‘The land of the wrong white crowd’

ANTI-RACIST ORGANIZATIONS AND PAKEHA IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE 1970s

If real New Zealanders are Maoris will someone please tell me what I am? One dictionary definition of a Maori is ‘native of New Zealand’. Since I was born in New Zealand, and anyone who wishes to call himself a Maori is a Maori, does that mean I am a Maori? I am not a European, by the same token I am not English. Now it seems as if I am not a New Zealander. Am I therefore a Stateless person?

SIGNED ‘HOMELESS’, this letter appeared in the New Zealand Herald in reaction to a Maori language petition presented to Parliament on 14 September 1972 by the newly emergent activist group Nga Tamatoa. One of the petition’s organizers, Hana Jackson, had argued that: ‘There is a growing realization that we are a Polynesian country and that Pakehas to be New Zealanders must look to Maoris for an identity . . . Pakeha children should learn Maori because it is a positive step towards equality and will make them more complete New Zealanders’. As Maori activist groups articulated their demands and asserted both a politics of difference and of identity, many non-Maori correspondents echoed the sentiments of ‘Homeless’ in letters to the editor. However tongue in cheek the letter was, it expressed perfectly the confusion over shifting definitions of New Zealandness and who defined its terms, a confusion that would become more pronounced as the decade progressed.

During the 1970s a sense of ‘homelessness’ provoked Pakeha to examine their own identity/ies in a rapidly changing social and economic environment. However homelessness was phrased, it suggested a number of dislocations that were both local and global. As Maori activist groups asserted their presence within a national political sphere (where the refrain ‘all New Zealanders’ was frequently heard while non-Pakeha were effectively marginalized), consensus over what it meant to be a ‘New Zealander’ appeared to be crumbling. As international social movements and identity politics impacted on New Zealand, a national identity smugly defined around New Zealand’s ‘exceptional’ race relations came apart. Like other settler colonies, New Zealand had a racist past that was both its own and, unexceptionally, only a variation on global themes. Articulations of the various dislocations of a normative ‘New Zealand’ identity were perhaps most obvious (and most contested) in the conflicts about race and racism in New Zealand in the 1970s. This article examines some of the ways in which a small group of Pakeha anti-racist organizations both produced and reacted to Pakeha identity politics. By situating these organizations within broader discussions of the relationship between Pakeha and New Zealand identities, the disjunction between Pakeha and their customary connection to New Zealandness is shown to be multifaceted and often ambivalent. Although ‘identity politics’ is often employed to refer to the hardening of ethnic boundaries
(even of ‘ethnogenesis’), the double movement of such politics — defining a new self that is discontinuous with the old yet necessarily in conversation with it — means that a clear analytical separation of ‘progressive’ anti-racist discourse from those polemically defined ‘conservative’ or ‘reactionary’ was impossible.

Of course, there were strongly argued distinctions between ‘old Pakeha’ and ‘new Pakeha’ identities. Old Pakeha were more likely to have referred to themselves as ‘New Zealanders’ or perhaps ‘European New Zealanders’ and tended to advocate a politics of homogeneity that I call ‘one-New Zealandness’, a term that refers to the desire for New Zealanders to be ‘one people’. This homogenization had civic and ethnic premises. ‘One people’ signified both a common citizenship, achieved through a rhetoric of equality, and a common heritage, achieved through ethnic assimilation. One-New Zealandness both unified and equalized all New Zealanders in what Etienne Balibar refers to as a ‘fictive ethnicity’: simply by being a New Zealander, a member was afforded equal status. However, the implied obligation was that to benefit from that equality individuals had to accept that being a New Zealander was more important than, for instance, being Maori, or that being Maori should be subsumed into the construction of New Zealandness.

For new Pakeha (who generally referred to themselves explicitly as Pakeha), the old identity signified a colonial, paternalistic and even racist culture. Having learned the facts of oppression that were their colonial legacy, new Pakeha defined themselves in a particular political relationship with Maori in Aotearoa/New Zealand. New Pakeha were anti-racist, anti-colonial and they promoted biculturalism against one-New Zealandness.

The first section of this article focuses on the critique of the majority culture of old Pakeha by anti-racists and argues that much as new Pakeha opposed and sought to undermine that culture, their critique relied on a number of stereotypes that, intriguingly, blurred the demarcations between the activists and their object of criticism. The second section of the article looks more closely at the new Pakeha identity that was articulated by anti-racists and others, highlighting a central epistemological tension in anti-racist debate: that between a relativistic position which advocated cultural difference and the universalist discourse of equality that anti-racists mobilized for their cause. This tension helps us to explore, finally, some of the transgressions between old and new identities in the wider context of postcolonial politics. As colonization was interrupted by the colonized, both old and new Pakeha reacted to their dislocation in paradoxical and ambivalent ways. Older, colonial, even colonizing forms of thinking and acting were perpetuated by new Pakeha as well as old, revealing discursive continuities as much as discontinuities. Whatever biculturalism might have meant in this highly contested and often shifting landscape, it was not simply a dividing line between Maori and Pakeha cultures.

According to anti-racists, New Zealand’s majority culture was chauvinistically ethnocentric. This was directly attributable to that culture’s colonial legacy. In 1981 the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination (ACORD) wrote that there is ‘a lack of awareness by pakehas that other cultures exist and a lack of sensitivity to the people of other cultures as to their wishes and their rights.
It is difficult for pakehas to appreciate this if they are unaware of the depth and pervasiveness of cultural differences. This ethnocentrism maintained majority culture and old Pakeha in positions of power and privilege. As Dun Mihaka, an activist who participated in the 1975 land march to Parliament (which opposed any further alienation of Maori land), explained, the march was not directed against one particular government, but at ‘all Pakeha governments, to what they’ve done to us, for the way they’ve screwed us . . . it’s directed at the history of New Zealand since contact with the Pakeha’. Marchers were, according to another activist, ‘speaking out against Pakeha domination’.

Whether anti-racists attacked ‘Pakeha domination’ or dominating Pakeha, however, was often unclear. Pakeha culture was essentialized as middle class. Pakeha, and particularly Pakeha men, were the power holders in a consumer society. So the critique of majority culture should perhaps be further refined as the critique of middle-class patriarchal culture by those who dissociated themselves from it. In critiquing the values associated with majority culture, anti-racists consistently contrasted them with ‘alternative’ values of Maoritanga in an attempt to dissolve potent Pakeha ethnocentrism.

