in New Zealand. He appears to have swallowed the line put about by Prime Minister David Lange post 1987 that ‘the Treasury agenda’ was all pervasive and all powerful. He begins the section dealing with the reforms of 1984–1993 with a quotation from Jack Nagel. It appears almost as a statement of fact; ‘During the reform years, the conventional relationship between elected government and bureaucratic advisors in a Westminster system was to a great extent reversed. The Treasury became the principal initiator; to know what governments would do, one read the Treasury’s briefing papers, not party programmes’. McKinnon concludes that by 1993 Treasury had secured most of the agenda that it had laid out in 1984 (p.357). The ascription to the Treasury of the key role was Lange’s way of deflecting blame from his own role in the reforms. It was also a way for critics from the left to rationalize what seemed to be traitorous actions by their party. Instead they were victims of a conspiracy. However, the evidence seems to be to the contrary. The striking aspect is the extent to which all the major transformations in New Zealand’s fiscal and monetary policies, and the decisions not to transform, were driven by the politicians. When a Finance Minister like Roger Douglas came along with a list of changes that he wanted, and the determination to make it happen, he did so with Treasury advice. Officials were often surprised by their Minister’s boldness, not the other way round.

Nevertheless, this work, meticulously footnoted and referenced, rests on a great deal of primary research and effort. Alongside the many other departmental histories being produced, it adds a valuable layer to the sub-strata of New Zealand’s historiography.

PAUL GOLDSMITH

Auckland


THIS SERIES ADVANCES the thesis that anti-nuclear movements have had a far greater role in preventing nuclear war than is realized by the public and argued by international relations scholars. An encyclopaedic approach is taken to prove the point. Other writers might have been content to study the clash between state and non-state actors on one side of the Iron Curtain, for instance, but Wittner has looked at both sides of that Cold War divide; and whereas others might have studied the superpowers only, Wittner has looked at powerful, middle-ranking and small states alike, using official and peace group records throughout. His series is therefore astonishing in scope and compelling in argument. Ebbs and flows of the movement are revealed over space and time, and deliberately so. The three judiciously told works sustain their creator’s highly provocative argument, and show that a ‘worldwide citizens’ campaign’ on this issue was indeed ‘the biggest mass movement in modern history’.

This third work develops his theses from 1971 to the present. Wittner shows why the division between anti-groups mattered, despite the attempt by hawks in Washington, Moscow, London and East Berlin to equate ‘aligned’ and ‘non-aligned’ groups. The latter, in short, made history; the former were crushed by it. He shows why pro-nuclear hardliners in the Communist and anti-Communist blocs could not ignore the movement, and how, even as they continued to denigrate it, Western governments adopted many of its policies. Thirdly, Wittner more than proves his claim that progress in nuclear disarmament depends on public pressure. In making these points, moreover, Wittner offers repeated evidence of how activism in the West could shape policies in East and West, and sustain
advocates of democracies in eastern Europe: impacts of interest to any student of the Cold War. In his conclusion he offers a persuasive suggestion as to why it took his book and his series to argue these points: namely, that policy-makers are unlikely to champion interpretations of the arms race which show them as buffeted by public pressures.

There are some other triumphs specific to this book alone. Above all, while historians might enjoy the credit E.P. Thompson is given as a shaper of the non-aligned movements in Western Europe of the early-to-mid 1980s and an influence on the thinking of Mikhail Gorbachev, the book really comes alive in discussing the transformation in superpower relations let loose by Gorbachev himself, and to a lesser extent Ronald Reagan. Wittner shows that the environment in which Gorbachev could unleash his foreign policy revolution had been created by non-aligned anti-nuclear activists in groups like Britain’s CND, Western Europe’s END, and America’s Freeze. Furthermore, his reading of Reagan’s still under-appreciated transformation from arch-Cold Warrior to nuclear dove shows that transformation was partly a result of Gorbachev’s pressure, partly a result of a wish to leave a legacy, but also the product of pressure from an American public which welcomed the movement’s arguments.

