewhere, historians in this country (and of this country) are retracing the connections that have always existed between New Zealand and the wider world. This means looking at the international networks, within the Commonwealth and the British-speaking world, and recognizing New Zealand's participation in various transnational networks, such as missionizing efforts, prohibition, suffrage and the labour movement. To a large extent, New Zealand's geographical isolation has been over-emphasized in the past; in particular, our distance from established economic markets and the centre of various empires. New Zealand *is* geographically isolated. It was, after all, the last habitable land mass on earth to be colonized by human beings. And it is fair to say that isolation was more keenly felt in the nineteenth than the twentieth century: air travel, the internet and other new technologies have since made the world smaller and, to a certain extent, 'flatter', to paraphrase Thomas Friedman's best-selling book of the same name.¹⁹ But New Zealanders have long participated in transnational 'webs' of empire and transnational networks.²⁰

As a genre, 'transnational history' assumes a comparative approach, principally because it takes a contemporary concept that many people understand — the nation — and seeks to address moments in the past that were analogous to the present. This is where migration and the nation find a connection. For some time, migration histories — whether free or forced migratory processes — concentrated on the impact of migration on either the destination or the place of origin. By introducing a transnational dimension, however, historians can examine the impact and reasons for migration at both the point of departure *and* the place of arrival. Moreover, such studies have usefully addressed a range of factors which help explain the previously little-acknowledged reverse migratory processes; the return of migrants to their land of origin.²¹ It is here that transnationalism is particularly relevant to critiques of migration. In this context, the nation occupies an ambivalent and contested space. The migration and movement of peoples across national boundaries and borders challenges the static nature of those boundaries; by literally permeating them, the movement of peoples fracture the nation (as an homogeneous unit). If the nation is regarded as a politically and constitutionally recognized entity, then the practical acts of migration clearly undercut the nation's claims to dominance.

Arguably, the field of scholarship where both national and non-national frameworks are clearly and explicitly prioritized and highlighted is that of migration. Within the domain of this historiography, there are many works which centre on New Zealand as a destination; where the movements of peoples to New Zealand and their experiences here are the main issues.²² In these texts, the main focus is on New Zealand society and culture; the country of origin is treated as more or less background or a preface to the main story. In other words, the real story begins once the migrants arrive at their destination. According to this paradigm, migration and colonization occupy separate spheres and thus separate histories. Adopting a transnational approach, however, reveals how migration has (in settler societies) been a part of the colonizing process and that immigrants have in turn been affected by processes of colonization. As noted above, a transnational approach also shifts the emphasis to countries of origin, locating the histories of immigrants in other national histories and considers the connections between those societies.²³ So, Irish migrants are understood *both* in terms of Irish history and New Zealand historical experiences, and so on. Transnationalism emphasizes the diasporic elements of migration narratives.

However, the *promise* of transnational processes such as migratory movements weakening and destabilizing 'the nation' founders at a very particular juncture: the rights of citizenship embodied in the passport. Radhika Vivas Mongia argument for Canada is relevant for New Zealand too: '[t]o suggest that the passport is a technology that nationalizes bodies along racial lines is, therefore, to track the itinerary of a process of subject production where both terms, "nation" and "state" are implicated in discourses of race'.²⁴ The passport is not only a necessary document facilitating movement across international borders, it is also used for restricting, monitoring and tracking the movement of visitors/aliens within the bounded territory of the nation-state.²⁵ David Pearson has taken a similar approach in his study of citizenship, where he argues that among the histories calcified in the story of the modern passport there is a history of difference.²⁶

In New Zealand, the relationship between migration and the nation is further muddled by the rhetoric of biculturalism, alongside claims for alternative ways of seeing and understanding the past. In New Zealand there may well be many 'nations', according to Gellner's definition; yet despite claims about recognizing diversity ('bicultural or multicultural') there is *still* one recognized nation-state. Even the Waitangi Tribunal, in its most critical reports, has argued this case.²⁷ The Treaty of Waitangi is now widely considered as New Zealand's de facto constitution. It promised a sort of bifurcated vision of the future, providing for both parties; although the English language version has been 'historically' dominant, the Māori language version is now being accorded legitimacy.²⁸ But in terms of understanding 'the nation', the Treaty might be seen as a sort of limiting instrument, and a tool of control and submission rather than one promising possibilities. Many iwi might rightly consider that once Treaty breaches have been dealt with, with recompense and apology given to them, the Treaty is a 'dead letter' and they can move forward to a new free-market future. Biculturalism, too, is a highly seductive term: it promises liberation by respecting difference, but in reality it can be a sort of

ideological straitjacket. Many criticisms have been levelled at what we might term the 'bicultural project', not the least its insistence on binary difference, contestability and, for some, exclusivity.²⁹