This focus on Pakeha culture marked a shift in anti-racist discourse: throughout the 1960s, anti-racist groups had tended to expend their energies on helping the victims of racism; at the turn of the new decade, criticism began to be voiced that such humanitarianism simply perpetuated a particular racialization of Maori as problems on the borders of society. From the early 1970s, a new analysis of institutional racism, derived from anti-racist and civil rights literature appearing in the United States, was applied to the New Zealand situation. It focused on the subjects of racism — Pakeha — and constructed a Pakeha problem rather than continuing paternalism towards the objects of racist practices and institutions. This analysis suggested that understanding racism meant understanding, and possibly defining, Pakehatanga. Accompanied by increasing pressure from Maori activists to assist them in decolonizing New Zealand, the new analytic framework led many anti-racists to see the potential for Pakeha identity to be politically transformed and, consequently, politically transformative.

Anti-racists posed a dichotomy between Pakeha and Maori values from the early 1970s. Frequently, they enunciated a generalized contrast between individualistic (even anti-social) Pakeha materialism and communitarian Maori spirituality. Thus, New Zealand Student Christian Movement (NZSCM) activists suggested that rather than Pakeha tutoring Maori, the reverse was now needed: ‘Isn’t it high time we stopped the systematic abusement [sic] and bastardization of Polynesian cultures and set about seeing if we can perhaps learn something from them? Where the hell is our dollar-oriented capitalist market economy leading us? . . . We as Pakehas must accept suggestions from the Polynesian people and be prepared to critically examine and discard many of our present “values” as not being applicable to the ultimate well-being of a modern civilization whose technological development has far outgrown its social maturity.’

Contrasting views of land epitomized the opposition between Pakeha materialism and communitarian Maori spirituality. In a Radio New Zealand
‘Viewpoint’ broadcast during the 1975 land march, Anglican minister Michael Deaker surmised that: ‘The marchers represent the abstract feelings that we Pakehas find difficult to perceive: that land is part of the Maori soul; that the Maori people must have land to relate to; that the man–land relationship does not necessarily revolve around production figures per hectare. For some Maori people, the feeling for the land is more important than whether or not that land is used.’

Peter Bromhead represented a similar analysis in a cartoon that appeared in the Auckland Star during the Bastion Point occupation. Bastion Point, or Takaparawhau, was one of the last remaining blocks of land in Auckland city belonging to Ngati Whatua, the local people of Tamaki Makaurau/Auckland, yet the history of the alienation of the Ngati Whatua land base, including the burning of homes and a wharenui in the early 1950s, was not well known in the 1970s. The remaining small block of land, very close to the central city, was highly desirable real estate. In 1976 the National government proposed that the land be redeveloped as a pricey retirement village. Response from some Ngati Whatua, under the leadership of Joe Hawke, was swift and also coincided with some support from Pakeha, particularly from the trade unions, the environmental movement and anti-racist organizations. Bastion Point was occupied for 507 days before the government evicted the occupiers in a highly criticized manoeuvre employing army tanks and police. ‘Governments and Maori land’ (Figure 1) comments on the bulldozing technique of successive Pakeha governments in acquiring Maori land. Bromhead’s cartoon neatly portrays Pakeha power, Pakeha insensitivity and Pakeha materialism in the image of the tractor. For Pakeha, land was valued according to its usefulness; for Maori, land signified a spiritual interaction between humans and their environment.

Critiques of Pakeha culture by Pakeha were stimulated by critiques offered by Maori activists such as Dun Mihaka. Some Maori also commented on Pakeha emotional deficits, a consequence of the individualistic ethos of Pakeha culture, and suggested that Maori should help. In 1972, Dr Mason Durie, a psychiatrist, noted the high rate of Pakeha suicide (three times that of Maori), and observed that: ‘Pakeha people all over the world have embarked on a way of life that emphasize[s] material achievement, mobility, promotion and independence . . . . The attitude of many Pakehas towards emotional situations [i]s alarming. They . . . concentrate on intellect and robot-like attitudes’. Durie suggested that individual Maori could help Pakeha by taking them, for example, to a tangi ‘to make them aware of a way of life that emphasized people rather than things.’ Such observations appealed to a generation that was questioning their own society’s values, a generation that was also courted by some politicians. Bill Rowling, the Labour Prime Minister in 1974–1975, suggested that the ‘alternative tradition’ in New Zealand, ‘which values comradeship, sharing and the joy of living, in harmony with the land’, might provide an answer for the ‘growing disenchantment with the excessive materialism’. Rowling echoed the comments of the NZSCM activists and Durie: Pakeha should look to Maori for better ways of living.

Yet the critique of majority culture perpetuated two stereotypes of Maori. The first employed a victim ideology that reverberated with colonial notions of fatal impact. Majority culture’s power and privilege, NZSCM activists claimed, had led to the ‘bastardization of Polynesian cultures’. The effect of this representation of absolute victimization was that Pakeha culture was attributed with the dynamism of change. Maori culture, by contrast, was fixed in ‘tradition’, as a Values party letter to Hana Jackson and Oliver Sutherland demonstrates: ‘Without a massive and basic shift in the values of the pakeha’s society your [Maori] culture and traditions will be slowly butchered in the squalor and gutters of the working class districts of Auckland and Lower Hutt’.

The second stereotype characterized Maori values as those of the noble savage. Maori values were associated with rusticity and with an aboriginal connection to the land. Urbanized Pakeha lacked these values because of their obsession with rapid technological change in the name of ‘progress’. The morality of Maori cultural mores and the immorality of Pakeha ones stood in sharp contrast. As the Citizens’ Association for Racial Equality’s (CARE) president, Mary Hume, outlined in the alternative lifestyle broadsheet *Haribol* in 1978, ‘Like many people, I do feel disillusioned about our materialistic way of life, and I do think we’ve neglected a wonderful opportunity for enrichment and happiness by not valuing many of the aspects of the Maori life that are there just waiting for us. I am talking about pleasure in people rather than things, tolerance of people, tolerance of those who are different, or disadvantaged perhaps, the ability to enjoy simple things, the loving spirit of hospitality, caring for the old, the embracing of all babies and children.’ Maori values were naturalized as timeless and intrinsically humanitarian whereas Pakeha values were temporal and insensible. Maori values were ‘simple’; Pakeha values were, implicitly, complex (probably unnecessarily so). Yet while Hume
appeared to focus on the actions of Maori in cherishing life, ultimately it was Pakeha who had the greater agency to pick and choose, for these ‘aspects of the Maori life’ were ‘there just waiting for us’.

