ensure that he alone was correct in every circumstance, and his self interest, would also impose limits upon the early success of the dearest of all his hopes.

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The Pakeha like the Maori cling to their myths of origin. Two generations of historical research notwithstanding, many still believe that New Zealand became a British colony because of the pressures exerted on a reluctant government by Edward Gibbon Wakefield and/or the evangelical missionaries. Such myths have no doubt validated pakeha-domination and assimilationist policies but as Adams says, ‘blinker us to the new directions we must seek if New Zealand is ever to become a truly multi-cultural nation’. His own emphasis on the duality of British intentions — to protect and control both British subjects and Maoris — though well-documented comes close to creating a new myth that could validate an integrated society in which both races are equal.

Myth-making apart, prospective buyers and readers of this book may well ask did we really need another book on the subject of British intervention less than ten years after the publication of Ian Wards, The Shadow of the Land and only three years after Alan Ward, A Show of Justice? Unquestionably, history teachers and students will find it useful to have an up-to-date version of how and why Britain intervened in New Zealand if only because the books, articles and theses on these questions are numerous. Moreover, Adams alone has had the incomparable advantage of being able to examine all the extant records in the United Kingdom and France as well as in New Zealand, including several valuable collections of private papers not previously consulted. Added to this, Adams is remarkably good reading. He has a fine command of detail, argues clearly and cogently and brings out his conclusions in a few, terse, telling words. The way in which he recapitulates his argument from time to time and in conclusion is particularly helpful, given the density of the material.

The first part of this book is centered on Colonial Office policy-making in response to frontier expansion in New Zealand and pressure groups on the spot and at home. Despite the prodigious amount of research on which it is based, surprisingly little that is essentially new is revealed. Rather much of the work of the older generation of imperial historians — notably H.T. Manning, E.T. Williams and W.P. Morrell is, as it were, synthesized, amplified and reinforced. As one would expect, most of Adams’ flak falls on his immediate predecessor, Ian Wards. Contrary to Wards, Adams attaches no importance to French and American designs: ‘There was no race for New Zealand because Britain was the only runner.... Most of the paranoia ... was generated in the heady climate of a rapidly expanding antipodean frontier, where fears easily became numerous, and
rumours certainties.’ Moreover, Colonial Office approval of the Declaration of Independence signed by the United Tribes, marked ‘no new departure’ in British policy. Implicit in Adams’ emphasis on the duality of British objections is his rejection of Wards’ view that the Colonial Office in the final stages only ‘flirted’ with evangelical precepts and restricted its policy to acquiring sovereignty over the whole of New Zealand. The matter of the whole or part, Adams contends, was left to Hobson’s discretion. Normanby’s Instructions to Hobson were, he suggests, consciously orientated to persuading the Maori that their protection was the main object of Hobson’s mission. But the Maori were only told ‘half the story’. Had they realized that annexation was ‘intended to put both races on an equal footing and then govern impartially between them’ they might not have so willingly signed the Treaty of Waitangi.

The Treaty itself, Adams like J.R. Rutherford, *The Treaty of Waitangi and the Acquisition of British Sovereignty in New Zealand, 1840,* regards as ‘the political act’ which led to New Zealand becoming a British colony. What made New Zealand British ‘in terms of English constitutional procedure and international law’ was Hobson’s May Proclamations, gazetted in October.

What the Treaty meant in the early years of British rule is revealed in Part II of the book, which examines and elucidates two of the most important policy questions facing colonial officials and governors 1840-1847, namely, land purchase and law enforcement. Here Adams, on the basis of more limited evidence, has arrived at similar conclusions to Ian Wards and Alan Ward. The question remains have they between them effectively debunked those historians who have found more strength and continuity in the policy of protection than they have? My own view is that they do less than justice to the philo-Maoris of the period and place insufficient weight on the aims and aspirations and conduct of the friendly Maoris. It should be remembered that it was they rather than the British who looked to the Treaty as a symbol of racial equality.

Coming back to Adams’ main argument that Britain intervened in New Zealand to protect and control both Maoris and settlers, and that by 1847 they had become single-minded in promoting settler interests, is this really how Britain perceived its national self-interest in New Zealand? True, Adams points out that New Zealand was ‘a useful second-rank trading partner for Britain’s colonies or eastern Australia’. But was not New Zealand more importantly an economic and social investment for the commercial, shipping and banking interests in the City of London and Inns of Court and for the ‘anxious classes’?

To explain British willingness to follow and control individual British settlers to New Zealand largely in terms of legal and humanitarian obligations is to ignore that the second British empire was created by the disciples of Adam Smith as well as William Wilberforce.

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