If any substantive criticism can be made of this third book, it is only the rather churlish one that when Wittner turns his attention away from the superpowers the same sense of history-making does not come through. As the reviewer of his second volume in the *Political Science Quarterly* recognized, Wittner’s international focus can lead to a ‘meanwhile in Scandinavia’ effect, where ‘all but the most devoted specialist will eventually start to dread’ reading lists showing how the movement rose or fell in different countries. It is hard for some of the exceptional anti-nuclear stories of nations like Greece under Andreas Papandrou in the 1980s, or Sweden more generally, to stand out as they deserve. Even an historian as adept as Wittner cannot be as comprehensive as he seeks to be, and so the anti-nuclear history of whole regions like Latin America is under told. The related subject of disarmament diplomacy in UN organizations is also too lightly touched on. Readers might be turned away by the book’s unspectacular selection of photos, by Wittner’s reluctance to employ phrases such as the ‘Second Cold War’ which are standard terms in Cold War literature, and even by the idealism of his concluding remarks: that to abolish the nuclear threat disarmament achievements will not suffice, and that the nation-state system must pass. (If it does not, Wittner argues, the nuclear threat to the world will persist, and all disarmament victories will continue to be temporary, partial, or ambiguous.)

For New Zealand readers, nevertheless, these flaws are offset by the achievements of this book, in particular the insights *Toward Nuclear Abolition* gives into this country’s world-famous anti-nuclear conversion. In few global stories, after all, has New Zealand played as large a role as it has in anti-nuclear politics, and Wittner presents that role well. One could argue that he still underrates the global impact of New Zealand leadership in the fight against French nuclear testing in Polynesia. Against this, however, he does place New Zealand’s contributions towards global anti-nuclear activism in its broader global context more than anyone before him, and in so doing allows New Zealanders to pay more attention to some of the truths about their own anti-nuclear history: that the movement here had the same educated middle-class support bases as elsewhere, that New Zealand was not the only Western country defying the US in the era of the ANZUS crisis, or that the US hard line in that crisis may therefore have been influenced by actual, not just potential, developments in other nations and by the fights within the Reagan Administration over the responses to recent and ongoing anti-nuclear pressures. Indeed, in this work we see the extent to which some of the foreign or foreign-derived influences on our own transformation — like Helen Caldicott, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and even Jerry Falwell — were already major figures in the global battles of the time, and therefore how New Zealand’s embrace of a nuclear-free
identity was shaped by more external influences or international trends than we sometimes admit.

At a time when nuclear issues appear to be rearing again, and when New Zealanders are contemplating the costs of their own anti-nuclear legislation, this book is essential reading. Written to the most rigorous historical standards, and committed to balance it lays a path for historians around the world to write dozens of more focussed works. It is an essential aid to understanding key features of contemporary New Zealand politics and identity and enduring international issues.

MATTHEW O’MEAGHER

The University of Auckland


RON CROSBY’S MUSKET WARS put the pre-1840 period of conflict in New Zealand back on the historical radar screens and reminded historians that they had neglected a very important and compelling segment of this country’s history. Angela Ballara’s Taua takes the period by the scruff and comprehensively maps it out, analyses it, and produces a masterful historical work. Its value lies in (a) the comprehensive research it is based on (there is a wealth of information in this book), (b) the author’s ability to crystallize and discuss a range of key concepts and occurrences, (utu, muru, take, etc) and (c) the book’s balance. Ballara’s discussion on cannibalism, for example, carefully and professionally weighs the evidence. Taua is superbly written, accessible to a general readership and is a sound scholarly contribution to knowledge.

Ballara has dispensed with the label ‘musket wars’ and challenged the assumption that they were the main catalyst for conflict in the period. She dismisses myths about the devastating impact of muskets, citing examples of highly destructive pre-contact conflict. Ballara admits to lacking knowledge of the technological detail of weaponry. This is a common problem among New Zealand academic historians. Knowledge of it is not superfluous, but essential to a better understanding of conflict in New Zealand in all periods it occurred. Information about the technological weaknesses of early nineteenth-century firearms (in particular the most commonly available ‘white’ powder ‘trade musket’) would assist Ballara in explaining why muskets were not as devastating as we have previously assumed. The argument would be strengthened further still, by drawing out the correlation between universal experience with eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century firearms. Much of this experience would tie in with early nineteenth-century conflict in New Zealand. The weakest part of the book is its chapter on tactics which relates various defensive measures, feints and ploys, but does not analyse battle situations for their tactical components.

Ballara’s analysis of the causes of war, of the relationship between war and tikanga, of the causes of peace (which is an essential element in understanding conflict), and the techniques of peacemaking is superb. The deep understanding of utu, the reciprocity that stems from it, and the complexity of its functioning in the early nineteenth century is informative and compelling. The consciousness Maori had of a ‘balance’ to be maintained in dealing with dispute and conflict is vitally important. Ballara’s analysis of the causes of conflict offers insights even into the fighting of the 1850s and 1860s, where close analysis of the evidence can show important parallels, for example Te Kooti’s attack on Mohaka in 1869 in response to Ngati Pahuwera opposition to him the year before.