The morality of the ‘noble savage’, and the immorality of the oppressor, were neatly summarized in a letter to *New Zealand Truth*, part of a series of correspondence about Maori attributes. ‘Who taught the Maori how to lie, cheat, and steal? None other than the pakehas, who came to New Zealand to exploit the country and make fools of the simple Maori folk’, wrote ‘Proud’ in 1971. According to this evaluation, pre-contact Maori were free from the vices of the oppressors; their moral superiority was a natural characteristic, as the NZSCM activists had suggested. Anti-racists thus characterized ‘Pakeha power’ as the Pakeha Problem. ‘ACORD recognizes the fact that pakeha attitudes and pakeha policies — both based on a pakeha value-system — are the real problems of race facing New Zealand today’, announced the organization’s introductory leaflet in 1973. Pakeha power was premised on a Pakeha value system that privileged ‘Pakeha knowledge’ over that of any other group. Consequently, others’ knowledge was pushed to the margins of society, since society was, as ACORD explained, ‘pakeha-defined’.

This representation created another stereotype: that of the Pakeha oppressor. The Pakeha oppressor was the direct descendant of the colonizer, and had inherited a characteristic superiority complex, maintaining his or her position of power by marginalizing non-Pakeha. Ironically, the Pakeha assumption (in both senses of the word) of power, particularly the power to define cultural knowledge, was also that society’s Achilles’ heel. Pakeha society, as defined by critics of Pakeha power, was based on a hegemony that dictated that ‘all New Zealanders’ were the same. But one-New Zealandness actually created a basis from which resistance could be mounted. Such resistance could garner support precisely because of its marginal position: cultures of survival are a current unknown to the mainstream. So Pakeha society could be disempowered precisely because its exclusivity in defining ‘knowledge’ meant ignorance of those at the margins.

The cornerstone of anti-racists’ critique of the Pakeha problem of exclusive power was, paradoxically, this representation of the Pakeha ignorance of others. The limited nature of Pakeha knowledge was chastised as an identity flaw. ACORD, for instance, depicted the judicial and penal systems as ‘wholly Pakeha systems, based on a Pakeha concept of justice — characterized by an inordinate concern for property — and a pakeha approach to offending — largely characterized by a lack of understanding of human behaviour and a desire for vengeance’. Pakeha were ignorant not simply of taha Maori, but, even more detrimentally, of human nature itself. Pakeha lack of knowledge about the other signified a lack of knowledge about the self.

For many anti-racists, understanding Pakeha required an effort to see Pakeha culture as it was perceived by non-Pakeha. This process suggested an inversion of ‘colonial’ modes of thought. Robert Young has discussed the definition of European ‘civilization’ in the nineteenth century by reference to its antithesis, savagery. These late twentieth century attempts to define majority culture suggest an inverse process: the definition of ‘uncivilization’ through an
idealization of the spiritualized Other. This anti-colonial maneuver by anti-racist organizations was clearly not intended to objectively characterize the Pakeha self but it was highly charged. It also required anti-racists to differentiate themselves from the mainstream, to narrate themselves into a marginal position as critics of majority society. As we have already seen, a tension between self-criticism and a repudiation of majority culture was strongly present in much anti-racist literature. As discussed below, some scholars and commentators have suggested that this tension was an expression either of ethnogenesis or of a Pakeha search for self and a sense of homelessness. Here I will simply suggest that the tensions expressed in anti-racist discourse can also be read as complex and ambivalent discussions of the relationship between ‘culture’ and ‘nationhood’. Central to these discussions was the ambiguity in defining cultural difference (suggesting boundedness and multiplicity) while acting within a tradition of universalist humanitarianism, a heritage from which both anti-racists and Maori activists drew heavily.

Understanding Pakehas, a pamphlet in a series of publications that the Vocational Training Council produced for Pacific Island migrants in order to prepare them for a new society, presented stark cultural differences: ‘Everything in western society emphasizes the individual. In religion each person has to find his own salvation. In politics, each person is expected to make his views known . . . each has to make his own way in the world and win status by what he succeeds in doing and owning. In many instances . . . Pakehas put the individual before the group, the self before others.’ Excerpts from the pamphlet were reprinted in the New Zealand Monthly Review, a left-wing publication that concerned itself with ‘racial matters’. Editorial notes accompanying the excerpts explained that ‘[u]nconscious cultural imperialism . . . is probably inevitable given the need for an individual’s identity to be securely based in a culture. But unchecked it can lead to institutional racism and worse . . . Understanding Pakehas . . . gives some idea to the Pakeha of how we are seen by those we sometimes judged as being from an “inferior” culture.’ Where ‘Pakeha’ had been explicated for the non-Pakeha audience of the pamphlet, now the Pakeha readership of the Review was being asked to scrutinize themselves as they appeared to others.

Understanding themselves became crucial to Pakeha anti-racists as they began to argue that a lack of self-knowledge signified the oppression of Pakeha by their own culture, as much as their oppression of others. Pakeha culture made the members of that culture unconscious of themselves and their oppressed and oppressive collective identity. Materialism, individualism, technological progress, all hindered self-growth. Pakeha blindly pursued profits, as another Bromhead cartoon, ‘Pakeha Concept of Land’, suggested (Figure 2).

Pakeha, the colonizers, needed to enter a process of conscientizaçao, as the Brazilian critical theorist Paulo Freire suggested, through which they could be liberated from unconscious imperialism and enter into a new understanding of themselves. This new understanding was premised on their sympathetic understanding of ‘the Other’, inverting the superior–inferior prejudices of racism. Maori and Polynesian cultures, anti-racists argued, offered solutions for the problems of majority culture. Yet there was slippage between defining
Pakeha as oppressors and as oppressed. Freire, who visited New Zealand in 1974, had argued that this double-helix for the colonizer provided an opening for the colonized in redressing the power imbalance. But for the Pakeha anti-racist negotiating the double role could be problematic. It was sometimes unclear who had political agency and for whose benefit that agency was to be employed, as these anonymous notes from an anti-racism seminar reveal:

Oppression: we are all oppressors/oppressed at same time. No: society can be divided into oppressors and oppressors on political/economic/cultural grounds. My superior is Maori — but she is not oppressed — she says she is not . . . Am I an oppressor: I am white, male University education, never hungry. Or am I just a cog — different from an oppressor? But I wouldn’t like to be a Maori. We can look at Maori society & see something of value for Pakehas . . . I want my Polynesian students to make it in the system – otherwise they will be losers. Should I learn the language (Samoan, Maori, Ceylonese)?