The emphasis on biculturalism 'meaning' or being defined as the relationship between Māori and the Crown has to a large extent obscured the degree to which the primary contract that is the Treaty of Waitangi exists between tangata whenua and tauwi, a much more inclusive model. Clearly, modern claims to plurality would suggest that 'the nation' as a composite, singular and united body is a fiction. Similarly, claims for self-determination — articulated since the arrival of Pākehā on these shores and accelerated after the signing of the Treaty — remind us that sovereignty need not be indivisible. There are other ways to conceive of holding and sharing power. At the constitutional level at least, the *idea* of the nation in New Zealand is up for debate.

Given this, what are the implications for writing 'New Zealand' in migration histories? We might say that where the nation is relevant, people operate above and below it; for instance, at local and regional levels. Nation is just one of a number of associational structures that shape the lives of individuals or are shaped by them.³⁰ The nation is not the overriding or dominant factor, but ought to be understood alongside class, gender, race, community, iwi, family, ethnicities and so on. All of these, it ought to be noted, operate across as well as against the nation. The challenge for historians in particular is that the nation can be easily rhetorically mobilized; it can be readily co-opted for political, jingoistic and patriotic purposes.

Yet despite (or perhaps, in spite of) academic scepticism of the kind outlined above, the nation has a surprising durability, both in terms of public discourse and institutional practice. Antoinette Burton has pointed to this inconsistency and paradox; that is, the inadequacy but *indispensability* of the nation.³¹ Burton rightly argues that irrespective of academic and scholarly critiques of the idea of the nation, obituaries for the nation are quite premature.³² It is fair to say that, across the former 'British world', claims shoring up the nation's durability and relevance have multiplied in response to recent postcolonial critiques. While we may wish to jettison the nation, in an intellectual sense at least, its existence has been woven into the fabric of our society and thoroughly contaminated our way of seeing the world. We are, it would seem, still the products of our past.

For historians, too, the desire to entirely abandon the nation or escape its clutches is riddled with ambivalence.³³ As a number of scholars have recently shown, the nation has been a central metaphor in the writing of New Zealand for well over a century. The work of Chris Hilliard, Fiona Hamilton, Miranda Johnson and Jacob Pollock, in particular, has shown how the past has been shaped to accommodate and reinforce a collective national identity and one where Pākehā might be seen as the instruments of change in the search for establishing New Zealand as a nation.³⁴ The nation is (and remains) a central and useful organizing device, a default way of thinking about how we order and understand the past. A national focus in our historical narratives can also be convenient. It guarantees a wide readership in terms of audience and aligns with trends in public history writing in particular, which often take national themes as their mainstay; for example, in heritage conservation, war history

and cultural tourism. Efforts to escape from the framework of the nation as a way of understanding New Zealand history are thus fraught with paradox.³⁵

For all New Zealanders — Māori and Pākehā, tangata whenua and tauwiwi — the past is not a foreign country; it is with us still. The engine-room of our *shared* history, when it was formed and how it was shaped, is the nineteenth century; so in this context, colonization is a major narrative. This is a fundamental premise of a postcolonial approach to history. Postcolonial perspectives on the nation have the potential to confuse and unsettle the relationship between the nation and migration. However, as noted here too, there is something of a begrudging acceptance among postcolonial scholars that however much we might wish to completely eliminate the nation from our frames of historical reference, it is embedded in realities and thus survives. It is all very well for scholars of Indian history to argue for the death of the imperial nation, but in New Zealand, has 'our' Raj come to an end?

The resilience of the nation validates the need for its ongoing interrogation. Moreover, perhaps the point is not to replace one explanatory framework with another — 'out' with the nation and 'in' with transnationalism — but to accept that the end-point *is the process*, where vigilance, rigorous examination and constant questioning of the centrality of the nation ought to be the goal, but in such a way that does not valorise or reify its centrality and thus its status. We need to learn to live with ambiguity and accept that juxtaposition is enough. This is not to succumb to any sort of postmodern 'defeatism', but rather to suggest that we accept the need for ongoing inquiry. Finally, we need to refigure the meanings of 'New Zealand' historical experiences in this light and so participate in transnational and internationalised historical understandings where we do not entirely abandon the local or the national.