What did an oppressor look like, and how willing were activists to label themselves as such? This Pakeha anti-racist saw himself as privileged, empowered and therefore required to use his agency for good; yet he was also oppressed by individualism and materialism (he was merely a ‘cog’ in the machine) and was reactive to Maori activism.

The notes also suggest that consciousness-raising among these groups required a careful construction of difference from majority culture, although recently recorded recollections of anti-racist activists suggest an already cultivated sense of difference helped them to explain their participation in the movement. For some, this sense of difference was produced through overseas travel (often for further study) that exposed several activists to other protest movements and examples of racism. For others, the process of politicization within New Zealand created a sense of difference or dislocation from their own
backgrounds. Mary Hume explained that she came from the ‘very homogeneous’ North Shore, but, ‘by a complete accident . . . I landed my first job in the Department of Maori Affairs . . . it had a huge effect on me, it really made me different from all my family’.  

ACORD member Margaret Arthur wanted to attend university and study science, which conflicted with what were seen as acceptable occupations for girls.  

David Williams came from a politically conservative family. When Williams first arrived at Victoria University in the mid-1960s he formed a group called ‘Ad Dextra — To the Right’. He told how he visited the South African Consul-General to get ‘information about how . . . apartheid wasn’t such a bad thing’. By the end of the 1960s, however, Williams had been ‘radicalized’ and was ‘advocating numerous left-wing causes’.  

Some activists also explained that their sense of difference was produced from unusual childhoods and family backgrounds. Bicultural experiences growing up in New Zealand affected several activists. Mitzi Nairn commented on the unorthodox views that her mother, an English immigrant, brought to an understanding of New Zealand’s past, views that affected Nairn’s understanding of ‘indigeneity’; Oliver Sutherland’s father, I.G.L. Sutherland, had been closely involved with Apirana Ngata and had compiled the influential study, *The Maori People Today* (1940). Vanya Lowry and her mother, Irene Lowry, who was heavily involved in CARE, shared a ‘bohemian’ life with Bob Lowry, a printer and writer in Auckland in the 1940s and 1950s. Ross Galbreath’s father was a conscientious objector in World War II and was, as Galbreath wryly observed, not a ‘true-blue’ (conservative). His influence left its mark on Galbreath’s ‘idealistic desire to do something’. Tom Newnham married a Maori woman, Kath Munro, and instances of racial discrimination that she faced became a domestic issue for their family. Newnham and Margaret Arthur were the only interviewees to identify their working-class backgrounds. For Newnham, the impact of the Depression on his family influenced his desire for social justice. Arthur noted her family’s sense of not being good enough because they were not middle class.  

Certainly, the position of critic rendered the anti-racist movement peripheral as it did the feminist and gay rights movements. A survey of Christchurch CARE carried out by James Brock in 1975 further suggested that this group of activists were not entirely alienated from society, but they did ‘appear to be “alienated” . . . in the sense that many of their political attitudes are out of line with those of the majority of the population . . . [they] appear to be deeply committed to their ideals and many seem prepared to take extreme measures to see their beliefs implemented’. Brock’s comments indicate an increasing polarization that led to conflict between Pakeha of different political positions, both inside and outside the anti-racist movement. While proponents of a new Pakeha identity saw themselves as radically removed from the old, moderates suggested that a ‘liberal’ approach could broach this polarization, invoking the role of liberal as mediator. But a liberal — what we might also label universalist — approach was rejected by radicals for its perpetuation of humanitarian paternalism towards the Other. Whites should work on whites. Ray Nairn explained in 1986 that ‘those of us who do identify ourselves as Pakeha have a clear task. We have to get our people to talk about
that identification with Pakeha domination; to name the fears they have about relinquishing control. Oliver Sutherland’s explanation for the formation of ACORD in 1973 reveals the genesis of this line of thought (at least in New Zealand). ‘Pakehas have the power to change this situation and they must’, he declared uncompromisingly. These sentiments were also reflected in newspaper correspondence. According to an Auckland Star correspondent who identified as Maori, all that Maori wanted was ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi, and it was ‘up to the Pakeha’.

These simply-enunciated tasks implied that change would only come from within Pakeha society, from within the culture of racism. In this sense anti-racists stood inside majority culture since they, too, were racist because Pakeha were in positions of power. As Tom Newnham pointed out to me: ‘we [Pakeha] are guilty’. To be a racist, though, suggested an oppression of the majority, too. An ACORD diagram used for anti-racist training explained that there were ‘Three kinds of Pakeha’: both racist and non-racist Pakeha ‘benefit [. . .] from living in a racist society’ and ‘let [. . .] it keep going’. Although anti-racist Pakeha also benefit from that society, the anti-racist ‘tries to change it’ (Figure 3). Yet the position of the anti-racist, actively involved in change, was a paradoxical one. New anti-racist Pakeha were opposed to old Pakeha and majority culture but, in acknowledging their own racism, they marked their similarity. They were oppressed as well as oppressors, but tried to escape the limitations of both positions through their own political agency.

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<th>RACIST</th>
<th>NON-RACIST</th>
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<td>Personally prejudiced &amp; bigoted. Discriminates.</td>
<td>Not personally prejudiced or tries not to be. Regards all as equals &amp; does not discriminate.</td>
<td>Tries not to be prejudiced. Analyses racist aspects of institutions takes part in [sic]. Works for change in institutions using all possible channels.</td>
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Figure 3: Adapted from ‘Three Kinds of Pakeha’, New Perspectives on Race Resource Sheet, 1980, ACORD, NZMS 521 [uncatalogued], Auckland City Libraries, Auckland.

As we have seen, however, answers to questions about the Pakeha self were often sought from the Maori or Polynesian Other in a ‘mimesis of alterity’. That act of mimicry, as Ana Maria Alonso has pointed out, has ‘very different consequences for ethnically dominant versus subordinated subjects’. In seeking answers from the Other, anti-racists were in danger of perpetuating the power imbalance that they criticized in paternalistic one-New Zealandness. On the one hand, anti-racists sought to shore up Maori claims for cultural recognition, and their right to be different. On the other hand, they often appealed to the same
language of equality on which one-New Zealandness was based. Moreover, their adoption and adaption of perceived Maori and Polynesian cultural traits implied that the borders between cultures were porous.

As ‘biculturalism’ became the new byword in the late 1970s and anti-racist organizations were increasingly called upon to support tino rangatiratanga, the recognition of difference within a universalist notion of equality became increasingly problematic. Of what might the Pakeha side of biculturalism consist? For many anti-racists, the politically transformative potential of the new Pakeha identity was its ‘post-coloniality’. This offered Pakeha a position from which they might renegotiate their place in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Thus, to be Pakeha, Paul Spoonley and others have suggested more recently, means to enter into a dialogic relationship with Maori and acknowledge, at some level, tino rangatiratanga.\(^\text{47}\) Bicultural, post-colonial Pakeha, according to such analyses, have defined a new identity for themselves and have perhaps undergone a process of ‘ethnogenesis’.\(^\text{48}\) But while this discussion expresses some of the shifting ethno-political relationships emerging from the 1970s, the analysis masks the multiplicity of emergent, contested and even overlapping political, cultural, social, national and ethnic identities that were asserted during the period — and the persistence of tropes of one-New Zealandness.

The definition of a collective Pakeha identity has been problematized by many commentators and scholars. Perhaps the most famous of these is Michael King, whose influential book Being Pakeha was first published in 1985. He suggested that questions about being Pakeha reflected concern about ‘personal and national identity’, in an age when it was no longer enough to define oneself simply as a New Zealander.\(^\text{49}\) ‘What kind of New Zealander am I then, as a consequence of genetic inheritance, upbringing and my own experiences in adult life?’ King now needed to ask.\(^\text{50}\) The national identity of ‘New Zealander’ did not need to be interrogated: it represented a collective understanding. Yet Pakeha identity was implicitly associated with ‘personal identity’. While King attempted to delineate a shared narrative — one that argued for Pakeha indigeneity while supporting certain demands for Maori self-determination — it was framed as a personal voyage that was unlikely to resonate with all Pakeha, as Paul Spoonley pointed out.\(^\text{51}\)

In fact, one of the major obstacles to defining a collective Pakeha identity is that there was, and still is, a widely held discomfort with the identifier. The Dictionary of New Zealand English gives six major noun usages, and three adjectival usages, of ‘Pakeha’ yet Harry Orsman’s selection of interpretations and comments are frequently derogatory and/or referent to a minus-one grouping (a residual category of non-Maori), rather than a positive in-group identification.\(^\text{52}\) Orsman outlines the foreigner/non-Maori status of Pakeha and the commonly held perception of the label as derogatory. ‘The word Pakeha, unlike Maori, is still essentially monocultural in active use being infrequently seriously used . . . by non-Maori of themselves . . . . When it is used by Maori people in English contexts it is open to perceptions by non-Maori that it is not merely exclusionary in connotation but implicitly derogatory’.\(^\text{53}\)

Other scholars have suggested a long heritage for this ‘self-consciousness’. It has been suggested by more than one scholar that the word is an early
transliteration of ‘bugger’, or ‘bugger you’, from the vernacular of ‘sailors’. Derogatory usages of ‘Pakeha’ were certainly common in media representations and newspaper correspondence throughout the 1970s and the identifier rejected because of these. ‘I resent this description [Pakeha]’, complained one newspaper correspondent, ‘as it appears that the word has several different meanings, some of them very derogatory . . . . If we are to address them as Maoris, then I would expect to be described as a “white New Zealander”’.

Pakeha could signify discomfort within anti-racist discourse, too. ‘Those of us who are pakehas cannot escape being pakehas, but we can become different pakehas than we are at present’, explained Oliver Sutherland.

Capitalisation of the word was not common practice in newspapers, and many other printed forms, for most of the 1970s, which also suggests a sense of discomfort with the term.

The result of this discomfort with the identifier ‘Pakeha’ is that ‘New Zealander’ or, if further clarity was required, ‘European New Zealander’, continued to be preferred. A study of ethnicity conducted in the mid-1990s showed that this conflation continues. The Smithfield Project analysed 1386 questionnaires completed by Form I students, and 268 further interviews. Of the 189 respondents who identified solely as ‘New Zealander’, interviews revealed that 96% of these ‘were indeed Pakeha’.

The explanations given for choosing New Zealander (over European or Pakeha) included a disinterest in ethnic labels; a belief that New Zealander marked something ‘special’; that such a label was preferable to Pakeha; that it encouraged assimilation; or that it emphasized superiority. The various reasons for employing ‘New Zealander’ suggest a continuing concern with homogeneity, as both a marker of equality and a fictive ethnicity. Moreover, the findings suggest that such a concern is a Pakeha one rather than a Maori, Pasifika or Asian one.

The conflation of ‘Pakeha’ with ‘New Zealander’ occurred in anti-racist literature as well as among the wider population. The New Zealand Race Relations Council avowed in 1970 that ‘Here we have long been a multiracial society and many New Zealanders have had long and happy experience of mixing with people of other races’. The comment suggested that ‘New Zealanders’ were of one race, and that ‘other races’ were therefore non-New Zealanders. Even in 1981, this conflation continued. A National Council of Churches publication, ‘Our Own Backyard’, demanded that ‘we’ should ‘look again at New Zealand history. ‘As New Zealanders, becoming aware of our deficiencies as a multi-racial community we regard the colonial arrogance of the nineteenth century with growing dismay’.

The ‘we’ referred, implicitly, to Pakeha. Slippage between that identity and ‘New Zealander’ persisted even within the discourse of groups who were highly attuned to the dangers of assimilation. This is not to denigrate the organizations, but merely to show the complicity and complexity between ‘opposing’ political positions, and indicate the discursive context which activist groups shared with the ‘majority’ even while they opposed that majority’s hegemony.

The evidence suggests that New Zealandness has continued to be imagined within a Pakeha frame of reference. Yet might the continued slippage into ‘New Zealander’ and New Zealandness in a period when both concepts were
unstable suggest another process? The preference for these ‘national’ identities also indicates a search for security as ‘Pakeha’ became dislocated from its normal connection to New Zealandness, a dislocation that became ever more marked as the colonized both revealed the ongoing practices of colonization and interrupted these processes with increasing forcefulness. As we have seen, one response to this dislocation was to focus on the safer identity ‘New Zealander’, to reassert one’s place-edness. Another response, perhaps from a sense of place-lessness, was to ‘brown’ Pakeha — an inverse of the kind of assimilation presupposed in one-New Zealandness.