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NOTES

1 Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism*, New York, 1997, p.3. This article was originally presented at the 'Migration Histories and Writing the Nation' one-day symposium held at the University of Waikato, 21 June 2007 and jointly hosted by the History Department, University of Waikato and the Irish and Scottish Studies Programme, Victoria University of Wellington. I wish to thank the organizers of that symposium, particularly Dr Rosalind McClean, for the invitation to speak and the editors of the *Journal* for considering this short article for publication.

2 Gellner, *Nationalism*, pp.3–4.

3 Terri A. Hasseler and Paula M. Krebs, 'Losing Our Way After the Imperial Turn: Charting Academic Uses of the Postcolonial', in Antoinette Burton, ed., *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking With and Through the Nation*, Durham, NC, 2003, pp.90–101. See also Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*, London, 1992; Arif Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism*, Boulder, 1997; and Epifanio San Juan, Jr, *Beyond Postcolonial Theory*, New York, 1988. For a thorough review of the scholarly debates around postcolonial approaches, see Neil Lazarus, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies*, Cambridge, 2004.

4 See, for instance, Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Malden, Mass., 2001.

5 It is worth remembering that 'country' refers to a geographical territory, while the term 'state' denotes a recognized administrative and decision-making institution.

6 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd edition, London and New York, 1991. See also E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 1983; R. Samuel, *Theatres of Memory Vol. 1: The Past and Present in Contemporary Culture*, London and New York, 1994; R. Samuel and P. Thompson, eds, *The Myths We Live By*, London and New York, 1990.

7 Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*, Cambridge, 1990, p.6.

8 Jon Stratton and Ien Ang have called for scholars to problematize the nation in studies of 'national culture'. Jon Stratton and Ien Ang, 'On the Impossibility of a Global Cultural Studies: "British" Cultural Studies in an "International" Frame', in David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, eds, *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, London, 1996, pp.361–91. The historian Tony Hopkins has noted that 'most history continues to be written within a national framework that derives its inspiration from nineteenth-century state-building and state-reforming movements in Europe' because 'preoccupation with the national epic has also endorsed a degree of insularity that has tended to marginalize international audiences'. See A.G. Hopkins, 'Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History', *Past and Present*, 164 (1999), pp.202–203.

9 Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, London, 1993; Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton, NJ, 2000. See also Homi K. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration*, London and New York, 1990; Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*, Chicago, 1995; and Kumkum Chatterjee, 'The King of Controversy: History and Nation-making in Late Colonial India', *American Historical Review*, 110, 5 (2005), pp.1474–5.

10 Burton, ed., *After the Imperial Turn*, pp.2, 8.

11 *ibid.*

12 Ann Curthoys, 'We've Just Started Making National Histories, and You Want Us To Stop Already?', in Burton, ed., *After the Imperial Turn*, p.84.

13 Marilyn Lake, 'White Man's Country: The Trans-National History of a National Project', *Australian Historical Studies*, 34, 122 (2003), pp.346–63.

14 Don H. Doyle and Marco Antonio Pamplona, eds, *Nationalism in the New World*, Athens, Georgia, 2006.

15 Thomas Bender, *A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History*, New York, 2006; Thomas Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, Berkeley, 2002.

16 Peter Gibbons, 'The Far Side of the Search for Identity: Reconsidering New Zealand History', *New Zealand Journal of History* (NZJH), 37, 1 (2003), pp.38–49.

17 Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and the Colony in the English Imagination 1830–1867*, Polity, London, 2002, p.9. See also Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*, Cambridge, Mass., 1993; and Robert Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*, Oxford, 2001.

18 Carol A. Breckenridge, Sheldon Pollock, Homi K. Bhaba and Dipesh Chakrabarty, eds, *Cosmopolitanism*, Durham and London, 2002. See also Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, London and New York, 1995.

19 Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, New York, 2005.

20 As Tony Ballantyne has demonstrated in his *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire*, Basingstoke and New York, 2002; see also Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, eds, *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History*, Durham, NC, 2005; and Tony Ballantyne and Brian Moloughney, eds, *Disputed Histories: Imagining New Zealand's Pasts*, Dunedin, 2006, especially pp.9–24.

21 For example, historians of slavery and the slave trade pioneered this approach by examining both sides of the migration experience. This involved working in two different (and separate) fields: African history and American history.