The feelings of displacement by the general Pakeha public were brought to the fore around Maori land protests. First, land protests and occupations appeared to ‘privilege’ Maori interests and consequently, according to this analysis, displace those of Pakeha. ‘Landless Pakeha’ wrote to the *New Zealand Herald* during the Bastion Point occupation complaining that land that they had sold ‘some years ago’ to the government ‘would now be worth more than 10 times what I received for it . . . I wonder whether Mr Hawke and Mr Rata would help me to get it handed back so I could resell it — that is, after they are finished with the Bastion Pt issue’.\(^61\) During the ‘tent embassy’ (by some members of the land march) in Parliament grounds at the end of 1975 correspondents to newspapers around the country quipped that they, too, were looking forward to ‘camping’ at Parliament. ‘The Speaker of the House should be congratulated for turning the grounds of Parliament into a camping area . . . that should solve the housing problem, and does solve my Christmas problem — my relatives from up north now have somewhere to stay’, jibed ‘G.O.E.’ in the *Evening Post*.\(^62\)

These arguments were based on the ‘rhetoric of equality’, so fundamental to one-New Zealandness. Parliament grounds were for ‘all New Zealanders’. Occupation of the grounds by Maori, which no ‘other’ New Zealanders (that is, Pakeha) had attempted, suggested a disruption of egalitarianism and thus of one-New Zealandness. When Jonathan Hunt, Leader of the House, asked the tent embassy to leave he appealed to the rhetoric of equality.\(^63\) It was a right of New Zealanders to enter Parliament’s buildings, he averred, but ‘that means however, also that no New Zealander can take for themselves an excess use of that right’.\(^64\) New Zealand citizenship gave the same rights but also demanded the same obligations from all New Zealanders. Maori, claiming ‘special’ rights based on their ‘race’, disrupted both the civic equality and fictive ethnicity of one-New Zealandness.

The second way in which land protests and occupations dislocated Pakeha identity was through the representation of Maori as inherently or naturally closer to the land. Anti-racists often represented Maori as closer to the land, to ‘organic’ ways of living, including a more supportive (if less complex) social framework. This idea drew on long-standing representations of ‘Maori’ as synonymous with ‘the natural environment’ and was echoed in the wider media. The *New Zealand Herald*, commenting on the presence of ‘young Pakehas’ involved in the 1975 land march, described their ‘affinity with the land and the Maori people’.\(^65\) ‘That representation marked an opposition between urban and rural living. Despite the urban redistribution of the Maori population after
World War II, or perhaps because of it, Maori were associated with the rural. Some argued that if the Maori land base continued to be alienated, ‘Maori people will be forced to stay [in the cities]. Prey to the worst effects of the urban environment . . . to become a “lumpenproletariat”.’66 Maori were thus represented as alien to the urban environment; implicitly Pakeha, who would not be reduced to proletariat status, were ‘at home’ in the cities.

But were they? Were such comments encoding, rather, a Pakeha sense of dislocation from their rural hinterland, from ‘the land’ they had tamed, the ‘space’ they had ‘placed’ themselves in? To an overwhelmingly urbanized, and increasingly bureaucratized, population, the land symbolized, in Bill Rowling’s words, a ‘simpler, deeper life’.67 Might the sense of dislocation reflect a general demographic change? Urbanization is the most obvious trend: in 1945, nearly three quarters of the population was urban and just over one quarter rural; by 1981, the urban population had reached over 80%, the rural proportion was only 16%.68 While the redistribution of the Maori population to urban centres has frequently been commented on, less remarked upon is the high mobility of the New Zealand population as a whole.69 Brian Heenan notes that this high mobility is comparable to other settler societies, including Australia, Canada and the United States and suggests that a high level of migration within immigrant societies is reflective of ‘deep-rooted socio-historical influences . . . . Potential migrants “learn about mobility simply through knowledge of their ancestors”.’70

Colonization implies ‘rootedness’, as colonizers ‘settle’ in a new land. Heenan suggests, however, that migration or rootlessness is inherent in the mentality of the settler population. Migrancy is an interesting, though subtextual, theme running through anti-racist discourse. Furthermore, the migrant heritage of Pakeha has been highlighted by emphasizing their non-indigenous, even their tauiwi status in recent anti-racist discourse. Their history as migrants to New Zealand rather than inhabitants of the land (a status reserved for tangata whenua) has been accentuated.71

The foreign status of Pakeha was often commented upon by Maori activists in a re-employment of New Zealand history by Maori activists. Donna Awatere (a member of Nga Tamatoa and other activist groups) dismissed any notion of an indigenous Pakeha identity. It was, she implied, synonymous with British, and both terms were interchangeable with ‘white’. ‘The Pakeha future in achieving a national identity can only be done with the Maori. It is the British way or the Maori way. These are your choices’, she stated uncompromisingly. Furthermore, she explained that whiteness/Britishness was no ‘better’ than Maori culture, and was, in fact, still ‘foreign’ to New Zealand. ‘White people are not superior. British culture is not superior. New Zealand is not British. This country belongs to the Maori.’72 Pakeha had no culture and therefore had no place in Aotearoa.

The third way in which Pakeha identity was dislocated was through acts of resistance to the idea that colonization was a completed action that had erased the presence of the indigenous. Both the literal reoccupation of land and the ‘alternative’ way of life that characterized these occupations showed that the indigeneity of the colonized had not been exterminated or assimilated. An
Evening Post by-line, describing the first day of the land march, questioned both the achievements of colonization and who its agents were: ‘Marching proudly behind their pou-whenua . . . an emotive group of people left a colony of footprints in the dust of the road to New Zealand’s most northern town of Te Hapua yesterday’. The ‘colony of footprints’ left by these rural inhabitants suggested a potent resistance that Parliament, and, by extension, Pakeha (urban) society, might beware. It marked out the different space which Maori and Pakeha might occupy: the ‘land’, on which Pakeha pioneers had cut roads connecting New Zealand, marking technological progress, had been re-appropriated by its earlier inhabitants.

Much more clearly, the Bastion Point occupation in Auckland epitomized a rejection of the colonization of land through the physical presence of the occupiers, and of a colonized identity through the presentation of an alternative way of life. The occupation was particularly potent because of its urban location. A recurrent feature of media reportage of Bastion Point was the cultivation of the land. The New Zealand Herald headlined an image of Joe Hawke (one of the leaders of the occupation) tilling the soil with the headline, ‘Bastion Pt Campers Till the Soil and Wait’ (Figure 4). Bromhead had employed the image of the tractor to symbolize colonization of Maori land by Pakeha but the image of technology could be re-appropriated. The alternative lifestyle on Bastion Point is also a recurring feature of memories of the occupation. As one occupier has remembered: ‘Along with the injustices suffered by the Ngati Whatua and

Figure 4: ‘Bastion Pt Campers Till the Soil and Wait’. New Zealand Herald, 10 January 1977, p.1.
the belief that this land claim was rightful, was the deep connection I gained from just being on the land . . . . We lived simply day by day and we evolved and built our lives literally from the ground up . . . . This was grass roots — a few tents, a couple of caravans, wood stoves, long drop loos . . . . We lived in the moment.74 The land was reoccupied by the rightful owners and the process of colonization disrupted. So, too, diachronic time, the time of progress, was rejected for the time of post-colonization, the moments of the ever-present.

Through land occupations Pakeha were made aware of their disconnection, and difference, from the population they had purportedly colonized and assimilated. These ‘occupiers’ asserted the maintenance of their aboriginal and ‘traditional’ connection to land despite the spread of colonial settlements. As the absoluteness of colonization was questioned so too was the absolute power of the colonizer. Aotearoa was the land of the wrong white crowd as a photograph, reproduced in a booklet for Christian Action Week by the National Council of Churches in 1982, asserted (Figure 5). Pakeha reactions to these disruptions were various. Some asserted, often aggressively, their place-edness and their strong connection to the land. Many rejected the identity ‘Pakeha’, preferring ‘New Zealander’, or used ‘Pakeha’ to signify their own indigeneity. Other Pakeha felt they were place-less. These Pakeha, like ‘Homeless’, believed that their right to be a New Zealander was being undermined. For others again, the search for a new place required a search for a new identity. The new Pakeha identity that anti-racists proposed in their actions and discourse was based on creating a culture of difference. They critiqued majority culture in order to differentiate themselves from it and delineate a new anti-racist identity that would inaugurate biculturalism in New Zealand.


Yet the definition of Pakeha culture as one of oppression — implying a need for cultural renovation, if not revolution — foundered as oppression itself was
problematized. The new identity that anti-racists developed was premised on its critique of the old (all Pakeha were racist and could only act from an acknowledgement of their racism) and continued to express similar concerns to those older identities. As much as new Pakeha differentiated themselves from the older culture of the majority their own definitions required that that culture would continue. Moreover, though not unsurprisingly, many Pakeha outside of activist movements continued to reinscribe a national framework within which they could secure and settle themselves: a specifically Pakeha place remained uncharted.

The peripheral position adopted by anti-racists as critics on the boundaries of New Zealandness revealed their own sense of dislocation from the mainstream yet also suggested the decentering of that mainstream in an uncertain post/colonial present. Could Pakehatanga be ideologically separated from its hegemonic, naturalized connection to New Zealandness? More troublingly for some was how a Pakeha identity could be asserted that was not dependent on its native Other. And in this anxiety the ambivalence, the double speak, of colonization is revealed: for if the definition of ‘Pakeha’ was dependent on its differentiation from ‘Maori’ then ‘New Zealandness’ itself was premised on both erasing and maintaining the one and the other. The proper object of colonization, the land of the colonized, was also destabilized. Colonization entailed the construction and disruption of native belonging, and made the identities of colonized and colonizer dependent on each other: now the ‘object’ of colonization could not be invoked by anyone simply in the terms of ‘property relation’. In examining these series of ambivalences we must also notice that a notion of biculturalism that prescribes equality between two cultures at the same time as reinforcing their difference from each other is ruptured. Biculturalism, as recent commentators and some Maori activists argue, has circumnavigated bi-nationalism; it may well have attempted to incorporate dissent into a new discursive framework through a ‘passive revolution’ that did not necessarily mitigate the hegemony of one-New Zealandness. Yet the construction of biculturalism has also circumnavigated the disruptive hybridities between ‘Pakeha’ and ‘Maori’, within ‘New Zealandness’, which make articulations of identities as enigmatic as the graffiti on the fence.

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NOTES

1 New Zealand Herald (NZH), 3 October 1972, p.6.
2 Auckland Star (AS), 4 October 1972, p.4. The Maori language petition, drawn up by Nga Tamatoa, asked that Maori language be taught in all schools with large Maori rolls and ‘that these same courses be offered as a gift to the Pakeha from the Maori in all other New Zealand schools as a more positive effort to promote a more meaningful concept of integration’. David Wickham, Papers, ‘Maori Struggles’, 95-222-1/06, Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL), Wellington.
3 ‘Pakeha’ has both wide and specific meanings although literal definitions are contested; see the discussion later in this paper. It is often applied widely by Maori to refer to all those of European descent. In this paper, however, it is used to refer to New Zealanders of European descent who are usually more than second generation settlers.
4 Following Paul Spoonley, I have distinguished between Pakeha anti-racist organizations, Maori activist/indigenous rights organizations and the anti-apartheid movement. The distinction is not neat: there was considerable overlap and dialogue between all three groups. Paul Spoonley, Racism and Ethnicity, 2nd ed., Auckland, 1993, pp.98–99.
7 Dun Mihaka, interviewed in ‘Maori Land Issue’, Seven Days, 13 September 1975, Television New Zealand, T0034, Chapman Archive, Department of Political Studies, University of Auckland.
9 North American analyses of ‘institutional racism’ made their way into the discourses of anti-racist and indigenous rights groups and academic publications in New Zealand from about 1972: of particular influence was Stokely Carmichael’s and Charles Hamilton’s Black Power, London, 1967. The institutional racism analysis in New Zealand was used to describe an oppressor/oppressed dialectic between Pakeha and Maori which had been embedded in New Zealand’s institutions, and history, through colonization. In using the analysis, Pakeha anti-racists and Maori activists demanded that Pakeha look at themselves, especially at the Pakeha problem of exclusive empowerment. For the application of institutional racism in New Zealand see, for example, Syd Jackson, ‘The Pakeha Problem’, CARE magazine, 20, July 1972, pp.7–8, 13.
13 NZH, 7 February 1972, p.3.
14 Fatal impact, or what James Belich refers to as ‘Dying Savage’ myths, were frequently invoked in New Zealand between the 1860s and the mid-1880s when the Maori population declined to its lowest point since the beginning of colonization. In the twentieth century, as the Maori population increased rather than ‘died out’, the ‘whitening’ of Maori became of central concern. Whitening Maori had been a feature of earlier missionary discourse: the first missionary in New Zealand, the Reverend Samuel Marsden, had argued for the ‘Semitic origin’ of Maori. By 1870 the Jewish ancestry of Maori had been all but abandoned by scholars and Maori Aryanism was promoted in its place. Edward Treager, a nineteenth-century Pakeha scholar, alleged a proto-European ancestry for Maori. He believed that he could ‘prove the fellowship of the Polynesian with the races of Europe’. Belich argues that the popular version of Maori Aryanism was a belief that New Zealand had ‘better blacks’. See M.P.K. Sorrenson, Maori Origins and Migrations: The Genesis of Some Pakeha Myths and Legends, Auckland, 1979, p.14 and James Belich, ‘Myth, Race and Identity in New Zealand’, New Zealand Journal of History, 31, 1 (1997), p.12.
15 Erich Jonkers to Hana Jackson and Oliver Sutherland, 7 March 1976, ACORD, NZMS 521 [uncatalogued], ACL.
17 New Zealand Truth (NZT), 13 July 1971, p.37.
18 ACORD, NZMS 521 [uncatalogued], ACL.
19 ACORD, NZMS 521 [uncatalogued], ACL.
20 Homi Bhabha argues for an analysis that is aware that the ‘epistemological “limits” of those ethnocentric ideas are also the enunciative boundaries of a range of other dissonant, even dissident histories and voices . . . the boundary becomes the place from which something begins its presencing’. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London and New York, 1994, pp.4–5.