22 See, for example, R.P. Davis, *Irish Issues in New Zealand Politics, 1868–1922*, Dunedin, 1974; W.D. Borrie, *Immigration to New Zealand, 1854–1938*, Canberra, 1991; J. Hewitson, *Far Off In Sunlit Places: Stories of the Scots in Australia and New Zealand*, Edinburgh, 1998; Angela McCarthy, *Irish Migrants in New Zealand, 1840–1937: 'The Desired Haven'*, Woodbridge, 2005; Te Ara — the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, *Settler and Migrant Peoples of New Zealand*, Auckland, 2006; and Jock Phillips and Terry Hearn, *Settlers: New Zealand Immigrants from England, Ireland and Scotland, 1800–1945*, Auckland, 2008. More recent works consider both the home country and the destination, see for instance, Lyndon Fraser, *To Tara via Holyhead: Irish Catholic Immigrants in Nineteenth-Century Christchurch*, Auckland, 1997; Brad Patterson, ed., *The Irish in New Zealand: Historical Contexts and Perspectives*, Wellington, 2002; Tom Brooking and Jennie Coleman, eds, *The Heather and the Fern: Scottish Migration and New Zealand Settlement*, Dunedin, 2003; Lyndon Fraser, *Castles of Gold: A History of New Zealand's West Coast Irish*, Dunedin, 2007; McCarthy, *Irish Migrants in New Zealand, 1840–1937*; Brad Patterson, ed., *Ulster–New Zealand Migration and Cultural Transfers*, Dublin, 2005; Angela McCarthy, *A Global Clan: Scottish Migrant Networks and Identities Since the Eighteenth Century*, London and New York, 2006.

23 See, for instance, the 'British World' scholarship around this topic: Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, eds, *The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity*, London, 2003; Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds, *Rediscovering the British World*, Calgary, 2005; Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds, *Canada and the British World: Culture, Migration, and Identity*, Vancouver, 2006; and Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw and Stuart Macintyre, eds, *Britishness Abroad: Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures*, Melbourne 2007.

24 Radhika Vyas Mongia, 'Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport', in Burton, ed., *After the Imperial Turn*, pp.196–7.

25 *ibid.*, p.211.

26 David Pearson, 'Citizenship, Identity and Belonging: Addressing the Mythologies of the Unitary Nation State in Aotearoa/New Zealand', in James H. Liu, Tim McCreanor, Tracey McIntosh and Teresia Teaiwa, eds, *New Zealand Identities: Departures and Destinations*, Wellington, 2005, pp.21–37.

27 The Waitangi Tribunal has argued that while Māori may have well-founded claims against the Crown for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi, nonetheless the nation-state and the rule of law must be respected. This is clearly articulated in the Tribunal's *Kaupapa Tuatahi: The Taranaki Report*, Wellington, 1996. For further discussion of this see Giselle Byrnes, *The Waitangi Tribunal and New Zealand History*, Melbourne, 2004, especially ch.5.

28 'Contra proferentem' is a rule of contractual interpretation which provides that an ambiguous term (or wording) will be construed *against* the party who imposed its inclusion in the contract; or, more accurately, against (the interests of) the party who imposed it. This is relevant when applied to the Treaty of Waitangi, with the major differences and contradictions between the translated Māori and English language texts.

29 Similar views are expressed in Dominic O'Sullivan, *Beyond Biculturalism: The Politics of an Indigenous minority*, Wellington, 2007.

30 These themes are explored further in Giselle Byrnes, ed., *The New Oxford History of New Zealand*, Melbourne, forthcoming July 2009.

31 Burton, ed., *After the Imperial Turn*, pp.1–23.

32 *ibid.*

33 Curthoys, pp.70–89.

34 Chris Hilliard, 'Island Stories: The Writing of New Zealand History 1920–1940', MA thesis, The University of Auckland, 1997; Fiona Hamilton, 'Founding Histories: Some Pakeha Constructions of a New Zealand Past in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries', MA thesis, The University of Auckland, 1999; Miranda Johnson, 'Land of the Wrong White Crowd: Pakeha Anti-Racist Organisations and Identity Politics in Auckland, 1964–1981', MA thesis, The University of Auckland, 2002; Jacob Pollock, 'From Colony to Culture: Historiographical Discourse and Historical Identity in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 1883–2003', MA thesis, The University of Auckland, 2005. See also Jacob Pollock, 'Cultural Colonization and Textual Biculturalism: James Belich and Michael King's General Histories of New Zealand', *NZJH*, 41, 2 (2007), pp.180–98.

35 Curthoys, pp.70–89.