21 ACORD, ‘Submissions to the Minister of Justice – September 21, 1973’, ACORD, NZMS 521 [uncatalogued], ACL.


25 ibid.


27 Freire argued that: ‘It is only the oppressed who, by freeing themselves, can free their oppressors. The latter, as an oppressive class, can free neither others nor themselves.’ Freire, p.42. See Jim Delahunty, “Education for Revolution”, *The Paper*, 12, July 1974, p.7.

28 Handwritten notes, [nd], ACORD, NZMS 521 [uncatalogued], ACL.

29 Don Borrie interviewed by Miranda Johnson, 26 November 2001; David Williams, interviewed by Miranda Johnson, 7 March 2002; Oliver Sutherland, interviewed by Miranda Johnson, 2 March 2002. Tapes held by Miranda Johnson.

30 Mary Hume, interviewed by Miranda Johnson, 4 March 2002.

31 Margaret Arthur, interviewed by Miranda Johnson, 21 February 2002.

32 David Williams, interviewed by Miranda Johnson.

33 Keith Sorrenson, interviewed by Miranda Johnson, 21 March 2002; Mitzi Nairn, interviewed by Miranda Johnson, 26 October 2001; Oliver Sutherland, interviewed by Miranda Johnson.

34 Mitzi Nairn, interviewed by Miranda Johnson.


37 Ross Galbreath, interviewed by Miranda Johnson, 7 February 2002.


39 Countless numbers of correspondents labeled activists ‘stirrers’. One newspaper correspondent dismissed left-wing activity as a ‘pencilant to espouse a “cause”, whatever it may be [which is] inherent in the “trendy lefties”. They succeed not in shaking the world, but in merely being a public nuisance’, NZH, 28 January 1977, p.4.


44 Tom and Kath Newnham, interviewed by Miranda Johnson.


46 ibid.

statement or position’. Specifically ‘Pakeha’ politics are sympathetic to tino rangatiratanga. They note, however, that Pakeha identity-claiming has been confined to the middle class. Fleras and Spoonley, pp.90–93.

48 Fleras and Spoonley refer to the ‘development of a new sense of group identity’ amongst Pakeha. Fleras and Spoonley, p.83.


50 ibid., p.181.


52 Fleras and Spoonley, p.84.


54 Ormond Wilson, From Hongi Hika to Hone Heke: A Quarter Century of Upheaval, Dunedin, 1985, p.89.

55 NZH, 16 April 1980, Section 2, p.7.

56 Oliver Sutherland, handwritten notes for public address, [nd], ACORD, NZMS 521 [uncatalogued], ACL.


58 ibid., pp.19–22.


63 In fact, the tent embassy remained under a special dispensation until 24 December 1975, when trespass notices were issued by the newly incumbent Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, leader of the National Party.


65 NZH, 15 September 1975, p.1.

66 HART, Aotearoa: Records, MS-Group-0201.

67 NZH, 7 February 1972, p.3.


69 Three quarters of the Maori population lived in rural areas; by the mid-1970s, three quarters lived in the cities. Between 1971 and 1976, 47.3% of New Zealanders had at least one change of residence, although as Brian Heenan has pointed out this high mobility has been concentrated within certain sectors of the population. The young (from late teens to early 30s) were by far the most mobile section of the population; occupationally, service and professional/technical workers — ‘career transients’ — also displayed high levels of mobility in the late 1960s and 1970s. L.D.B. Heenan, ‘Population Redistribution and Internal Migration’, in Ian Pool, ed., Country Monograph Series no 12: Population of New Zealand, vol. 1, New York, 1985, pp.98, 109, 113.

70 ibid., p.115.


72 Donna Awatere, Maori Sovereignty, Auckland, 1984, p.32. Emphasis in original.


75 Fleras and Spoonley outline the ‘range of biculturalisms’ in existence in contemporary Aotearoa/New Zealand. At a state level, they argue that ‘instead of power-sharing through
structural adjustments, biculturalism tends to lead to institutional accommodation by incorporating a Maori dimension into state practices and national symbols.’ Fleras and Spoonley, p.239; Jane Kelsey, a frequent critic of government Treaty policies, is more blunt, defining the government policy of biculturalism as ‘a contemporary form of assimilation’. Jane Kelsey, ‘From Flagpoles to Pine Trees’, in Spoonley, Macpherson and Pearson, p.185.

76 Kelsey, referring to Gramscian hegemonic theory, has argued that the development of Treaty policy in the 1980s was a ‘passive revolution’ in which the state tried to reassert Pakeha hegemony through ‘the inclusion of new social groups . . . by making sufficient concessions to secure their allegiance without any expansion of their real economic and political power’. Gramsci explained passive revolution as a ‘“molecular” social transformation’ that takes place ‘beneath the surface of society’. Jane Kelsey, ‘Treaty Justice in the 1980s’, in Spoonley, Macpherson and Pearson, p.109. Gramsci’s articulation of the struggle for hegemony (and thus its incompleteness) should be remembered: while ‘the State is seen as the organ of one particular group . . . the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria . . . between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups – equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point’. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, New York, 1971, p.142, emphasis added.